Judgment :- Petitioner is the tenant and respondents 1 to 3 are landlords. Transaction covered by Ext.P4 lease deed admittedly comes within the purview of rent control legislation. In R.C.P. No.13 of 1984 before Rent Control Court. Perintalmanna, respondents 1 to 3 sought to evict petitioner on the grounds of arrears of rent and bona fide need for own occupation. Claim under S.11(3), on the ground of bona fide need for own occupation, was rejected. Eviction was allowed only on the ground of arrears of rent. In appeal, eviction was granted under S.11(3) also. That was confirmed in revision. Attempt is to get these orders vacated, in exercise of the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 2. Grounds taken up are: i) Over and above respondents 1 to 3, there is another co-owner also. Wife of the petitioner purchased share of that co-owner. Hence respondents 1 to 3 alone are not entitled to evict him; ii) Ext.P4 must be considered as a permanent lease, which is not liable to be terminated, as there is a provision for renewal; and iii) Findings of the appellate and revisional courts, on bona fide need, are perverse justifying interference. 3. Law presumes that each and every co-owner is as much in possession of the entire co-ownership property as any other co-owner. So also, his possession is considered in law to be on behalf of other co-owners also. Trespass into co-ownership property is a wrong against the possession of all co-owners even though all may not be in physical possession. Rule is well settled that a co-owner can, without representing the other co-owners or without joining them, maintain an action to evict a trespasser. That is because an act of trespass in an individual wrong against every co-owner and actionable at the hands of each of them. It is the right of every co-owner to preserve the co-ownership property against invasion and protect the rights of other co-owners also. 4. But there was divergence of opinion as to whether such individual exercise of right is possible or not where a co-owner seeks to evict a tenant, who is in possession of the co-ownership property after determination of the lease in his favour. A Full Bench of Gujarat High Court, in Nanalal Girdharlal and another v. Gulamnabi Jamal Bhai Motorwala and others ( A.I.R.1973 Gujarat 131), said that it is not possible. A Full Bench of Gujarat High Court, in Nanalal Girdharlal and another v. Gulamnabi Jamal Bhai Motorwala and others ( A.I.R.1973 Gujarat 131), said that it is not possible. A lease usually contains a covenant on the part of the lessee to deliver up the premises on the determination of the tenancy. But,even when such express stipulation is absent, tenant is under an implied covenant to restore possession of the premises to landlord on determination of the tenancy. This implied covenant is recognised in S.108(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, which provides that in the absence of contract or local usage to the contrary, lessee is bound, on determination of the lease, to put the lessor in possession of the property. When lease is determined on any of the modes provided in S. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, landlord is entitled to possession of the property under the implied covenant contained in the lease. It is this implied covenant that is sought to be enforced by landlord when he files a suit for eviction of the tenant. When there are two or more co-owners, this implied covenant would obviously be in favour of all of them and they would be jointly entitled to enforce it vide S.43 of the Contract Act. They must, therefore, all join in filing a suit to recover possession except when, by a special provision of law, co-owners are permitted to sue through some or one of the members. This decision was impliedly approved by Supreme Court in Sri. Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and others (A.I.R.1976 S.C. 2335). Therefore, that must be accepted as the law. 5. But both decisions accepted some exceptions to the rule. Tenant, who is in possession of the property after determination of the lease, cannot be equated to a trespasser. He will be a tenant, at sufferance or holding over, as the case may be. He may be having possession without any priority of estate. He becomes a tenant at will until some other interest is created. But the above said two decisions accepted two exceptions to this rule that all co-owners must join in the suit. He will be a tenant, at sufferance or holding over, as the case may be. He may be having possession without any priority of estate. He becomes a tenant at will until some other interest is created. But the above said two decisions accepted two exceptions to this rule that all co-owners must join in the suit. They are in cases "where tenant is estopped from denying the exclusive title of the landlord or landlords and contending that he is or they are only one or some of the co-owners and cannot, in the absence of other co-owners, be en titled to maintain an action for recovery of possession. One category of case is where landlord grants lease to tenant claiming to be the sole owner of the property leased, though, in fact, he is only one of the co-owners. Other category is where landlord is a co-owner, but while granting lease, does not disclose that he is acting as co-owner on behalf of himself and other co-owners and grants the lease by himself. In these two categories of cases, rule of estoppel comes into play and it has an overriding impact on the question whether co-owner, who granted lease, can alone give notice to quit or sue for recovery. Tenant who accepted the lease from only one or some of the co-owners and came into possession cannot deny the title and title may not arise for consideration in such a case because tenant is precluded from denying title of the landlord at the commencement of the tenancy, as is embodied in S.116 of the Evidence Act, so long as the tenancy continues. This is a case in which petitioner came into possession under Ext.P4 executed by respondents 1 to 3 alone, as if they alone are the owners. He cannot say that they are not landlords and he is not liable to be evicted by them. That closes the first contention. 6. Ext.P4 contains only a vague provision for renewal without specifying any of the terms and conditions. He cannot say that they are not landlords and he is not liable to be evicted by them. That closes the first contention. 6. Ext.P4 contains only a vague provision for renewal without specifying any of the terms and conditions. It is true that, as held in Aboobacker Keyo v. Govindan Sons (1990(2)K.L.T.551), a tenant already in possession with a covenant for renewal in his favour can resist his eviction by landlord without filing a suit for specific performance if he has validly exercised the option and if the suit for specific performance of the agreement for renewal is not barred by limitation on the date of the landlord's suit, on the equitable principles of part performance recognised under the Transfer of Property Act. It is a valuable right available to tenant and it runs with the land and cannot be defeated by the unilateral refusal of the landlord at his pleasure. He can resist redemption on the basis of the renewal clause. But in order to claim the benefit of equitable principle of part performance, it is essential that the terms of the agreement between the parties must be reasonably certain or if it is not certain, at least it must be possible for the court to make it certain by applying the formula a machinery provided for in the document. Otherwise, the contract will be void and unenforceable. Rent payable or other terms and conditions are not at all specified in Ext.P9. There is only an agreement to agree leaving the terms and conditions in the dark. At any rate, there is no scope for a contention that lease is of a permanent nature and is not, therefore, liable to be terminated. 7. Last ground is that finding of the appellate and revisional courts on the question of bonafide need for own occupation is perverse. They are courts of competent jurisdiction, which did not exceed the bounds of their authority. In exercise of the powers under Article 227, this Court cannot sit on judgment as an appellate forum to correct mistakes by re-appraisal of the evidence. Power is only one of superintendence, which has to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases, in order to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within their bounds of authority' and not for correcting mere errors which are possible in the exercise of jurisdiction. Power is only one of superintendence, which has to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases, in order to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within their bounds of authority' and not for correcting mere errors which are possible in the exercise of jurisdiction. Such errors, if any, are to be corrected only by statutory forums even though in appropriate exceptional cases this Court may be justified in interfering in order to do justice when it is found that the subordinate courts or tribunals arrived at perverse conclusions by misguiding themselves on questions of fact or law resulting in flagrant failure of justice. No such contingency has arisen in this case. Conclusions are reasonable and even if a different conclusion is possible by re-appraisal, this Court may not be justified in doing so. Original petition is dismissed. However, at the request of counsel, petitioner is granted four months time from today to. vacate the premises on condition that within thirty days from today, he files an affidavit before rent control court unconditionally undertaking to surrender vacant possession without raising any objection by the expiry of the said period. No costs.