JUDGMENT V.S. Kokje, J. 1. The petitioner was an employee of the M.P. Textile Corporation Ltd. which undoubtedly is an instrumentality of the State and, therefore, covered under the definition of "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. A departmental enquiry was instituted against the petitioner on certain charges of misconduct. On October 22, 1988 the petitioner was placed under suspension and on October 22, 1988 itself one Shri B.K. Mathur was appointed as enquiry officer. On November 26, 1988 a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner, alleging commission of certain misconducts. The petitioner replied to the show cause notice on December 12, 1988. But prior to that on December 9, 1988 the order for conducting an enquiry and appointment of enquiry officer was cancelled. On December 2, 1988 and December 7, 1988 the petitioner requested for a regular enquiry against him. On December 7, 1988 itself, the petitioner received from Respondent No.2 letter dated December 5, 1988 asking him to see the Respondent No. 2 on December 12, 1988 for personal hearing. Accordingly the petitioner presented himself before the Managing Director the Respondent No. 2, and again requested that a regular enquiry be conducted. On January 11, 1989 the petitioner received letter dated January 7, 1989 terminating his services. A departmental appeal against the order of termination was also rejected. 2. The main contention of the petitioner before us is that the requirement of holding a regular enquiry could not have been dispensed with in the circumstances of the case as there was no reason why regular enquiry could not be held. The respondents have produced Annexure R-2, a note, on the basis of which the petitioner was dismissed from service. According to the respondents, the Managing Director was satisfied that it was not possible to appreciate the irregularities committed by the petitioner in a domestic enquiry. The Annexure R-2 betrays lawful ignorance of the procedure expected to be followed in a domestic enquiry as also a total lack of respect for the principles of natural justice. The Managing Director has expressed in clearest terms that on going through the audit reports, he was fully satisfied that grave financial irregularities have been committed by the officers and officials attached to the Unit resulting in misappropriation of the Corporation fund. He has also found that the activities of the delinquent employees were clearly against public interest. The Managing Director has expressed in clearest terms that on going through the audit reports, he was fully satisfied that grave financial irregularities have been committed by the officers and officials attached to the Unit resulting in misappropriation of the Corporation fund. He has also found that the activities of the delinquent employees were clearly against public interest. After observing thus, the note proceeds as follows: "Such employees should not be allowed to go unpunished and they should be accorded the most severe punishment. The record is most damaging and I am satisfied that the employees concerned are entirely responsible for the irregularities. I am also satisfied that sufficient physical and legal impediments exist in conducting a formal and detailed Departmental Enquiry. In view of the principles of natural justice it is felt reasonable that an opportunity may be given to them to explain their conduct. Hence SCNs may be issued to the concerned employees. They may be asked to show cause as to why serious disciplinary action should not be taken against them. Their replies should be received by the office within seven days of the receipt of the SCN. I am further of the view that after the replies are received and processed by the office, they may be given yet another opportunity to explain their conduct at a personal hearing with me." 3. A perusal of Annexure A-2 clearly shows that the Managing Director had already convinced himself of the guilt of the petitioner and other officers. The show cause notice was, therefore, an empty formality. In any case, there was no ground for dispensing with the enquiry and that the Managing Director should have supplied sufficient reason for dispensing with the enquiry. In a recent decision Jaswantsing v. State of Punjab, 1991 I CLR 1, the Supreme Court has held relying on a decision in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985-II-LLJ 206) as follows :- "The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a Court of Law, it is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a Court of Law, it is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer. In the counter filed by the third respondent it is contended that the appellant, instead of replying to the show cause notices, instigated his fellow police officials to disobey the superiors. It is also said that he threw threats to beat up the witnesses and the Enquiry Officer if any departmental inquiry was held against him. No particulars are given. Besides it is difficult to understand how he could have given threats, etc., when he was in hospital. It is not shown on what material the third respondent came to the conclusion that the appellant had thrown threats as alleged in paragraph 3 of the impugned order. On a close scrutiny of the impugned order it seems the satisfaction was based on the ground that he was instigating his colleagues and was holding meetings with other police officials with a view to spreading hatred and disaffection towards his superiors. This allegation is based on his alleged activities at Jullunder on April 3, 1981 reported by SNO/GRP, Jullunder. That report is not forthcoming. It is no one's contention that the said SNO was threatened. The third respondent's counter also does not reveal if he had verified the correctness of the information. To put it tersely the subjective satisfaction recorded in paragraph 3 of the impugned order is not fortified by any independent material to justify the dispensing with of the inquiry envisaged by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. We are, therefore, of the opinion that on this short ground alone the impugned order cannot be sustained.' 4. In Chief Security Officer v. Singasen Rabi Das, (1991-I-LLJ-308), the enquiry was dispensed with for the following reasons (p.309): "because of the fact that it is not considered feasible or desirable to produce the witnesses of the security/other Railway employees since this will expose them and make them ineffective in the future. These witnesses if asked to appear at a confronted enquiry are likely to suffer personal humiliation and insults thereafter or even they and their family members may become targets of acts of violence." 5. These witnesses if asked to appear at a confronted enquiry are likely to suffer personal humiliation and insults thereafter or even they and their family members may become targets of acts of violence." 5. While dismissing the appeal of the employer, the Supreme Court observed as follows (pp.309-310): "In the present case the only reason given for dispensing with that enquiry was that it was considered not feasible or desirable to procure witnesses of the security/other Railway employees since this will expose these witnesses and make them ineffective in the future. It was stated further that if these witnesses were asked to appear at a confronted enquiry they were likely to suffer personal humiliation and insults and even their family members might become targets of acts of violence. In our view these reasons are totally insufficient in law. We fail to understand how if these witnesses appeared at a confronted enquiry, they are likely to suffer personal humiliation and insults. These are normal witnesses and they could not be said to be placed in any delicate or special position in which asking them to appear at a confronted enquiry would render them subject to any danger to which witnesses are not normally subjected and hence these grounds constitute no justification for dispensing with the enquiry. There is total absence of sufficient material or good grounds for dispensing with the enquiry." 6. In the case before us, the respondents have not even satisfied us as to why and how the enquiry was not feasible. 7. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the order of dismissal cannot be sustained, and has to be set aside. We, therefore, quash the dismissal order and direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner within 15 days of this order. The respondents shall also pay to the petitioner all the benefits of service, including salary, perks etc., from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement within two months. The petitioner shall also be entitled to costs of this petition in view of the callous and capricious manner in which the enquiry against him was dispensed with and he was thrown out of employment. Counsel's fee Rs. 2,500/-. The respondents shall however be entitled to proceed against the petitioner, if they choose to do so, in accordance with law, on the charges on which the petitioner was removed from service. Counsel's fee Rs. 2,500/-. The respondents shall however be entitled to proceed against the petitioner, if they choose to do so, in accordance with law, on the charges on which the petitioner was removed from service. Security deposit be refunded.