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1991 DIGILAW 340 (BOM)

Bacharam Dhondi Katkar v. Laxman Anandrao Katkar deceased by his heirs & others

1991-07-26

P.S.PATANKAR

body1991
JUDGMENT - P.S. PATANKAR, J.:---This appeal raises a short but interesting question i.e. whether a mortgagee or assignee of mortgagee can recover actual possession of mortgage property, in the facts of the present case, from the mortgagor or purchaser who has taken forcible possession of the mortgaged property? A few facts which are necessary for understanding and appreciating the point involved in the matter are as follows:--- 2. There were 8 properties which were owned by one Rajaram i.e. the father of defendants 2 and 3. The said Rajaram effected a mortgage by conditional sale dated 20th July, 1936 for Rs. 1,500/- in favour of one Shankarlal Marwari. It was mortgaged for a period of 5 years and produced at Exhibit 79. The said Shankarlal Marwari in turn effected an assignment of the rights of the mortgagee in favour of one Harisaheb Jadhav by Deed dated 23rd August, 1938. It was also for Rs. 1,500/- and the Deed is produced at Exhibit 80. The said Harisaheb expired sometime in 1948 without having any issue or wife. He left behind his sister by name Krishnabai. The plaintiffs are the sons of the said Krishnabai. Krishnabai stepped in the shoes of Harisaheb and after the death of Krishnabai, the plaintiffs have stepped in her shoes. Sometime in 1966, defendants 2 and 3 forcibly took possession of 4 lands i.e. suit lands out of the said 8 lands which were originally mortgaged. Defendants 2 and 3 in turn sold those 4 lands to defendant No. 1 by a registered sale deed dated 24th April, 1967 for Rs. 4,500/-. The plaintiffs thereafter filed the suit on 25th September, 1967 on the basis of their title and claimed possession of those suit properties from the defendants. 3. The plaintiffs inter alia alleged that there was a mortgage by conditional sale for a period of 5 years and the mortgagee was put in possession. There was assignment of those mortgagee rights. The plaintiffs were deprived of their possession illegally in 1966 and defendants 2 and 3 colluded with defendant No. 1 and sold the suit lands to defendant No. 1. Therefore, it was alleged that they were entitled to get possession because of their title. It was claimed that they stepped in the shoes of Harisaheb and were entitled to the lands and the possession thereof. Therefore, it was alleged that they were entitled to get possession because of their title. It was claimed that they stepped in the shoes of Harisaheb and were entitled to the lands and the possession thereof. Written statement came to be filed on behalf of defendant No. 1 and inter alia it was contended that the plaintiffs were having no title to those lands. It was further contended that he was put in possession lawfully as lesses in October 1966 and thereafter in 1967, the said lands came to be purchased by him from the defendants 2 and 3. It was further contended that the plaintiffs were not entitled to get actual possession of the lands. At the most they were having right of for enclosure and to get back mortgage money. 4. I have stated above only those contentions which are material for considering the point involved. 5. The Trial Court inter alia held that the plaintiffs have failed to prove their title to the suit lands. However, they have proved that they were in possession 12 years next before the suit. He also hold that the plaintiffs were entitled to get possession since the defendants have taken unlawful and forcible possession. In the result, the suit came to be decreed and actual possession of the suit lands came to be awarded. 6. Being aggrieved, the defendant No. 1 preferred an appeal which came to be dismissed by the learned District Judge, Satara. The learned Judge held that the plaintiffs were wrongfully dispossessed and they were having right to the property. The mortgagor cannot take law into his own hands and dispossess the mortgagee. The mortgagee was having a right to claim the possession and it was not necessary for him to file the suit for recovery of mortgage money in terms of section 68(1)(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. It was for the mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged property and until then the mortgagee was entitled to remain in possession. He, therefore, took the view that the defendant No. 1 became the trespasser and the plaintiffs were rightly granted decree of actual possession of the suit lands. 7. Mr. M.A. Rane, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant (defendant No. 1), has pressed only one point for my consideration. He, therefore, took the view that the defendant No. 1 became the trespasser and the plaintiffs were rightly granted decree of actual possession of the suit lands. 7. Mr. M.A. Rane, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant (defendant No. 1), has pressed only one point for my consideration. He submits that assuming that the defendants 2 and 3 have failed to redeem the mortgage, it cannot give right to the mortgagee or his assignee in the present case to claim actual possession of the mortgaged property once the mortgagee lost the actual possession. He submits that it was necessary for the mortgagee to exercise right of for enclosure. Alternatively, the mortgagee could claim the amount of the mortgage money by filing the suit in view of section 68(1)(c) of the T.P. Act, and the mortgagee could not file the suit only for possession. Mr. V.T. Walawalkar, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 3 (plaintiffs) submitted that the Court below has correctly granted the decree for actual possession. It requires no interference in this appeal. 8. Both the learned Counsel cited various judgments in support of their contentions. However, before considering those cases, let me note certain provisions of law. Section 58(a) of the T.P. Act inter alia defines the phrase 'mortgage' as follow:--- "58(a) A mortgage is the transfer of an interest in specific immoveable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, an existing or future debt, or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability. The transferor is called a mortgagor, the transferee a mortgagee; the principal money and interest of which payment is secured for the time being are called the mortgage-money, and the instrument (if any) by which the transfer is effected is called a mortgage-deed." It indicates that mortgage is the transfer of an interest in specific immoveable property for the purpose of securing the loan. Therefore, there is primarily relationship of debtor and creditor, between the mortgagor and mortgagee. The principal money and interest is only secured by the mortgaged property and incidentally possession of mortgaged property may be given to the mortgagee. However, such giving of possession would not create a right in the mortgagee to retain such possession until payment of the mortgage money. The principal money and interest is only secured by the mortgaged property and incidentally possession of mortgaged property may be given to the mortgagee. However, such giving of possession would not create a right in the mortgagee to retain such possession until payment of the mortgage money. It is only in the case of usufructuary mortgage that the mortgagor delivers possession and authorises the mortgagee to retain such possession until payment of the mortgage money. In no other type of mortgage, this happens. Section 58(d) provides as follow:--- "58(d) Where the mortgagor delivers possession (or expressly or by implication binds himself to deliver possession) of the mortgaged property to the mortgagee, and authorizes him to retain such possession until payment of the mortgage-money, and to receive the rents and profits accruing from the property (or any part of such rents and profits and to appropriate the same) in lieu of interest, or in payment of the mortgage-money, or partly in lieu is called an usufructuary mortgage and the mortgagee an unfructuary mortgagee." However, it is possible to have a composite mortgage or anomalous mortgage. For example, it may be a mortgage usufructuary by conditional sale. In such a case, the property is put in possession of the mortgagee as usufructuary for a fixed period and if the debt is not discharged at the expiry of the period, he can become owner under conditional sale. In such a case, in my view, mortgagee can elect to treat it as usufructuary mortgage. In that event he can either claim back possession, if lost, or mortgage money under section 68(1)(c). If he elects to treat it as mortgage by conditional sale, then he can exercise right of foreclosure or claim mortgage money. The mortgagee can exercise only those right which are given by law or created specifically by the agreement between parties. It is possible for the mortgagee to retain possession in an usufructuary mortgage or if it contains a term analogous to it in any other type of mortgage authorising the mortgagee to retain possession until the payment of the mortgage money. It is only in those cases a right is created in a mortgagee to protect his possession against the mortgagor. It is only in those cases a right is created in a mortgagee to protect his possession against the mortgagor. In other words, if possession is not delivered or if possession is delivered and no right is created to retain the same, the mortgagee has no right to retain possession against the mortgagor who is real title holder. In my view, possession of mortgagee should be protected in law or by agreement between the parties to create a right in mortgagee to retain the same as against mortgagor. 9. Section 67 of the T.P. Act deals with rights and liabilities of mortgagee. It clearly mentions that an usufructuary mortgagee has no right to foreclose or sale. It is because he is having a right to retain possession by the very nature of the mortgage. Similarly, the conditional mortgagee or a mortgagee under an anomalous mortgage is entitled to foreclose. However, the mortgagee by conditional sale is having no right to institute a suit for sale. 10. Section 68 lays down that the mortgagee has a right to sue for the mortgage money. This right is available to all mortgagees. Section 68(1)(c) is as follows:--- "68(1) The mortgagee has a right to sue for the mortgage-money in the following cases and no others, namely:--- (a) X X X (b) X X X (c) where the mortgagee is deprived of the whole or part of his security by or in consequence of the wrongful act or default of the mortgagor." This shows that even if the mortgagee is deprived of the security due to the wrongful act or default of the mortgagor, the mortgagee is having a right to sue for the mortgage money. It is no doubt an optional or alternative right available to the mortgagee. The mortgagee is therefore, having a right in the limited cases as mentioned above to retain possession of the mortgaged property, and only in those cases if possession is taken forcibly or wrongfully by any person of the mortgaged property, then the mortgagee can file a suit either for possession or for mortgage money. Therefore, right to retain possession is available to an usufructuary mortgagee or it may be given by the document. Therefore, right to retain possession is available to an usufructuary mortgagee or it may be given by the document. If it is given by document then irrespective of the nature of the mortgage or the rights which are given under sections 67 and 68 of the T.P. Act, the mortgagee shall have a right to retain possession as provided and in case there is disturbance of possession, he can exercise that right and recover possession. The mortgagee shall have better title to possession than the mortgagor. 11. Now let me consider the various judgments cited. I feel that none of these cases help either of the parties for deciding the point involved. Mr. Rane cited the judgment reported in A.I.R. 1988 Guj. 110, (Mahendra Mohanlal Mistry v. M/-s. Metha Mohanlal Mathurdas)1. It was a case of conditional sale. The mortgaged property was not given in possession of the mortgagee. On failure to pay the mortgage money, the suit came to be filed by the mortgagee for possession of the suit property. A contention was raised that unless there is foreclosure of the mortgage, there is no right with the mortgagee to get the possession. The Court held that a mortgagee by conditional sale is having no right to sell but is having only right of foreclosure available under section 67. Therefore, the mortgagee should have filed the suit both for foreclosure and possession. If the mortgage is foreclosed, then only it creates a title in the mortgagee and the mortgagee can get the relief of possession. If the mortgage remains in existence, the mortgagee cannot become the owner and does not get title to the suit property till a decree of foreclosure is obtained. It was also observed that the other optional right is given to the mortgagee under section 68(1) i.e. a personal remedy available to a mortgagee against the mortgagor for recovery of the mortgage money. Therefore, it was held that the suit of the mortgagee only for possession was not maintainable. However, in the present case, possession was delivered to the mortgagee and therefore, the ratio of the said judgment is not attracted. Mr. Rane then relied upon A.I.R. 1972 Patna 295, (Deolall Sah v. Sheonandan Singh and others)2. It was a case of usufructuary mortgage. However, in the present case, possession was delivered to the mortgagee and therefore, the ratio of the said judgment is not attracted. Mr. Rane then relied upon A.I.R. 1972 Patna 295, (Deolall Sah v. Sheonandan Singh and others)2. It was a case of usufructuary mortgage. However, contemporaneously another document was executed by the mortgagee in favour of the mortgagor and the mortgagor became lessee under the same. When the mortgagor failed to pay the mortgage money, the mortgagor filed the suit for getting possession of the mortgaged property. However, it was the suit filed on the ground of dispossession. It was held that the mortgagee was not entitled for restoration of possession since the mortgagee has lost the right to remain in possession of the mortgaged property due to the execution of the lease deed. It was, therefore, held that the remedy available to the mortgagee was to sue for mortgage money. 12. Mr. Walavalkar, relied upon various judgments which are mainly concerned with the rights of the lessee. The right of lessee are statutorily defined in T.P. Act and the every definition of lease as contained in section 105 shows that there is a transfer of a right to enjoy the property. Such a right is not available to a mortgagee except in the case of usufructuary mortgagee or a mortgagee who is given such a right specifically by the mortgage deed. The definition of lease is as follow:--- "105. A lease of immoveable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transfer or by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. The transferor is called the lessor, the transferee, is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent." Mr. Walavalkar first relied upon A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 620, (Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by his legal representatives v. Rao Jagdish Singh and others)3. It was under the Oanoon Ryotwari Gwalior State Samvat Act. Walavalkar first relied upon A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 620, (Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by his legal representatives v. Rao Jagdish Singh and others)3. It was under the Oanoon Ryotwari Gwalior State Samvat Act. Considering the provisions of the said Act, it was held that the rights of a tenant in respect of possession of the property are not extinguished or put to an end automatically. The tenant can only be dispossessed legally even though his right to tenancy is extinguished. The Supreme Court considered the ratio of judgments reported in A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 144, (Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd v. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy and others)4, A.I.R. 1958 Bom. 358, (Brigadier K.K. Verma and another v. Union of India and another)5, and the Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in A.I.R. 1959 All. page 1, (Yar Muhammad and another v. Lakshmi Das and others)6, and laid down that a person cannot be forcibly dispossessed and possession can only be taken through a Court. The observations of the Division Bench of this Court reported in A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 358 and the Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court in A.I.R. 1959 All. page 1 came to be approved. The observations are as follow:--- "Under the Indian law the possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law. Although he may not have a right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy his possession is judicial and that possession is protected by statute. Under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant may sue for possession against his landlord, if the landlord deprives him of possession otherwise than in due course of law, but a trespasser who has been thrown out of possession cannot go to Court under section 9 and claim possession against the true owner." "No question of title either of the plaintiff or of the defendant can be raised or gone into in that case (under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act). The plaintiff will be entitled to succeed without proving any title on which he can fall back upon and the defendant cannot succeed even though he may be in a position to establish the best of all titles. The plaintiff will be entitled to succeed without proving any title on which he can fall back upon and the defendant cannot succeed even though he may be in a position to establish the best of all titles. The restoration of possession in such a suit is, however, always subject to a regular title suit and the person who has the real title or even the better title cannot, therefore, be prejudiced in any way by a decree in such a suit. It will always be open to him to establish his title in a regular suit and to recover back possession." "The High Court further observed : Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a Court. No person can be allowed to become a judge in his own cause." All these are the cases therefore, where there was a relationship of lessor and lessee. Further, it has been laid down that a person who is dispossessed can file a suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (presently section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963) for restoration of possession within a period of 6 months. However, such a person can bring regular suit on the basis of his title after 6 months. But he cannot succeed against a person who is having real or better title. In my view, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court or by the Division Bench Judgment of the Allahabad High Court cannot help the respondents as it is not a case of lessor or lessee. The Division Bench Judgment of our High Court was relating to the right of a lessee whose lease was terminated. It was held that the right of such a lessee is protected though to a limited extent by the provisions of section 116 of the T.P. Act and, therefore, such a lessee who is dispossessed forcibly by the lessor can get back the possession. It was a suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 on the ground that there was dispossession within 6 months prior to the suit. It was a suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 on the ground that there was dispossession within 6 months prior to the suit. Similar was the position in the case of the Full Bench Judgment of the Allahabad High Court though it was with reference to the U.P. Tenancy Act. The suit was filed under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 within a period of 6 months on the ground of dispossession by the lessor. In that context, it was held that the question of title was irrelevant. 13. Mr. Walavalkar then relied upon A.I.R. 1965 All. 409, (Maya Ram v. Sant Ram others)7. It was also a case under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. In that case, the plaintiff originally filed the suit for injunction. It was a suit filed by the lessee against the lessor restraining him from interfering with his possession. During the pendency of the suit, the lessor dispossessed the lessee and, therefore, the lessee amended his plaint and prayed for delivery of possession. The said prayer came to be approved by the Allahabad High Court holding that thelessee was protected in law and the lessee was justified in amending the plaint and claiming possession. This cannot be of any help to Mr. Walavalkar. Then Mr. Walavalkar relied upon the judgment reported in I.L.R. (5) Bom. 446, (Sayaji Bin Nimbaji v. Ramji Bin Langapa)8. It was a case where a mortgagee in possession was dispossessed and the mortgagee filed suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. It was held that the mortgagee was entitled to recover possession. It was a case decided in 1881 i.e. prior to the coming into operation of the present Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Further, though it is not clearly mentioned that it was a usufructuary mortgage, the discussion indicates that it is a usufructuary mortgage. This is therefore, of no help to Mr. Walavalkar. Mr. Walvalkar then relied upon the judgment reported in I.L.R. 15 Allahabad page 384, (Ram Harakh Rai v. Sheodihal Joti)9. It was again a suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. It was a case in which the mortgagee was put in possession and the said mortgagee was dispossessed. The suit was brought within 6 months from the date of dispossession. It was again a suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. It was a case in which the mortgagee was put in possession and the said mortgagee was dispossessed. The suit was brought within 6 months from the date of dispossession. Further, the mortgagee in that case had raised crops in the field. It was held that the mortgagee was entitled to possession and also for damages for loss of crop. It was held that the first paragraph of section 9 had most salutary objective in view i.e. to discourage persons to take possession forcibly or otherwise than by due process of law. In my view, the ratio of this judgment will be of no help to the respondent. He then relied upon A.I.R. 1990 Gauhati 85, (Madar Singh v. Taiyab Hussain)10. It was a case under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and it was held that when suit was filed under that section for possession, the question of title is immaterial and the Court is not called upon to adjudicate upon the same. The suit under section 6 can only be for possession on the ground of dispossession and it cannot go beyond. In my view, the ratio of the said judgment is not attracted to the facts of the present case. Then Mr. Walavalkar relied upon A.I.R. 1942 Oudh - 172, (Ram Padarath Singh v. Nimar Singh others)11. It was a case involving usufructuary mortgage where the mortgagee lost the possession. The mortgagee filed the suit for getting the mortgage money in view of section 68(1)(c). A contention was raised that the mortgagee should have filed a suit for possession. However, it was held that the mortgagee was having an alternative remedy available that is to bring a suit for possession or to recover the mortgage money under section 68(1)(c). In the present case, mortgage involved is not usufructuary mortgage and, therefore, this cannot be of any help. Mr. Walavalkar also relied upon A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 165, (Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander and others)12. In that case the Supreme Court considered scope of sections 8 and 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (i.e. sections 5 and 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963). Mr. Walavalkar also relied upon A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 165, (Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander and others)12. In that case the Supreme Court considered scope of sections 8 and 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (i.e. sections 5 and 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963). It was held that if the suit is filed under section 9 then it is filed on the basis of possession and dispossession within a period of 6 months prior to the suit. However, even after the expiry of the period of 6 months, a regular civil suit is maintainable for possession in view of section 8. However, in such a suit, the question of title becomes relevant. The Supreme Court held that in such a case, the suit can be filed with 12 years of dispossession in view of section 64 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court approved the observations of Pollock and Wright on possession which is as follow:--- "Possession in law in a substantive right or interest which exists and has legal incidents and advantages apart from the true owner's title." The Supreme Court observed as follows:--- "When, however, the period of 6 months has passed questions of title can be raised by the defendant and if he does so the plaintiff must establish a better title or fail. In other words, the right is only restricted to possession only in a suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act but that does not bar a suit on prior possession within 12 years and title need not be proved unless the defendant can prove one." Mr. Walavalkar then relied upon I.L.R. 17 Mad. page 469 (Linga Reddi v. Sama Rau and others)13. It was a case of usufructuary mortgage where the mortgagee was not put in possession. Subsequently, another mortgage was executed and the second mortgagee was put in possession. The first mortgagee filed a suit for getting mortgage money under section 68. In the light of these facts, it was held that the mortgagee could file a suit for recovering mortgage money and need not file a suit for possession. 14. In my view, the present mortgage is not an usufructuary mortgage. It is a mortgage by conditional sale. It was stipulated that the principal amount was to be refunded within a period of 5 years and the mortgage property was given in possession. 14. In my view, the present mortgage is not an usufructuary mortgage. It is a mortgage by conditional sale. It was stipulated that the principal amount was to be refunded within a period of 5 years and the mortgage property was given in possession. However, there is no stipulation or term in the mortgage deed that the mortgagee shall remain in possession till the mortgage money is paid back. It is also not implicit in the mortgage deed that the mortgagee shall have a right to remain, in possession till the mortgage money is paid or that the mortgagee shall get back the possession if he is deprived there of by the mortgagor. The mortgage deed, which is at Exhibit 79, does not create a right in the mortgagee to retain the possession till the mortgage amount is paid back. In my view, therefore, the mortgagee has no right to recover the possession of the mortgaged property. He can only get back the mortgage money in view of section 68(1)(c). 15. Further, it can be seen that the present suit is not filed under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. It is not filed within a period of 6 months from dispossession. In the plaint, it has been clearly stated that defendants 2 and 3 took possession in 1966 unauthorisedly and thereafter defendants 1 to 3 colluded and defendants 2 and 3 executed the sale deed in favour of defendant No. 1 on 24-4-1967. This averment can be found in paragraph 1(l) of the plaint. The suit filed on 25th September, 1967 was obviously beyond 6 months of dispossession and cannot fall under section 6. I find that the said suit has been filed on the basis of title. In the same paragraph, at the end, it has been stated that defendants 1 to 3 unlawfully took possession of properties 1-A to 1-D and the plaintiff got the right to file the present suit and to get possession of those lands on the basis of title. I further find that it has not been filed on the basis that defendants have committed breach of any term contained in the mortgage deed. It has not been averred that any term in the mortgage deed gave right to the plaintiff to retain possession till payment of mortgage money. I further find that it has not been filed on the basis that defendants have committed breach of any term contained in the mortgage deed. It has not been averred that any term in the mortgage deed gave right to the plaintiff to retain possession till payment of mortgage money. In my view, the plaintiffs were having no better title than the defendants and particularly defendants 2 and 3. In the present case, the mortgagor or the heirs of mortgagor were having better title than the mortgagee or his assignee. 16. Further, it may be seen that under mortgage dated 20th July, 1936, there were 8 properties which were mortgaged. While 4 properties out of the same are still in possession of the plaintiffs. It is possible for the plaintiffs to recover the amount of mortgage money by foreclosing the mortgage. If the mortgagee is put back in possession then the mortgagor may lose his right to get back the possession since the suit for redemption would be barred. It is not at all desirable. On the contrary, the mortgagee can file a suit for foreclosure or for getting the mortgage money. 17. Mr. Walavalkar submitted that section 68(1)(c) does not cover forcible dispossession by the mortgagor and the wrongful act mentioned in the said section is having limited application and in any case, wrongful act must be prior to the deprivation of the security in the hands of the mortgagee. It is not possible to accept this contention. The plain reading of section 68(1)(c) shows that even if the mortgagee is deprived of the whole or part of the security due to the wrongful act of the mortgagor then the mortgagee is having a right to sue for the mortgage money. There is no reason to give such limited meaning to the phrase 'wrongful act'. Wrongful act means an act which injures or violates or infringes any legal right of another person. It would certainly include, in my view, a trespass or forcible possession by the mortgagor of the mortgaged property. The Webster's New World Dictionary defines 'wrongful' as (1) full of wrong, unjust, unfair or injurious and (2) without legal right, unlawfully. The word 'wrongful act' therefore, would cover forcible dispossession of mortgagee by mortgagor. 18. It would certainly include, in my view, a trespass or forcible possession by the mortgagor of the mortgaged property. The Webster's New World Dictionary defines 'wrongful' as (1) full of wrong, unjust, unfair or injurious and (2) without legal right, unlawfully. The word 'wrongful act' therefore, would cover forcible dispossession of mortgagee by mortgagor. 18. In my view a mortgagee, except in the case of usufructuary mortgage or a mortgagee who is given a right by the document to retain possession of mortgaged property till the mortgage amount is paid back, has no right to retain the possession against mortgagor even if he is put in possession. The right of a mortgagee is circumscribed. His real right is to recover the mortgage money, and the immoveable property is merely a security for the loan. Possession may be given incidentally. While the primary object of mortgage is to create the relationship of creditor and debtor. Therefore, in such cases mortgagee can exercise his right given by T.P. Act and recover the mortgaged debt. However, the mortgagee cannot bring a suit for possession of mortgaged property only excepting in the cases mentioned above where right to retain possession is created. In the present case no such right was created and therefore, the suit only for possession of mortgaged property was not maintainable. 19. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree dated 5th August, 1988 passed by the District Judge, Satara, in Appeal No. 452 of 1973 arising out of the judgment and decree dated 17th September, 1973 passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Koregaon is Regular Civil Suit No. 99 of 1967 is set aside. The Regular Civil Suit No. 99 of 1967 is dismissed. However in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed. -----