N. Y. HANUMANTHAPPA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner herein was working as manager (accounts) in the Karnataka state handicrafts development corporation limited, Bangalore. The corporation served to him a charge-sheet at Annexure-A levelling 11 charges against the petitioner. He was also kept under suspension with effect from 13-2-1981. The charges levelled against the petitioner are:1) entering into conspiracy with a common intention to create unrest in the rank and file of employees and to paralyse the business of the corporation in order to carry on the clandestine business activities of the petitioner, to achieve the goal of gaining the ultimate control over the organisation and instigation and organisation of a totally unjustified and illegal strike in the corporation and taking active part in the strike. 2) tampering with the official records giving a distorted version to the press, getting them published in the samyuktha Karnataka thereby causing embarrassment and spoiling the image of the corporation. 3) non-reconciliation of the difference between the book balances and the bank accounts and non-demarcation of duties between the accounts wing and the internal audit wing. 4) non-recovery of the dues from sundry debtors, non-reconciliation of ledger balances with the schedules. 5) behaving in a riotous, disorderly and indecent manner with the managing director and other officers of the corporation in the presence of the workmen on 24-1-1981. 6) failure to hand over the keys and the charge before the start of strike inspite of notification vide press on 24-1-1981. 7) non-being a part and parcel of the management but taking active part by remaining unauthorisedly absent from 31-1-1981 to 12-2-1981, then joining the workers in the illegal and unjustified strike. 8) shouting slogans at 5 p. m. on 2-2-1981 as shameless management and violating Section 35 of the Police Act. 9) irregular payment of salary advance to sri. C. m. subbaiah. 10) non-finalisation of the accounts of the corporation for 1979-80. for the disposal of this writ petition, charge Nos. 8) shouting slogans at 5 p. m. on 2-2-1981 as shameless management and violating Section 35 of the Police Act. 9) irregular payment of salary advance to sri. C. m. subbaiah. 10) non-finalisation of the accounts of the corporation for 1979-80. for the disposal of this writ petition, charge Nos. 1, 7 and 8 are only relevant, which read as follows:1) entering into conspiracy with a common intention to create unrest in the rank and file of employees and to paralyse the business of the corporation in order to carry on the clandestine business activities of the petitioner, to achieve the goal of gaining the ultimate control over the organisation and instigation and organisation of a totally unjustified and illegal strike in the corporation and taking active part in the strike. 7) non-being a part and parcel of the management but taking active part by remaining unauthorisedly absent from 31-1-1981 to 21-2-1981, then joining the workers in the illegal and unjustified strike. 8) shouting slogans at 5 p. m. on 2-2-1981 as shameless management and violating Section 35 of the Police Act. ( 2 ) PURSUANT to the charge memo, the petitioner submitted his explanation denying each and every allegation made against him by the corporation. Having not satisfied with the explanation given, the disciplinary authority, as required under regulation 24 of the Karnataka state handicrafts 'development corporation limited, service regulations ordered to hold an enquiry. Regulation 24 reads as follows:"enquiry: none of the penalties 5 or 6 specified in clause (1) of regulation 20 can be imposed except after an enquiry. The authority competent to impose the above penalties shall, on the basis of information received or after a preliminary enquiry, frame charges if, in his opinion, there is a prima facie case to be enquired into. The charges and the statement of allegations on which these are based shall be communicated in writing to the employee and he shall be required within a period to be specified in the accompanying notice to submit the written statement of his defence. If he pleads guilty, the authority may proceed to pass orders. If he fails to submit his statement or pleads not guilty the authority shall either himself enquire or direct an enquiry to be made into the charges by an authority not below the rank of the employee. If he pleads guilty, the authority may proceed to pass orders. If he fails to submit his statement or pleads not guilty the authority shall either himself enquire or direct an enquiry to be made into the charges by an authority not below the rank of the employee. During such enquiry the employee shall be given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses examined in support of the charges and adduce his own defence. On the record of enquiry, the authority competent to impose the punishment, may proceed to pass orders. None of the penalties 1 to 4 specified in clause (1) of regulation 20 can be imposed except after the employee is informed in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the allegations on which this is proposed to be taken and given an opportunity to make any representation he may wish to make. If it is proposed to award penalties 5 and/or 6 under clause 20, these shall be communicated to the delinquent and an opportunity given to him/her to represent against this before any orders are passed or decisions taken. " ( 3 ) ONE Sri B. Gurudatt, a practising advocatewas appointed as enquiry officer. The enquiry was held, a report was submitted and then a dismissal order was passed by the disciplinary authority which came to be challenged before this court in W. P. No. 8767/1984 by the petitioner on the grounds, (1) opportunity to defend the case by permitting him to engage a counsel was not given; (2) enquiry proceedings were vitiated as neither statement of imputation nor other documents which the management wanted to rely upon were furnished to the petitioner; (3) charges were vague; (4) discrimination in appointing an Advocate as enquiry officer in the case of the petitioner while in the case of others appointing others as enquiry officers. So also the enquiry was constituted in contravention of regulation 24 of the service regulations, as according to the petitioner the enquiry officer who is an Advocate was inferior to the rank of the petitioner on the date of initiating the proceedings. The same was contested by the respondent. After hearing, this court by its order dated 12-12-1985 allowed the said writ, petition. The operative portion of the order reads as follows:"in the result, this writ petition succeeds. Impugned order is hereby quashed and petitioner is entitled to all consequential benefits. The same was contested by the respondent. After hearing, this court by its order dated 12-12-1985 allowed the said writ, petition. The operative portion of the order reads as follows:"in the result, this writ petition succeeds. Impugned order is hereby quashed and petitioner is entitled to all consequential benefits. Respondent to pay a cost of Rs. 250-00. Rule made absolute. " The said order was challenged before a division bench of this court in writ appeal No. 97 of 1986. The division bench without expressing any opinion on other contentions held that for the purpose of disposing of the enquiry proceedings, it is sufficient if an Advocate is permitted to be engaged by the petitioner. The operative portion of the order reads as follows: "we, therefore, allow the appeal and in substitution of the order under appeal we make an order in terms above. The memos filed by the parties are placed on record. It is needless to state that the delinquent officer is entitled to subsistence allowance, according to rules, till the enquiry is completed. " ( 4 ) IN pursuance to the orders passed both bythe learned single judge and the division bench, the proceedings were continued again by the same enquiry officer. After completion of six hearing dates, for the first time the petitioner herein raised an objection to the effect that he may not get fair enquiry at the hands of the enquiry officer as he is biased against him, in that, on the same charges the enquiry officer had submitted a report earlier which was acted upon by the disciplinary authority. Thus, he contended that a separate enquiry officer be appointed and enquiry be held. However, the said written objection was not taken into consideration. The enquiry was conducted for the second time and an enquiry report was submitted. On the basis of the material made available, the enquiry officer held that charge No. 1 as proved substantially and charge Nos. 7 and 8 are proved fully. On the basis of the report submitted by the enquiry officer, the disciplinary authority, after going through the report of the enquiry officer, passed an order dated 12-3-1987 dismissing the petitioner from service. The disciplinary authority observed that in view of the gravity of the charges levelled against the petitioner the only punishment deserves to be inflicted on the petitioner is one of dismissal. The disciplinary authority observed that in view of the gravity of the charges levelled against the petitioner the only punishment deserves to be inflicted on the petitioner is one of dismissal. Thus, passed an order of dismissal. That order was confirmed by the appellate authority at the instance of the petitioner. ( 5 ) AGGRIEVED by these proceedings, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition challenging the same on the grounds that: (1) the enquiry that was conducted by the enquiry officer is vitiated for the reason that as on the date of the enquiry, the enquiry officer was below the rank of the employee, which is in contravention of Rule 24 of the service regulations; (2) the enquiry officer was not an officer of the corporation, but a practising Advocate who came to be appointed on contract basis to hold enquiry only as against this petitioner while in the case of others, some of the officers of the corporation were appointed as enquiry officer; (3) the charges levelled against the petitioner were vague, imaginary and general in nature, in that, charge No. 1 levelled against the petitioner regarding conspiracy. But there was nothing to show who conspired at what time and place. The material produced to substantiate charge No. 1 regarding conspiracy as alleged in the charge-memo was of unconvincing in nature; (4) the entire enquiry vitiated for non-supply of statement of accusation alongwith list of witnesses and materials which the management wanted to rely upon in support of its case; (5) in order to see Justice is done to both parties, the corporation should have appointed someone else as enquiry officer instead of the present enquiry officer who was biased against the petitioner; that too when on the same charges he had already given his findings recommending for the petitioner's dismissal; (6) enquiry proceedings also vitiated for non-supply of some of the documents though requested. If the management supplied the said documents as requested by the petitioner, it would have been proved that the charges levelled against the petitioner are vague and imaginary one. In order to find out the truth the enquiry officer should have concede to the petitioner's request to summon some of his witnesses to prove the allegation made aga nst him; (7) in the absence of sufficient material to give findings by the enquiry officer that those charges levelled against charge Nos. In order to find out the truth the enquiry officer should have concede to the petitioner's request to summon some of his witnesses to prove the allegation made aga nst him; (7) in the absence of sufficient material to give findings by the enquiry officer that those charges levelled against charge Nos. 1,7 and 8 as proved devoid of merit. Merely because home witnesses were examined that itself not sufficient for the enquiry officer to arrive at a conclusion that the charges levelled against the petitioner are proved in the absence of sufficient evidence. When the management comes with a definite case it was for the management to prove its case and not to throw burden on the delinquent officer to prove the case of the management as it has been done in the instant case by the enquiry officer. After completion of the enquiry, before passing an order by the disciplinary authority, in all fairness the enquiry report should have been given to the petitioner so that the petitioner would have made use of the enquiry report and submitted his detailed explanation meeting each and every finding given by the enquiry officer. Having not done so, the proceedings are hit by Articles 14 and 311 of the constitution. Lastly, Sri Nagaraj contends that cumulative effect of all these acts, that is non-observance of mandatory requirements including non-adherence to comply principles of natural justice, it has to be said that charges as not proved and even if it is held as proved the punishment imposed is dis-proportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the following decisions; (1) AIR 1971sc p. 752, surath chandra chakravarty v The State of West Bengal; (2) 1969 (1) KAR. Lj. P. 588, a. k. narayana Rao v general manager, southern railway and others; (3) 1989 (6) slr 18 , s. r. farishta v union of India and others; (4) AIR 1986 SC 2045 , r. s. nayak va. r. anthulay and another; (5) AIR 1962 punjab 355, smv datt sharma v State of Punjab and others; (6) AIR 1986 SC 180 , olga tallis and others v Bombay municipal corporation and others; (7) AIR 1981 SC 136 , s. l. kapoorvjagmohan and others; and (8) AIR 1991 SC 471 , union of India and others v mohd. Ramzan khan. Ramzan khan. ( 6 ) AS an answer to these contentions of the petitioner, Sri H. B. Datar, learned senior counsel, for the respondent submitted that: (1) regarding the first contention that the enquiry officer was lower in rank than that of the petitioner and not in tune with Rule 24 of the service regulations is incorrect, in view of subsequent amendment to the said regulation by a notification dated 14-6-1985. Rule 9. 6 of the amended regulation reads as follows:"9. 6. Procedure for imposing minor penalties. An order imposing any of the penalties specified to clauses (i) to (iv) of Rule 9. 3 shall be passed after. A) the employee is informed in writing of the proposal to take action against him/her and of the allegations on which action is proposed to be taken and the employee is given an opportunity to submit his/her representation in writing. B) such representation, if any, is taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority. Procedure for imposing major penalties: before imposition of penalties specified in clauses 1. 5 to 6 of Rule 9. 3 an enquiry on the following lines shall be held. A) the disciplinary authority or any authority empowered by it in this behalf shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations in which the enquiry is proposed to be held. Such charges together with a statement of the allegations on which they are based, shall be communicated in writing to the employee and he shall be required to submit within such time as may be specified by the disciplinary authority or any authority has to be empowered by it in this behalf a written statement of his defence. B) an employee shall for the purpose of preparing his defence be permitted to pause and take extracts from such official records as he may specify provided that such permission may be denied for reasons to be recorded in writing if in the opinion of the disciplinary authority the said records are not relevant for the purpose. C) on receipt of written statement of defence if an employee pleads guilty, the authority may proceed to pass orders. If an employee does not plead guilty for or if no such statement is received within the time specified, the disciplinary authority may itself enquire into such charges or if it considers necessary may appoint an enquiry officer for the purpose. If an employee does not plead guilty for or if no such statement is received within the time specified, the disciplinary authority may itself enquire into such charges or if it considers necessary may appoint an enquiry officer for the purpose. "according to him, the competency and bias is now not open to the petitioner to contend in view of the order passed by this court in the earlier proceedings in W. P. No. 8767/1984, dated 12-12-1985 and w. a. No. 97/1986, dated 15-1-1986. According to Sri Datar, it is not correct to contend, as did by the petitioner that the enquiry officer was lower in rank than that of the petitiont in view of the letter dated 1-6-1981 of the managing director of the corporation appointing Sri B. Guntdatt as enquiry officer on the scale of Rs. 1,700/- per month and will be of the rank of the chief personnel-cum-administrative manager for all administrative purposes. Regarding bias, Sri Datar submits that for the first time nearly after six hearings the petitioner raised objection to the effect that it is not proper for the enquiry officer to proceed with the enquiry as he is biased with the enquiry officer. Throughout petitioner participated in the proceedings, as such it is not right on the part of the petitioner to contend to the effect that the enquiry officer was biased, that too, when the enquiry was almost completed. In other words, what Sri Datar tried to contend was that the petitioner having participated himself in the enquiry now it is not open to him to plead that the enquiry proceedings were vitiated because of bias. In support of his contention Sri Datar relied upon the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. G. Sarana v university of lucknow and others, AIR 1976 SC p. 2428; (2) AIR 1970 Kerala p. 142 (p. m. Kursin v P. S. raghavan and others ). For these reasons, Sri Datar submitted that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. G. Sarana v university of lucknow and others, AIR 1976 SC p. 2428; (2) AIR 1970 Kerala p. 142 (p. m. Kursin v P. S. raghavan and others ). For these reasons, Sri Datar submitted that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. ( 7 ) AFTER hearing both the counsel and on going through the pleadings and the authorities which both parties retied upon, I am of the view that the disciplinary authority was not right in imposing punishment of dismissal on the petitioner for the following reasons: (1) as far as first contention of Sri Nagaraj, in view of the appointment order dated 1-6-1981 it has to be said that the said appointment was not in contravention of Rule 24 of the service regulations. As far as charge No. 1 is concerned, as rightly contended by Sri Nagaraj it suffers from vagueness and the finding arrived at on the said charge is quite arbitrary and devoid of merit because except making an elaboration of the statement of some of the witnesses of the management, tike supervisor, peon and packing clerk, the management did not choose to examine some of the important witnesses who could have spoken about the activities of the petitioner. In similar situation dealing about charges being vague, the High Court of Delhi in the case of s. r. farishta v union of India and others, 1989 (6) slr p. 18 held as follows:"constitution of India, Articles 226 and 311 central reserve police force Act, 1949, Section 11 (1) - central reserve police force rules, 1955, Rule 27, charge-sheet/ termination - issuance of charge-sheet in connection with the neglect of duties enumeration of charges charge must be clear, specific and definite vagueness in the charge per se amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity to the delinquent. Vague can be considered as the antonym of definite. If the ground is incapable of being understood or defined with sufficient certainty, it can be called vague. It is not possible to state affirmatively more on the question of what is vague. It must vary according to facts and circumstances of each case. There cannot be a hard and fast Rule to determine vagueness. If the charge is vague, there is no reasonable opportunity to show cause and it will vitiate the inquiry proceedings. It is a fatal defect. Charge should not be vague. It must vary according to facts and circumstances of each case. There cannot be a hard and fast Rule to determine vagueness. If the charge is vague, there is no reasonable opportunity to show cause and it will vitiate the inquiry proceedings. It is a fatal defect. Charge should not be vague. If there is vague, rules of natural Justice have been violated. The charge-sheet must be specific and must set out all the necessary particulars irrespective of the fact that delinquent knew about the same. Although precision of a criminal charge is not needed but it must be clear, specific and definite. Vagueness of the charge perse amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity. Evenotherwise it is a basic principle of natural Justice that the delinquent must know the charge distinctly and clearly. Violation of such principle of natural Justice is prejudice by itself and there is no need for proof of any further prejudice. " ( 8 ) REGARDING the contention of bias, srinagaraj relied upon the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of R. S. Nayak v A. R. Antulay and another, AIR 1986 SC p. 2045, which reads as follows:"at the hearing Mr. Jethmulani for the appellant had prayed that we should give a direction to the learned chief Justice to nominate a judge other than Mehta, J. To take up the further trial of the case and this prayer has been opposed by Mr. Rao for the respondent. It is too well settled that litigants can have no say in regard to the choice of the judge before whom their lis must be heard. We have no doubt that Mehta, J. Had dealt with the matter in a fair way and there is no warrant on the facts of the case for shifting the case from him to another learned judge for trial. Recording of the prosecution evidence is almost over and but for a few more witnesses and some documents which might come, the prosecution has already laid its entire cards before the court and Mehta, J. Has, with reference to all this material, taken a view which we have reversed. Recording of the prosecution evidence is almost over and but for a few more witnesses and some documents which might come, the prosecution has already laid its entire cards before the court and Mehta, J. Has, with reference to all this material, taken a view which we have reversed. Though we have ao doubt in our mind that Mehta, J. Acted fairly and impartially in disposing of the case in the manner he did, it cannot be said that there is no scope for apprehension in the appellant's mind that his complaint may not receive adequate and proper treatment at the hands of the same learned judge who has already expressed himself one way. In these circumstances, while reiterating our opinion that we have no doubt that Mehta, J. Acted fairly and impartially and without casting any reflection whatsoever on the learned judge, we would, following the well known dictum that Justice should not only be done but must also appear to be done, request the learned chief Justice of the high court to nominate another learned judge to take up the matter from the stage at which Mehta, J. Made the impugned order. We hope the learned chief Justice will take prompt steps to nominate a learned judge to take up the trial and once such nomination is made, the learned trial judge will proceed expeditiously to dispose of the case finally. "the said decision is not applicable to the case on hand in view of the acquiescence on the part of the petitioner coupled with the authorities relied upon by Sri Datar, reported in the case of Dr. G. Sonata v university of lucknow and others, AIR 1976 SC 2428 . "the principle of natural Justice which are meant to prevent miscarriage of Justice are also applicable to domestic enquiries and administrative proceedings. One of the fundamental principles of natural Justice is that in case of quasi judicial proceedings, the authority empowered to decide the dispute between opposing parties must be one without bias by which is meant an operative prejudice, whether conscious or unconscious towards one side or the other in the dispute. What has to be seen in a case where there is an allegation of bias in respect of a member of an administrative board or body is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. What has to be seen in a case where there is an allegation of bias in respect of a member of an administrative board or body is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. In other words whether there is substantial possibility of bias animating the mind of the member against the aggrieved party. In deciding the question of bias human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct have to be taken into consideration. In a group deliberation and decision like that of selection board the members do not function as computers. Each member of the group or board is bound to influence the others more so if the member concerned is a person with special knowledge. His bias is likely to operate in a subtle manner. "another case referred upon by Dr. Nagaraj, Advocate for the petitioner is the case of olga tellis, AIR 1986 SC 180 , wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows:"the procedure prescribed by law for the deprivation of the right conferred by Article 21 must be fair, just and reasonable. Just as a mala fide act has no existence in the eye of law, even so, unreasonableness vitiates law and procedure alike. It is, therefore, essential that the procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his fundamental right must conform to the norms of Justice and fairplay. Procedure, which is unjust or unfair in the circumstances of a case, attracts the vice of unreasonableness, thereby vitiating the law which prescribes that procedure and consequently, the action taken under it. Any action taken by a public authority which is invested with statutory powers has, therefore, to be tested by the application of two standards; the action must be within the scope of the authority conferred by law and secondly, it roust be reasonable. If any action, within the scope of the authority conferred by law, is found to be unreasonable, it must mean that the procedure established by law under which that action is taken is itself unreasonable. The substance of the law cannot be divorced from the procedure which it prescribes for, how reasonable the law is, depends upon how fair is the procedure prescribed by it. The substance of the law cannot be divorced from the procedure which it prescribes for, how reasonable the law is, depends upon how fair is the procedure prescribed by it. If a law is found to direct the doing of an act which is forbidden by the Constitution or to compel, in the performance of an Act, the adoption of a procedure which is impermissible under the constitution, it would have to be struck down. " ( 9 ) FROM the above, it is clear that the procedureto be followed in an enquiry shall be fair and anjust. Any unreasonable approach vitiates the proceedings. ( 10 ) IT is very fundamental in any of the disciplinaryproceedings or for that purpose in any proceeding, if any charge is levelled against a person not only that the charge-memo should contain all the contents which the other side wants to rely upon but also supply or furnish to the other side the documents which it likes to rely upon including details of the witnesses. When it is said that Justice is not only done but seen to be done, the enquiry officer should not have taken the petitioner by surprise but he should have given an opportunity of hearing. Whenever a request is made to supply certain documents or permit him to examine some of the witnesses it is the duly of the enquiry officer to allow such request unless the request so made was with an intention to drag on the proceeding or impossible to comply with. In the instant case, inspite of mafic request made by the petitioner neither the documents which he wanted were supplied nor he was permitted to examine some of the witnesses. Hence, it has to be said the enquiry is vitiated for not considering the request of the petitioner for supplying the documents and failure to permit the petitioner to examine the witnesses. This view of mine finds a basis on the earlier thinking of both the Supreme Court and the other high courts, in the case of shiv datt sharma, AIR 1962 punjab 355, it has been held as follows: (paras 11,14 and 16)"the counsel then contended that on 9- 12-1958 a request was made to the enquiry officer to summon some documents in support of this contention. Reference has been made to paragraph 13 of the petition. Reference has been made to paragraph 13 of the petition. In this paragraph, it is stated that the documents which were summoned were meant to show that the managing director while acting as an official liquidator, got certain amounts credited to his personal account. This evidence, according to the petitioner was relevant to the charges under enquiry. The enquiry officer refused to summon these records. In my opinion, the refusal on the part of the enquiry officer to summon the records in question do not show that he was so much biased against the petitioner as to be unfit to hold an enquiry. It may be stated that the managing director was not on the trial in those proceedings and that the refusal on the part of the enquiry officer cannot be held to be a decision which was not arrived at honestly. I am not called upon to, and I need not, in these proceedings, go into the correctness or otherwise of the grounds for refusal on the merits, for, I am not sitting as a court of appeal against that order. The learned Advocate general has submitted that the enquiry officer had no power to summon those witnesses. Sri Nehra has on the other hand submitted with equal force that the enquiry officer had full power to summon the employees of the bank to appear before him in those proceedings. In my opinion, in the present case, it was only fit and proper for the enquiry officer, even if he had no power himself, to summon the witnesses to ask the managing director to direct those eight witnesses to appear before him for the purpose or examination in the enquiry. To expect the petitioner to produce those witnesses on his own responsibility was, in my opinion, not only highly improper but was perverse and unjustified on the facts and circumstances of the present case. It dearly tended to reduce the opportunity offered to the petitioner to produce the defence to a farce and an empty formality. The subsequent refusal by way of protest on the part of the petitioner to produce any defence cannot legalize or justify the refusal on the part of the enquiry officer to assist the petitioner in securing the appearance of the defence witnesses. The subsequent refusal by way of protest on the part of the petitioner to produce any defence cannot legalize or justify the refusal on the part of the enquiry officer to assist the petitioner in securing the appearance of the defence witnesses. Before parting with the case, I hope the enquiry officer would reconsider with an open mind the question of summoning the other defence witnesses as well if the petitioner makes out a case for their production because it is one of the elementary principles that a person proceeded against must feel that he is being given a fair impartial treatment. " ( 11 ) IT is also not in dispute that when a punishment hasto be inflicted on the basis of a report the findings given thereon shall be specific and definite. But in the instant case, the enquiry officer on the material made available came to the conclusion that charges 1, 7 and 8 as proved though they are of trivial in nature, that too, the evidence adduced was not convincing in nature. The findings given on the basis of the evidence adduced shall be reasonable. But, if the evidence adduced by both sides is taken note of, it has to be said that the findings of the enquiry officer are quite arbitrary. ( 12 ) THE report of the enquiry officer has also to be held as perverse, in that, the enquiry officer without noticing to hold that charges levelled against the delinquent officer as proved the management should have examined some of the responsible persons of the corporation, instead of placing reliance on the statements of a peon, a packing clerk and a supervisor, who were either unconnected with any of the charges levelled against the petitioner or at no time informed the management about the so-called activities of the petitioner which were prejudicial to the interest of the management. Thus, non-examination of some of the important witnesses of the corporation, though available on the date of enquiry, is fatal. ( 13 ) REGARDING non-supply of enquiry report,of course service regulations are silent, but the principles of natural Justice demand that before passing an order atleast one more opportunity shoulcfhave been given to the delinquent official in -order to putforth his case more effectively. ( 13 ) REGARDING non-supply of enquiry report,of course service regulations are silent, but the principles of natural Justice demand that before passing an order atleast one more opportunity shoulcfhave been given to the delinquent official in -order to putforth his case more effectively. Non-compliance of the same made the order of dismissal contrary to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and this court in number of cases. (I) in the case of a. k. narayana rao, 1969 (1) KAR. Lj. 588 a division bench of this court has held as follows: "where the railway servant made a request to the concerned authority for copies of the proceedings and the findings recorded in the preliminary enquiry preceding the disciplinary proceedings, refusal to supply copies, would vitiate the punishment. " From the above, it is clear that furnishing of entire material to the delinquent official which the disciplinary authority relies upon is a must. (ii) the Supreme Court in the case of surath chandra chakravarthy, AIR 1971 SC 752 , while dealing with the situation wherein failure to supply statement of allegations resulting in removal of an employee, held as void and inoperative. The Supreme Court has observed as follows: "rule 55 embodies a principle which is one of the basic contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him. The whole object of furnishing the statement of allegations is to give all the necessary particulars and details which would satisfy the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to put up defence. The whole object of furnishing the statement of allegations is to give all the necessary particulars and details which would satisfy the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to put up defence. So, inspite of the government servant repeatedly objecting to the vagueness of charges and non-furnishing of statement of allegations, the failure to supply him the facts, circumstances and particulars relevant to the charges even at the stage of second show cause notice would amount to denial of proper and reasonable opportunity of defending himself in complete disregard of Rule 55," (iii) similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of s. l. kapoor v jagmohan and others, AIR 1981 SC 136 , wherein it held as follows: "thus on a consideration of the entire material placed before us we do not have any doubt that the New Delhi municipal committee was never put on notice of any action proposed to be taken under Section 238 of the punjab Municipal Act and no opportunity was given to the municipal committee to explain any fact or circumstance on the basis (of which) that action was proposed. If there was any correspondence between the New Delhi municipal committee and any other authority about the subject matter or any of the allegations, if information was given and gathered it was for entirely different purposes. In our view, the requirements of natural Justice are met only if opportunity to represent is given in view of proposed action. The demands of natural Justice are not met even if the very person proceeded against has furnished the information on which the action is based, if it is furnished in a casual way or for some other purpose. We do not suggest that the opportunity need be a 'double opportunity' that is, one opportunity on the factual allegations and another on the proposed penalty. Both may be rolled into one. But the person proceeded against must know that he is being required to meet the allegations which might lead to a certain action being taken against him. If that is made known the requirements are met. Both may be rolled into one. But the person proceeded against must know that he is being required to meet the allegations which might lead to a certain action being taken against him. If that is made known the requirements are met. " (iv) even recently the Supreme Court in the case of union of India and others v mohammed ramzan khan, AIR 1991 SC 471 has held as follows: "at the hearing some argument had been advanced on the basis of Article 14 of the constitution, namely, that in one set of cases arising out of disciplinary proceedings furnishing of the copy of the inquiry report would be insisted upon while in the other it would not be. This argument has no foundation inasmuch as where the disciplinary authority is the enquiry officer there is no report. He becomes the first assessing authority to consider the evidence directly for finding out whether the delinquent is guilty and liable to be punished. Even otherwise, the inquiries which are directly handled by the disciplinary authority and those which are allowed to be handled by the inquiry officer can easily be classified into two separate grounds one, where there is no inquiry report on account of the fact that the disciplinary authority is the inquiry officer and inquiries where there is a report on account of the fact that an officer other than the disciplinary authority has been constituted as the inquiry officer. That itself would be a reasonable classification keeping away the application of Article 14 of the constitution. " "we make it clear that wherever there has been an inquiry officer and he has furnished a report to the disciplinary authority at the conclusion of the inquiry holding the delinquent guilty of all or any of the charges with proposal for any particular punishment or not, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of such report and will also be entitled to make a representation against it, if he so desires, and non-furnishing of the report would amount to violation of rules of natural Justice and make the final order liable to be challenged hereafter. " It is also imperative that when an enquiry is initiated the inquiry authority shall strictly follow the principles as contemplated to hold an enquiry as otherwise the entire enquiry proceedings will be vitiated. " It is also imperative that when an enquiry is initiated the inquiry authority shall strictly follow the principles as contemplated to hold an enquiry as otherwise the entire enquiry proceedings will be vitiated. Stressing the need of observance of the procedure as prescribed the Supreme Court in the case of b. s. minhas v Indian statistical institute and others, AIR 1984 SC 363 , has held as follows: "an executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged. Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. This judicially evolved Rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with that sword. " The aforesaid principle laid down by Mr. Justice frankfurter in vitarelli v seaton, (1959)3 law ed. 2d 1012 has been accepted as applicable in India by this court in as. Ahluwalia v punjab state, (1975)3 SCR 82 ; AIR 1975 SC 984 , and in subsequent decision given in sukhdev v bhagatram, (1975)3 SCR 619 ; AIR 1975 SC 1331 . Mathew J. Quoted the above referred observation of Mr. Justice frankfurter with approval. ( 14 ) THE contention of Sri Datar that as far as the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of mohammed ramzan khan, AIR 1991 SC p. 471 have no application to the present case for the reason that the said decision is prospective and not retrospective in nature. I am unable to accept the said contention for the simple reason that the proceedings were initiated as far back in 1981 and the order of dismissal was passed in the year 1985. The order under challenge in the decision referred to above was the one relating to the year 1982-83, whereas the order challenged in this writ petition was of 1985. Neither authorities relied upon by Shri h. b. datar, relevancy to the case nor there is any merit in his contentions made in support of order of dismissal of the petitioner. Thus, for the above reasons, it has to be said that the enquiry in question is vitiated for non-compliance of principles of natural justice. Neither authorities relied upon by Shri h. b. datar, relevancy to the case nor there is any merit in his contentions made in support of order of dismissal of the petitioner. Thus, for the above reasons, it has to be said that the enquiry in question is vitiated for non-compliance of principles of natural justice. ( 15 ) IN view of paucity of sufficient material produced in support of charges levelled against the petitioner, it has to be said that punishment imposed on the petitioner is disproportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner. When it is said that in the instant case not observed compliance of principles of natural Justice is writ large and the punishment imposed is disproportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner and the findings arrived at run contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court and this court, it has to be held that the order of dismissal as arbitrary and illegal. ( 16 ) FOR the reasons stated above, this writ petition is allowed and the order of dismissal passed by the respondent-management is set aside with a direction that the petitioner shall be reinstated in service with continuity of service. Regarding back-wages, in view of the memo filed by the petitioner that in future he would not resort to any sort of activities which will be in the nature of unbecoming of a manager of the corporation, it is ordered that the respondent shall pay to the petitioner 40% of the salary from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement and that amount shall be paid after calculating the year-wise entitlement. Reinstatement shall take effect from 1-7-1991 and the payment of 40% of the salary ordered now shall be paid to the petitioner by the management on or before 15-7-1991. No costs. --- *** --- .