JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - Since a dispute was raised about maintainability of the appeal without deposit of the amount disputed in appeal or furnishing of security in respect thereof subject to direction of the Court, and it is of seminal importance, the matter was heard at length. 2. The appeal is directed against an order passed by the learned District Judge, Sundargarh on an application filed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation' u/s 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (Act 63 of 1951) (hsreinafter referred to as 'the Act')- The appeal has been filed u/s 32(9) of the Act. 3. According to Mr. M. M. Sahu, learned counsel appearing for the Corporation, the appeal was against a decree for payment of money and therefore, in terms of Order 41, Rule 1, Sub-rule (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in shourt the Code') deposit of the amount in dispute or furnishing of security thereagainst as directed by the Court is obligated. Mr. N. Patra, learned counsel for the appellants, however, submits that the order passed by the learned District Judge does not amount to a decree for payment of money and therefore, the question of making any deposit or furnishing any security does not arise. 4. Section 31 of the Act is a special provision for enforcement of claims by the State Financial Corporations. Where an "industrial concern'" as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act, in breach of any agreement makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any installment thereof in meeting 'its obligation in relation to any guarantee given by the Corporation or otherwise fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the Financial Corporation, or, where the Financial Corpo ration requires an industrial concern to make immediate repayment of any loan or advance u/s 30 and the industrial concern fails to make such repayment, then, without prejudice to the provisions of Section 29 of the Act and of Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, (4 of 1882), any officer of Financial Corporation, generally or specially authorised by the Board in this behalf, may apply to the District Judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carries on whole or a substantial part of its business, for. one or more of the reliefs as enumerated in Section 31. One of the reliefs is for sale of the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation as security for the loan or advance. In terms of Section 32(1), where an application is for the reliefs mentioned in Clauses (a) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 31, the District Judge shall pass an ad interim order attaching the -security, or so much of the property of the industrial concern as would, on being sold realise in his estimate an amount equivalent in value to the outstanding liability of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation together with the costs of the proceedings taken u/s 31. In terms- of Sub-section (5) of Section 32, the District Judge after giving due notice to the defaulter can make the ad interim order absolute and direct sale of the attached property or transfer the management of the industrial corcern to the Financial Corporation or confirm the injunction. 5. A conspectus of the relevant provisions of Sections 31 and 32 rnakes it clear that Section 31 deals with the power of the District Judge to enforce claims by the Financial Corporation in respect of deta. Its for repayment of amounts due to the Corporation.' An application u/s 31 of the Act is not a suit. .In AIR 1973 SC 1765 : Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Watson Manufacturing Co. Pvt, Ltd., it was held that an application for any of the reliefs that can be granted under the Act is not ?. plaint in a suit for recovery of mortgage loan by sale of mortgaged property, and it is not even akin .to a suit by a mortgagee to recover mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property. It was held that the Corporation-applicant in such an application cannot pray for a preliminary decree for sale of the property or final decree for payment of money, and cannot seek to enforce any personal liability, even if such lability is incurred under the contract of mortgage, as the law stood then. The proceeding initiated u/s 31(1) is something akin to an application for attachment of the property in execution of a decree at a stage posterior to the passing of the decree. The proceeding initiated u/s 31(1) is something akin to an application for attachment of the property in execution of a decree at a stage posterior to the passing of the decree. Therefore, any order passed by the District Judge while dealing with an application u/s 31 does not amount to a decree, much less a decree for payment of money. Strong reliance has been laid by the learned counsel for the Corporation on the observation of the Supreme Court in Gujarat State Financial Corporation's case (supra) that the proceeding as "something akin to an application for attachment of property in execution of a decree at a stage posterior to the passing of the decree", to show that the order in assence was for payment of money, and it amounts to a dacree for payment of money. The decision instead of furthering the case of the Corporation rather demolishes it. The decision makes it clear that it was something akin to an application for attachment of property in execution of a decree. There is gulf of difference between a decree for payment of money and an application for attachment of property in execution of a decree. 'Akin' means having resemblance or connection with. Claim of the Corporation is not a monetary claim to be investigated, as is apparent from Sections 31 and 32, though it may become necessary to specify the figure for the purpose of determining how much of the security is to be sold, investigation of the claim does not involve all the contentions that can be raised in a suit. 6. The basis of claim in a petition u/s 31 is that there is a breach of agreement or default in making repayment of loan or advance or installment thereof and, therefore, the mortgaged should be sold. It is not a money claim. This position has been also stated by the Supreme Court in Gujarat State Financial Corporation's case (supra). An application u/s 31 does not initiate a proceeding to obtain substantive relief capable of being valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss. The Corporation cannot pray for a decree of its outstanding dues and can make an application for one of the three reliefs mentioned in Section 31(1), non of which if granted results in a money decree or decree for recovery of outstanding loans or advance. The Corporation cannot pray for a decree of its outstanding dues and can make an application for one of the three reliefs mentioned in Section 31(1), non of which if granted results in a money decree or decree for recovery of outstanding loans or advance. My view gets sustenance from a decision of the Supreme Court in Maganlal Vs. Jaiswal Industries, Neemach and Others, . 7. The legislative intent is also further apparent from Sub-section (3) of Section 32 which prescribes that an order of attachment or sale of property under Sac. 32 shall be carried into effect "as far as practicable" in the manner provided in the Code for the attachment of sale of property in execution of a decree as it the Financial Corporation was the decreeholder. Any order passed u/s 32 is not a decree suicto sensu as defined in Section 2(2) of the Code. This also is the view of the Supreme Court as evident from Maganlal's case (supra). The Supreme Court observed that by application of legal, fiction created under Sub-section(8) of Section 32, an order passed thereunder for sale of attached property is a decree in a suit for sale, and the Financial Corporation was the decree- holder whereas the debtor was the judgment debtor. The provisions of the Code with regard to execution of a decree for sale of mortgaged property (underlining by me for emphasis) contained in Order 21 thereof including the right to file an appeal against such orders passed during the course of execution which are appealable, shall apply mutatis mutandis to the execution of an order u/s 32 of the Act, unless some provision is not practicable to be applied. It is apparent from this provision that the order cannot be equated with a decree for money. 8. Under a social statute an appeal without any strings attached has been provided for in Sub-section (9) of Section 32. Therefore, restrictive conditions of Order 41, Rule 1, Sub-rule (3) of the Code are not applicable. In special statutes like the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, or the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, entertainment of appeals has been circumscribed by certain conditions like depositing the amount in dispute or a specified amount No such conditions has been prescribed in Sub-section (9) of Section 32. Th3t also shows that Section 32(9) confers an unbridled power of appeal and therefore, the appeal is maintainable. Th3t also shows that Section 32(9) confers an unbridled power of appeal and therefore, the appeal is maintainable. I admit the appeal for disposal on merits.