JUDGMENT Om Prakash, J. 1. By this writ petition, the petitioners seek quashing of the entire proceedings taken up against them under Section 7 of the Police Act, and of their dismissal order dated 19121977, Annexure 7 to the writ petition, passed by the Commandant, respondent no. 2. 2. Briefly, the facts are that earlier in contemplation of the proceedings under Section 7 of the Police Act, the petitioners were suspended by the order dated 18th July, 1974. In those proceedings they were acquitted by the trial court by the order dated is 1st November, 1976 and that acquittal order was affirmed by the High Court by the order dated 3rd August, 1977. Pursuant to that order the petitioners were reinstated with effect from 4th August. 1977. 3. Thereupon, the petitioners made a representation that in view of their clear acquittal they should be reinstated right from the inception, that is, from 11th July, 1974 and not from 4th August, 1977. 4. Then again the petitioners were suspended by the order dated 28th October, 1977 on the ground that they turned hostile and absolutely disobedient because they were not reinstated with effect from 18th July, 1974 and, therefore, they grossly disobeyed the order of the superior officers, inasmuch as they failed to obtain kit from the store and discharge their duties. To this effect a chargesheet dated 31st October, 1977, Annexure 4 to the writ petition was served upon them and after enquiry their dismissal on second round was ordered on 14th December, 1977. 5. This is how, the petitioners have come upto the High Court in the second round seeking quashing of the entire proceedings having been taken up against them under Section 7 of the Police Act and their eventual dismissal. 6. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the petitioners being the members of the Pradeshik Armed Constabulary (P.A.C.) may be punished only under Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the U.P. Pradeshik Armed Constable Act, 1948 (for short, the Act, 1948), which constitutes a selfcontained code for the P.A.C. personnel and no proceedings for punishment can be initiated against them under Section 7 of the Police Act, 1861 (for brevity sake, the Act, 1861). It is, therefore, contended that any enquiry under Section 7 of the Act, 1861 against the petitioner's was beyond jurisdiction and their dismissal order dated 24th December, 1977, Annexure7 to the writ petition is liable to be quashed on that ground. The question for consideration is whether Sections 6, 7 & 8 of the Act, 1948 introduce a self contained code for dealing with the P.A.C. personnels in the matter of all the breaches, violations and misconduct and whether the disciplinary enquiry can be init aced against them under Section 7 of the Act, 1861. Section 5 of the Act, 1948 states that subject to the provisions of Sections 6 to 8 every member of the P. A.C. shall upon his appointment and during his continuance be deemed to be a police officer having all the powers, privileges, liabilities, penalties, punishments and protection as a police officer duly enrolled has by virtue of the police Act, 1861 or any other law or the rules or the regulations made thereunder. From this provision, it is abundantly clear that a member of the P.A.C. shall be deemed to be a police officer and he shall have all the powers and liabilities which a duly enrolled police officer has under the Act, 1861. However, this deeming provision is subject to the provisions of Sections 6 to 8 of the Act, 1948. Section 5 of the Act, 1948 is a pointer to the proposition. Specific overrides the general. Though a member of the P.A.C. shall be deemed to be a police officer and he shall have all the powers, privileges, punishment, liabilities etc. which a police officer has under the police Act, 1861, but that will be subject to the provisions of Sections 6 to 8 of the Act, 1948, meaning thereby that the general provisions as contained under the Act, 1861 will be subject to the specific provisions of Sections of 6 to 8 of the Act, 1948. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that Sections 6 to 8 of the Act, 1948 cast a selfcontained code, in so far as the prosecution and punishment of the P.A.C. personnels are concerned and that no action can be taken against them under Section 7 of the Act, 1861 for the charge of insubordination set out in the chargesheet (Annexure 4) which is specifically covered by Section 7(c) of the Act, 1942. I am afraid that too general proposition set out by the learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted. The argument of the petitioners' counsel proceeds on the footing that whatever action entailing punishment is to be taken against the P.A.C. personnels that can be taken only under the self contained code embodied in Sections 6 to 8 of the Act, 1948 and not under Section 7 of the Act, 1961. 8. The question is whether Sections 6 to 8 of the Act, 1948 and S. 7 of the Act, 1861 are mutually exclusive and operate in different fields without overlappmg each other and whether for the lapses contemplated by Section 7 of the Act, 1961, the P. A. C. personnel's can be dealt with under Section 7 of the Act, 1861. 9. Let us have a look at the scheme of Sections 6 to 8 of the Act, 1948. Whereas section 6 refers to the more heinous offences and section 7 refers to the lessers heinous offences and Section 8 of that Act takes within its sweep minor punishments. Sections 6 and 7 specify the offences but section 8 seems to be residuary in character, inasmuch as it states that the authorities specified there in may award to any officer of the P.A.C. of and below the rank of headconstable any of the punishments specified therein for the commission of any offence against discipline which is not otherwise provided for in this Act or which in the, opinion of the authorities is not of a serious nature to call for prosecution before criminal court. So all the breaches of discipline not specified under sections 6 and 7 and which do not call for prosecution by virtue of their insignificant character can be punished under section 8. So the scheme of the Act, 1948 is that section 6 to 8 refer to the offences and for such offences, P.A.C. personnel can be prosecuted in the manner, prescribed thereunder and not under any provision of the Act, 1861. In short, so far as these offences are concerned, sections 6 to 8, undoubtedly, constitute self contained code and prosecutions of them are wholly excluded from and are not within the purview of the Act, 1861. In short, so far as these offences are concerned, sections 6 to 8, undoubtedly, constitute self contained code and prosecutions of them are wholly excluded from and are not within the purview of the Act, 1861. Whereas sections 6 to 8 relate to the offences and the prosecution of the P. A.C. personnel Section 7 of the Act, 1861 deals with the disciplinary proceedings. Section 7 deals with the powers of the superior officers in regard to the control of their subordinates and they are empowered to punish the acts of negligence and not the offences. If the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is accepted that no punishment can be inflicted upon the P.A.C. personnel, except as provided under Sections 6 to 8 of the Act, 1948, it would mean that no disciplinary proceedings not involving criminal prosecution, could be initiated against the erring P.A.C. personnel's as they can be taken up against the police personnel's under Section 7 of the Act, 1861. The submission of the petitioners' counsel leads to a fallacious conclusion that the P.A.C. personnel's can only be prosecuted and punished for the offences set out under Sections 6 to 8 and their superior authorities are helpless in initiating disciplinary proceedings which do not amount to prosecution on a criminal charge for the misconduct of their subordinates. It can never be the legislative intent. Sections 6 to 8 of the Act, 1948 are not analogous to Section 7 of the Act, 1861 but they may be analogous to Section 29 of the Act, 1861 which prescribes penalty for the neglect of the duty. Section 29 of the Act, 1861 says that every police officer who shall be guilty of any violation of duty or willful breach of neglect of any rule or regulation or lawful order shall be liable on con vision before a Magistrate to a penalty not exceeding three months pay or to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a period not exceeding three months or to both, whereas Section 7 deals with the disciplinary proceedings. Section 29 of the Act, 1861 makes certain breaches in criminal offence. Section 29 of the Act, 1861 makes certain breaches in criminal offence. Where breach is covered by both provisions it is necessary that delinquent be prosecuted under Section 29 first before initiating disciplinary proceedings under Section 7 and, therefore, the submission of the petitioners that charge of insubordination being covered by Section 7(c) of the Act, 1942 cannot be inquired under Section 7 of the Act, 1861 has to be rejected. For the negligence in not having taken the kit from store and not having discharged duty afterwards, petitioners can be subjected to disciplinary proceedings under Section 7 of the Act, 1861. From the scheme of Sections 6 to 8 of the Act, 1948 and of Section 29 of the Act, 1861, It is abundantly clear that Sections 6 to 8 prescribe graver punishment for the offences committed by the P.A.C. personnel's, but Section 29 of the Act, 1861 prescribes lesser punishment for the breach on the part of the police personnel's, the reason being that the P.A.C. personnel's belonging to a paramilitary force are expected to maintain much higher discipline and integrity as compared to the members of the policeforce and, therefore, much stricter punishments are prescribed under Sections 6 to 8 as compared to the punishment contained in S. 29 of the Act, 1861. As the punishment prescribed under Section 29 of the Act, 1861 would have been wholly inadequate to deal with the breaches and violations on the part of the P.A.C. personnels, therefore, a selfcontained code relating to the offences has been set out under Sections 6 to 8 of the Act, 1948. But as already pointed out, Sections 6 to 8 of the Act, 1948 as they relate to the offences and their punishment, operate in entirely a separate field and they do not overlap the field carved out by Section 7 of the Act, 1861 and the two sets of provisions under separate Acts are mutually exclusive. 10. But as already pointed out, Sections 6 to 8 of the Act, 1948 as they relate to the offences and their punishment, operate in entirely a separate field and they do not overlap the field carved out by Section 7 of the Act, 1861 and the two sets of provisions under separate Acts are mutually exclusive. 10. To sum up, disciplinary proceedings against the P.A.C. personnel can be initiated by their superior authorities against their subordinates under Section 7 of the Act, 1861, read with Section 5 of the Act, 1948 and, therefore, no exception can be taken to the proceedings that had been taken up against the petitioners under Section 7 of the Act, 1861 for their gross misconduct in that they failed to carry out the orders of the superior authorities to collect the kit from the store and discharge their duties after reinstatement. 11. For the reasons, the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners of widest amplitude that no action can be taken against the P.A.C. personnel under Section 7 of the Act, 1861 for any misconduct, breach or violation in view of Sections 6 to 8 of the Act, 1948, cannot be accepted and is, therefore, rejected. 12. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs. (Petition dismissed.)