Judgment B. Prasad, J. 1. This appeal, by defendant No.1, is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 4-3-1985 (decree signed on 15-3-1985) passed by Shri L Oraon, Subordinate Judge, Janishedpur, in T. S. No.8 of 1982, whereby and whereunder the learned Subordinate Judge, decreed the suit in part against both the defendants directing them to remove all structures and fitting from the suit premises and to give khas vacant possession of schedule a lard to the plaintiff-respondent No.1 within three months from the date of the judgment. Further the defendants were directed to pay the arrears of rent for the months of April and May, 1981, at the rate of rs.60-/ per month and also to pay compensation at the rate of Rs.60/- per month from 1-6-1981 onwards till they give khas vacant, possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff after removing all the structures and fittings therefrom. 2. It appears that the present respondent No.1 was the sole plaintiff in the suit. The present appellant was defendant No. \ and respondent no.2 was defendant No.2 in the suit. The suit was brought for a decree for khas possession of the rented premises fully described in Schedule a of the plaint after getting the structures and fittings of Defendant No.1 removed therefrom and for delivering the khas possession of the aforesaid premises to the plaintiff by evicting the defendants. Further a prayer was made for a decree of a sum of Rs.120/- being the rent for the months of april and May, 1981, and also a decree for recovery of compensation of rs.12.250/- at the rate of Rs.50/- per day for wrongful occupation of schedule a premises by the defendants. The suit was tiled under the following circumstances. 3. The case of the plaintiff-respondent is that on 20-8-1977 through a sale-deed (Ext.2) executed by Shivlal, the original owner, the plaintiff purchased 1.05 acres of land comprising of recent Survey Plot Nos.43,46, 47, 48 and 49 of Khata No.80 with an area of 0.61 acres of land. The suit was tiled under the following circumstances. 3. The case of the plaintiff-respondent is that on 20-8-1977 through a sale-deed (Ext.2) executed by Shivlal, the original owner, the plaintiff purchased 1.05 acres of land comprising of recent Survey Plot Nos.43,46, 47, 48 and 49 of Khata No.80 with an area of 0.61 acres of land. These plots were carved out of R. S. Plot No.69, Khata No.25 situated at village shonarpura, P. S, Ghatshila, in the district Singhbhum, Further by the same sale-deed be purchased 0.44 acres of land of Recent Survery Plot No.50 under Khata No.42 formerly being portion of R. S. Plot No.48 of the same This purchase was made from the recorded and rightful owner, mr. Shivalal son of Late Tshwar Das (another Ishwar Das) for valuable consideration of Rs.40,000/-. Since after purchase the plaintiff became the absolute owner of this land and got his name mutated over the same in the office of the Circle Officer, Ghatshila. 4. The further case of the plaintiff is that before the execution of the sale deed (Ext.2) Shivlal, Plaintiffs vendor, had granted lease with respect to 0.14 acres of land of Survey Plot No.69 being portions of new Survey plot Nos.46 and 48 to M/s. Busman Shell Oil Storage and Distributing company of India Limited (in short the burmah Shell) for a period of five years from 1-6-1971 to 31-5-1976 by virtue of a registered deed of lease (Ext.6 ). After granting of this lease, Burrnah Shell installed Delivery Pump and erected structures on the said demised premises at its own cost for the purpose of opening delivery pumps for Pctrol/h. S. D. This deed of lease had expired on 31-5-1976 with respect to the premises described in Schedule a of the plaint. In the meantime, oh 24-1-1976 by virtue of Burmah shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976, (in short the act)the right and interest as also the liabilities of the said Burrnah Shell in relation to its Undertakings in India were vested in Government of India. Subsequently, by Notification No. G. S. R.40 (E) issued under Sec.7 of the Act the intrest, right, title and liabilities of Burmah Shell in relation to its Undertakings of India strod transferred and vested to a Government company, namely, Burrnah Shell Refinery Limited. Subsequently, by Notification No. G. S. R.40 (E) issued under Sec.7 of the Act the intrest, right, title and liabilities of Burmah Shell in relation to its Undertakings of India strod transferred and vested to a Government company, namely, Burrnah Shell Refinery Limited. Again on 12-2-1976 the name of this Government Company was changed from Burmah Shell refinery Limited to Bharat Refineries Limited and subsequently, it was re-named as Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (in short the corporation ). Shri Shivlal, the previous owner of the demised premises, by his letter 20-9-1977 (Ext.11), informed the plaintiff that he was requested by defendant No.1 (the present appellant) by its letter, dated 31-8-1977 for the renewal of the lease. Along with (Ext.11) a copy of the letter, dated 31-8-1977 from the present appellant for the renewal of this lease was enclosed. By a letter, dated 29-9-1977 (Ext.11/a) the plaintiff informed defendant No.1 that he purchased the suit land and requested defendant no.1 not to pay the rent to Shivalal for demised premises with effect from september, 1977 onwards. Defendant No.1 (the present appellant) by his letter, dated 2-11-1977 (Ext.11/b) had informed the plaintiff that he bad received the information from Shivlal, the original owner, with respect to the purchase of demised premises by the plaintiff. 5. The further case of the plaintiff is that he had purchased the entire land for his residential and business purposes. Accordingly, he sent a registered notice to defendant No.1 on 19-1-1978 (Ext.3/b) for vacating the suit premises. On 1-2-1977 through a letter (Ext.11/c) defendant No.1 requested the plaintiff for renewal of the lease for five years with effect from 1-6-1976. By another notice dated 18-12-1980 the plaintiff informed defendant no.1 that he needed the suit premises for his personal use and asked it to vacate the same. Similarly, another notice (Ext.3/a) dated 25-5-1981 was given by the plaintiff to defendants for vacating the suit premises. The further allegation of the plaintiff is that defendant No, 1 did not pay the rent for the suit premises for the months of April and May, 1981, and has, therefore, become a defaulter in the eyes of law. On these grounds, the plaintiff filed the suit for the aforesaid reliefs. 6. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 filed separate bvit identical written statements. On these grounds, the plaintiff filed the suit for the aforesaid reliefs. 6. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 filed separate bvit identical written statements. In the written statement defendant No.1 contended that the registered sale-deed dated 20-8-1977 in favour of the plaintiff is illegal, as the vendor, Shivlal had no right to sell the land of Plot Nos.69 and 68 since these plots are said to have been taken on statement by Mokarari Patta from Boojo Gopal Singh Deo and Laxmi Kanta Pal respectively. The aforesaid Mokarari Mokrashi Pattas were illegal and on their strength no title passed to the plaintiff. The lands of these two plots was old Patit lands and, therefore, on coming into force of Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the entire land of these two plots vested in the State of Bihar free from all incumbrance. Since the vendor, Shivlal could not acquire any right on the strength of these two pattas, he could not have transferred, the title over this land to the plaintiff by the registered deed of sale dated 20-8-1977 (Ext.2)and the mutation of the name of the plaintiff in Zamindari Serista would be of no consequence. As a matter of fact, Shivlal and Burmah Shell had entered into a deed of lease dated 28-9-1972 for a period of five years, with an option of renewal for further period of five years, with respect to the disputed land. Previously Burmah Shell had entered into a lease dated 5-9-1951 with Shivlal for the aforesaid land for a period of ten years with an option for renewal for further period of ten years with respect to the land measuring 0.64 acres on the monthly rent of Rs.60/- per month. Since 1951 Burmah shell had enacted structures and had installed pumps and tankes on the demised premises and had started the service station. The land in occupation of Burmah Shell comprised of Plot No.69 Khewat No.2, Khata No.24, measuring 0.64 acres. The aforesaid lease expired on 31-5-1976 but defendant no.1 continued in possession of this land as usual. Subsequently, Burmah shell was vested in. the Central Government and presently it is known as bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (defendant No.1 ). Defendant No.1 acquired interest over the demised premises by virtue of the aforesaid Act namely Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976. Subsequently, Burmah shell was vested in. the Central Government and presently it is known as bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (defendant No.1 ). Defendant No.1 acquired interest over the demised premises by virtue of the aforesaid Act namely Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976. Further by virtue of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the lessors rights over the demised premises vested in the State of Bihar free from all incum-brances and, therefore, the present defendant No.1 was holding this land under the State of Bihar ; notwithstanding any document created by Shivlal either in favour of the defendants or the plaintiff. Sbivlal had no right on the land of Plot No.69 and, therefore, he could not have sold it to the present plaintiff. This defendant never requested the plaintiff for the renewal of the lease for a period of five years or for any period. No notice determining tenancy was served on defendant No.1. This defendant is, therefore, not liable to be evicted. There is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. This defendant has also acquired right over the demised premises by adverse possession. On these grounds, amongst others, defendant No.1 prayed that the suit was liable to be dismissed with cost. 7. Another written statement has been filed on behalf of defendant no.2 in which similar pleas have been raised. Defendant No.2 is the dealer operating the aforesaid pumps. 8. On hearing the parties the learned trial court by the aforesaid judgment and decree, decreed the suit in part in the manner indicated above. Jt is against this judgment and decree that the present appeal has been filed. 9. In this appeal the appellant has contended that the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court are illegal, bad in law and against the weight of evidence on record. The learned court below approached the case from a wrong angle of vision and come to an erroneous decision. The suit is bad for non-rejoinder of the necessary parties. The learned court below should have dismissed the suit. Admittedly, the tenancy with respect to the suit property was with Burmah Shell and due to the passing of the act, the Union of India became a lessee/tenant under the plainaiff. Since the Central Government was not joined in the suit it was not maintainable. The learned court below should have dismissed the suit. Admittedly, the tenancy with respect to the suit property was with Burmah Shell and due to the passing of the act, the Union of India became a lessee/tenant under the plainaiff. Since the Central Government was not joined in the suit it was not maintainable. The learned court below ought to have held that the estate of Brojo Gopa! singh Deo and Lakshmi Kanta Pal had vested in the State of Bihar under the bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, and, therefore, Shivial the alleged vendor of the plaintiff had no title to transfer the suit property in his favour. The alleged deed of lease dated 28-9-1972 (Ext.6) being itself void and in operalive, the defendant could not have attorned Shivalal as landlord to the suit property. The learned court below gravely erred in relying on Exts.8, 9, 9-A and 10 and in coming to a finding that the plaintiff-respondent had title to the suit property. It also erred by wrongly holding that registered deeds of lease dated 15-9-1951 and 28-9-1972 could be renewed for a further period of five years, without any registration and as the documents were unregistered, they were inadmissible in evidence. The learned court below wrongly decided issue Nos.6 and 7 in favour of the plaintiff. The learned court below did not answer the question whether Shivial could have acquired any valid title on the strength of Mokarari Pattas granted by ex-landlords even after vesting of their estate in the State of Bihar. The learned court below should have held that the suit was bad for want of the service of notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act The alleged notices (Exts.3 and 3/a) did not determine tenancy at the end of the month and no this ground alone the suit was liable to be dismissed The learned court below wrongly held that in absence of the formalities as requsred by Sec.108 (q) of the Transfer of property Act, possession of the defendants could not be held to be adverse to the plaintiff The learned court below wrongly decided Issue No.8 against the defendant, when admittedly the rent for the months of April and May, 1981 were sent by Cheque to the plaintiff who, however, refused the same. The learned court below also erred in decreeing the suit on the ground of bona fide personal requirement. The learned court below also erred in decreeing the suit on the ground of bona fide personal requirement. The learned court below has wrongly decided issue Nos.3 and 4 against the defendants. It also gravely erred in deciding issue Nos 1, 2 and 9 against the defendants. The learned court below could not have passed a decree for damage against the appellant. On these grounds, amongst others, it has been submitted that the judgment and decree passed by the learned court below be set aside and the suit be dismissed with cost. 10. The plaintiff has based his title over the suit land on the strength of Ext.2 which is a sale-deed dated 20-8-1977 executed by Shivial in favour of the plaintiff. Ext.2 was executed on 20-8-1977 and was registered on 28-9-1977. From Ext.2 it would appear that Shivalal, the original owner, had sold the suit premises along with the other lands total being 1.05 acres in favour of the present Respondent No.1. It further appears that there was a registered Mokarari Mourashi Patta dated 27-5-1937 granted to Shivalal. the vendor, by Brojo Gopal Singh Deo in respect of 0.65 acres of old Putit and waste land in Plot No.69 of Mouza Shonarpur. Ext, 2 further shows that a registered Bengali Patta dated 8-2-1950 was granted by Lakshmi Kanta Pal to the vendor, Shivlal for a plot of land containing an area of about 29 decimals in Plot No, 68 in the aforesaid village which was being held as raiyati Sthitiban tenure. It further appears that by a registered Bengali kebab dated 2-1-1952 the said Lakshmi Kanta Pal further sold to the vendor. Shivlal fin area of.20 decimals in land in Plot No.48 in the aforesaid village. Through Exi.2 Shivlal sold the aforesaid land in favour of the present plaintiff for a sum of Rs.40.000/-. In paragraph 8 of the written statement defendant No.1 has contended that the aforesaid sale-deed was illegal as shivlal bad no right to sell the lands of Plot Nos.69 and 68 since no title passed to him on the basis of the alleged Pattas said to have executed by brojo Gopal Das Deo and Lakshmi Kanta Pal. In paragraph 8 of the written statement defendant No.1 has contended that the aforesaid sale-deed was illegal as shivlal bad no right to sell the lands of Plot Nos.69 and 68 since no title passed to him on the basis of the alleged Pattas said to have executed by brojo Gopal Das Deo and Lakshmi Kanta Pal. It was further contended that the land in these two plots was Patit land and on the enforcement of the bihar Land Reforms Act, the entire land alleged to have been taken on lease vested in the State of Bihar free from all encumbrances. Further it has been pleaded that on the strength of any such ilkgai Pattas Shivlal did not. acquire any title and, therefore, the plaintiff also did not acquire any title on the strength of Ext.2. It may be mentioned here that in Ext.2 there is a recital that vendor, Shivlal had granted a lease in respect of new Plot No.49 and a portion of new Plot No.48 to M/s Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing company Limited DOW known as Bharat Refinery Limited at rent of rs.60/- per month. 11. In these connection, a reference may be made to Ext.6. It is the certified copy of the deed of lease dated 28-9-1972 on the strength of which, according to the plaintiff, Shivlal had granted a lease with respect to the demised premises in favour of the aforesaid Burmah Shell. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has, however, submitted that ext.6 could not have been admitted into evidence without complying with the necessary provisions of law as contained in Sections 65 and 66 of the evidence Act. Sec.65 of the Evidence Act runs as follows : "section 65.- Case in which secondary evidence relating to the documents may be given.- Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition, or contents of a document in the following cases : (a) When the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved. . . . . and when after the notice mentioned in Sec.66, such person does not produce it. Sec.66 provides for the rules for the issue of a notice to produce a document. " 12. . . . . and when after the notice mentioned in Sec.66, such person does not produce it. Sec.66 provides for the rules for the issue of a notice to produce a document. " 12. In the present case it appears that the certified copy of the deed of lease was filed on the Court on 3-9-1983 and on the same date the plaintiff filed a petition before the Court for directing the Advocate of Defendant no.1 to produce the original deed of lease in the court. The order-sheet dated 3-9-1983 further shows that the court ordered for issue of registered notice to the lawyer of defendant No.1 to produce the original deed of lease. This notice appears to be given on 10-9-1983 but the lawyer for defendant No.1 did not produce the original deed of lease. It appears that under these circumstances Ext.6, being the certified copy of this document, was admitted in evidence on 2-1-1985 though with objection. In this connection a reference may be made to the evidence of P. Ws.4 and 5. P. W.4 is Kishore Ranjan Mandal who is a deed-writer. He has proved the certified copy (Ext.6) to be in the writing of one Bisheshwar Gope. P. W.5 is sudhanshu Shekhar Acharaya working in the Sub-registration Office at chaibassa, He has produced Book No.1, Volume No 14 of 3974 relating to the deed No.10999 of 1974. He has proved the writings relating to this document as appearing in the aforesaid Book (Ext.7 ). It is also on the strength of the evidence P. Ws.4 and 5 that Ext.6 could be admitted into evidence. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that necessary legal formalities for admitting Ext.6 ; which is the certified copy of the deed of lease ; were not complied with. In any view of the matter, the validity of this deed is cannot be validly under challenge since even according to the present appellant he came in possession of the demised premises on 1-6-1971 on the strength of this document. 13. In any view of the matter, the validity of this deed is cannot be validly under challenge since even according to the present appellant he came in possession of the demised premises on 1-6-1971 on the strength of this document. 13. In this connection a reference may be made to paragraph 10 of the written statement of Defendant No.1 in which it has been admitted that the Shivlal and Burmah Shell had entered into a deed of lease dated 28-9-1972 for a period of five years with an option of renewal for further period of five years with respect to the demised land. Previously also the company entered into the lease dated 5-9-1951 for a period of ten years with option for renewal for a further period often years with respect to the same land measuring 0.64 acres on the same monthly rent of Rs.60/- per month. It thus appears that even in the written statement, defendant No.1 has based its claim over the disputed land on the strength of a registered deed of lease dated 28-9-1972 which has been marked as Ext.6 by the court below. In this background also defendant No.1 cannot challenge Ext.6 on the ground that it is only the certified copy of the original which could not he produced. Obviously, the original document was with Defendant No.1 who refused to produce it even on the service of notice as mentioned above. Hence the genuineness of Ext.6 could not have been challenged by defendant No.1. 14. A perusal of Ext.6 shows that through it the lease of the demised premises was granted from 1-6-1971 to 31-5-1976 with a provision for its renewal for a further period of five year. So far as the payment of rent was concerned, according to condition No.3 of Ext.6 the rent was payable by 15th day of month next following. It was further stipulated in Ext.6 that if the lessee shall fail to pay any rent over due within 15th days after written demand made upon them lessor shall determine this demise forthwith and shall re-enter and take possession of the premises. Its conditions No.9 is also very important. It was further stipulated in Ext.6 that if the lessee shall fail to pay any rent over due within 15th days after written demand made upon them lessor shall determine this demise forthwith and shall re-enter and take possession of the premises. Its conditions No.9 is also very important. It provides that if the lessee shall be desirous of renewing this present lease, and of such desire shall have given notice to the lessor in writing prior to expiration of the term hereby granted, and shall have duly observed and performed all the terms and conditions thereof the lessor shall grant to them a renewed lease of the said premises for a further period of five years. From the aforesaid conditions it would appear that the rent for demised premises was payable by 15th day of next month and that in case of non-payment within 15th days after the written demand made by the lessor he will be entitled to re-enter and take possession of the demised premises. It further appears that if the lessee intented to get a renewal of the lease he will have to give notice to the lessor in writing prior to the expiration of the term granted by the lease which had to be duly served on the lessor. In the present case it is not in dispute that no such notice by the lessee namely, Burrmh Shell or even the present appellant could be given to the lessor before the expiry of this lease namely, before 31-5-1976. It will thus become clear that the appellant cannot claim automatic renewal of this lease for a further period of five years with effect from 31-5-1976 since it had failed to exercise the option for the reneal of the lesse, before 31-5-1976. In this connection, it may be mentioned that on the strength of the Act the present appellant stepped in the shoes of the original lessee on 24-1-1976 at a time when this lease was still subsisting. The aforesaid Act had come into force on this date and, therefore, the present appellant or its predesessor-in-interest had acquired the demised premises by the operation of this Act. Under this circumstance in terms of Ext.6 it was necessary for the present appellant to get renewal of this lease before 31-5-1976, This has not been done. 15. The aforesaid Act had come into force on this date and, therefore, the present appellant or its predesessor-in-interest had acquired the demised premises by the operation of this Act. Under this circumstance in terms of Ext.6 it was necessary for the present appellant to get renewal of this lease before 31-5-1976, This has not been done. 15. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has, however, drawn my attention to Sec.5 (2) of this Act which runs as follows : "5 (2 ).- On the expiry of the term of any lease or tenancy referred to in sub-section (1), such lease or tenancy shall, if so desired by the Central Government, be renewed on the same terms and conditions on which the lease or tenancy was held by Burmah Shell immediately before the appointed day. " According to this Act appointed day was 24-1-1976. Sub-section (3) of section 7 of this Act provided as follows : " (3) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Sec.5 shall apply to a lease or tenancy, which vests in a Government Company, as they apply to a lease or tenancy vested in the Central Government and reference therein to the "central Government" shall be construed as a reference to the Government Company". 16. From these provisions of this Act it would appear that before the expiry of any subsisting lease in favour of Burmah Shell the option had to be exercised by the Central Government or the Government Company and it is only when they so desired that the subsisting lease on its expiry could be renewed on the same terms and conditions on which the lease or tenancy was held by Burmah Shell immediately before the appointed day. In the present case it is not in dispute that no such desire was expressed by the present appellant or even by the Central Government before the expiry of the term of this lease namely, before 31-5-1976. Under this circumstance, ths appellant cannot take advantage of these provisions of this Act and submit that by operation of law in view of coming into force of this Act on 24-1-1976 automatically the period of lease got renewed for a further period of five years with effect from 1-6-1976. From paragraph 7 of the plaint it would appear that defendant No.1, by a letter dated 21-8-1977, requested Sbivlal for the renewal of the lease. From paragraph 7 of the plaint it would appear that defendant No.1, by a letter dated 21-8-1977, requested Sbivlal for the renewal of the lease. Accordingly, Shivlal, by his letter dated 20-9-1977 (Ext.11), informed the plaintiff about this request made by defendant No.1. By a letter dated 2-11-1977 (Ext.11/b) defendant No.1 informed the plaintiff that he had received the intimation from Shivlal the original owner to the effect that the plaintiff had purchased the demised premises. Accordingly, through Ext.11/c dated 1-2-1978 defendant No.1 requested the plaintiff for the renewal of the lease from 1-6-1976 for five years. From these facts it becomes clear that defendant No.1 did not exercise the option or did not express any desire for renewal of the lease on the expiry of the term of the lease, namely, on 31-5-1976. The same is the case with the present appellant. Hence the said of this Act cannot be taken by the appellant to show that the lease in question stood automatically renewed. In this connection, a reference may be made to Ext.3/b which is a registered notice dated 19-1-1978 given by the plaintiff to defendant No.1 for vacating the suit premises. Also a reference may be made to Ext.3/a which is another registered notice dated 25-5-1981 given to defendant No.1 to vacate the suit premises. It may be stated here that in the present case no D. W. was examined. No document was also proved on behalf of the defendants. 17. So far as the payment of rent is concerned, in paragraph 14 of the plaint it has been alleged that defendant No.1 did not pay rent of the demised premises for the months of April and May, 1981. I have already noticed above that according to condition No.3 the rent for demised premises was payable by 15th day of the month next following and if the lessee failed to pay any such rest over due within next 15th day the lessor was entitled to re-enter and take possession of the demised premises after making a written demand therefor. From the written statement it appears that defendant No.1 has not replied to paragraph 14 of the plaint. In paragraph 19 of the written statement, however, it has been stated that the plaintiff had not acquired any right over the disputed land and, therefore, no question of payment of rent by defendant No.1 to the plaintiff ever arose. From the written statement it appears that defendant No.1 has not replied to paragraph 14 of the plaint. In paragraph 19 of the written statement, however, it has been stated that the plaintiff had not acquired any right over the disputed land and, therefore, no question of payment of rent by defendant No.1 to the plaintiff ever arose. In paragraph 22 of the written statement it has specifically been stated that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. From these averments made in the written statement it becomes clear that admittedly no rent for the demised premises was paid by defendant No.1 for the months of April and May, 1981 or even thereafter. The plea of defendant no.1 that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, however, cannot be accepted in view of Ext.11/d which is a letter from the present appellant to respondent No.1. This letter is dated 28-7-1981 and through it a cheque dated 21-7-1981 for Rs.180/- drawn in favour of defendant No.1 was sent as rent for the pump site at Ghatshila for the months of April, 1981 to June, 1981. This shows that, riotwitbstanding any plea taken to the contrary to the effect that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, by its action the appellant had clearly admitted through Ext.11/d that, there was such a relationship as otherwise it could not have sent rent for the months of April.1981 to June, 1981 to the plaintiff. This shows that the present appellant has not come forward with correct facts. Ext, 11/c is a later dated 1-8-1981 from the plaintiff to defendant No.1 according to which the aforesaid cheque for rs.180/- (rent for three months) was returned to it on the ground that already a legal notice was served on defendant No.1 Ext.11/f is another letter from the plaintiff dated 6-2-1982 according to which a cheque for rs.360/- was returned back to defendant No.1 in view of the legal notice served on it and also in view of the fact that it had already become a defaulter. From these documents it would appear that defendant No.1 cannot now take the plea that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that it had not become a defaulter in the eyes of law for not having paid rent of the demised premises for two consequtive months. 18. I have already referred to Ext.3 which is a Pleaders notice dated 19-1-1978 through which defendant No.1 was requested to remove all structures and fittings from the demised premises and give its vacant possession to the plaintiff within one month from the date of its receipt. Ext.3/b appears to be another copy of this letter (Ext.3 ). In this letter, it has clearly been stated that under law defendant No.1 was not entitled to any notice for eviction from the suit premises. By stating this fact in paragraph 9 of this letter it would appear that according to the lawyer defendant No.1 was not entitled to any notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property act for vacating the suit premises. On behalf of the appellant it has been submitted that since no notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property act was ever served on defendant No.1 no decree for its eviction from the suit premises could be passed. This, however, does not appear to be the correct petition in law. In this connection, reliance was placed by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No, 1 on the case of srimati Shanti Devi V/s. Amal Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1981 SC 1550 . In the said case also there was a lease for a definite term which expired by efflux of time and by Sec.111 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act. That being the position it was held that service of a notice under Sec.106 of the transfer of Property Act was not necessary. In the said case there was no allegation of the tenant holding over. In the present case also there does not appear to be any such allegation for the reasons stated below. Hence, 1 think that this decision is applicable to the facts of the present case and there is no escape from the conclusion that no notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act to defendant No.1 was necessary fot vacating the suit premises. Hence, 1 think that this decision is applicable to the facts of the present case and there is no escape from the conclusion that no notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act to defendant No.1 was necessary fot vacating the suit premises. This views also find support from the case of Dhanpal chattiar V/s. Yesodai Animal, AIR 1979 SC 1745 , in which it was also held that in a suit for eviction of tenant under any State Rent Control Act giving of notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not necessary. 19. In this connection, a reference may be made to Ext.11/c which is a letter dated 1-2-1979 from Defendant No.1 to the plaintiff. In this letter also no case has been made out for holding over in favour of defendant no.1. This shows that even on 1-2-1976 defendant No.1 has not come forward with any case for holding over. According to the above mentioned case if there is no allegation of the tenant with respect to the holding over no notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary. No doubt, in Ext.11/c a reference has been made though the period of lease had expired five years after 1-8-1971 the appellant had exercised the option for the renewal of the lease for a further period of five years commencing from 1-6-1976, In this connection, a reference has been made to the letter l/g-9 dated 26-5-1976 sent to Shivlal the original owner. No such letter has been brought on the record In the written statement defendant No.1 has not come forward with any such casa. From Ext, 11 dated 20-9-1977, however, it appears that Letter No. L/g-9 dated 31-8-1977 was received from defendant No.1 for the renewal of the lease of pump site at Ghatshilla. If this statement made in Ext.11 is correct then the request for renewal of the lease was not made on 26-5-1976 as alleged in Ext.11/c. It was for defendant no.1 to make out a case with respect to the renewal of the lease. No such case has been made out and even at the time of the arguments it has been conceded on its behalf that no such renewal was requested before the expiry of the lease on 31-5-1976. No such case has been made out and even at the time of the arguments it has been conceded on its behalf that no such renewal was requested before the expiry of the lease on 31-5-1976. From paragraph 12 of the written statement also it would appear that defendant No.1 has not made out any case for the renewal or the lease before its expiry on 31-5-1976. It has simply come forward with a case that even thereafter it continued in possession of the land as usual. 20. The learned counsel for the appellant has tried to make out a case for holding over the provisions for which are contained in Sec.116 of the transfer of Property Act. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellant that in spite of the expiry of the period of lease ; since the appellant continued to be in possession of the demised premises this is a case of holding over ; according to which the appellant would be clothed with certain rights as provided by this section. In this view of the matter, it has been submitted that even if the appellant or its predecessor-in-interest had not exercised any option with respect to the renewal of the lease before 31-5-1976 it will not make any ditference inasmuch as even thereafter it continued to remain in possession of the demised premises and, therefore, the lease would be deemed to be subsisting in the eyes of law. In support of this contention, the learned counsel has heavily relied on the provisions of Sec.116 of the Transfer of property Act. This contention has been challenged by the learned counsel arpearing on behalf of defendant No.1. In view of these submissions it has become necessary for me to examine the same in some detail. 21. The learned counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to paragraph 12 of the plaint according to which it has been stated that the plaintiff at the request of defendant No.1 had agreed to grant the formal renewal of lease of the said pump site for a period of five years with effect from 1-6-19-6 and expiring on 31-5-1981. The learned counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to paragraph 12 of the plaint according to which it has been stated that the plaintiff at the request of defendant No.1 had agreed to grant the formal renewal of lease of the said pump site for a period of five years with effect from 1-6-19-6 and expiring on 31-5-1981. This paragraph (Paragraph 12 of the plaint) has been replied in Paragraph 18 of the written statement in which it has been stated that the plaintiff was neither requested nor be granted any lease or renewal of lease for five years or for any term. Thus, the fact stated in Paragraph 12 of the plaint to the effect that at the request of defendant No.1 the plaintiff had agreed to renew this lease for a further period of five years has been denied by defendant No.1. Further it may be stated that there is a lot on difference between the words "renewal" and "agreed to renew". "agreed to renew" will not amount to renewal or will not mean renewal of the lease. In this connection, a reference may be made to the case of Brijnandan Singh V/s. Jamuna Prasad Sahu, AIR 1958 Patna 589. This is a Bench decision of this Court, It has been held in this case that a contract in order that it may constitute lease under the Transfer of Property act has to be a demise in presenti. The means that an agreement to grant lease in future cannot constitute lease. A line of distinction has been drawn between an agreement to grant lease in future and a conveyance of property or a lease which is take effect from a future date. In the latter case even when a deed of lease is execute which is to take effect from a future date it may amount to lease but if there is only an agreement, to lease in future it cannot constitute lease. It was further held in this case that in order to judge whether a perticular contract constitutes an out and out lease or a mere agreement to grant lease, the facts of each case has to be judged on its own merits. It was further held in this case that in order to judge whether a perticular contract constitutes an out and out lease or a mere agreement to grant lease, the facts of each case has to be judged on its own merits. From the facts of the aforesaid case, it would appear that defendant No.1 the proprietor of eght annas interest in a particular tauzi had agree to give in perpetual lease his half share in 32 Bighas of Zirat and Bakasht land in favour of Jamuna Prasad Sabu who was plaintiff No.1 and Jagarnath Prasad Sahu who was subsequently transposed as plaintiff no.2. At the time of this agreement Zirat and Bakshat lands were in the possession of rehenders of defendant No.1. The agreement for the lease could be completed only when the month of Jeth was practically closing. There was always the danger that if the mortgage money was not paid to rehanders before the end of the month of Jeth the possession over the mortgaged property would be delayed for the period of another only year namely by the end of the next Jeth. Therefore, in order to obviate this difficulty the parties arranged that the transactions should be complete in two stages, firstly by the execution of an agreement, which was done under registered deed dated 15-6-1943 and then by the execution of a final document of lease within a period of two months from that date on the payment of the entire nazarana money. A suit was brought for specific performance of contract as covered by this registered document dated 15-6-1943 and which was decreed. If is against this decree that defendant No 1 filed the aforesaid appeal in which the above mentioned observation was made by the division Bench of this Court. From this it would appear that there is a gulf difference between "agreed to grant lease" and the lease itself. By a simple agreement to grant a lease no right accused to the lessee as has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No.1. Hence, I do not find any force in this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. 22. By a simple agreement to grant a lease no right accused to the lessee as has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No.1. Hence, I do not find any force in this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. 22. On behalf of the appellant it has next been contended that, in any view of the matter, this is a case of holding over and, therefore, no decree for his eviction from the suit premises could be passed. In this connection. , my attention has been drawn to Paragraph 12 of the written statement of defendant No.1 in which it has been stated that though the lease expired on 31-5-1976 this defendant containued in possession of the land as usual. No other case of holding over has been made out no behalf of defendant no.1. So far as defendant No.7. is concerned, in its written statement also no case of holding has been made out. 23. In this connection a reference may be made to under Sec.116 of the Transfer of Property Act which runs as follows : "116. If a lessee or underlessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor or his legal representative accepts rent from the lessee or underlessce, or otherwise assents of his continuing in possession, the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property in leased, as specified in Sec.106". From this it would appear that certain conditions are to be fulfilled before a case of ho Iding over could be made out. The first condition is that the lessee or underlessee has to remain in possession of the lease-hold property even after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee. The second condition is that the lessor or his legal representative accepts rent from the lessee or underlessee or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession. The third condition is that in such a situation in absence of an agreement to the contrary the lease will be deemed to be renewed from year to year or from month to month, according to purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in Sec.106. The third condition is that in such a situation in absence of an agreement to the contrary the lease will be deemed to be renewed from year to year or from month to month, according to purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in Sec.106. In such a situation if the lessee continues in possession of the demised premises after the determination of the term of the lessee he can be treated a tenant on sufferance. The expression "holding over" is used in the sense of retaining possession. A distinction should be drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the lease, without the consent of the landlord and a tenant doing so without the landlords consent. The former is called a tenant on sufference in the language of the English law and the latter class of tenants is called a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. The tenancy on sufference can be converted into a tenancy at will by the assent of the landlord but the relationship of landlord and tenant is not established until the rent is paid and accepted. It has also to be noticed in this connection that before a lessee can be deemed to be holding over within the meaning of Sec.116 it must make out a case to that effect in the pleadings. As noticed above, defendants have not made out a case of holding over in their written statements. Moreover, it is not the case of the defendants that they had ever paid rent to the plaintiff. On the other hand, the specific case made out in the written statement of defendant No.1 is that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that this defendant had perfected its right over the demised premises by adverse possession. These facts have been stated in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the written statement. It further appears from the written statements that Shivlal, the vendor of the plaintiff, had no right on the land of Plot No.69 and any sale-deed with respect to this land would be illegal and void. These facts have been stated in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the written statement. It further appears from the written statements that Shivlal, the vendor of the plaintiff, had no right on the land of Plot No.69 and any sale-deed with respect to this land would be illegal and void. It has further been contended in paragraph 19 of the written statements of defendant No.1 that the plaintiff had not acquired any title by virtue of the sale-deed by Shivlal which was invalid aud void and, therefore, no question of payment of rent to the plaintiff by the defendant arose under the circumstances of the case. From these averments made in the written statement it becomes clear that the defendant No.1 has set up its independent claim for possession over the demised premises denying any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Also admittedly no rent for the demised premises was paid to the plaintiff. In any case no rent for the demised premises was ever paid as the rent sent through Ext.11/d to the plaintiff was not accepted and the same was returned as will appear from Ext.11/c. It is not the case of the defendants there any rent for the demised premises was ever paid to the plaintiff. Hence, the second condition of Sec.116 that the lessor or his legal representative accepts rent from the lessee after the determination of the lease is not fulfilled. The third condition is that a case of holding over can be made out if the lessor assents to the continuation of the lessee in possession of the demised premises. In the present case it appears that by through a registered notice (Ext.3/b) dated 19-1-1978 the plaintiff had asked the defendants to vacate the suit premises. Again by another letter dated 18-12-1980 (as stated in para 15 of the plaint) the plaintiff informed defendant No.1 that he needed the premises for bis own use and occupation. Further it appears that through Ext.3/a a registered notice dated 25-5-1981 was given to the defendants to vacate the suit premises. From these notices (Ext.3/series) it becomes clear that the plaintiff never accepted the defendants as his lessee and, there-fore, this condition also of Sec.116, namely, that the lessor assented to the continuation of the lessee in possession of the demised premises is not satisfied. From these notices (Ext.3/series) it becomes clear that the plaintiff never accepted the defendants as his lessee and, there-fore, this condition also of Sec.116, namely, that the lessor assented to the continuation of the lessee in possession of the demised premises is not satisfied. 24 In this connection, a reference was made to the case of Burmah Shell oil Distributing now known as Bhnrat Petroleum Corporation Limited V/s. Khaja midhat Noor, AIR 1988 SC 1470 . This was a case from Patna. From the facts of this case it would appear that a lease deed was executed with a permission to sub-lease the demised premises. The lease was not for agricultural purpose and it was for a term of 10 years. The lease period expired on 16-1-1968. Even after the expiry of this period, the sub-lessee continued to pay the rent which was being accepted continuously from month to month by the lessor. A notice was issued by the lessor to the lessee terminating the lease and for giving vacant possession of the land by 15-1-1973. No notice was given separately to the sub-lessee terminating the lease. A suit for ejectment was filed. The lessee did not contest the suit but the sub-lessee contested the suit on the ground that the lease was not validly terminated It was held by the Hon ble Supreme Court that there was a valid notice of the termination of the lease of the lessee. In any even the lessee did not dispute and accepted that there was a valid termination of the lease hold property. In this view of the matter, the finding of this Court as reported in 1988 BBCJ (HC) 59 was approved. 25. On behalf of the appellant it has next been contended that in any view of the matter after the expiry of the period of lease and in view of the provisions of Sec.116 it will become a lessee or tenant from mouth to month. Under the provisions of Sec.116 in a case of holding over and in absence of any agreemeat to the contrary the lease will be deemed to be renewed from year to year, or from month to month according to the purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in Sec.306. Under the provisions of Sec.116 in a case of holding over and in absence of any agreemeat to the contrary the lease will be deemed to be renewed from year to year, or from month to month according to the purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in Sec.306. I have already held above that the present appellant has not been able to make out a case of holding over, however, even if it be presumed for the sake of argument that such a case has been made out, it will mean that on the strength of Sec.116 the lease can be said to he from month to month. Even in such a situation since admittedly no rent has been paid by the defendant to the plaintiff they are liable to be evicted from the suit premises hence, even on this ground there is no force in this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. 26. In this connection, my attention has been drawn to the case of dattonpant Gopaharao Devakate V/s. Vithal Rao Maruthirao Janagaval. (1975) 2 supreme Court Cases 246. In this case in the concluding portion of paragraph 12 of the judgment it has clearly been held that no notice is necessary if a lease of immovable property is determined under clause (a) of Sec.111 of the Transfer of Property Act efflux of the time limited thereby. I have already noticed earlier that as per the decision in the case of Dhanapal Chaitiar (supra) giving a notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not necessary even when the eviction against the tenant was under any State rent Control Act. Also I have already above the case of Shrimati Shanti Devi (supra) that in cast of which the tenant does not allege any holding over notice under Sec.116 of the Transfer of Property Act is not necessary. Under Sec.116 of the Transfer of Property Act, the notice to be given under this section should expire with the end of the month of the tenancy. On this ground, it has been contended on behalf of the appellant that since fifteen days, notices were not given expiring by the end of a month of the termination would be deemed to be invalid in the eye of law. On this ground, it has been contended on behalf of the appellant that since fifteen days, notices were not given expiring by the end of a month of the termination would be deemed to be invalid in the eye of law. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that Ext.3/a and 3/b are pleaders notices and not notices under Sec.106 of the Transfer of property Act. He has pointed out that it is well settled that under the facts of the present case no notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary. Hence, it was his submission of that there is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. I feel inclined to agree with this submission of the learned counsel for the respondents. 27. On behalf of the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the plaintiff has wrongly valued the suit by assessing twelve months rent at the rate of Rs.750/-and has paid the court fee of this amount. It has been contended that the suit should have been valued according to the market valuation of the suit premises and on this ground it should have been thrown out. As against it the learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that in a suit for a eviction from the demised premises taken on lease through a registered document, according to law, the claim of the plaintiff has to be valued at 12 month rent and not at the market-value the suit property. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance in the case cf Sheo Shankar Prasad V/s. Barhan Mistry, 1985 pjlr 358. In this case it was held that where in an eviction suit, the Court goes into the question of title, not incidently but in a full fledged manner, the case should be tried as a regular suit and the plaintiff should be asked to pay ad valorem court-fee on the market-value of property. The facts of this case, however, appear to be entirely different. In the aforesaid case the defendants had seriously denied the title of the plaintiff to the demised premises. Also it appears that in view of this defence taken, parties led evidence on the question of title of the parties and the courts had dealt with this question at considerable length. In the aforesaid case the defendants had seriously denied the title of the plaintiff to the demised premises. Also it appears that in view of this defence taken, parties led evidence on the question of title of the parties and the courts had dealt with this question at considerable length. It was under these circumstances that the above decision has been recorded by the learned Single Judge of this court. In the present case, however, the facts are entirely different. Here as will appear from Ext.11/c defendant No.1 had requested the plaintiff for the renewal of the lease for five years with effect from 1-6-1976. It also appears that through Ext. l)/a, which was a latter dated 20-9-1977, the plaintiff informed defendent No.1 that he had purchased the suit land and requested him to pay the rent from September 1977 onwards to him. Defendant No.1, by his letter dated 2-11-1976 (Ext.11/b), had informed the plaintiff that the original owner (Shivlal) has already intimated to him that presently the plaintiff has become owner of the suit premises and it was under this circumstance that, through Ext.11/c, by defendant No.1 requested the plaintiff for renewal of the lease. Hence, in this background it cannot be said that defendant No.1 had denied the title of the plaintiff over the demised premises. No doubt, in the writt n statement it has denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties but the very fact that since 1951 itself it had taken the lease of the demised premises from shivlal, from whom through Ext.2 the plaintiff had purchased it, it cannot be said that it has seriously challenged the title of the plaintiff over the demised property. This view finds support from another Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Kailash Verma V/s. Sushil Kumar Vohra, 1991 (1) PLJR 136, in which also the above mentioned decision in the case of Shiva Sharikar Prasad (supra) was considered and distinguished. Under this circumstances, even when a plea of adverse possession was taken by defendant No.1 that will not make any difference so far as the frame of the suit or payment of court fee are concerned. Hence I do not find any merit in this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. 28. Under this circumstances, even when a plea of adverse possession was taken by defendant No.1 that will not make any difference so far as the frame of the suit or payment of court fee are concerned. Hence I do not find any merit in this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. 28. It has lastly been contended on behalf of the appellant that in any view of the matter after coming into force of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, Shivalal, the vendor of the plaintiff, did not have any title over the demised premises which were acquired by him on the strength of Mokarari mourashi Patta. The land being patit in nature, it would automatic vest in the State of Bihar after coming into force of this Act. There does not appear to be any merit in this contention. From Ext, 6 it would appear that the parties granted to the vendors of Shivlal were Mourishi in nature. That will mean that through those pattas inheritable right was given to the lessee. Moreover , it is clear from Ext.6 as also made out in the written statement that the appellant had acquired the lease of the demised premises from Sivalal from the year 1951 itself. That lease was brought into existence before coming into force of the aforesaid Act. After obtaining this lease in the year 1951 the appellant erected various structures on the demised premises and started operating the petrol and HSD pumps. In this view of the matter, this land cannot be said to be vacant at the time when the Bihar Land reforms Act came into force. On the other hand, it was tenanted to the appellant who continued in its possession even after 1980. Hence the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act would not attracted under the circumstances of this lease. 29. From the detailed discussions made above, it becomes perfectly clear to me that there is no merit in this appeal. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed on contest with cost throughout against Respondent No.1 and ex-parte without cost against Respondent No.2. Pleaders fee Rs.350/-. The judgment and decree passed by the learned court below are hereby confirmed. Appeal dismissed.