JUDGMENT - SALDANHA M.F., J.:---These review petitions deal with an unusual situation that requires a rather out of the ordinary consideration. Writ Petition No. 1476 of 1989, which was the culmination of a very protracted and heavy litigation between the Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and its different unions, some defunct and some active, was disposed of by me through a judgment dated 13/14th December, 1990. That judgment ran into 107 pages, was dictated in open Court and the type-script, after finalisation, was signed a few weeks thereafter when the respective parties collected the copies of the judgment. Original respondent No. 2, namely, Kamgar Utkarsha Sabha, thereafter presented the first of the review petitions dated 1st February, 1991 wherein they set out certain grounds on the basis of which they desired that this Court should reconsider the order regarding the award of costs of Rs. 25,000/- against that union. 2. On notice being given to the other parties, the 1st respondents to the main petition, namely, Mafatlal Engineering Industries Employees' Union, opposed any reduction in the quantum of costs, but their learned Counsel, however, orally submitted in the alternative that the original petitioners, namely, the company, ought to be made to bear a considerable portion of the costs awarded if the Court was inclined to reduce the costs as against original respondent No. 2. This submission proceeded on a legal argument that the findings in the judgment against the original petitioners were sufficient to warrant such a conclusion. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the company, namely, the original petitioners, objected to any such procedure contending that even if the Court were to entertain and allow the review petitioners that its scope was circumscribed to the reduction or otherwise of the costs and that it was wholly beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to Award costs against the original petitioners as this would involve substantially altering the original judgment. 3. The parties sought time to place their submissions on record and the original respondent No. 1 thereafter filed Review Petition No. 2530 of 1991 essentially contending that the concluding part of the original judgment contains an error which requires to be corrected and that to this extent it was necessary that the last finding in that judgment be reviewed. 3. The parties sought time to place their submissions on record and the original respondent No. 1 thereafter filed Review Petition No. 2530 of 1991 essentially contending that the concluding part of the original judgment contains an error which requires to be corrected and that to this extent it was necessary that the last finding in that judgment be reviewed. As a corollary to this, it was contended that if such a review was permissible that it would also justify the Award of costs against the original company. The company, namely, the original petitioners have filed their reply to these review petitions in which they have, in the first instance, pointed out that no review is at all justified. They have also reiterated the position that the grounds on which review has been asked for are untenable because according to the original petitioners the scope of review is very restricted and what is, in fact, being sought through the review petitions is something that can only be done in appeal. 4. Mr. Pawaskar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Company, has relied on a decision of the Goa Bench of this High Court in the case of (Chandrakant v. Shripad)1, A.I.R. 1989 Bom. 91. In that judgment, Kamat, J., had dismissed the review petition, in the first instance, because the petition was in relation to an interlocutory order and the issues were yet to be determined before the trial Court. The occasion for review, therefore, was not really germane. Secondly, as observed by the learned Judge, the case law is to the effect that a review petition is not to be resorted to in a case where the argument is that the judgment is erroneous. It is only in those cases where the error is "obvious" or one which has occurred virtually by mistake and where it would be expedient to rectify that error in the very Court which had made the order that a review petition is to be resorted to. 5. On merits, Mr. Pawaskar submitted with a degree of vehemence that it is unthinkable that a charge of an unfair labour practice is directed against a company which has paid Rs. 6.43 crores to the workmen and which has at all times functioned with what he termed as "utmost good-faith". Mr. 5. On merits, Mr. Pawaskar submitted with a degree of vehemence that it is unthinkable that a charge of an unfair labour practice is directed against a company which has paid Rs. 6.43 crores to the workmen and which has at all times functioned with what he termed as "utmost good-faith". Mr. Pawaskar added that the action of the company was resorted to only after the Labour Commissioner had put his imprimatur to the agreement in question and, therefore, this case was wholly distinguishable from all other U.L.P. cases. I have reminded learned Counsel that respondent No. 1 had challenged the validity of the agreement dated 30-5-1986 on the very next day and that his clients proceeded to act on it even though they were aware that the proceeding was pending before a judicial authority. 6. The situation in which a Court may review an order are well-defined and the elaborate case law on this point abundantly indicates that it is a power to be exercised most sparingly. The case law also highlights the fact that it is a power which must be exercised as of necessity in appropriate cases. This last aspect, to my mind, is predominant in the present context because the courts at all levels do work under considerable pressure and if for any reason an error has occurred, regardless of for what reason if good ground is made out for the correction of that error, a Court of good conscience would be obliged to accept its fallibility and to carry out the correction rather than to refuse to do so. With the courts choked to over-capacity, if through a process of review the judicial machinery can be saved a further round of unnecessary litigation, to my mind, it is eminently desirable that this avenue be resorted to. To this extent, some necessary lee-way will have to be grafted on to the existing position that obtains on the subject. One of the more important situations in which this would arise is when certain case law has not been placed before the Court which would have materially altered the original decision. The second of these is a corollary to the first whereby the interests of justice may be better served through a rectification of the order. One of the more important situations in which this would arise is when certain case law has not been placed before the Court which would have materially altered the original decision. The second of these is a corollary to the first whereby the interests of justice may be better served through a rectification of the order. It is not unknown after a decision for a party or its lawyer to discover something vital which could radically alter the correctness of the decision or in their words improve on its quality, thereby justifying a review. To my mind, the present case presents a combination of both situations and it is for this reason that after hearing the parties in detail, I have entertained the review petitions. 7. In this context, it is essential to bear in mind that the case law relating to a Court's power of review essentially concerns itself with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court is not circumscribed by provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure even though courts may refer to those provisions and may generally be guided by them. The position in law was very aptly summarised by Chinappa Reddy, J., (as he then was) in the case of (Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Prishak Sharma and others)2, reported in A.I.R. 1979 S.C. page 1047, wherein the Court had observed as follows:- "there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it.........." While considering what is necessary in order to prevent the miscarriage of justice, one also needs to consider the converse position, namely, as to what ought to be done in order to foster the procurement of speedy justice. It is true that the power of review is not to be confused with the power of an Appeal Court nor is it to be used as a substitute for those powers, but at the same time it is equally essential in the present context to note that if corrective action is permissible through a procedure a review, it would save the courts and the litigants the time and rigours of having to approach a superior Court and come back after remand. In other words, a Court ought not to be technical with regard to the exercise of these powers in genuine cases. 8. Before dealing with the merits of the case, it is essential for me to record that Mr. Kochar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondents appeared before me on 15th July, 1991 and requested that the orders be deferred as he was serving notice on the other parties with regard to a further affidavit that he desired to file. Accordingly, when the matter was taken up 16-7-1991. Mr. Kochar has filed an additional affidavit which I have taken on record. This affidavit seeks to reopen the case on merits in so far as certain explanations have now been put forward with regard to the circumstances under which the second respondents had indicated the date of admission to membership of their members. I do not propose to elaborate on this aspect of the case because no cognisance can be taken of this affidavit in so far as this material could have easily been placed before either the trial Court or the High Court at an earlier point of time which was not done. Furthermore, what is stated in this affidavit even if taken note of cannot improve the case of the second respondents nor would it in any manner alter the findings in the judgment. 9. That brings me to the first ground on which the review has been sought, namely, that having regard to the fact that the findings in the main judgment do not exonerate the company, that the award of costs against the second respondents alone was erroneous. Normally, I would not have reconsidered this question because as rightly pointed out by Mr. Pawaskar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the company, the Court has in the judgment given detailed reasons for the award of costs as also for the quantum. I may state here that the quantum of costs awarded does not require any reconsideration. However, with regard to the question as to who should be made to pay these costs, some modification of the earlier order is essential in the circumstances hereinafter enumerated by me. 10. Mr. I may state here that the quantum of costs awarded does not require any reconsideration. However, with regard to the question as to who should be made to pay these costs, some modification of the earlier order is essential in the circumstances hereinafter enumerated by me. 10. Mr. Cama, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondents, has pointed out that there exists an error apparent in the existing judgment and for this purpose, he has placed heavy reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of (Apar Pvt. Ltd. v S.R. Samant and others)3, reported in 1980(II) L.L.J. 344. While interpreting the provisions of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, the Division Bench of this Court had placed reliance on the decision in (Secretary of State v. Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen and others)4, 1972(II) All. England Reports at page 949, as also on several other decisions while very clearly enunciating the principle that the commission of an unfair labour practice does not necessarily involve mala fides or want of good unfair faith. The Court held that the commission of an unfair labour practice itself is evidence of mala fides and/or want of good faith. The same is the view expounded by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Kamani Tubes Ltd. v. Kamani Employees' Union)5, reported in 1987 Mh.L.J. 861. These decisions lay down a principle of law that is binding on me and it was obviously an error on the part of the parties concerned not to have brought this position to my notice at the time when the writ petition was argued. 11. The point in issue which is one of considerable consequence that goes virtually to the root of the matter in these review petitions and automatically affects the last finding in the main judgment is the vexed question that hinges around justification or justifiability in relation to the commission of an unfair labour practice. Dharmadhikari, J., in the (Billion Plastics v. Dyes and Chemicals Workers Union)6, reported in 1983(2) Bom.C.R. page 25 had occasion to review the case law in detail and has concluded that justification cannot be pleaded as a defence in such a situation. A tricky position had arisen in that case where the argument was that the strike was legal and was, therefore, justified, but the Court rejected that submission. A tricky position had arisen in that case where the argument was that the strike was legal and was, therefore, justified, but the Court rejected that submission. We have a somewhat more certain position enunciated by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kamani Tubes Ltd., reported in 1987 Mh.L.J. 1986, wherein the company produced material in support of its defence that the financial inability to pay wages had given rise to what was otherwise categorised as an unfair labour practice. The Division Bench had occasion to examined the relevant provisions of the Act and held that there was no warrant for taking the view that an extenuating circumstances or a justification could absolve the guilty party from the finding that an unfair labour practice has been committed. Bharucha, J., on behalf of the Bench while dealing with Item 9 of the IV Schedule to the Act, which incidentally is the very provision with which we are concerned, observed as follows : "The phraseology of Items 9 affords no scope for the taking into account of motive or reason or cause for the failure. To read Item 9 in any manner other than as set out above would be to do violence to its language. To read Item 9 as suggesting that there would be no failure if there was inability to implement would be to read into it the words "without good cause" and that would be impermissible." 12. It is also essential to call a reference to the decision of this Court in (Executive Engineer, Electrical Division, Nagpur v. Prakash Devidas Kalasit)7, reported in 1985 Mh.L.J. 338, wherein another Division Bench of this Court while examining the ingredients of an unfair labour practice observed that "motive or mens rea is not an essential ingredient for holding the employer responsible for indulging in or to have indulged in unfair labour practices. It is not necessary that motive must precede or should be the basis for declaring an action to be an unfair labour practice. If the impugned action attracts any of the items of Schedule IV, there could be no impediment for the courts to hold that such action or actions constitute an unfair labour practice". These observations, to my mind, virtually conclude the issue. 13. If the impugned action attracts any of the items of Schedule IV, there could be no impediment for the courts to hold that such action or actions constitute an unfair labour practice". These observations, to my mind, virtually conclude the issue. 13. On a strict construction of the Act, entertaining any ground by way of justification would be wholly impermissible and against the very scheme and spirit of the law because it would open a virtual Pandora's box by providing an escape route in almost every case. I am in complete agreement with the interpretation of the law as set out in these cases and I would like to add that the purpose of enacting this statute was precisely in order to cater for bringing about a certain purity of conduct and, therefore, the achievement of that objective must be enforced with a decree of absolute and total firmness and without admitting to any of the multifarious excuses or justifications that clever defaulters or their representatives may put forward. A breach is a breach and will have to be categorised as such regardless of the circumstances under which it has occurred or the consequences thereof, and in this view of the matter, the finding earlier recorded by me which is inconsistent with the correct statement of the law requires to be reviewed as of necessity. 14. In the earlier judgment, there is a finding that the Company and the second respondents had signed an agreement under the circumstances that would render that agreement unenforceable. The solitary ground on which I had earlier recorded the last finding, namely, that the company cannot be held guilty of having committed an unfair labour practice was the argument of Mr. Pawaskar who had contended that the company had acted in good faith because it was under the impression that the settlement signed before the Labour Commissioner could be implemented and that, consequently, it cannot be held guilty of acting "unfairly". That settlement has been struck down and in view of the correct legal position that the intention of the parties of the circumstances under which the unfair labour practice has been committed is wholly irrelevant. That finding requires to be corrected and it will have to be held that the company had committed an unfair labour practice. 15. In the light of this conclusion, the grievance of Mr. That finding requires to be corrected and it will have to be held that the company had committed an unfair labour practice. 15. In the light of this conclusion, the grievance of Mr. Kochar does assume some significance because the Award of costs against the second respondents alone would not be a fair order. In the altered circumstances, to my mind, and having regard to the fact that the company was as much responsible for all that has happened, it would be necessary to modify the earlier order in respect of the payment of costs and to direct that the costs of Rs. 25,000/- that were ordered to be paid to the first respondents shall be paid in equal proportion by the petitioners and by the second respondents. In this view of the matter, the two Review Petitions are allowed with the following order: a) The review petitions are allowed. b) The order of the Industrial Court stands confirmed and the earlier judgment of this Court dated 13/14 December, 1990 to stand modified accordingly. c) The writ petition is dismissed. d) The petitioners and the second respondents shall pay to the first respondents costs quantified in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- in equal proportion, the payment of these costs being condition precedent for any further proceedings. Petitions allowed. -----