BHATT, J. ( 1 ) BY this petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, petitioner has challenged his termination order from service. The resume of the material facts giving birth to the present petition, may be mentioned, at the outset. The present petitioner was appointed as Clerk/typist, on 12-7-1978, in the Office of Accountant General, Gujarat, Rajkot Branch. The appointment order is produced at Annexure B. As per the said order petitioner was appointed purely on temporary basis as Clerk/typist in the pay scale of Rs. 260-400. 00 under the provisions of Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as t. S. Rules for short ). The petitioner resumed his duty on 20-7-1978 in Rajkot Office and was thereafter transferred at his own request to Ahmedabad Office with effect from 1-9-1979. ( 2 ) AFTER completion of 3 years of service the petitioner made representation to the respondents to grant him the quasi-permanent status as per the provisions of Rule 3 of T. S. Rules. No decision could be taken by the respondents despite several reminders in this behalf by the petitioner. On 30-9-1982 the services of the petitioner came to be terminated in purported exercise of powers under Rule 5 of the T. S. Rules, 1949. The termination order is produced at Annexure c. ( 3 ) THE petitioner thereafter made various representations to the respondents which not only were not considered but also were not even replied. Therefore the petitioner moved this Court by filing a Special civil Application No. 5032 of 1984, however, the same petition came to be withdrawn by the petitioner as he wanted to resort to other legal remedies available to him under the law. The petition came to be withdrawn under the permission of this Court on 19-12-1984. A copy of the order of this Court of that petition is annexed at Annexure d. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER, petitioner made several petitions to the respondents. However, the same were not at all considered. Subsequently, the petitioner, as a last resort preferred statutory appeal under Rule 24 (3) of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, to the Honble President of India, on 16/10/1985, which came to be rejected, on 30/05/1986. However, the same were not at all considered. Subsequently, the petitioner, as a last resort preferred statutory appeal under Rule 24 (3) of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, to the Honble President of India, on 16/10/1985, which came to be rejected, on 30/05/1986. The order of i ejection of the said appeal is annexed to the petition at Annexure e. ( 5 ) THE petitioner has inter alia contended that he is extremely poor. His father came to be terminated from the services of Gujarat Electricity Board. The petitioner was left with 10 other alternative but to move the Legal Aid committee of this Court seeking legal assistance for pursuing the legal remedy. The Legal Aid Committee of this Court was pleased to render free legal aid and decision was? take to that effect on 20/03/1989. As the petitioner was a Central Government employee, after getting the assistance of Legal Aid he preferred an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal (C. A. T.) being O. A. No. 509 of 1989. The C. A. T. at Ahmedabad, was pleased to dispose of the said case application on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to entertain such an application. The order passed by the C. A. T, is produced at Annexure "f" which is dated 8/08/1990. ( 6 ) THE petitioner has also contended that he was not informed about the decision of the C. A. T, by his lawyer and since he had no money to travel to Ahmedabad from his Home Town and since his letters were not replied by his Advocate he, personally, came to Ahmedabad on 9/04/1991, and requested the concerned Advocate who represented him before the Tribunal to get certified copy of the order of C. A. T, and an application came to be made on the same day, i. e. , on 9/04/1991 and the copy was obtained on same day. Again petitioner had to move the Legal Aid Committee of this court so as to file the present petition. The petitioner was granted legal aid and that is, tow, this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Again petitioner had to move the Legal Aid Committee of this court so as to file the present petition. The petitioner was granted legal aid and that is, tow, this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner has challenged the termination order dated 30/09/1982 at Annexure c and rejection order of his appeal dated 30/05/1986, at Annexure e. ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised four following contentions in this petition : (1) That the petitioner has worked continuously for more than 3 years and therefore he is entitled to the status of quasi-permanent employee under rule 3 of T. S. Rules. (2) Even assuming that the petitioner has not acquired quasi-permanent status then there is a breach of provisions of Rule 5 of T. S. Rules. (3) That in the alternative the impugned termination order is punitive and stigmatic under the grab of order of termination simpliciter and therefore it is illegal. (4) That the order of the appellate authority at Annexure e is cull and void and violative of principles of Natural Justice. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent has raised preliminary objection against the maintainability of the present petition under Art. 226 of the constitution. It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that in view of the withdrawal of Special Civil Application No. 5032 of 1984 on 19/12/1984 there is a bar of res judicata. This contention is prima facie subtle but not sustainable. It may be mentioned that the earlier writ petition was disposed of as withdrawn on 19/12/1984, and the order permitting the withdrawal of the writ petition for the same reason cannot operate as res judicata. Permission to withdraw the petition cannot be equated with an order of its dismissal on merits. In a writ petition after contest if disposed of on merits by a speaking order the question decided in that petition would operate as res judicata but not a dismissal in or on the ground of latches or availability of alternative remedy, etc. Therefore, it cannot be contended that there is a bar of res judicata in entertaining the present petition. The bar of res judicata will operate only on a controversy over an issue between the parties which has been heard and decided. Therefore, it cannot be contended that there is a bar of res judicata in entertaining the present petition. The bar of res judicata will operate only on a controversy over an issue between the parties which has been heard and decided. ( 9 ) NEXT it is contended on behalf of the respondents that in the alternative the present petition will not be maintainable in view of the earlier petition which came to be withdrawan unconditionally. There is no dispute about the fact, that earlier writ petition was disposed of as withdrawn. However the withdrawal of the earlier petition would not also create any impediment against the maintainability of the present petition in view of the facts scenario emerging from the record of the present petition. In the earlier writ petition following order as per Annexure d came to be passed on 19/12/1984 :"mr. K. V. Gadhia, learned Counsel seeks permission to withdraw this petition as the petitioner wants to resort to other remedies available to him in law. Permission granted. Petition stands disposed of as withdrawn. Notice discharged. No other order as to costs. "relying on the aforesaid order it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that earlier petition was sought to be withdrawn with the permission so that the petitioner can resort to other remedies available to him in law. The Court was pleased to permit the withdrawal of the said petition as the petitioner wanted to resort to other remedies available to him in law. ( 10 ) IT is contended on behalf of the. respondents that the Court was not inclined to admit the petition and therefore the withdrawal was made. As against that it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the objection was raised against the maintainability of the first writ petition as alternative remedies in law were available. Would it be proper for this court to peruse the affidavits filed by the parties to know the circumstances under which the earlier writ petition came to be withdrawn as the order of the Court in that petition is placed on record at Annexure d ? No. Therefore it is necessary to read the order and decide what is the nature of the order. As could be seen from the order as aforesaid the permission was granted to the petitioner as he desired to resort to other remedies available to him in law. No. Therefore it is necessary to read the order and decide what is the nature of the order. As could be seen from the order as aforesaid the permission was granted to the petitioner as he desired to resort to other remedies available to him in law. Therefore the order of this Court passed in the earlier writ petition in disposing of the writ petition has to be read as it is. Had the Court intended to dismiss the petition at the threshold it could have stated so explicitly. In the absence of communication in the order itself it will not be proper to enter into the arena of conjectures and surmises and to come to the conclusion on the basis of extraneous evidence that the Court in earlier writ petition intendend to reject the writ petition at the threshold. A plain perusal of the order passed in the earlier writ petition leaves no any doubt that the Court had allowed the petitioner to withdraw the petition so that the petitioner could resort to other remedies available to him in. law. Therefore it would be idle to advert to that contention that Court was not inclined to admit the petition and, therefore, it came to be withdrawn. ( 11 ) THE permission was granted by the Court in earlier petition so that petitioner could resort to other remedies available to him in law. Thereafter the petitioner had filed an appeal under Rule 24 (3) of the Central Civil services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, against the termination from services to the Honble President of India on 16/10/1985 which came to be rejected on 30/05/1986, as per Annexure e. Now it is contended that the appeal was filed late after the withdrawal of the earlier writ petition and therefore that must not be the reason why the petition was withdrawn. This contention cannot be upheld in the facts of the present case. This contention cannot be upheld in the facts of the present case. It is true that appeal was filed late before the competent authority but mere late filing of an appeal would not lead to an inference that the earlier writ petition was not withdrawn for the purpose as mentioned in the order itself of withdrawal at Annexure d. ( 12 ) AFTER the appeal came to be rejected by the Honble President the petitioner filed a petition before the C. A. T. , Ahmedabad being O. A. No. 509 of 1989. The said application under Sec. 19 of the administrative Tribunals Act came to be dismissed without being admitted along with an application for condonation of delay on 8-8-1990. The order of C. A. T. , Ahmedabad Bench is produced at Annexure f. It is very clear from the said order that the C. A. T. could not entertain that application as the dispute or the grievance arose prior to 1-11-1982 and therefore in view of the provisions of Sec. 21 of the Administrative tribunals Act, it held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the said application. It is in these circumstances, it is contended that the present petition is filed challenging the termination order at Annexure c and the rejection of the Appeal under Rule 24 (3) at Annexure e by invoking the provisions of Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. In these circumstances could it be said that there is a bar of maintainability of the present petition in view of the earlier petition having been permitted to be withdrawn ? The spontaneous answer would be in the negative. In earlier petition permission was sought for withdrawal so as to seek other alternative remedies available to the petitioner in law. Permission was granted by this Court on 19/12/1984 as sought for the withdrawal. It is explicit from the plain perusal of the order at Annexure d that this Court permitted the petitioner to withdraw that petition as he wanted to resort to other remedies available to him in law. Pursuant to that request petitioner as such filed an appeal under Sec. 24 (3) of the Rules which came to be rejected and thereafter petitioner knocked the doors of justice by filing an application under Sac. Pursuant to that request petitioner as such filed an appeal under Sec. 24 (3) of the Rules which came to be rejected and thereafter petitioner knocked the doors of justice by filing an application under Sac. 19 of the Administrative tribunals Act, However, the said petition came to be rejected as Tribunal came to the conclusion that it had no jurisdiction as the grievance or dispute arose prior to 1-11-1982. This means that the petitioner is running from pillar to post for getting his grievances redressed and when he has come to this Court by filing this petition under Arts. 226 and 227 a contention is raised that he is disqualified from agitating the grievances against the termination of his services. In the background of the aforesaid factual scenario and the order passed by this Court in the earlier writ petition, it cannot be contended even for a moment that the present petition is not maintainable either on the ground of principle of constructive res judicata or on the ground of public policy. On the contrary public policy command-; and demands in such a situation that justice should be done by granting appropriate relief if person is found to be entitled to relief and that is the underlying purport and desideratum of the provisions of Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Therefore the, contention against the maintainablility of the present petition is totally meritless and is hereby, rejected. ( 13 ) IT brings into sharp focus, the first contention raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner. It is contended that the petitioner has acquired the status of quasi-permanent employee as he has put in more than 3 years continuous service. Reliance is placed on Rule 3 of the T. S. Rules. It will be appropriate to consider the Rule, which reads as under :"3. A Government servant shall be deemed to be in quasi-permanent service : (i) If he has been in continuous Government service for more than 3 years; (ii) If the appointing authority being satisfied as to his suitability in respect of age, qualifications, work and character for employment in a quasi-permanent capacity, has issued a declaration to that effect, in accord. ince with such instructions, as the governor General may issue from time to time. ince with such instructions, as the governor General may issue from time to time. " ( 14 ) QUASI-PERMANENCY status though not equal to substantive status, is considerably better than holding post of a temporary status. In fact it is one of the four capacities in which the post may be held by a Government servant. The other three being temporary, substantive, and on probation. The petitioner was appointed as a clerk/typist in the Office of the Accountant General,gujarat at Rajkot on 20-7-1978. He came to be terminated on 30-9-1982. There is no dispute about the fact that petitioner had put in continuous service for more than 4 years 2 months on the date of his termination. The termination order is passed relying on the provisions of Rule 5 (1) of the T. S. Rules. Rule 5 (1) (a) provides termination of temporary services, which reads as under :"5. Termination of Temporary Service - (1) (a) The service of temporary government servant who is not in quasi-permanent service shall be liable to termination at any time by a notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to Government servant. "his services is terminated by the respondents considering the petitioner as temporary Government servant, who is not in quasi-permanent service. Therefore, the question which requires to be considered is as to whether the petitioner had acquired the status of quasi-permanent service or not. As seen from the Rule 3 that the Government servant shall be deemed to be in quasipermanent service if he has been in continuous temporary service for more than three years and if the appointing authority being satisfied, having regard to the quality of his work, conduct and character as to the suitability for employment in a quasi-permanent capacity under the Government of India, has made a declaration to that effect. This rule postulates two conditions to be conditional to a declaration making a Government servant quasi -permanent in post. After completion of more than 3 years continuous temporary service the petitioner made representations to the appointing authority so as to give him the benefit of quasi-permanent service. This rule postulates two conditions to be conditional to a declaration making a Government servant quasi -permanent in post. After completion of more than 3 years continuous temporary service the petitioner made representations to the appointing authority so as to give him the benefit of quasi-permanent service. As averred in paragraph 4 of the petition, despite his representations to make the petitioner quasi-permanent servant as per the requirement of the provisions of Rule 3 of the Central civil Services (T. S.) Rules, no decision ha; been taken by the respondents. ( 15 ) ON behalf of the- respondents it is denied to have. received representation. In this connection from the petition it is also reiterated that the petitioner was not eligible for quasi-permanency as the petitioner has not completed continuous 3 years temporary service. The respondents have contended that petitioner has not completed 3 years in the said cadre in one office. ( 16 ) THUS it is submitted on behalf of the respondents that what is contemplated by Rule 3 is the continuous temporary service for 3 years or more in one office. Petitioner had acquired service of 4 years two months and 18 days on the day of his termination. However, according to the respondents, petitioner had not completed continuous three years in one office. Therefore, it is contended that unless and until an incumbent or person holding temporary post completes continuous 3 years service in one office he will not be eligible for and considered for quasi-permanent status. This contention is not sustainable in view of the fact that 3 years continuous temporary service in one office only under one master is not contemplated under Rule 3. According to the Rule 3 a Government servant shall be deemed to be in quasi-permanent service if he has been in continuous temporary service for more than 3 years. What is contended is that continuous temporary service for more than 3 years in one office at a time. This interpretation is not only not permissible but is highly shocking. If the respondents contention is accepted it would tentamount to adding or in reading something in the rule which is not there. It is a statutory rule and it has to be read and interpreted as it stands. This interpretation is not only not permissible but is highly shocking. If the respondents contention is accepted it would tentamount to adding or in reading something in the rule which is not there. It is a statutory rule and it has to be read and interpreted as it stands. On a plain persual or even at a cursory glance at Rule 3 it leave no any manner of doubt that continuous temporary service in one office for Government servant is not contemplated. Government servant must be in continuous temporary service is the only requirement. Therefore, the submission raised on behalf of the respondents in this behalf is absolutely meritless and it cannot be sustained. Even on factual aspect this contention cannot be sustained as averred in paragraph 5. 1 of the affidavit-in-reply it is very clear that petitioner remained in one office for continuously more than 3 years. Initially petitioner came to be appointed on 20-7-1978 at Rajkot from where he came to be transferred at is own request at Ahmedabad Office with effect from 1-9-1979. Admittedly, he remained in Ahmedabad Office continuously for more than 3 years till the date of his termination. In other words petitioner admittedly remained in Ahmedabad Office right from 1-9-1979 to 30-9-1982 Thus the contention that 3 years continuous service postulates in only one office is factually also not sustainable. ( 17 ) AGAIN it is contended that though petitioner remained in Ahmedabad office continuously for more than 3 years but it was on a unilateral basis. In that it is contended on behalf of the respondents that petitioner was transferred on unilateral basis with effect from 1-9-1979 and therefore it cannot be said that he has served in Ahmedabad Office continuously for more than 3 years. This contention is totally worthless, First that it militates against the averments made in paragraph 5 in affidavit-inreply. It is contended in the said reply that the petitioner was appointed as Clerk /typist on 20-7-1978 in Rajkot Office and was transferred on unilateral basis at his own request with effect from 1-9-1979 and hence his case could be considered for quasi-permanent only after 1-9-1982. ( 18 ) IT may be noted that the impugned termination order came to be passed on 30-9-1982. ( 18 ) IT may be noted that the impugned termination order came to be passed on 30-9-1982. There is no any whisper as to why petitioners case for quasi-permanency was not considered after 1-9-1982 as contended by respondents in aforesaid paragraph in affidavit-in-reply. Apart from that the submission that after the service in one office is continuous on account of the transfer at the request of the incumbent or petitioner the criteria to have completed 3 years continuous temporary service as contemplated in Rule 3 is not satisfied is also not only startling proposition but is also totally illegal interpretation of Rule 3. The appointing authority might have some administrative instruction in this behalf. Needless to mention that the administrative instructions contrary to the provisions of Rule are illegal. Administrative instructions can only supplement the statutory provisions and cannot supplant. This proposition of law is no longer in controversy. One thing is certain that the contention that the first part of Rule 3 of T. S. Rule that there should be continuous temporary service for more than 3 years is satisfied in the present case is required to be accepted and the interpretation made by the respondents of the continuous temporary service for more than three years in one office is not only illogical but is illegal. Now the question arises as that what could be done at this stage. This is a very important question to be decided. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that in view of the time lag spent so far by the petitioner in getting his grievances redressed and the special circumstances of the present case and the fact that the respondents have not terminated the services of the petitioner immediately after completion of three years in this petition the Court should grant the relief of quasipermanent status. Prima facie this submission might appear subtle but not sustainable. Rule 3 contemplates that two conditions should be satisfied before a temporary servant is declared to acquire quasi-permanent status. Rule 3 prescribes the procedure to declare a Government servant as quasi-permanent, which though not equal, is considerably better than temporary capacity. The rule postulates two conditions to be fulfilled before a declaration declaring a Government servant to be a quasi-permanent in a post. The mere completion of 3 years of service is not enough. Rule 3 prescribes the procedure to declare a Government servant as quasi-permanent, which though not equal, is considerably better than temporary capacity. The rule postulates two conditions to be fulfilled before a declaration declaring a Government servant to be a quasi-permanent in a post. The mere completion of 3 years of service is not enough. The Government servant does not acquire quasi-permanent status unless and until a declaration as above is issued in his favour. The suitability is also contemplated in the latter part of Rule 3. If the temporary Government servant has completed continuous service for more than 3 years the appointing authority has to apply its mind and decide as to the suitability of the incumbent for employment in quasi-permanent capacity; having regard to the quality of his work, the conduct and his character and thereafter has to make a declaration to that effect. Again it may be noted that the respondents have not considered the case of the petitioner under rule 3 mainly on the ground that he has not fulfilled the first condition of Rule 3, namely, he has not completed continuous service for more than 3 years as observed hereinbefore. The interpretation of the respondents was that it should be three years temporary service in one office and also not at the request of the incumbent or petitioner. This interpretation is found illegal. It seems respondents have not applied its mind on this point. ( 19 ) IN view of the aforesaid facts prima facie ones would be inclined to say that in such a situation when a period of more than 10 years rolled by in procedural delay for getting the legitimate grievance redressed, this Court in this petition should decide the question of quasi-permanent status instead of directing the respondents to apply its mind and to decide it immediately. Nonetheless the respondents shall continue to take a conscious decision to the question of giving quasi-permanent status to the petitioner and the date from which he has to be given the quasi-permanency status. On the point of grant of quasi-permanency status to the petitioner there is a controvercy as to whether the representations in this behalf allegedly made by the petitioner are received or not. On the point of grant of quasi-permanency status to the petitioner there is a controvercy as to whether the representations in this behalf allegedly made by the petitioner are received or not. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court it would be expedient to direct the respondents to decide the question of the representation of the petitioner under Rule 3 regarding grant of quasi-permanency service as early as possible but not later than 31/12/1991. ( 20 ) THE respondents shall decide the said issue in accordance with law including the date from which such status can be granted if at all it is decided to be accorded to the petitioner. Accordingly, first contention as aforesaid stands disposed of. That will bring into consideration the second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. It was contended that assuming that quasi-permanency status is not acquired by the petitioner then in that case Rule 5 of T. S. Rules will apply, which is mandatory. In that it was contended that the temporary services termination should be simultaneous with pay + allowances for the period of the notice at the same rate at which the petitioner was drawing immediately before the termination of his service. Learned Counsel for the respondents pointed out in the course of his submissions that the amount was paid on the same day immediately after the termination of service. Therefore learned Counsel for the petitioner rightly not pressed this point. In the circumstances that point is not required to be examined in this petition. . ( 21 ) THAT brings to sharp focus the contention No. 3. In that it is submitted that the impugned termination order though appears to be prima facie order simpliciter but in reality it is punitive and stigmatic, such an order could not have been passed in view of the facts of the present case, more so as highlighted in paragraph 3 of the affidavit-in-reply. Therefore, it is argued that there is a violation of the provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. This submission is, seriously, challenged by the respondents. ( 22 ) IT would be, therefore, pertinent at this juncture to refer paragraph 5. 3 of affidavit-in-reply. In that it is specifically contended that petitioner was informed from time to time to improve his work by various memos and he was already given opportunity to make representation against that. This submission is, seriously, challenged by the respondents. ( 22 ) IT would be, therefore, pertinent at this juncture to refer paragraph 5. 3 of affidavit-in-reply. In that it is specifically contended that petitioner was informed from time to time to improve his work by various memos and he was already given opportunity to make representation against that. He was issued several memos to improve his work and behaviour right from his transfer from Rajkot to Ahmedabad office. The adverse entries in his C. Rs. for the year 1980-81 and 1981-82 were also communicated to the petitioner so that he could improve his work and correct his misbehaviour. The petitioner did not represent against the adverse remarks made against him in C. R. for the years 1981-82. It is further contended that the Weeding Committee met on 19-7-1982 to consider fitness or otherwise of temporary employees for retention in Government service and concluded that the petitioner was definitely unfit for retention in Government service. Further it is contended by the respondents that the petitioner had also given in writing on 11-6-1982 that he did not wish to work as his mind is not working. ( 23 ) RELYING on the aforesaid averments in affidavit-in-reply it is contended that the impugned termination order is not a termination order simpliciter but it is a punitive order against the petitioner. The impugned termination order at Annexure c purported to have been passed under Rule 5 (1) of the T. S. Rules does not ex-facie show any stigma. However, what has weighed with the respondents authority while passing the impugned termination order is reflected and manifested in aforesaid observations. The real reasons for passing the impugned termination order are alleged misbehaviour and misconduct on the part of the petitioner. Of course, the shelter sought under Rule 5 (1) of the T. S. Rules but in reality the foundation of the impugned order is elsewhere, which is not far to seek and that too in view of the aforesaid averments. A Government servant who is visited with civil or evil consequences has to be afforded with the Constitutional safeguards. Here comes into picture the provisions of Art. 311 (2) that no Government servant shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank without giving an opportunity of being heard in respect of any charge. A Government servant who is visited with civil or evil consequences has to be afforded with the Constitutional safeguards. Here comes into picture the provisions of Art. 311 (2) that no Government servant shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank without giving an opportunity of being heard in respect of any charge. The Constitutional protection under the Art. 311 (2) is available to permanent or temporary Government servant. If a temporary Government servant whose services are terminated ostensible under the garb of a statutory rule but in reality attached with a stigma or punishment without observing the Constitutional safeguards or procedure is patently illegal. ( 24 ) IT appears from the facts of the present case that the respondents tried to resort to a cut short falling back on the right of a master under rule 5 (1) of the T. S. Rules so as to get rid of petitioner against whom there were serious allegations of misbehaviour and misconduct. Such a short cut even in a case of temporary servant is neither permissible nor legal. The respondents have gone even to the level of stating that petitioner represented before them that his mind was not working. Such a serious aspersion coupled with alleged misconduct and misbehaviour on the part of the petitioner which weighed with the respondents in terminating his temporary service cannot be upheld. Considering the facts of the present case the impugned order of termination which is a stensibly simpliciter termination, in reality is stigmatic and punitive, therefore in such a situation the impugned termination order cannot be sustained. It is incumbent upon the respondent authority to follow the procedures prescibed under Art. 311 (2 ). When such a procedure is not followed when a temporary Government servant whose services are terminated attaching with a stigma and without enquiry it is in clear violation of the Constitutional provisions of Art. 311 (2 ). In such situation the impugned termination order is liable to be quashed also on the ground of the violation of provisions of art. 311 (2 ). This Court in such a situation has held that the order of such a termination of service is unconstitutional, in Anopsinh Jatubha v. D. S. P. ,jamnagar and Ors. " reported in [1986 (2)] XXVII (2) GLR 753. 311 (2 ). This Court in such a situation has held that the order of such a termination of service is unconstitutional, in Anopsinh Jatubha v. D. S. P. ,jamnagar and Ors. " reported in [1986 (2)] XXVII (2) GLR 753. Following the aforesaid decision this Court has also recently held in Mahendrakumar veerabhai Makwcna v. Slate of Gujarat and Anr. , reported in [1991 (1)] XXXII (1) GLR 179 that the temporary servant whose services are terminated attaching with stigma and without due enquiry is entitled to reinstatement with backwages. ( 25 ) THE Apex Court of the land has recently held in Om Prakash v. H. P. Tcurkm Development Corporation, reported in 1991 (3) SCC 291 that in a case of an order of termination even that of a temporary employee the Court has to see that the order was made on the ground of misconduct, if such complaint was made and in that process the Court has to examine the real circumstances, as well as, the basis and foundation of the order complained of and if the Court is satisfied that the termination of service is not so innocent as claimed to be and if the circumstances disclose that it is only misleading with a view to avoid the enquiry as warranted by Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution then such a termination is liable to be quashed. Needless to mention the termination in the present case though appears to be innocuous, it is only intended to punish the petitioner for the alleged misconduct and misbehaviour in respect of the allegations made in affidavitin- reply. Therefore in the opinion of this Court in the present case the form of termination order is only a cloth for an order of punishment. Consequently, it deserves to be quashed in its entirety. In fact the proposition of law on this count is crytilised in host of the decisions of this Court as well that of Apex Court. In view of the aforesaid discussions the contention No. 3 raised on behalf of the petitioner is full of substance and therefore is required to be accepted. The impugned termination order ostensibly a simpliciter but in reality it is punitive and stigmatic and is required to be quashed. ( 26 ) THE impugned termination order is also vulnerable on that ground and therefore it is illegal and required to be set aside. The impugned termination order ostensibly a simpliciter but in reality it is punitive and stigmatic and is required to be quashed. ( 26 ) THE impugned termination order is also vulnerable on that ground and therefore it is illegal and required to be set aside. That brings into consideration the fourth contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. In that it is contended that the order of the appellate authority passed on 30-5-1986 annexed at Annexure e is illegal as it is neither a speaking order nor showing application of mind. This question remains significant as in this petition the order of the appellate authority is also challenged and in view of the fact that the petitioner was earlier granted permission to resort to other alternative remedies available to him in law. Petitioner had filed appeal under Rule 24 (3) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, challenging the termination order. ( 27 ) ANNEXURE e is the rejection order of the appeal. A mere look at it does not even show the reasons which weighed with the competent authority in deciding a statutory appeal under Rule 24 (3) of C. C. S. (C. C. A.) Rules. The challenge against this order in this petition appears to be justified when a statutory authority deciding a statutory appeal under the statutory rule must assign reasons for its ultimate decision. No doubt the statutory authority may not embark upon a detailed enquiry and write a judgment like decision of a Court. Nonetheless, it must appear that the contentions raised in the appeal were considered and it must explicilty record the reasons. It is one of the rules of natural justice. This proposition is very well settled in a decision of the Apex Court rendered in "s. N. Mukherjee v. Union of India" reported in 1990 (4) SCC 594. In the said case it is held that "recording of reasons- authority exercising quasi-judicial functions must record reasons for its decision irrespective of whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review-reasons should be clear and explicit though may not be elaborate-this is one of the embodied rules of natural justice. " Thus there is no even an iota of doubt that the order rejecting the statutory appeal annexure e radiates an imprint of non-application of mind. It is also non-speaking order. It is really vulnerable. " Thus there is no even an iota of doubt that the order rejecting the statutory appeal annexure e radiates an imprint of non-application of mind. It is also non-speaking order. It is really vulnerable. Therefore it is required to be quashed. ( 28 ) ORDINARILY, in case of setting aside an order of rejection of an appeal of the statutory appellate authority, this Court would direct the authority concerned to rehear the matter in accordance with law. However, that course is not required to be adopted in the present case as the impugned termination order itself is being quashed on the ground of being violative of Art. 311 (2 ). ( 29 ) NOW the question remains for consideration is as to whether respondents should be directed to reinstate the petitioner with full backwages as the impugned termination order at Annexure c is unconstitutional and illegal. Ordinarily the petitioner in such a situation would be entitled to full backwages from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement and other incidental Service benefits. More so, in absence of any allegation or contention that the petitioner was gainfully employed during the interagnum. Petitioner was ready and willing to continue in the service but for the impugned termination order he would have discharged his duties. It may also be mentioned that petitioner is extremely poor and he could not also engage private lawyer, therefore, at almost all stages he had to request for legal aid for getting his legal grievances redressed. He had also requested the Legal Aid Committee of Gujarat High Court, Ahmedabad, for providing him legal assistance so that he could pursue his legal remedies. Considering the application, the Committee found his case fit and appropriate for the grant of legal aid and that is how his case is also placed before this court by an Advocate engaged by the Legal Aid Committee of this Court. However petitioner has not worked gainfully after his termination order came to be passed on 30-9-1982. More than 10 years period has expired. Again the relief of reinstatement with full backwages is discretionary relief. The respondents have alleged serious charges against the petitioner in the affidavitin- reply. The competent authority has yet to decide the question of grant of quasi-permanent service status. More than 10 years period has expired. Again the relief of reinstatement with full backwages is discretionary relief. The respondents have alleged serious charges against the petitioner in the affidavitin- reply. The competent authority has yet to decide the question of grant of quasi-permanent service status. However the petitioner in his representation to the respondents, which was shown to this Court in course of marathon submissions, which contained an averment therein that he earlier requested the respondents to give him reinstatement and for that he offered to let go full backwages. Considering the overall picture enlarging from the facts of the present case it would be fare and reasonable to grant 50% backwages only. ( 30 ) IN the result, the petitioner succeeds. The impugned termination order is quashed and consequently the petitioner shall be reinstated immediately in service with continuity as if termination order had not been passed. However, he shall be entitled to 50% of the backwages from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement. The respondents are directed to make payment of backwages and other incidental service benefits considering the revision of pay revised from time to time within a period of 3 months from today. The question of grant of quasi-permanent status in service as contemplated under Rule (3) of T. S. Rules is pending before the competent authority since long and therefore it shall be taken up and decided as expeditiously as possible but not later than 15/01/1992 in accordance with law. Petition is allowed accordingly with cost. Rule made absolute. .