JUDGMENT 1. - This miscellaneous petition is directed against the order of Additional Sessions Judge, Rajsamand dated 17.4.85 whereby he affirmed the order of confiscation of Truck No. RSY 3079 passed by Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Bhim on 28.6.84. 2. Brief facts giving rise to this petition are that on 18.2.84 one complaint was filed by Regional Forest Officer under section 26 of the Rajasthan Forest Act (hereinafter referred to asthe Act) against Udai Singh alleging that on 15.2.84 he was taking wood from forest without any permit and the accused be convicted and it was also prayed that the truck may be confiscated. A challan under section 42 of the Act was filed before the learned Magistrate. Udaisingh was arrested and charge under section 26 and 41 of the Act was framed against him. After trial the learned Magistrate by his order dated 26.7.84 acquitted Udaisingh but under section 55 of the Act the truck was confiscated as it was used for taking wood without any authority and peimit. Against this order of confiscation the petitioner filed an appeal which was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge on 17.4 85. Hence this petition. 3. Mr. T. S. Champawat, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitied that in the present case Sec 55 is not attracted as no offence under section 26 or 41 punishable under section 42 was committed. He has also submitted that there is no question of applicability of the word "may be in addition to any other punishment prescribed for such offence and the order of confiscation is wholly illegal, and amounts to abuse of the process of the court. He has further submitted that no charge under section 55 has been framed against the owner or the driver though the driver was present but he was not prosecuted. Mr. Champawat. has further submitted that the wood found in the truck was of negligible value in comparison to the value of truck. Mr. Champawat, has submitted that before confiscation of the truck no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner and thus violated the principles of natural justice. He has relied on State of M P. v. M/s. Azad Bharat Finance Co., AIR 1967 SC 276 , Krishna Pillai v. State of Madras, AIR SC 335 , and K.R. Pushphan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1985 Ker. 184 . 4. Mr. He has relied on State of M P. v. M/s. Azad Bharat Finance Co., AIR 1967 SC 276 , Krishna Pillai v. State of Madras, AIR SC 335 , and K.R. Pushphan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1985 Ker. 184 . 4. Mr. S. M. Singhvi, learned Public Prosecutor has submitted that as per Section 55 of the Act, vehicle cannot be released on the ground that the actual culprit who was carrying the forest word illegally and without authority or permit acquitted. 5. I have heard Mr. T.S. Champawat, learned caunsel for the petitioner and was Mr. S M. Singhvi, learned Public Prosecutor and perused the record. 6. To resolve the controversy, it would be proper to read Section 55 of the Act, which runs as under:- "55. Forest Produce, tools etc. when liable to confiscation-(1) All timber or forest produce which is not the property of State Government and in respect of which a forest offence has been committed and all tools, beats, carts, trucks and cattle used in committing any forest offence, shall be liable to confiscation. (2) Such confiscation may be in addition to any other punishment prescribed for such offence." 7. A perusal of this Section shows that if a forest offence has been committed the truck used in commission of the offence shall be liable to be confiscated and such offence may be in addition to any other punishment prescribed for such offence. It is clear from the perusal of this section that carrier can be confiscated when forest offence has been committed. 8. In State of M. P. v. Azad Bharat Finance (supra) while upholding the judgment of the High Court Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the High Court was correct in reading S. 11 of the Madhya Bharat Act as permissive and not obligatory. It is well settled that the use of the word "shall" does not always mean that the enactment is obligatory or mandatory; it depends upon the context in which the word "shall" occurs and the other circumstances. On the basis of this Mr. Champawat, submittted that Section 11 of the Opium Act is anologous to the provisions of Section 55 of the Act. The relevant part of Section 11 of the Opium Act is as under ;- "11. On the basis of this Mr. Champawat, submittted that Section 11 of the Opium Act is anologous to the provisions of Section 55 of the Act. The relevant part of Section 11 of the Opium Act is as under ;- "11. Confiscation of opium.- In any case in which an offence under section 9 has been committed Committed (a) ------ (b) ------ (c) The vessles, pakages and converings in which any opium liable to confiscation under this Section is cune, and the other contents (if any) of the vessel or pakage in which such opium may be concealed, and the animals and conveyances opium in carrying it, shall likewise be liable to confiscation." 9. A perusal of this section will show that if the conveyance used in carrying contraband article shall likewise be liable to confiscation. As both these sections are very much similar lo the extent that the words used are offence has been committed then the words shall likewise be liable to confiscation. In that case in a truck contraband opium was found. Five persons were challaned for the alleged illegal possession of opium and for its transport u/s9-Aand 9-Bofthe Opium Act. The accused were acquitted but the truck was confiscated as the Magistrate was of the opinion that S. II of the Madhya Bharat Act showed clearly that the truck in which the opium was carried had to be forfeited in all circumstances, and he observed by the use of the word "shall" this court was compelled that the truck be seized, may be there was the hand of the owner in it or not and neither there is any provision that the truck owner had the knowledge or not of the opium being carried. The Sessions Judge also held that the word shall" in S. 11 (d) was mandatory and not directory. He observed that though it is correct that the truck was not used for carrying opium with the knowledge or connivance of the owner but S. 11 (d) as applicable in state does not give discretion to the court in not ordering the confiscation of the conveyance used for carrying contraband opium. The High Court held that the word "shall" occurring in S 11 of M.P. Opium Act means "may" and that it confers discretion on the "court to confiscate the conveyance provided it belongs to the offender. The High Court held that the word "shall" occurring in S 11 of M.P. Opium Act means "may" and that it confers discretion on the "court to confiscate the conveyance provided it belongs to the offender. But where it is not so, and, the owner of the truck has neither notified the offender to transport opium, nor is there any reason to believe that the owner knew that his vehicle was likely to be used for transporting contraband opium, the conveyance should not be confiscated because confiscation in such circumstances would be tanamount to punishing one, who has not committed any offence under the Opium Act, and the Supreme Court held that in the instant case, no case has been made out, therefore, the confiscation is illegal. 10. In Krishna Pillai v. State of Madras (supra) in which the appellant was charged with having committed an offence conveying dutiable goods namely two blocks of gold from French Territory of Pondichery into Indian Union by land by a route other than the authorised route prescribed under the Land Customs Act. Mohamed Ibrahim was charged with having committed an offence under section 7 (It (c) of the Land Customs Act. Mohamed Ibrahim was acquitted, but goods were confiscated. Section 7 (3) of the Land Customs Act runs as under:- "Such Magistrate shall thereupon inquire into ana try the charge brought against the accused person and upon conviction may sentence him to imprisonment which may extend to six months or to fine not exceeding Rs. 1000 or both and may confiscate the goods in respect of which the offence has been committed." In this case the High Court acquitted the accused but seized goods, so an appeal was preferred. While deciding the case, their lordships of the Supreme Court held that the only jurisdiction and power which the court has got under this section is t. confiscate the goods in respect of which the offence has been committed, upon conviction and not otherwise. If once the High Court set aside the conviction and sentence passed upon the appellant the High Court has neither the jurisdiction nor the power to conform the order of confiscation of the two blocks of gold which has been passed by the learned Magistrate. If once the High Court set aside the conviction and sentence passed upon the appellant the High Court has neither the jurisdiction nor the power to conform the order of confiscation of the two blocks of gold which has been passed by the learned Magistrate. The order of confiscation of the two blocks of the gold was manifestly illegal and without jurisdiction and the order of the blocks was set aside by the Supreme Court. 11. In K. R. Pushphan v. State of Kerala and Ors. (supra) it has been held that it is well settled by the decision of the Supreme Court and of this Court that the confiscation of the vehicle would be illegal and unsustainable if the value of the contraband alleged to have been carried in the vehicle is negligible, compared to the value of the vehicle. 12. In the present case admittedly no complaint has been filed against the driver who was present. The complaint was filed only against Udaisingh, who has been acquitted for the offence of taking wood without any authority or permit. Udaisingh was charged and has been prosecuted for the offence under section 26 and 41. The word "shall" used in Section 11 of the Opium Act has been interpreted by their lordships in State of M. P. v. Azad Bharat Finance Co. (supra) as not mandatory and only discretionary depending upon the circumstances which is anologous to Section 55 of the Act and the words used in both the sections as discussed above are similar. Therefore, in my opinion, the word "shall" used in Section 55 be read as discretionary particularly in the peculiar circumstances of this case, when the accused has been acquitted. Apart from that when no forest offence is committed and as per record value of the wood which was found in the truck is about a sum of Rs. 4760/- and the value of the vehicle RSY 3079 which is definitely much higher, therefore, in view of the decision in K. R. Pushphan v. State of Kerala (supra) the confiscation of vehicle would be illegal and unsustainable, if the person has been acquitted. It is true that inherent powers are used very sparingly and they are used only if it is necessary to give effect to any order or to prevent abuse of process of the court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. It is true that inherent powers are used very sparingly and they are used only if it is necessary to give effect to any order or to prevent abuse of process of the court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. They cannot be invoked in respect of any matter of the court nor they can be exercised to override express provisions of law prohibiting the interference if their exercise would be inconsistent with any of the specific provisions of the Code. In the present case if the confiscation of the truck is allowed when the accused has been acquitted, no notice to owner has been issued and moreover value of wood is negligible, under these circumstances, if proceedings are allowed to continue, in my opinion, it will amounts to abuse of the process of the court. Therefore, there is no bar to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Court and to secure ends of justice, the order of confiscation of the vehicle deserves to be quashed. 13. In the result, this petition is allowed, the order of learned Additional Sessions Judge dated 17.4 85 and the order of learned Munsii and Judicial Magistrate are set aside. The truck no. RSY 3079 has already been given on Superdginama, so the same is discharged. *******