Judgment S. B. Sinha, J. 1. This application is directed against an order dated 27-2-1989 passed by Sri Satya Narayan Prasad. Munsif. Chaibassa in Miscellaneous case no.5 of 1988 whereby and whereunder the said learned court dismissed the said miscellaneous case arising out of an application under Sec.47 of the Code of Civil Procedure holding that the Execution case no.1. of 1987 filed on 25-3-1987 would be deemed to have been filed in continuation of Execution case no, 10 of 1981 and, thus, the same is not barred by limitation. 2. The fact of the matter is admitted. The decree-holder opposite party filed Title Suit no 19 of 1965 for declaration of his title and recovery of possession and the said suit was decreed by a judgment and decree dated 23-12-1966. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the said decree which was registered as Title Appeal No 3 of 1987 and the said title appeal was dismissed by judgment dated 24-8-1968. The petitioner, thereafter preferred a second appeal in this court which was registered as Second Appeal no.667 of 1968 and by an order dated 26-3-1971 this Court dismissed the aforementioned second appeal 3. In the year 1981, opposite parties levied execution of the aformentioned decree which was registered as Execution case no.10 of 1981. On or about 10-12-1983, aa application for amendment of the execution thereof was filed by adding new plot no.10 and khata no 39 in the schedule mentioned in the execution application. By an -order dated 12-5-1984, the said application for amendment was allowed, but the dectet as such was not amended A copy of the said order dated 12-5-1984 is contained in annexure-1 to the civil revision application 4. The retitioner preferred a civil revision application in this Court against the said order which was registered as Civil Revision No.150/84 (R)and by an order dated 3i-l-1986 the said revision application was deposed of wherein a prayer was made that the decree-holder should get the original decree amended. The decree-holders thereafter filed an application before the trial court for necessary amendment of the decree and the decree passed in the aformentioned Title Suit no.19 of 1985 was amended by an order dated 12-5-1986. The aforementioned Execution case filed by the opposite parties was later on dismissed for default on 28-5-1986 and the decree-holders-opposite parties filed another Execution case being Execution case no.2 of 1987 on 5-3-1987. The aforementioned Execution case filed by the opposite parties was later on dismissed for default on 28-5-1986 and the decree-holders-opposite parties filed another Execution case being Execution case no.2 of 1987 on 5-3-1987. In the said execution case, an objection was raised on behalf of the petitioner that the same was barred by limitation in view of the fact that it was filed more than 12 years after passing of the judgment and decree by this Court in Second Appeal no.667 of 1968. 5. As noticed hereinbefore, the learned court below held that the execution case no.2 of 1987 was in continuation of the earlier execution case filed by the decree-holders being Execution case no.10 of 1981 and as such the same was not barred by limitation. 6. Mr. M. Y. Eqbal learned counsel appearirg on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the learned court below completely misdirected itself in passing the impugned order in so far as it failed to take into consideration that in view of the provisions of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 , whereby a period of J 2 years having been provided by way of limitation the question of saving of limitation in filing one execution case with reference to an earlier execution case which was dismissed for default does not arise. According to the learned counsel, even if a decree is amended the date of such amendment would not give rise to a fresh starting point of limitation. Learned counsel in this connection has strongly relied upon Pentapati china Venkanna and others V/s. Pentapati Bangararaju and others, reported in air 1964 SC 1454 ; Ram Gobind Rai V/s. Shahabad District Board reported in air 1976 Patna 118 : and m Ouseph V/s. Lena reported in AIR 1979 Kerala 14. 7. Learned counsel further submitted that in view of the fact that earlier execution case was dismissed for default, the same would operate as res judicata. Mr. Eqbal has further drawn my attention to Sec.9 of the limitation Act, 1963. 8. Mr. 7. Learned counsel further submitted that in view of the fact that earlier execution case was dismissed for default, the same would operate as res judicata. Mr. Eqbal has further drawn my attention to Sec.9 of the limitation Act, 1963. 8. Mr. S. N. Sinha learned counsel appearing for the decree-holders opposite parties, on the other hand, submitted that as the decree was amended on 12-9-1984, a fresh cause of action arose for filing an execution case on and from the said date ad in view of the fact that the present execution case was filed on 5-3-1987, the same was within the prescribed period of limitation. Learned counsel in this connection has placed strong reliance upon laxmibai Hareshwar Joshi V/s. The State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1977 bombay 168 and in B Shiva Shankar Das and others V/s. Mufti Syed Yusuf hasan, reported in AIR 1934 Alld.481. 9. Learned counsel further submitted that in view of the fact that in the civil revision application No.150 of 1984 (R), the Execution case was stayed from 25-5-1984 till 27-10-1986, the said period and other periods during which the said execution proceeding was stayed by reason of the orders passed by different counts should be excluded from c reputation in terms of Sec.15 of the Limitation Act Learned counsel in this connection has strongly relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Prem Laia agarwal v Lakshman Prasad Gupta and others, AIR 1970 SC 557.3 ). 10. It appears that in the aforementioned Execution Case No.10 of 1981, an objection was filed on behalf of the petitioner which was registered as Miscellaneous Case No.3 of 1982. By order dated 7-7-1982 the said miscellaneous case was dismissed and an order was passed for issuance of a writ of delivery of possession. The petitioner being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order dated 7-7-1982, preferred an appeal which was registered as Miscellaneous Appeal No.23 of 1982. In that appeal, the writ of delivery of possession was stayed. The said Miscellaneous Appeal was dismissed with cost by order dated 5-3-1983. A Writ of delivery of possession was again issued on 4-7.1983, but the Nazir reported that the delivery of possession could not be effected as the new corresponding khata or plot numbers of the property in question were not given in the writ for delivery of possession. 11. The said Miscellaneous Appeal was dismissed with cost by order dated 5-3-1983. A Writ of delivery of possession was again issued on 4-7.1983, but the Nazir reported that the delivery of possession could not be effected as the new corresponding khata or plot numbers of the property in question were not given in the writ for delivery of possession. 11. In that situation on 23-12-1983, the decree-holder filed an application before the executing court for amendment of the execution petition in the light of the report of the Nazir. An objection was filed by the petitioners to the stid application for amendment and by an order dated 12-5-1984, the application for amendment was allowed. The afore-mentioned order dated 12-5-1984 is contained in Annexure-1 to the civil revision application. 12. It may be mentioned that a decree was passed in respect of plot no.8 khata No.41 of village Sonu in the district of Singhbhum. However, it appears that the judgment-debtor objected to the prayer of amendment of the execution petition by the decree holder in the following terms as would appear from the said order 12-5-1984, which is contained in Annexure-1 to the civil revision application :- "the objection from the side of the J. Dr. raised on the ground of plot and khata number of the decretal land given in the decree is according to old survey settlement of rights but in the Khatian published in the new survey settlement of right, 1964, the present plot and khata number respectively of the decretal land are 10 and 39 and the executing court neither can correct the decree by mentioning the new particulars according to them latest survey settlement of rights nor the decree according to him particulars of the land given in it can be executed because the decree shows such particular of land which is now due to the latest survey settlement a different land from the original suit between the parties. It is further argued on behalf of the J. Dr. that the C. C. of decree in t. S.31/80 showing the corresponding number of plot No.8 khata No.4l which is decretal land with the new plot and khatian number of the same is not admissible because that suit was not interparting. Thirdly it was argued on behalf of the J. Dr. that the C. C. of decree in t. S.31/80 showing the corresponding number of plot No.8 khata No.4l which is decretal land with the new plot and khatian number of the same is not admissible because that suit was not interparting. Thirdly it was argued on behalf of the J. Dr. that the boundary of the decretal land is also not mentioned in the decree as well as in the execution petition. " 13. The executing court, however, was of the opinion that the application for amendment of the execution petition can be allowed holding :- "hence it is for ascertaining the identity of the decretal land. C. C. of the decree in T. S.31/80 through not interparting but the J. Dr. is one of the defendants in that suit and the corresponding number of the decretal land given ifl the decree of T. S.3l/80 tne finding of the court after comparing the khatian old and new and it is only for the purpose of identifying the decretal land is consideeed in this proceeding and not for any purpose which can prejudice the 3. Dr. Thirdly, the boundary of the decretal land in the execution proceeding and the decree is not essential because the entire area of the plot No.8 khata No 41 old corresponding to plot No.10 khaia No.39 new was decreed in favour or tne d. Hr. so there cannot be difficulty in ascertaining the plot. It is a portion of land of the same plot had been decreed in favour of the D. Hr. then the boundary of the land was essential. 14. It is against this order that the petitioner filed f civil revision application in this court being Civil Revision No.150 of 1984 (R ). By order dated 1-6-1964 further proceedings of the Execution case No 10 of tuw1981 was directed to be stayed by this Court in the afore-mentioned civil revision application. I haw perused the records of the said civil revision application. 15. By order dated 1-6-1964 further proceedings of the Execution case No 10 of tuw1981 was directed to be stayed by this Court in the afore-mentioned civil revision application. I haw perused the records of the said civil revision application. 15. On 19-12-1984, a statement was made on behalf of the counsel appearing on behalf of the decree-holders that an application for amendment of decree would be filed and this Court on the basis thereof granted an opportunity to file such an application, pursuant whereto, an application for amendment of decree was filed before the trial Court on 13-3-1985 by the opposite parties in the aforementioned Title Suit No 19/65 by inserting new plot numbers and khata numbers in the said decree. The order was passed in the said suit on 1-4-1985 but by an order dated 12-9-1986, the hearing of the sai Title Suit no.19 of 1965 was resumed pursuant to the order of this courtd. Both the parties appeared in the said suit and finally the said suit was closed by order dated 7-12-1986 pursuant to the order of this Court. The learned court below has observed that it appears that both the parties were taking steps in the Title Suit no.19 of 1986 till 9-12-1986, but in the meanwhile the said Execution case no.10 of 1981 was dismissed for default on 28-5-1986. 16. In the aforementioned Civil Revision application this court in its order dated 31-1-1986 observed that in view of the fact that the trial court has already passed an order directing amendment of the decree, the said civil revision application has become infructuous holding : "it has been rightly stated by Mr. Sinha that this revision application has become infructuous and the order under revision stands superseded by the order of amendment passed in the suit which is dated 1-4-1985"; and this Court directed dismissal of the said revision petition as haviag become infructuous. It further appears from the records of the case that an application for recall of the said order dated 31-1-1986 was filed. By an order dated 2-2-1986, this court directed :- "it is therefore ordered that the Munsif shall hear the parties again and dispose of the application for amendment of the decree filed by the opposite parties in Title Suit no.19 of 1985. The Munsif will pass appropriate order in the suit by 8th October, 1986. " 17. By an order dated 2-2-1986, this court directed :- "it is therefore ordered that the Munsif shall hear the parties again and dispose of the application for amendment of the decree filed by the opposite parties in Title Suit no.19 of 1985. The Munsif will pass appropriate order in the suit by 8th October, 1986. " 17. However, by an order dated 27-10-1986. in terms of a prayer made by the counsel for the J. Dr. petitioner, the said application was permitted to be withdrawn. It is. thus, clear that in fact the original decree was directed to be amended only after the aforementioned order was passed and not on 12-5-1984. 18. The points raised in this application have to be considered in the light of the facts as noticed hereinbefore. 19. There cannot be any doubt that a sea change has been made by inserting Article 136 of the Limitation Act in place of old Article 182. Article 136 of the new Limitation Act reads as follows :- 19_581_BLJ1_1992.htm It appears that major variations, modifications and alterations have been done by the Legislature while repealing Article 182 of the Old Limitation Act. The old Art.182 of Limitation Act covered the matter relating to execution of decrees or orders which was not provided for either in the old Article 183 or Sec.48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 20 In Ram Gorind Rai V/s. Shahabad District Board, reported in AIR 1976 Patna 118, a learned Single Judge of this Court while considering the effect of Article 136 of the Limitation Act vis-a-vis the old provision held that the decree-holder cannot include new items of properties in the execution proceeding after 12 years from the date of the decree. This Court in that case followed the decision of the Supreme Court in China Venkanna V/s. Bangaraju, air 1964 SC 1454 , wherein it was held as follows : - "an application made after 12 years from the date of the decree would be a fresh application within the meaning of Sec.48 of the civil Procedure Code, if the previous application was finally disposed of. It would also be a fresh application if it asked for a relief against parties or properties different from those proceeded against in the previous execution petition or asked for a relief substantially different from that asked for in the earlier petition. " 21. It would also be a fresh application if it asked for a relief against parties or properties different from those proceeded against in the previous execution petition or asked for a relief substantially different from that asked for in the earlier petition. " 21. In the instant case, the decree stood amended on 12-9-1984, but, as noticed hereinbefore, even thereafter the parties appeared in the aforementioned title Suit No.19 of 1965 till 9-12-1986. 22. The delivery of possession issued by the executing court could not be given effect to as it was recorded that in absence of plot number and khata number it was not possible far the Nazir to effect delivery of possession. It was in this situation, an application for amendment of the execution case was filed. As noticed hereinbefore, this Court also found that the orders passed by the executing court dated 12-5-1984 may not be sufficient as it was necessary to amend the decree itself and, thus, it passed an interim order on 25-5-1984. It is in pursuance of the order of this Court that an application for amendment of the decree was filed and the decree was amended on 12-9-1984. But despite the same, the parties have been fighting out in Title Suit No.19/86. In this situation, it cannot be said that the decree was enforceable without amendment. Similarly, subsequent events took place in between passing of original decree and the filing of the execution petition before the executing court, which necessitated, even according to this Court, amendment of the decree. It is, therefore, clear that without getting the decree amended, the decree-holder was not in a position to get the same executed. 23. In Ouseph V/s. Lona, reported in AIR 1979 Kerala 14, the Kerala high Court held that the decree in its original form was enforceable as from the date on which it was passed and, therefore, it was that date which was crucial for the purpose of computation of limitation. From perusal of said judgment it does not appear as to what was the nature of the amendment sought for in that case. 24. From perusal of said judgment it does not appear as to what was the nature of the amendment sought for in that case. 24. However, in Laxmibai Hareskwar Joshi and others V/s. The State of maharashtra and others, reported in AIR 1977 Bombay 168 a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Letters Patsnt Appeal held as fellows : "in the present case the defendants were ordered by amendment to do certain things and on their default to do so, delivery of possession was to ba made to the plaintiff and the plaintiff could remove huts of the defendants through Court. A declaration was also given in favour of the plaintiff that he was the owner of the land in suit. In view of this, with great respect we are unable to agree with S. K. Desai. J. in holding that the date which is material for the purposes of limitation is the date of the original decree and not the date of the amendment. There cannot be any doubt that if the date of the amendment of the decree viz. August 31, 1963, is taken into consideration, the darkoast is well within time under article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 . " 25. From the decisions of the various courts as referred to hereinbefore, it is evident that a decree becomes enforceable within the meaning of the provisions of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 if the same can be executed without there being any iraterial alterations so as to give new rise to the parties in order to make the decree capable of being executed. 26. In this case, the Nazir reported that the decree is not capable of being executed unless and until a new writ of delivery of possession was issued showing the correct plot number and correct khata number which have undergonea change because of a recent survey settlement operation. Evidently, old khata has been converted into two different khatca and new plot numbers have been given in placs of old plot numbers. 27. It is trus as was contended by Mr. Evidently, old khata has been converted into two different khatca and new plot numbers have been given in placs of old plot numbers. 27. It is trus as was contended by Mr. Eqbal that by reason of insertion of new plot numbers and new khata numbers, it cannot be said that the rights of the parties have been altered; but non only the Nazir recorded that the decree as passed was not executable because of certain subsequent events: even such a contention was raised also by the judgment debtor-petitioner himself. Evea this Court while considering the effect of the order dated 12-5-1984 in Civil Revision No.350 of 1984 (R) was of the same opinion ana evidently gave opportunity to the decree-holder to file an application for amendment of the decree in the suit itself, 28. Further from ths order dated 12-9-1986 which has been quoted hereinbefore, it is apparent that this Court was 01 the firm view that in the facts and circumstances of this case, it was not only necessary to correct the certified copy of the decree but also necessary to make necessary amendment in the original decree, so that the same may become executable. Pursuant to the aforementioned order, the teamed trial court considered the question as to whether the entire decree requires to be amended or not. 29. Further, as noticed hereinbefore, it was the judgment-debtors-petitioner himself who had all along besn contending that the decree, as it then stood, was not executable. The judgment debtors-petitioners even were not satisfied with the order dated 12-5-1984 passed by the executing court whereby and whereunder the executing court allowed the application for amendment of the execution petition, Inter alia, on the ground that unless and until the decree itself is amended, the executing court had on jurisdiction to go behind the decree so as to enable it deliver possession of the properties not mentioned therein. 30. In my considered opinion, this conduct on the part of the judgment debtor-petitioner constitutes an estoppel so as to estop him from contending that the decree was not required to be amended in order to render the same enforceable. 31. In my opinion, the word enforceable used in Article 136 of the limitation Act, 1963 is of great significance. 32. It has got to be given its literal meaning. 31. In my opinion, the word enforceable used in Article 136 of the limitation Act, 1963 is of great significance. 32. It has got to be given its literal meaning. If a decree is passed which cannot be executed unless substantial amendments are made either because of a mistake on the part of the court or because a subsequant event, the same cannot be said to be a mistake in the nature of arithmetical or clerical error which can be rectified in terms of Section J 52 of the Code of Civil procedure. 33. The instant case is one of such cases which comes within the dicta of Laxmibal Hareshwar Joshi and others V/s. The State of Maharashtra and others as reported in AIR 1977 Bombay 168. For the reasons aforementioned, it has to be held that the decision of this Court in Ram Gobind Rai V/s. Shahabad District Board reported in AIR 1976 Patna 1 8 and in Sri Chandra Mauli Deva v Kumar Binoya Nand Singh and others, reported in AIR 1916 Patna 208 can be said to have no application to the facts and circumstances of this case. 34. Further it has rightly been suggested by Sri Sinha that the execution case was stayed in C. R. No.150 of 1984 (R) for a period of about 2 years five months and two days. On an earlier occasion also, in Miscellaneous appeal No.23 of 1982, the execution proceeding was stayed for about six months. The said period has also to be excluded for the purpose of computation of the period of limitation in terms of Sec.15 of the Limitation act, 1963. However the exact period for which the proceedings in the earlier execution case being Execution Case No.10 of 1981 was stayed cannot be found out from the records of the present execution case and thus it cannot be held that if the total period is excluded from computation, the present execution case has been filed within the prescribed period or not. 35. Before parting with this judgment, it may be mentioned that it appears from the records of C. R. No.150 of 1984 (R) that in relation to the self-same matter, one Sri Nandlal Mishra also filed a suit being Title Suit No.31 of 1980 which was dismissed by judgment dated 29th November, 1982. 36. 35. Before parting with this judgment, it may be mentioned that it appears from the records of C. R. No.150 of 1984 (R) that in relation to the self-same matter, one Sri Nandlal Mishra also filed a suit being Title Suit No.31 of 1980 which was dismissed by judgment dated 29th November, 1982. 36. Taking thus all facts and circumstances into consideration, I am of the view that there is no merit in this application which is accordingly dismissed. 37. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment debtor must pay and bear the cost, incurred in this Civil Revision application by the decree holders. Advocates fee is quantified at Rs.1000/-Revision dismissed.