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1991 DIGILAW 343 (RAJ)

Madani Devi v. Devi Shankar

1991-04-10

N.C.KOCHHAR

body1991
JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) is directed against the judgement and decree dated 23.11.1976 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No.2, Jodhpur in Civil Appeal No. 39 /74 upholding the judgement the decree dated 9.8.1974 passed by the learned Munsif City, Jodhpur in Civil Original Suit No. 457/71. In this appeal, the appellants (the defendants) have challenged the declaration made by the learned lower courts that the respondent Devi Shankar (the plaintiff) was the owner of the latrine in question and the land situated behind it, having acquired title therein by way of adverse possession. The brief facts are as under:- On 24.7.1971, the plaintiff had filed a suit against the defendants with the allegations that he is the owner of the house in dispute shown in green colour in the site plan attached with the plaint and by the side of his house is the latrine constructed on an area of land measuring 4'6"x4'8" and behind the latrine there is strip of land measuring 4'6"x4'8" which is meant for use of the sweeper who comes to clean the latrine and to demarcate the strip of land a wall has been constructed. The plaintiff pleaded that he was the owner of the above said latrine and strip of land shown in the red colour in the site plan attached with the plaint and, in the alternative, he has been using it for the last more than 40 years openly, peacefully and without any interruption as the owner thereof and had become its owner by adverse possession. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendants had purchased the house situated by the side of the above said latrine and shown in yellow colour in the site plan under a sale-deed dated 8.1.1970 from Laxmi Narayan and there after without the knowledge of the plaintiff had obtained the permission of the Municipality for making reconstruction of their house and had wrongfully included the latrine in their plan and had started demolishing the latrine and the wall behind the strip of land and, on making enquiry from Municipality, the plaintiff learnt about the sanction accorded by the Municipality and filed an appeal before the Additional District Magistrate and obtained a stay order and thereafter his appeal was accepted and the sanction granted to the defendants was revoked but the defendants wanted to demolish the latrine and the wall in question and when the plaintiff objected they started quarrelling with him and his son. In these circumstances, the plaintiff prayed for a decree of declaration that he had the title in the property in dispute and, in the alternative, he had become the owner thereof by way of adverse possession. The suit was contested by the defendants, who denied that the plaintiff was the owner of the property in dispute in any way and claimed that the property in dispute was forming part of the house purchased by them from Laxmi Narayan. After framing the necessary issues and recording the evidence produced by the parties, the learned trial court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to produce any document showing that the property in dispute belongs to him but that he had succeeded in proving that he has been using it openly, peacefully and without any interruption as the owner thereof and had acquired title therein by way of adverse possession. Consequently, the decree for declaration in this respect was passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. Their appeal having been dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, the defendants have approached this court by filing this second appeal. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record of the case. 3. Their appeal having been dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, the defendants have approached this court by filing this second appeal. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record of the case. 3. The first point raised by the learned counsel for the appellants-defendants is that the learned lower courts did not properly appreciate the evidence produced by the defendants and came to a wrong conclusion that the plaintiff has become the owner of the property in dispute by adverse possession. With the aid of the learned counsel for the defendants, I have gone through the evidence produced by the parties, but find that the learned lower courts have discussed the entire evidence in detail and have given good reasons for coming to the conclusion arrived at by them and the said findings of fact cannot be said to be perverse in any way. This court, therefore, cannot interfere with those findings while exercising jurisdiction under section 100 of the Code. 4. The other submission made by the learned counsel for the defendants is that the plaintiff having pleaded that he had the title in the property in dispute could not claim decree on the alternative plea that he had become the owner of the property in dispute by adverse possession and, as such, the learned lower courts committed legal error in passing a decree in his favour and against the defendants. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in case Chapsibhai Dhanjibhai Dand V/s Purshottam reported as AIR 1975 SC 1878 . I have gone through the said ruling. The point before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was whether a person who had pleaded that he is the owner of the land in dispute but fails to prove it can succeed on his alternative plea that he has acquired easement rights thereon and it was held as under: "As already stated, a party to a suit can plead inconsistent pleas in the alternative such as the right of ownership and a right of easement. But where he has pleaded ownership and has failed, he cannot subsequently turn around and claim that right as an easement by prescription. But where he has pleaded ownership and has failed, he cannot subsequently turn around and claim that right as an easement by prescription. To prove the latter, it is necessary to establish that it was exercised on some one else's property and not as an incident of his own ownership of that property. For that purpose, his consciousness that he was exercising that right on the property treating it as some one else's property is a necessary ingredient in proof of the establishment of that right as an easement." 5. In the above case, it has been held that consciousness on the part of the person claiming right of easement that he has been exercising it on some one else's property, is a necessary ingredient in proof of the establishment of such a right. In the case of adverse possession, however, the claim of ownership can be made only by a person who uses the property with the consciousness and assertion that the same is his own property and not of the other and continues asserting it openly for a specified period. A person becomes the owner of the property of the other by transfer, by inheritance or by adverse possession etc. and if a person asserts his right of ownership in a property he can take different grounds to substantiate his claim of ownership thereof and can put-forward those grounds by taking alternative pleas in his pleadings and if he succeeds in proving any one of those grounds his claim of ownership cannot be denied by the courts. A party to a suit can thus establish his right of ownership on the basis of initial title or in the alternative on the basis of adverse possession. My view finds support by the decisions in cases "Luvar Popal Kala V/s Luvar Bachu Rugnath & ors " reported as AIR 1958 Bombay 152 and "Ram Charan Singh V/s L.Chunni Lai & ors." reported as AIR 1941 Oudh 454 , and no case taking a contrary view has been brought to my notice. Even in the case of Chapsibhai (supra) the right of a party to take alternative inconsistent pleas has been recognised by the Supreme Court. I, therefore, do not find any force in this argument of the learned counsel for the defendants as well. 6. No other point has been raised before me. 7. Even in the case of Chapsibhai (supra) the right of a party to take alternative inconsistent pleas has been recognised by the Supreme Court. I, therefore, do not find any force in this argument of the learned counsel for the defendants as well. 6. No other point has been raised before me. 7. Finding this appeal to be without any merit, I dismiss it with costs.Appeal dismissed with costs. *******