Judgment Sachchidanand Jha, J. 1. This revision under Sec.14 (8) of the Bihar buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (herein after referred to as the "act") by the defendant is directed against an order for his eviction from the suit premises. 2. The plaintiff instituted Eviction Suit No.6 of 1985 for eviction of the defendant-petitioner on the ground of personal necessity. The defence set up by the defendant, inter alia, was denial of landlord-tenant relationship. The defendant, in fact, claimed title in respect of the suit premises, which is a shop, on the basis of a Hukumnama. 3. For the purpose of disposal of this revision, it is not necessary to set out in detail the pleadiags of the parties. The court below on the basis of evidence led on behalf of the parties, disbelieved the defendants case regarding right, title and possession on the basis of Hukumnama and has found the existence of relationship of landalord and tenant between the parties. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner attempted to challenge the said finding. The finding recorded by the court below as to the landlord-tenant relationship is a finding of fact recorded on consideration of the entire evidence and materials after a detailed discussion thereof and I see no reason to interfere with the aforesaid finding of fact in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 4. Learned counsel next submitted that the finding recorded by the trial court regarding the personal necessity of the plaintiff is not in accordance with law. In this connection, he has drawn my attention to the averments made in the plaint, particularly those in para-9, to show that the object of eviction is not the own occupation of the plaintiff, but reconstruction of the building as per a new design for cammercial purposes as well as residential purposes and as such the alleged ground is not in conformity with Sec.11 (1) (c ). It was submitted that, in any view, the need of the plaintiff cannot be said to be reasonable and bonafide. It was submitted that, in any view, the need of the plaintiff cannot be said to be reasonable and bonafide. It would be useful to quote Para-9 of the plaint, which runs as follows : "that the shop room in question and other rooms on the land have all become very old and are in a delapidated condition and the plaintiff intends to demolish the structure and build new rooms thereon according to the new design suited for commercial as well as residential purposes. " 5. In my opinion, the averments in Para-9 do support the contention of the counsel on behalf of the petitioner as aforesaid. The relevant part of clause (c) of Sec.11 (1) of the Act, containing the ground of personal necessity, is as follows :- "where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord. " 6. This Court in the case of Binapani Sarkar V/s. Inderdeo Singh, AIR 1972 Pat.383, while considering a similar question held, as follows :- "under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act), requirement by a landlord for remodelling or leconstructing the house is not a ground for eviction of the tenant. Sub-clause (a) of Sec.11 (1) of the Act provides for eviction of a tenant only where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord. " A similar view appears to have been taken by this Court in the case of H. S. Ansari V/s. Mabhoob Hasan, 1982 BLJR 579. 7 Mr. Ram Balak Mahto, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-opposite party, on the other hand, submitted that the finding recorded by the court below on the question of personal necessity is a finding of fact which cannot be disturbed under Sec.14 (8) of the Act. According to the learned counsel, the jurisdiction of this Court under Sec.14 (8) is limited to "satisfying itself that an order under the section is according to law. According to the learned counsel, the jurisdiction of this Court under Sec.14 (8) is limited to "satisfying itself that an order under the section is according to law. " He has, in this context, relied on the following passage from a judgment of the bombay High Court, which was quoted with approval in the case of Hari shankar V/s. Giridhari Lal, AIR 1963 SC 698 , wherein more or less similar provision had fallen for consideration :- "the object of Sec.25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law. The section does enumerate the cases in which the court may interfere in revision, as does Sec.115 of the code of Civil Procedure, and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference ; but in the instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the Court which made the order had no jurisdiction or in which the court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted or casee where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has act and a proper trial according to law, then the court can interfere. But, in my opinion, the court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrive (at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at. " I am afraid, the observations of their Lordships do not lend any support whatsoever to the contention. So far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned, as a matter of fact, it really enlarges the scope of revision compared to the provisions of Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is true that in a case where two views on the basis of the evidence are possible the High Court is precluded from taking a different view merely because "it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may arrive at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at. " The position in the present case however, is entirely different. " The position in the present case however, is entirely different. The moot question for consideration in the instant case is whether on the pleadings of the plaintiff any ground of eviction in conformity with Clause (e) of Sec.11 (1) or under any other clause thereof is made out or not In my opinion the test for answering the question on the facts of the case is whether the repairs/ reconstruction which are sought to be made in the building are incidental to occupation by the plaintiff or are aimed at construction a new building altogether. To illustrate, if a house, which is in a dilopidated condition, is reasonably and in good faith is required for the own occupation of the plaintiff, it can certainly be said that repairs would be incidental to the occupation or living in the house. On the other hand, if the object is demolition of the house and in its place construction of a new building according to now design it would be difficult to hold that such reconstruction would be merely incidental. The test in my opinion further would be as to whether such repairs/reconstruction are the primary object or only incidental. In the former case, it would not be in conformity with Clause (c), while in the later it would be covered by the aforesaid provision. Where the findings of fact are recorded and an order lor eviction is passed on the basis of pleading which is not germane to the provisions of Sec.11, the order would be without jurisdiction and this Court would be within its jurisdiction to interfere, 8. Learned counsel appearing on behaif of the opposite party also placed reliance on a judgment reported in 1979 BBCJ 541 . wherein it has been held that where the building is required for personal occupation on getting the same remodelled or reconstructed, the primary object is to occupy the building and reconstruction or remodelling is only incidental. It would appear that in that case the decision of this Court in the case of Binapani sarkar (supra) was noticed and the same was distinguished on the facts of the case in the following terms :- "but here the plaintiff did not require the house primarily for reconstruction or for remodelling, i he prime object of the plaintiff in getting possession of the suit premises was to establish his son in business. If incidentally, the premises had to be remodelled or reconstructed then there does mean that the decree for eviction was sought for on the ground of remodelling or reconstruction. " 9. The decision in each case has to rest on the evidence and the case of the parties. Having regard to the averment in regard to the need of the plaintiff, as set out in Para-9 of the plaint, I am of the opinion that the primary object of eviction is not the own occupation of the plaintiff, but reconstruction of the building according to a new design for commercial as well as residential purposes. It is well known that mere use of phraseology constiuting the ground of personal necessity is not conclusive and the court has to satisfy itself that the ground is genuine and not a pretence. 10. For the reasons stated above, I am of the view that the plaintiff is not eptitled to a decree for eviction in the present suit as the alleged ground does not conform to the conditions of Clause (c) of Sec.11 (1) of the act under which the suit had been filed of any other clause thereof and as such the order directing his eviction is not according to law. 11. In the result the impugned order dated 7-9-1988 is set aside and the application is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Application allowed.