JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, J.—On difference in views having been expressed by the learned Judges constituting Division Bench, the case has been referred to me. 2. I have heard the petitioner and learned Counsel for the respondent and have also gone through the records of the case. Facts have been given in detail in the judgment of V. K Mehrotra, J. and I need not reiterate the same. Suffice it to say that after decision of C W, P. No. 96 of 1988 when the respondent preferred Special Leave Petition to the Supreme Court of India, petitioner considered the act on the part of the respondent in having accepted the suggestion for disposal of the C W. P. in terms of the opinion which was to be rendered by a Committee, if such an opinion was accepted by the court, to be an undertaking to the court on behalf of the respondent and under that belief the petitioner moved contempt petition (*) No. 52 of 1988, pointing out that the act of respondent in having approached the Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petition amounted to committing contempt of this Court. The Contempt Petition was dismissed. CM. P. No. 11 of 1990 is to seek expunction of certain remarks contained in the judgment of learned Chief Justice N. M. Kasliwal which remarks have been enumerated as (a) to (e) in the judgment of Mehrotra, J. 2-A. The law on the subject has also been dealt with in detail in the two judgments of V. K. Mehrotra, J. and V. P. Bhatnagar, J. Power to expunge remarks is an extra-ordinary power and can be exercised only when a clear case is made out. The question to be considered is not whether another Judge would have made those particular remarks but whether the Judge in making those remarks has acted with impropriety. Court must be satisfred that the words to be expunged are wholly irrelevant and are unjustifiable and retention thereof on record will cause serious harm to the person to whom it refers and its expunction will not affect the reasons of the judgment. Court must be satisfred that the words to be expunged are wholly irrelevant and are unjustifiable and retention thereof on record will cause serious harm to the person to whom it refers and its expunction will not affect the reasons of the judgment. If derrogatory remarks, which are not relevant but relate to any of the issues arising for decision are made it is also the duty of the court to delete the same in the interest of public morale, but it is not every derrogatory remark which is liable to be struck off. Nothing can be said to be derrogatory if it is relevant. The Court should consider the question as to whether the remarks complained of are or are not necessary for establishing the claim of a partly or for establishing the defence. If the same are necessary, then such remarks cannot be ordered to be expunged merely because the same are derrogatory. It is also judicially recognised that in the matter of making derrogatory remarks against persons or authorities, whose conduct comet into consideration before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has had an opportunity of explaining a defending himself and further whether there is evidence on record bearing on the conduct justifying the remarks and whether ii is necessary for the decision of the case as an integral part thereof to animadvert on that conduct. 3. In the light of the legal position, which has been considered in the judgment, it will be necessary to see whether there is evidence on record bearing on the conduct of the petitioner justifying the impugned remarks and whether it was necessary for the decision of the case to have made such remarks The question of locus standi of petitioner was considered by the Division Bench while disposing of C W. P. by observing as follows : "Two objections raised on behalf of the fifth respondent may be dealt with in short before concluding the judgment The first relates to the locus standi of the petitioner and the second to the so called delay and laches. Both these objections have been stated merely to be rejected The petitioner is the Professor and Chairman of a Department of Study and Dean of a Faculty of the University He is also a member of the Academic Council of the University besides other bodies and authorities. He has sufficient interest in the matter as such and has apparently instituted the present petition acting bona fide motivated by a legitimate concern for the academic discipline and standards and for keeping the University and its various authorities and bodies within the bounds of law." 4. Once the locus standi of the petitioner to move the Court, challenging the action of the University, in allowing admission to the respondent, had been accepted in the civil writ petition, petitioner became concerned with the conduct of proceedings. Nowhere in the contempt petition, contents of which have been quoted in the judgment of V. K. Mehrotra, J. it was alleged that the same was being filed by way of public interest litigation but the entire reading thereof show that it was moved in the capacity as a petitioner in the civil writ petition. There was nothing in the reply filed by the respondent to show that the contempt petition had been filed by way of public interest litigation. The contempt petition on the face of it gives an impression that the petitioner was genuinely convinced that in having moved the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition against the judgment dated July 18, 1988 in Civil Writ Petition, the respondent had been guilty of wilful breach of undertaking. Petitioner had performed his duty by informing the Court about the conduct of respondent in having moved the Supreme Court By mere moving, the application, it cannot be said that the petitioner acted mala fide or with vengeance. Whether such an act amounted to undermining the authority and dignity of the Court and thereby was punishable under the Contempt of Courts Act or not, was a question which was to be decided by the Court. Contempt is essentially a matter between the Court and the contemner and there was nothing wrong in the petitioner having drawn the attention of the Court to an act of the respondent, which according to his genuine belief was in wilful breach of an undertaking. Contempt is essentially a matter between the Court and the contemner and there was nothing wrong in the petitioner having drawn the attention of the Court to an act of the respondent, which according to his genuine belief was in wilful breach of an undertaking. From the record of contempt petition, it cannot be said that there was any factual basis in the observations quoted at (a), (b) and (e). Making of the remarks at (c) and (d) for the decision of the case cannot be said to be necessary as an integral part thereof. As has rightly been held in Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashi Bhman Kar, AIR 1986 SC 819, that harsh or disparaging remarks are not to be made against the persons and authorities whose conduct cones into consideration before courts of law unless it is really necessary for the decision of the case as an integral part thereof to animadvert on that conduct. The remarks of the Judge should be in conformity with the settled practice of courts to observe sobriety, moderation and reserve. The higher the forum and greater the powers, the greater need for restraint and more mallowed should be the reproach. This judgment was later on followed in the case of A. N. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta and others, (1990) 2 SCC 533. 5. In view of the above, I am in full agreement with the views expressed by V K Mehrotra, J. that the observations at (a) to (e) merit expunction In the result, the application is allowed and observations at (a) to (e) in judgment dated ly-7-1989 shall stand expunged. Application allowed.