JUDGMENT T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, J. 1. The plaintiff is the appellant. He was a tenant of 64 cents of land - actually 62 cents as found on measurement - under the first respondent He applied by O. A. No. 1169 of 1970 before the Land Tribunal, Mavelikkara, for purchase of the landlord's rights over the 64 cents. While that application was pending disposal, the appellant and the first respondent entered into an agreement by which the appellant agreed to surrender 26 cents of land to the first respondent in return of the latter transferring all his rights over the remaining 38 cants to the appellant. Both sides complied with their obligations under this agreement. The first respondent's transfer of his rights over 38 cents of land to the appellant was by the deed Ext. B1 dated 5-3-1973 in which after referring to O.A.No. 1169 of 1970 it was mentioned inter alia that the parties will not have any further claims as against each other, In his turn, the appellant surrendered 24 cents, that is the area found on actual measurement, to the first respondent. After the surrender the first respondent transferred the 24 cents in question to the second respondent under Ext. A5 dated 27-3-1973. Evidently it was the intent of the parties that O. A. No. 1169 of 1970 shall not be prosecuted any more inasmuch as the dispute between them stood settled under the agreement mentioned above. 2. Despite the agreement and its fulfilment on both sides, the appellant seems to have pursued O. A. No. 1169 of 1970. The first respondent did not participate in the proceedings, in view of the agreement and its implementation. The application was allowed, and the appellant was issued a certificate of purchase, which is Ext. A1 dated 7-10-1977, for the entirety of the 64 cents. After obtaining the said certificate, the appellant filed the suit for recovery of possession of the 26 cents surrendered to the first respondent on the strength of his title with the contention that fee has got title thereto under Ext. A1, that the surrender to the first respondent was invalid as in violation of S.51 of the Land Reforms Act, (the Act) 1963 and that the first respondent had no rights to be transferred because of the operation of S.72 of the Act, and the vesting of the landlord's rights in the State thereunder. 3. A1, that the surrender to the first respondent was invalid as in violation of S.51 of the Land Reforms Act, (the Act) 1963 and that the first respondent had no rights to be transferred because of the operation of S.72 of the Act, and the vesting of the landlord's rights in the State thereunder. 3. The trial court do not accept the contention of the plaintiff. He held that the appellant was bound by the deed of sale Ext. B1, and that he cannot challenge the same at this stage. The suit was therefore dismissed. In appeal, the appellate court took a very peculiar view of the matter. She stated that the appellant's remedy was to apply for restoration of possession under S.13A of the Land Reforms Act, and that without resorting to that remedy the suit was not maintainable. The appeal was thus dismissed. These decisions are challenged by the plaintiff in this second appeal. 4. Counsel for the appellant Sri. Somasundaram squarely placed his case on Ext. A1, the purchase certificate dated 7-10-1977 issued to the appellant for the entire 64 cents. He states that the appellant's title over the 26 cents of the plaint schedule property is unassailable, and in the absence of any superior title in the respondents, he is entitled to recover the property on the strength of his title. But before going into this question, I shall deal with the points raised in the courts below based on S.13A and S.51. 5. S.13A provides a relief of restoration of possession to a person who would have been a tenant under the Land Reforms Act as amended by Act 35 of 1969, if he had been dispossessed after 1-4-1964. In that event, he could apply for restoration of possession under the section. A very reading of the section shows that the dispossession contemplated by the section should have taken place before 1-1-1970 and that this dispossession must be by virtue of some decree or some other proceeding. A voluntary surrender of the nature made by the appellant after 1-1-1970 is not comprehended by S.13A. In any case, that cannot apply to dispossession after 1-1-1970 as evident from sub-s.(2) which provides that an application for restoration under S.13A has to be made within a period of six months from the date of commencement of the Act namely 1-1-1970. A voluntary surrender of the nature made by the appellant after 1-1-1970 is not comprehended by S.13A. In any case, that cannot apply to dispossession after 1-1-1970 as evident from sub-s.(2) which provides that an application for restoration under S.13A has to be made within a period of six months from the date of commencement of the Act namely 1-1-1970. In fact a judgment debtor claiming benefits under the amended Act can claim the same even in the execution proceedings after 1-1-1970. S.13A is not intended to deal with such situation but to cases where the dispossession took place before 1-1-1970. The appellate court has not correctly understood the scope of S.13A while dismissing the plaintiff's suit as hit by that section. The more important question that arises for consideration is the one based on S.51. The appellant's contention is that there was a surrender by him of 26 cents of land to his landlord. He states that any such surrender is not effective unless it is admitted before the land Tribunal and is registered in the office of the Land Tribunal in the prescribed manner. No such proceedings have been taken before the 26 cents in question were surrendered. He therefore says that the surrender is void and that he is entitled to recover. S.51(1) which is relevant reads thus: "51. Surrender by tenant-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a tenant may terminate the tenancy in respect of any land held by him at any time by surrender of his interest therein: Provided that no such surrender shall be made in favour of any person other than the Government. Provided further that such surrender shall not be effective unless it is made in writing and is admitted by the tenant before the Land Tribunal and is registered in the office of the Land Tribunal in the prescribed manner.'' 6. A bare perusal of the section is sufficient to show that what is inhibited is termination of the tenancy in respect of the land held by the tenant by surrender of his interest. The scheme of the Act is such that on the coming into force of S.72 on 1-1-1970, the right, title and interest of the land owner has vested in the State. The landlord - tenant relationship has ceased to subsist after that date. There is therefore, no question of termination of any tenancy after 1-1-1970. The scheme of the Act is such that on the coming into force of S.72 on 1-1-1970, the right, title and interest of the land owner has vested in the State. The landlord - tenant relationship has ceased to subsist after that date. There is therefore, no question of termination of any tenancy after 1-1-1970. S.51 can operate only if there is scope for termination of a tenancy, which could, in the normal course, have arisen only at a time when S.72 was not in force i.e. prior to 1-1-1970. When once that section has come into operation, the question of applying S.51 for the future period does not really arise. Any purported surrender after 1-1-1970 really is an assignment or an abandonment and not a surrender in favour of a person with a superior right. The surrender in this case of the 26 cents was after 1-1-1970 at a time when the landlord tenant relationship between the appellant and the first respondent had ceased to exist. By such surrender, there was no termination of say tenance because no tenancy subsisted between the parties. The basic essential condition for the operation of S.51 does not therefore exist in this case. The question of admitting the surrender before the Land Tribunal does not therefore arise for the simple reason that S.51 itself is not attracted to the facts of this case. The surrender of 26 cents to the first respondent was not therefore hit by S.51 as contended by counsel for the appellant. 7. The argument which counsel for the appellant very seriously pressed was that the appellant had title to the property under Ext. A1 and therefore he was entitled to recover possession of the 26 cents. True, Ext. A1 purports to confer title on the appellant. In the normal course, that would have been sufficient to enable the appellant to recover possession of the property. But the certificate of purchase had been procured despite the admission in Ext. B1 that the parties do not have any further demands or claims against each other. In the face of this clear recital in Ext. B1, one would have expected the appellant not to press the application O.A.No. 1169 of 1970. But he did not choose to do so, and on the other hand, proceeded with it and procured the certificate Ext. A1. In the face of this clear recital in Ext. B1, one would have expected the appellant not to press the application O.A.No. 1169 of 1970. But he did not choose to do so, and on the other hand, proceeded with it and procured the certificate Ext. A1. It is true that the first respondent has not specifically pleaded any fraud on the part of the appellant. But that will not enable the appellant to recover possession of the property. The 26 cents have been surrendered as part of a scheme of arrangement between the parties by which the first respondent transferred his rights over the 38 cents to the appellant, and the appellant in turn surrendered 26 cents (actually 24 cents) to the first respondent. It was integrated scheme of settlement of the disputes between the parties by which mutual obligations were cast on the respective parties. Both parties performed their obligations. Since it was an integrated scheme of settlement, the appellant cannot seek to recover the 26 cents, the plaint schedule property, from the first respondent without avoiding the arrangement entered into between them, and without restitution of the benefits derived under Ext. B1. When there are mutual obligations to be performed simultaneously, one cannot be allowed to avoid his obligations while retaining the benefit. The appellant was therefore bound to return the benefits under Ext. B1 if really he was claiming any relief in respect of the 26 cents. He has not done so, he has not even expressed his willingness to do so. Even otherwise, the arrangement is one entered into between the parties with open eyes. It is not open to the appellant thereafter to unilaterally ignore one part of the arrangement and retain the other. The appellant has not chosen to have the arrangement which led to Ext. B1 and which led to the surrender of 26 cents set aside either in the plaint or in the subsequent proceedings. He is therefore bound by those transactions, and so long as the arrangement stands, it is not open to him to claim recovery of possession of the 26 cents. I may also state that the arrangement between the parties is not liable to be set at nought at the whim or fancy of the appellant. It can be cancelled or invalidated only on sufficient grounds being made out, like fraud, misrepresentation and the like. I may also state that the arrangement between the parties is not liable to be set at nought at the whim or fancy of the appellant. It can be cancelled or invalidated only on sufficient grounds being made out, like fraud, misrepresentation and the like. None such has been pleaded and none such has been found. The appellant has not chosen to avoid the arrangement by which he surrendered the 26 cents to the first respondent. As stated earlier, so long as that arrangement stands, the possession of the first respondent is lawful and the appellant cannot recover 26 cents in question. I therefore, dismiss the second appeal. The appellant shall pay costs of this appeal to the respondents.