S. K. CHAWLA, J, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal by an accused challenging his conviction under section 302, I. P. C. and sentence of imprisonment for life inflicted there under. ( 2 ) IT was not disputed that on 30. 5. 1986 at a trijunction of roads called BARAM BABA KA TIGADDA in village Khamaria, Police-Station Kumhari, District Darnoh, a quarrel had taken place between deceased Halka and appellant Narayan. The time then was day time around 2. 30 p. m. During the course of that quarrel appellant Narayan inflicted a knife blow on the deceased. . ( 3 ) THE prosecution case was that on account of previous enmity between the deceased and the appellant, the appellant stopped the deceased while the latter was at BARAM BABA KA TIGADDA and was going to his own house. The appellant also took out a knife and inflicted knife blows on the deceased. One Ganga (P. W. 2) tried to intervene but he was pushed and tripped on the ground by the appellant. The appellant then fled away from the scene. Deceased Halka died at the spot. The post mortem examination (Ex. P11) revealed that the deceased had sustained a contusion 3 x 1/2" on the left side of his face, another contusion 1-112 x 1/2" on the right side of his face with fracture of the right mandible bone, each mosis in the eye and an incised injury 1_112" x , 1/2" x cavity deep on the left side of chest at the level of nipple. On dissection of the body below the said incised injury, it was found that the wound had gon@ deep into the left ventricle of the heart and measured 11/2" x 1/2". The fifth rib was also found cut and large amount of clotted blood was present in the pericaralal cavity. The death was due to injury to the heart. ( 4 ) THE police got medically examined Ganga (P. W. 2) as also appellant Narayan. Ganga (P. W. 2) was found to have sustained a bruise 2t1 x I" on the left knee, another contusion i" x i" on left shoulder and thirdly a contusion 2" x I" on the back of his neck vide injury report, Ext. P9. ( 4 ) THE police got medically examined Ganga (P. W. 2) as also appellant Narayan. Ganga (P. W. 2) was found to have sustained a bruise 2t1 x I" on the left knee, another contusion i" x i" on left shoulder and thirdly a contusion 2" x I" on the back of his neck vide injury report, Ext. P9. Appellant Narayan was found to have sustained an abrasion 2 x 1/2 on his right forearm, another abrasion 2/1 x 1/2" on his left leg and a bruise 2" x i" on l\is left chest, vide injury repot, Ext. P-10. On these allegations, the prosecution case was that the appellant had committed the offence of murder. ( 5 ) THE defence of appellant Narayan was that the deceased was holding a la/hi and started assaulting the appellant with it. As many as three lathi blows were dealt by the deceased on the appellant. In that situation, the appellant in order to save himself from further assault, had to inflict a single knife blow on the deceased. As soon as the deceased fell down the appellant tried to run away but was obstructed by Ganga (P. W. 2 ). The appellant had then to push Ganga (P. W. 2) who fell down. The appellant, thereafter, made good his escape. ( 6 ) LEARNED Sessions Judge, Damoh, who tried the case, held the prosecution story to be established. The plea of right of private defence was held to be not made out. The appellant was held guilty of the offence of murder. ( 7 ) SHRI S. C. Datt, learned counsel for the appellant, raised only one point, it was argued by him that the incident had taken place suddenly without any premeditation on the part of the appellant. There was a scuffle between the deceased and the appellant, where after, the appellant happened to inflict a single knife injury on the deceased at the spur of moment and in the heat of passion. There was a scuffle between the deceased and the appellant, where after, the appellant happened to inflict a single knife injury on the deceased at the spur of moment and in the heat of passion. In the circumstances the offences which the appellant had at the most committed was under section 304, Part II, I. P. C. and not under section 302, I. P. C. In support of his argument Shri Datt sought to seek support from the decisions reported in Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, Kulwant Rai v. State, Hariram v. State of Haryana Jagar Singh v. , State of Punjab, Tholan v. State of Tamil Nadu and Kartar Sincih v. State of Punjab. ( 8 ) THE prosecution case rested on the eyewitness account given by Bhura (P. W. 1) Ganga (P. W. 2) Gouribai (P. W. 3), Bhagwandas (P. W. 4) and Harcharan (p. W. 5 ). A detailed examination of their evidence is not necessary so much as to find out if the incident involving the appellant had really taken place, as to find out the circumstances in which that incident had taken place. It was not clear as to what was the immediate cause of the quarrel-Harcharan (P. W. 5) was the only witness who endeavoured to the point. According to him, the appellant was sitting on a platform at BARAM BABA KA TIGADDA. Seeing him, the appellant for no rhyme or reason clung to him, when he protested, the appellant released him but seeing the deceased pass along that place, the appellant rushed towards the deceased and caught, him by the collar of his shirt. This would make it appear as if the appellant was seized with a catching mania. Continuing further, the witness deposed that the appellant then demanded sum of Rupees Twenty Thousand from the deceased. The deceased tried to rescue himself by saying that he would give the money at his house. It is not known why the appellant should have demanded such a fat sum from the deceased in the first place. The Witness tried to explain that the appellant had been previously prosecuted for assault on the deceased but the appellant had been acquitted. It is not known why the appellant should have demanded such a fat sum from the deceased in the first place. The Witness tried to explain that the appellant had been previously prosecuted for assault on the deceased but the appellant had been acquitted. Even if this were true, it is difficult to gulp the idea that an acquitted accused for that reason would demand a fat sum of Rupees Twenty Thousand and the complainant, i. e. the deceased would also express his willingness to pay that sum if only the appellant accompanied him to his house. ( 9 ) THERE is ample indication in the evidence to show that quarrel between the appellant and the deceased had taken place unexpectedly on a chance meeting. The deceased was absolutely unarmed. He did not have any kind of lathi with him. The quarrel developed into an actual fight in which both grappled with each other and in the process also fell down resulting in contusions to the deceased on his face and abrasions to the appellant on his limbs. The story told by some of the eye-witnesses that the appellant had grappling with Ganga (P. W. 2) and both had fallen down, was a definite improvement over the initial story that the appellant after the incident at the time of running away had given Ganga simply a push in consequence of which Ganga only had fallen and not the appellant. Earlier the appellant in the course of grappling with the deceased had inflicted a knife blow, and only a single blow, on the chest of the deceased. The appellant did not persist in the assault. ( 10 ) THE question is what offence was committed by the appellant. It is often argued that since the accused had caused out a single injury, he cannot be hold guilty of murder. The argument may in some cases hit upon correctly. But it is wrong to place the argument on a pedestal of law or even to accept it as a rule of thumb. The true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in clauses (1) to (4) of section 300, I. P. C. the act will be murder, even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate, A is bound hand and foot. The true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in clauses (1) to (4) of section 300, I. P. C. the act will be murder, even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate, A is bound hand and foot. B comes and placing his revolver against the head of A, shoots A in his head killing him instantaneously. Here there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention ofb in shooting A was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within clause (1) of section 300, I. P. C. Taking another instance, B sneaks into the bed room of his enemy A while the latter is asleep in his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of A, B forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of A and runs away. A dies shortly thereafter. The injury to A was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that B intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of B within clause 3rdly of section 300, I. P. C. and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused. ( 11 ) IT may be mentioned that even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within classes (1) to (4) of section 300, I. P. C. the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts anyone of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part I of section 304, I. P. C. If the case of the accused is such as to fall within clauses (1) to (3) of section 300, I. P. C. , it would be offence under Part II of section 304, if the case is such as to fall within clause (4) of section 300, I. P. C. again the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of section 299, I. P. C. may be attracted but not any of the clauses of section 300, I. P. C. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under section 304 I. P. C. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of section 304, the case fell within 3rd part of section 299, I. P. C. ( 12 ) TO come back to the case of single injury, it may on medical examination be found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. If the circumstances of the case are such that it can also be held that the said particular injury was intended, clause 3rdly to section 300, LP. C. will be attracted and the offence would be murder. The leading case on clause 3rdly of section 300, I. P. C. is Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab. The latest case is that of Jai Prakash v. Staie (Delhi Administration) wherein the Supreme Court after reviewing the entire case law held that even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, requirements of clause 3rdly to section 300, I. P. C. are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. In that decision, in the wake of an altercation and exchange of hot words, but not a fight, a single kirpan blow was thrust in the chest of the deceased by the appellant penetrating the heart and causing instantaneous death of the deceased. It was held by the Supreme Court that the offence was murder. In that decision, in the wake of an altercation and exchange of hot words, but not a fight, a single kirpan blow was thrust in the chest of the deceased by the appellant penetrating the heart and causing instantaneous death of the deceased. It was held by the Supreme Court that the offence was murder. But if single injury of above kind is inflicted under circumstances making it likely that the particular bodily injury actually found to be present was not intended, for example, where the accused without serious prior enmity acted without premeditation suddenly at the spur of the moment during the course of a scuffle with the deceased rendering the aiming of the particular injury found present to be improbable, the offence would not be murder that culpable homicide not amounting to murder under section 304, I. P. C. albeit the injury may be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. This is the ratio of the decisions relied upon by Shri Datt referred to in paragraph 7 of this judgment. ( 13 ) COMING back to the present case, as already found by us, the quarrel between the deceased and the appellant was not anticipated and had taken place suddenly upon their chance meeting. The immediate cause of the quarrel could not be known. The deceased was not standing away. On the other hand, grappling was taking place between the appellant and the deceased reasonably raising the possibility that the appellant could not have aimed his knife at a particular part of the body of the deceased, namely the left side of his chest. The appellant did not persist in the assault. No particular motive to kill the deceased. The chest injury was undoubtedly sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. But in the above circumstances it cannot be held with any degree of certainty that the appellant intended to inflict that particular injury. The knife blow was undoubtedly dealt forcibly causing a penetrating wound inside the heart. No particular motive to kill the deceased. The chest injury was undoubtedly sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. But in the above circumstances it cannot be held with any degree of certainty that the appellant intended to inflict that particular injury. The knife blow was undoubtedly dealt forcibly causing a penetrating wound inside the heart. As such the appellant can safely be credited with the knowledge that he was likely by the said blow to cause death, attracting 3rd part of section 299, I. P. C. thereby making the act of the appellant punishable under Part II of section 304, I. P. C. The offence committed by the appellant was not one under section 302, I. P. C. but one under section 304, Part II I. P. C. ( 14 ) IT was submitted by Shri Datton behalf of the appellant, and not challenged by the Deputy Advocate General on behalf of the State, that the appellant, taking into consideration under-trial detention, has already undergone actual sentence of five years and some months and considering the remissions which the appellant must have earned, he has undergone not less then seven years of sentence. The sentence so far undergone, in our opinion, would more than amply meet the ends of justice. ( 15 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the appellant is altered from section 302, I. P. C. to section 304, Part II, I. P. C. and he is sentenced to the period already undergone. As a result, he shall be released immediately if not required in any other connection. Appeal partly allowed. .