JUDGMENT : H.H. Kantharia, J.—As these three writ petitions arise out of identical orders made by the Industrial Court, Pune, on identical facts and circumstances, they are heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment with the consent of the advocates appearing on both sides. 2. The first respondent in all the three writ petitions were working in the Central Fruit Nursery of the petitioners at Puntamba in Ahmednagar District continuously for a period of 13 years, 10 years and 8 years, respectively. Their duties were to raise seedlings, grafting to various trees bearing fruits and sell the same to the cultivators. This work belonging to the petitioners was going on continuously for 30 years and more. For the purpose of the said nursery activity, the petitioners had in their possession irrigated land. They used to engage labourers on daily wage basis for operating oil engines, watering plants, cultivating the land, watching and guarding plants, etc. and the first respondents were engaged as labourers on daily wages and they had continuously worked there for 13 years, 10 years and 8 years, respectively, as stated above. Despite the first respondents so working for such a long time they were not made permanent and, therefore, they filed unfair labour practice complaints in the Industrial Court at Pune charging the petitioners for committing unfair labour practice covered by Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the MRTU & PULP Act'). 3. The unfair labour practice complaints were resisted by the petitioners contending that grafting and seedling work was provided to the cultivators with Title element of income and the first respondents, in all the three writ petitions, were working only as casual labourers seasonally depending upon the exigencies of work. The petitioners also contended in the written statement that there was no continuity of service put in by the first respondents even as casual labourers and consequently there was no need to make the first respondents permanent and as such the petitioners had not committed unfair labour practice as alleged against them. 4. The petitioners also contended in the written statement that there was no continuity of service put in by the first respondents even as casual labourers and consequently there was no need to make the first respondents permanent and as such the petitioners had not committed unfair labour practice as alleged against them. 4. Both sides adduced oral evidence in the Trial Court on consideration of which the learned Member of the Industrial Court came to the conclusion that though daily rated workmen, the first respondents were doing work that was of a permanent nature and for long uninterrupted period and as such there was no reason why they should not be made permanent employees. The learned Judge accordingly by his identical orders dated August 31, 1983 declared that in not making the first respondents permanent, the petitioners engaged in unfair labour practice covered by Item 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act and directed them to cease and desist from indulging in such unfair labour practice and ordered them to make the first respondents permanent as Class-IV servants in the category of mazdoors in the concerned department of the petitioners effective from August 1, 1982 and they should be paid wages and other benefits on the footing that they were permanent mazdoors in the employment of the petitioners. 5. Being aggrieved, the petitioners invoked the supervisory writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution by filing the present writ petitions. 6. At the hearing of these writ petitions, Mr. Kerkar, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, urged that the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the labour practice complaints as the first respondents were not workmen and further that the activities carried on by the petitioners were of seasonal nature and the paramount intention of the petitioners was to give work to the casual workmen who were not in the permanent employment of the petitioners. Controverting such arguments, Miss Sarnaik submitted that the activities for which the first respondents were working could be seasonal but the employment in which they were engaged was not seasonal but of permanent nature. Further submission of Miss Sarnaik is that it is too late in the day to say that the first respondents were not workmen and that the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the unfair labour practice complaints. 7. Further submission of Miss Sarnaik is that it is too late in the day to say that the first respondents were not workmen and that the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the unfair labour practice complaints. 7. I find no substance in both the arguments of Mr. Kerkar for the simple reason that in the type of activity which the petitioners were engaged in, they had engaged the first respondents as labourers for various operations connected with the fruit nursery activity of the petitioners for continuous period of 13, 10 and 8 years. The nature of the work carried on by the first respondents were permanent, although they were working on daily wage basis. The argument of Mr. Kerkar that the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the unfair labour practice complaints as the first respondents were not workmen has to be stated only to be rejected, inasmuch as it was the contention of the petitioners that the first respondents were casual workmen. And it is important to note that a casual workman does not cease to be a workman. I, therefore, find no error apparent on the face of the record in the impugned orders passed by the learned Member of the Industrial Court in holding that the first respondents were doing the work of permanent nature and they were the daily rated workmen employed by the petitioners. Although the first respondents wanted to be in the category of permanent workmen effective from the date on which they had completed one year of continuous service, the learned Trial Judge made them permanent with effect from August 1, 1982 about which no grievance was made by the first respondents. 8. Be that as it may, the most important point to be noted here is that it has been stated at the Bar that the petitioners have given effect to the orders passed by the Industrial Court and have made the first respondents permanent from the year 1984 effective from August 1, 1982 and are being given wages and other benefits in their positions as permanent workmen employed by the petitioners. Under the circumstances, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned orders made by the Industrial Court. 9. In the result, all the three writ petitions fail and they stand rejected. Under the circumstances, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned orders made by the Industrial Court. 9. In the result, all the three writ petitions fail and they stand rejected. Rule in each of the writ petitions thus stands discharged but with no order as to costs.