JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - The petitioners question correctness of the order dated 19-2-1983 passed by the Executive Magistrate, Bhubaneswar holding that there was no contravention or violation of any order passed by him and therefore, the petition filed for initiation of an appropriate proceeding u/s 188 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC') for violation of the order did not merit consideration. 2. The factual position is almost undisputed. On the basis of a petition filed by the petitioners, an order u/s 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the Code') was passed on 3-6-1987. Subsequently, a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code was initiated on 27-7-1987. The allegation is that on 22-8-1987 notwithstanding the order passed u/s 144 of the Code, there was change in the nature and character of the disputed land as a cabin was put up by the opposite parties herein The petitioners filed an application for initiation of a proceeding u/s 188, IPC for such violation. According to the petitioners; notwithstanding initiation of proceeding u/s 145 of the Code, prohibitive order u/s 144 continued to hold the fort. The opposite parties however, submit that after initiation of proceeding u/s 145, any anterior order had no effect, and even if it is accepted that the opposite parties have changed the nature and character of the disputed land, there was no violation. 3. For resolution of the dispute, the only point that needs adjudication is whether after initiation of proceeding u/s 145, any order passed anterior continued to have effect. 4. An order u/s 144 does not remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof, provided that if the State Government considers it necessary so to do for preventing danger to human life, health or safety or for preventing a riot or any affray, it may, by notification, direct that an order made by a Magistrate u/s 144 shall remain in force for such further period not exceeding six months from the date of the order made by the Executive Magistrate. 5. 5. The words "may" in Section 144(1) and "shall" in Section 145(1) make it clear that while Section 144(1) is in general terms and confers a discretion to exercise it for the purposes specified therein, it is obligatory on the Magistrate to start a proceeding u/s 145(1) if he is satisfied as to the likelihood of a breach of peace relating to the land or water. If after initiating a proceeding u/s 144, the Magistrate finds that the conditions of Section 145(1) are satisfied, it is advisable to proceed u/s 145. It practically constitutes a fresh proceeding, the validity of which will have to be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances existing on the day preliminary order is passed in the proceeding, and not with reference to those which existed when the conditional order u/s 144(1) had been made. Because of the restricted period statutorily prescribed in respect of Section 144, where there is a likelihood of continuance of the dispute relating to possession, the more effective remedy u/s 145 is prescribed. 6. An order u/s 144 can be made under various circum- stances including a danger of a breach of peace arising from dispute as regards possession. Section 145 is of limited scope and applies only where there is a danger of a breach of peace due to such dispute. The former is discretionary, latter is obligatory. Where special condition of Section 145 is fulfilled. Section 144 yields to Section 145. Conversion of a proceeding u/s 144 to one u/s 145 is a misnomer. Magistrate initiates a fresh proceeding on being satisfied about existence of requisite conditions. 1 he two proceedings do not have simultaneous existence. 7. The proceeding u/s 145 is not a continuance of one initiated u/s 144, even though the order for initiation thereof is passed in a proceeding relating to the latter. As indicated above, it is entirely a different proceeding. Disputed questions of possession do not form the subject-matter of adjudication when the Magistrate Acts u/s 144 of the Code. It is only where possession of the property is initially assumed to be with one party or the other, an order u/s 144 of the Code is passed. Where disputed questions of possession appear to exist for commencement of exercise of the jurisdiction u/s 144. It is only where possession of the property is initially assumed to be with one party or the other, an order u/s 144 of the Code is passed. Where disputed questions of possession appear to exist for commencement of exercise of the jurisdiction u/s 144. it is open to the Magistrate to pass a prohibitory order with a view to ultimately initiate a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code. Where the Magistrate becomes satisfied during pendency of such a proceeding that there is likelihood of a breach of the peace relating to land or water which forms the basis for the preliminary order which is likely to continue beyond its life of two months, an order for initiation of proceeding u/s 145 of the Code may be passed if the requisite conditions of Section 145 exist. A similar view was also expressed by this Court in AIR 1969 Ori 221 : Hadu Khan and Ors. v. Mahadev Das and Ors.. 8. It further appears that if the Magistrate is satisfied about any emergency relating to the property, it is open to him to pass an order u/s 146 which is in the nature of a preventive order. If the contention of the petitioners is accepted then there may be a case of two orders, one u/s "44 and the other u/s 145, operating with the possibility of conflicting directions. It cannot certainly be the legislative intent. So in the eye of law, a proceeding u/s 144 does not survive and loses its force once proceeding u/s 145 is initiated. Therefore, the order that was passed on 1-6-1987 u/s 144 became inoperative after initiation of proceeding u/s 145 on 27-7-1987. In any event the alleged violation of the order passed on 22-8-1987 is beyond the period of two months from the date of order passed u/s 144 of the Code. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that once pissed an order of prohibition continues to hold the field even in a proceeding u/s 145 is not acceptable in view of the conclusions above. The order suffers from no infirmity warranting any interference. The revision application is accordingly disposed of.