Judgment : NAINAR SUNDARAM, J.: 1. These two appeals can be disposed of in common. The factual background behind these two Appealswiil have to be necessarily traced. On 26.4.1990, C.R.P.No.1290 of 1990, which a revision preferred under Art.227 of the Constitution of India by the respondent, was disposed of by the learned single Judge of this Court in the following terms: “I do not think that this is a fit case where this Court can interfere under Art.227 of the Constitution of India. Admittedly, the trial Court has issued only notice in I.A.No.2249 of 1989, an injunction application. A counter appears to have been filed to that application on 9.4.1990. According to Mr.Vijayan, learned counsel for the petitioner, the matter stands posted to 3.5.1990 for filing a counter to the application for expediting the hearing. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, I think that a direction is to issue to the trial Court to dispose of I.A.No.2429 of 1989, according to law and on merits, on 3.5.1990 itself, will suffice. I am told that in view of the pendency of the injunction application, the respondents are taking steps to put up constructions. Under those circumstances, the trial court is directed to pass an order in I.A.No.2429 of 1989, injunction application according to lawand on merits, without fail on 3.5.1990. This revision petition is dismissed with the above directions. 2. The District Munsif, Vridachalam, was the first-respondent in the revision. The appellant herein was the third-respondent in the revision. The revision was disposed of by the learned single Judge at the admission stage itself, without notice to the respondents. Complaining that the application I.A.No.2429 of 1989 was not disposed of within the time as directed by the learned single Judge, the respondent preferred Contempt Application No.160 of 1990. In the contempt application, the District Munsif, Vridachalam, was the first respondent and the appellant herein was the second respondeat. Complaining that the application I.A.No.2429 of 1989 was not disposed of within the time as directed by the learned single Judge, the respondent preferred Contempt Application No.160 of 1990. In the contempt application, the District Munsif, Vridachalam, was the first respondent and the appellant herein was the second respondeat. The prayer in Contempt Application N0.160 of 1990 runs as follows: “For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit it is humbly payed that this Honourable Court my be pleased to issue necessary contempt proceedings against the first and second respondent here in for contempt of Court under Secs.10 and 11 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with O.XIX of the Original Side Rules of this Court for violating the order of this Court in C.R.P.No.1290 of 1990 dated 26.4.1990 and punish the first and second respondents for the same and pass such further or other orders as this Honourable Court may be deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.” In the affidavit filed in support of the application for contempt, it was averred that, “Apprehending the undue delay likely to be caused by the first respondent in collusion with the Government Pleader, and the second respondent, the applicant moved the above C.R.P.No.1290 of 1990 in this Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India and sought for a direction to dispose of I.A.No.2429 of 1989 on 3.5.1990 on merits.” It must be noted here itself that in the said affidavit there is no single averment that the appellant in any manner contribute to the omission and default on the part of the District Munsif, Vridachalam, to dispose of I.A.No.2429 of 1989, as directed in the revision. The appelant, however, was obliged to file his counter-affidavit to protect himself against being hauled up for contempt. In paragraph 8 thereof the averments which brought the appellant to trouble ran as fellows: “It is submitted that this Honourable Court also did not find any ground to admit the case but only gave a direction in the interest of justice in order that the first respondent may dispose of the petition early. The stipulation of time by this Honourable Court cannot by any means be construed in strict sense as the time for due compliance.” 3. The stipulation of time by this Honourable Court cannot by any means be construed in strict sense as the time for due compliance.” 3. The learned single Judge dealt with Contempt Application No. 160 of 1990 and he found that the District Munsif, Vridachalam, had no jurisdiction for not disposing of I.A.No.2429 of 1989 as per the direction given in C.R.P.No.1290 of 1990; and taking into consideration that the District Munsif, Vridachalam, belongs to the subordinate judiciary, the learned single Judge directed the Registrar of this Court to call for an explanation from the District Munsif, Vridachalam, and deal with him administratively. However, with regard to the appellant herein, the second respondent in the contempt application, the learned single Judge took note of the averments in paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit already extracted and opined: “A reading of the counter-affidavit filed by the second respondent especially paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit, clearly shows that he has committed Contempt of Court and this is a typical case where a public officer, not only disobeys the order of this Court, but also tries to defend his action by filing a counter-affidavit stating that no contempt has been made out. Though he says that it is not intentional, I am not convinced, because of the statements made by the officer in paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit. In view, this is a flagrant violation of the order of this Court, to which he is a party.” The learned single Judge chose to punish the appellant herein for contempt by imposing a fine of Rs.1,000. As against the order in Contempt Application No. 160 of 1990, Contempt Appeal No.2 of 1991 has been preferred. 4. The appellant took out Sub-Application No.309 of 1990 in Contempt Application No. 160 of 1990, praying for the acceptance of his unconditional apology and to review the order made in Contempt Application No.160 of 1990 and purge him of the contempt and delete the fine, of Rs. 1,000 imposed on him. This sub-application was dismissed by the learned single Judge and L.P.A.No.36 of 1991 has been preferred as against the order of the learned single Judge in the sub-application. 5. 1,000 imposed on him. This sub-application was dismissed by the learned single Judge and L.P.A.No.36 of 1991 has been preferred as against the order of the learned single Judge in the sub-application. 5. Mr.V.Sridevan, learned Government Pleader, appearing for the appellant, would submit that the appellant inadvertently and without any wilful intention made the averments in paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit filed in Contempt Application No. 160 of 1990 and he became truthfully repentant and tendered his apology by filing the requisite affidavit in Sub-application No.309 of 1990 and in the said circumstances, the learned single Judge ought to have exonerated the appellant from contempt. The learned Government Pleader also submits that apart from the averments made in paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit, which could only be characterised as an act of indiscretion, the appellant could not be stated to have, by any positive and overt act or omission of his, tended to impede the disposal of I.A.No.2429 of 1989. The learned Government Pleader also submits that no averments to the above effect have been made in the affidavit filed in, support of the Contempt Application No.160 of 1990, Mr.K.M.Vijayan, learned counsel for the respondent. submits that it is not possible to characterise the averments made in paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit of the appellant as innocuous and only as an act of indiscretion on his part and the appellant has been throughout indulging in acts much to the prejudice of the rights of the respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant interference by us in appeal with orders of the learned single Judge. 6. We assessed the submissions of the learned Government Pleader, appearing for the appellant and the counter submissions of Mr.K.M.Vijayan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, in the light of the principles that should govern proceedings for contempt as against a person who may not be stated to be a party, to whom the directions have been given and who should comply with the directions. The direction in the revision was to the District Munsif, Vridachalam, to dispose of I.A.No.2429 of 1989 within the stipulated time. Admittedly, he did not do so. If, by any act or omission of his, the appellant had tended to impede the disposal of the application by the District Munsif, Vridachalam, as directed by t his Court, certainly that can be taken note of. Admittedly, he did not do so. If, by any act or omission of his, the appellant had tended to impede the disposal of the application by the District Munsif, Vridachalam, as directed by t his Court, certainly that can be taken note of. The principle is that a party, though not directly bound by the order issued against the other party, vet conducted himself in such a manner so as to assist or procure the breach of the order by the other party that would amount to obstructing the course of justice, punishable in contempt law. The party should have voluntarily rendered a positive act of assistance to the other party with full knowledge of all legally relevant circumstances. However, mach, as Mr.K.M.Vijayan, learned counsel for the respondent, could strain, he was not able to point out to us any such feature or conduct that could be attributed to the appellant. The appellant could not be stated to have actively assisted in the breach or violation committed by the District Munsif Vridachalam. The very basis for the contempt application was the omission or default on the part of the District Munsif, Vridachalam, to dispose of I.A.No.2429 of 1989 within the time stipulated by this Court. In the absence of positive allegation, and substantive proof thereof, that the appellant was in any way responsible for the non-disposal of I.A.No.2429 of 1989, as directed by this Court, it is not possible to hold him for contempt on that basis. It must be remembered that the quantum of proof required, assuming that there are relevant allegations, is very demanding one, being pitched at the level normally associated with criminal proceedings. 7. Then we come to the averments found in paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit of the appellant, extracted already. We can only characterise the averments as foolhardy and being the result of a misconstruction and misunderstanding by the appellant of the order made by this Court in the revision. The appellant need not have indulged in exposing his understanding and construction of the order of this Court. Yet he did it. But, the moot question is, do the said averments found in paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit of the appellant show that he by any act or omission of his, assisted or procured the breach of the order of this Court, by the District Munsif, Vridachalam. Yet he did it. But, the moot question is, do the said averments found in paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit of the appellant show that he by any act or omission of his, assisted or procured the breach of the order of this Court, by the District Munsif, Vridachalam. Nothing to that effect is evident and has been made out. While the construction or understanding of the order of the is Court and further exposing them as the appellant did, cannot be commended, it is very difficult to found a basis for contempt on them. It has been already noticed that there is total lack of allegation that the appellant either by any overt act or omission of his, impeded or hindered the disposal of I.A.No.2429 of 1989 by the District Munsif, Vridachalam. It has been always countenanced that power to punish for contempt should be sparingly and circumspectly used and only when it is found to be a case of deliberate contempt. The indiscretion of making the averments in paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit has been realised by the appellant when he took out Sub-application No.309 of 1990 and he has sufficiently exhibited the repentant mood as we could see from the following averments found in the affidavit filed therein: “While filing the said counter-affidavit, I had made an inadvertent statement that the stipulation of time by this Honourable Court cannot by any means be construed in strict sense as the time for the compliance. I have since realised that I ought not to have made the statement and that whenever a time limit is set up by this Honourable Court the same should be complied with without fail. I sincerely apologise for my inadvertent statement referred to above. I pray that this Honourable Court may be pleased to forgive me and accept my apologies. …….. I respectfully submit that I and sincerely sorry for my averments made in paragraph 8 of my counter-affidavit. Only out of ignorance I had made those averments. There is absolutely no intention to disobey the orders of this Honourable Court. There was no wilfulness in my conduct. I apologise again for my averments in paragraph 8 of my counter-affidavit.” Certainly we can take note of the is attitude of the appellant. 8. Only out of ignorance I had made those averments. There is absolutely no intention to disobey the orders of this Honourable Court. There was no wilfulness in my conduct. I apologise again for my averments in paragraph 8 of my counter-affidavit.” Certainly we can take note of the is attitude of the appellant. 8. In view of our above discussion, we are of the opinion that there is no ground on facts and in law to maintain the punishment of the appellant for contempt and the imposition of the fine of Rs.1,000 on him as done by the learned Single Judge in Contempt Application No.160 of 1990. We are not able to concur with the learned single Judge on the question. As a result, we allow Contempt Appeal No.2 of 1991, set aside the order of the learned single Judge, in so far as it punished the appellant for contempt and imposed a fine of Rs.1,000 on him. With regard to the processes to be followed as against the District Munsif, Vridachalam, that shall be pursued as directed by the learned single Judge. 9. In view of our allowing Contempt Appeal No.2 of 1991, there is no need to consider L.P.A.No.36 of 1991 since the purpose of the appellant has been served. Accordingly, L.P.A.No.36 of 1991 is dismissed. We make no order as to costs.