Judgment :- RAJU, J. The above tax cases are all appeals filed by the various assessees against the order of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes made in exercise of suo motu powers of revision whereunder the Commissioner set aside the orders passed by the appellate authority and ordered the restoration of the order passed by the assessing authority. The cases are dealt with in common since they involve identical questions of law and facts and submissions also have been made in common by the counsel. 2. The relevant factual details necessary for the purposes of considering the appeals before us are as follows : The appellants, who are the assessees, were engaged during the relevant assessment periods in question in the business of fabricating and supplying mild steel iron grills to the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board for use in the manufacture of RCC poles required by the electricity system to carry on their main lines. Originally, when assessments were made under section12 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, hereinafter referred to as "the Act", the various assessees claimed that what they supplied to the electricity system were only mild steel rods and rounds purchased in their turn by them and made in the form of grills to suit the purposes of the Electricity Board and, therefore, they were second sales and not liable to tax under the Act in their hands. The said stand was accepted by the assessing officer and exemption claimed was allowed. Subsequently, the inspection of the business place of the assessees and some of their branches disclosed certain vital materials and records relating to the supply of the said goods to the Electricity Board. Among such records were the purchase orders placed by the Electricity Board on he dealers and the bills issued by the dealers themselves which disclosed that the dealers had fabricated and supplied grills as fabricated by them in terms of the specification given by the Electricity Board for their use in the manufacture of RCC poles by the Electricity Board. The assessing authority, in the light of the said materials, initiated proceedings in exercise of the powers under section16 of the Act to bring to assessment the turnover which escaped assessment as referred to supra. The assessing authority, in the light of the said materials, initiated proceedings in exercise of the powers under section16 of the Act to bring to assessment the turnover which escaped assessment as referred to supra. In the said proceedings, it was contended by the assessees that they purchased M.S. rounds and rods locally, made changes in the materials as required by the Electricity Board in their purchase order and that the materials in spite of such changes effected, continued to be iron and steel and had not undergone any change. It was also their contention that in effect the sales by them to the Electricity Board were of M.S. rounds and rods locally purchased by them with mere alterations in their shape. Overruling the objections, the assessing authority confirmed the proposals and brought to assessment the turnover which escaped tax at the time of the earlier assessment. Appeals were filed before the appellate authority. In addition to reiterating the submissions that the supplies effected by the assessees to the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board were in substance second sales of mild steel M.S. rods and rounds, in some of the cases certain factual discrepancies were also pointed out. The plea questioning the jurisdiction of the assessing authority for invoking the provisions of section16 of the Act was rejected by the appellate authority. But at the same time, relaying, upon an earlier decision of the Appellate Tribunal, Additional Bench at Coimbatore, the appellate authority came to the conclusion that what the assessees supplied in the form of grills were only M.S. rounds and rods falling under item 4 of the Second Schedule to the Act and consequently they stood exempt from tax by virtue of their being the second sales. It is the said orders passed by the appellate authority that was the subject-matter of suo motu proceedings by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in exercise of the powers under section34 of the Act. 3. It is the said orders passed by the appellate authority that was the subject-matter of suo motu proceedings by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in exercise of the powers under section34 of the Act. 3. Before the revisional authority, pursuant to the notices issued by the said authority, the assessees contended that commercially the goods supplied by the assessees to the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board in the form of grills continued to be M.S. rods and rounds only and that so long as they retained their identity as such, their supplies should be taken to be second sales of M.S. rods and rounds and, therefore, exempt from the levy of sales tax in their hands. Overruling the contentions of the assessees, it was held that inasmuch as with the steel M.S. rods and rounds the assessee fabricated grills of a particular size and shape adopting a particular technique, the resultant grills, which were ultimately supplied, were commercially different from the steel M.S. rods and rounds purchased by them and, therefore, the assessing authority was right in subjecting them to tax and that the appellate authority committed an error in treating the sales of the assessees as merely second sales of steel M.S. rounds and rods. Aggrieved, the assessees have filed the above tax appeals. 4. Mr. C. Venkataraman, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the assessees/applicants, while reiterating the submissions before the authorities below, submitted that what was supplied by the assessees to the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board was in fact and substance steel M.S. rods and rounds with certain modification in their shape, that there was no change in the commercial identity of the steel M.S. rods and rounds purchased by them when they again resold them to the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board in the form of grills and inasmuch as the revising authority itself was conscious of the fact that the goods did not undergo any manufacturing process in their hands after their purchase, no interference was called for with the orders of the appellate authority which took into account the nature of the transaction in the light of an earlier decision of the Additional Bench of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. The learned counsel relied upon the decisions reported in 1968 (22) STC 294 (Bom) (Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Amar Wire & Rolling Mills), 1974 (33) STC 292 (Cal) (Phanindra Nath Manna and Company v. Commercial Tax Officer) and 1976 AIR(SC) 800, 1976 (2) SCR 168, 1983 (13) ELT 1582 , 1976 (37) STC 319, 1976 (1) SCC 834 , 1976 (3) SCR 168 , 1976 UPTC 282, 1976 (5) CTR 278, 1976 TaxLR 1519, 1976 CTR(SC) 278, 1976 SCC(Tax) 102 (SC) (State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra) in support of his plea. 5. The decision in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Amar Wire & Rolling Mills (supra) was that of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court whereunder it was held that mild steel round bars and mild steel flat bars fabricated by a re-rolling mills from mild steel materials purchased by it from registered dealers, and subjected to the process of bending at either end or drilling of holes in order to facilitate their use in concreting work, do not cease to be steel bars and would fall within the scope of clause (c) of entry 3 of Part I of Schedule B to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. The Bombay High Court came to the said conclusion in that case with reference to the nature of treatment and process to which the steel in question was subjected to and the High Court proceeded to concur with the factual finding rendered by the Tribunal that the process of bending or drilling of holes alone did not have the effect of rendering the steel purchased by them a different commercial article. 6. In Phanindra Nath Manna and Company v. Commercial Tax Officer 1974 (33) STC 292 , a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court held that that galvanised iron sheets meant both plain iron sheets as well as corrugated galvanised iron sheets and if flat iron sheets are covered by entry "G.I. sheets", they did not cease to be so by mere alteration of shape by corrugation, inasmuch as the process of corrugation is one of mere alteration of shape and it does not make galvanised iron sheets a different article or product of iron. As in the other case, the views expressed in the above decision of the Calcutta High Court turned on the peculiar nature of the process to which the goods purchased by the assessees in that case have been subjected to. 7. The decision next referred to was one of the Supreme Court reported in (as) State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra (supra). In the said case, the assessees used to purchase iron scrap and thereafter used to convert them into steel rounds, flats, plates, etc., and the scrap was already subject to tax once. That being the position, when the transactions were subjected to tax once again, the assesses contended that the entry "iron and steel" was wide enough to include scrap as well as the steel rounds, flats, plates, etc., made out of the scrap which was subject to tax once and that, therefore, the sales of the steel rounds, flats, plates, etc., cannot be subjected to tax once again. This Court sustained the plea of the assessees and the Revenue took up the matter on appeal before the Supreme Court. While allowing the appeals, the apex Court declared the principles governing the matter of interpretation of the entry "iron and steel" as hereunder. "If the object was to make iron and steel taxable as a substance, the entry could have been : 'Goods of iron and steel'. Perhaps even this would not have been clear enough. The entry, to clearly have that meaning, would have to be : 'Iron and steel irrespective of change of form or shape or character of goods made out of them'. This is the very unusual meaning which the respondents would like us to adopt. If that was the meaning, sales tax law itself would undergo a change from being a law which normally taxes sales of 'goods' to a law which taxes sales of substances out of which goods are made. We, however, prefer the more natural and normal interpretation which follows plainly from the fact of separate specification and numbering of each item. This means that each item so specified forms a separate species for each series of sales although they may all belong to the genus : 'Iron and steel'. We, however, prefer the more natural and normal interpretation which follows plainly from the fact of separate specification and numbering of each item. This means that each item so specified forms a separate species for each series of sales although they may all belong to the genus : 'Iron and steel'. Hence, if iron and steel 'plates' are melted and converted into 'wire' and then sold in the market, such wire would only be taxable once so long as it retains its identity as commercial goods belonging to the category 'wire' made of either iron or steel. The mere fact that the substance or raw material out of which it is made has also been taxed in some other form, when it was sold as a separate commercial commodity, would make no difference for purposes of the law of sales tax. The object appears to us to be to tax sales of goods of each variety and not the sale of the substance out of which they are made.As we all know, sales tax law is intended to tax sales of different commercial commodities and not to tax the production or manufacture of particular substances out of which these commodities may have been made. As soon as separate commercial commodities emerge or come into existence, they become separately taxable goods or entities for purposes of sales tax. Where commercial goods, without change of their identity as such goods, are merely subjected to some processing or finishing or are merely joined together, they may remain commercially the same goods which cannot be taxed again, in a series of sales, so long as they retain their identity as goods of a particular type." * 8. Regarding the tests to be applied, the apex Court in the very same judgment held as follows : "It is true that the question whether goods to be taxed have been subjected to a manufacturing process so as to produce a new marketable commodity, is the decisive test in determining whether an excise duty is leviable or not on certain goods. No doubt, in the law dealing with the sales tax, the taxable even is the sale and not the manufacture of goods. No doubt, in the law dealing with the sales tax, the taxable even is the sale and not the manufacture of goods. Nevertheless, if the question is whether a new commercial commodity has come into existence or not, so that its sale is a new taxable event, in the sales tax law, it may also become necessary to consider whether a manufacturing process, which has altered the identity of the commercial commodity, has taken place. The law of sales tax is also concerned with 'goods' of various descriptions. It, therefore, becomes necessary to determine when they ceased to be goods of one taxable description and become those of a commercially different category and description. It appears to us that the position has been simplified by the amendment of the law, as indicated above, so that each of the categories falling under 'iron and steel' constitutes a new species of commercial commodity more clearly now. If follows that when one commercial commodity is transformed into another, it becomes a separate commodity for purposes of sales tax." * Relying upon the said ratio, learned counsel for the assessees in the present case contended that so long as the processing by the assesses did not result in the production of a different commercial product, the sales by them were of the same goods purchased by them from market and are not subject to tax once again in their hands, their sales being the second sales. 9. Mr. R. Lokapriya, learned counsel appearing for the Revenue, contended that the order of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes is quite in accordance with law and the principles laid down by this Court in the light of the decision of the apex Court in P. L. Malhotra's case (supra), and as such the same does not call for any interference in these proceedings. 10. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the various judicial pronouncements placed before us and also to the nature of processing that has been undertaken by the assessees in respect of the steel M.S. rounds and rods and we are of the opinion that the view taken by the revisional authority and the findings rendered do not suffer from any infirmity warranting our interference in the above tax appeals. In State of Tamil Nadu v. S. Syam Steel Rolling Mills (P.) Ltd. 1977 (40) STC 156 , 1977 (6) CTR 283 a Division Bench of this Court considered a similar issue in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in P. L. Malhotra's case (supra) and came to the conclusion that once the identity is lost and a different commercial commodity emerges as a result of manufacturing process or as a result of any other process, the resultant commodity cannot be said to be the same commodity as the one from which it resulted and claim for exemption as second sales in such circumstances cannot be sustained. In that case, the court came to be conclusion that M.S. angles and M.S. squares, which were made out of M.S. rounds are not one and the same and the fact that M.S. rounds purchased by them suffered tax does not render the M.S. angles and M.S. squares eligible for exemption. In Arkay's National Engineering and Foundry Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu 1980 (46) STC 394 , this Court held that M.S. bar cuttings obtained in the process of cutting M.S. rods purchased locally after paying local tax are scrap and as such really lost its original identity and therefore the benefit of single point levy in terms of section 4 was not available to sales of such scrap. 11. We have been taken through some of the sample purchase orders issued by the Tamil Electricity Board and the bills raised therefor, as against the supplies of M.S. grills effected by the various assessees. The conditions as well as the special conditions pertaining to the transactions in question give sufficient details regarding the processing required to be undertaken by the various assessees and the description of the goods to be supplied with details of their specification and standard or quality. No special significance can be made to the advantage of the assessees merely because the Commissioner in the order has stated that it is not the stand of the department that there was a manufacturing process. The further conclusion that "the reason for the department to bring to tax the turnover is that the grills fabricated were commercially different from rods and bars" * cannot be lost sight of. The further conclusion that "the reason for the department to bring to tax the turnover is that the grills fabricated were commercially different from rods and bars" * cannot be lost sight of. Having regard to the nature of the processing undertaken, the revising authority appear to have thought that it was more appropriate and proper to categorise the same as "fabrication" rather than "manufacture". That apart, there is nothing in the order which militates against the finding of the revising authority that as a consequence of the fabricating process, a different and distinct commodity has come into existence and it was no longer, after such fabrication, merely steel M.S. rounds and rods. On going through the nature of the goods supplied, the name ascribed to the same in common parlance by those who are concerned with the same, the altogether different use to which the goods fabricated by the assessees are to be put and the nature of the fabricating process that has been undertaken, we have no hesitation in holding that the resultant products fabricated and supplied by the assessees known as "M.S. grills" for use in manufacture of RCC poles by the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, are not the same as M.S. rounds and rods purchased by the assessees locally and that they are commercially and trade-wise a different product altogether. The assessing authority as well as the revising authority, in our view, was right in subjecting those transactions to sales tax holding that they are not eligible to the benefit of single point levy under Schedule II read with section4 of the Act. Consequently, we are not persuaded to agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants and the plea in this regard fails and shall stand rejected. 12. Learned counsel made a feeble attempt to challenge the order on the ground that the same has been passed after the period of limitation stipulated under section34 of the Act for the exercise of powers of suo motu revision. No doubt, the provisions of the Act as it stood at the relevant and material point of time, ordained that the Board shall not pass an order if more than five years have expired after the passing of the order sought to be revised. No doubt, the provisions of the Act as it stood at the relevant and material point of time, ordained that the Board shall not pass an order if more than five years have expired after the passing of the order sought to be revised. The grievance of the appellants appears to be that though the order has been claimed to have been passed on September 1, 1980, the same appears to have been passed on a later date and corrected as September 1, 1980 to make it within limitation. We are afraid that we can countenance such a plea on behalf of the appellants. As a matter of fact, to an objection raised on the plea of bar of limitation before the revisional authority itself, we find that the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes himself has adverted to this aspect in paragraph 7 of the order questioned in these appeal proceedings and the Commissioner has rendered a finding that inasmuch as the common order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was dated September 2, 1975, under section34 of the Act the Board has time to pass orders up to September 2, 1980 and that, therefore, the bar of limitation cannot be countenanced. This itself belies the claim of the appellants that the order has been passed later and got corrected. That apart, the legality and regularity of official acts and proceedings have to be normally presumed, unless the contra has been established with clinching and substantive material. On the facts of the case, nothing has been brought to our notice to discredit the claim that the order of the revisional authority was passed as a matter of fact on September 1, 1980, well within the period of limitation of five years. This submission of the counsel for the appellants also fails. 13. Learned counsel tried to make a submission that while reassessing the transactions in question, the figures adopted show that they were imaginary rather than real and based on records. Even on this aspect, no substantial material worth consideration has been brought to our notice to sustain such a factual plea notwithstanding the fact that the proceedings before us are appeals. Learned counsel tried to make a submission that while reassessing the transactions in question, the figures adopted show that they were imaginary rather than real and based on records. Even on this aspect, no substantial material worth consideration has been brought to our notice to sustain such a factual plea notwithstanding the fact that the proceedings before us are appeals. In the absence of proper, sufficient and relevant material, even if it be an appeal, we cannot render any findings on such basic factual averments and claims and we are not persuaded to agree with the plea of the counsel for the appellants on this ground also. 14. For what all has been said above, we see no merit in the above tax appeals which, therefore, fail and shall stand dismissed; but in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.