JUDGMENT K. S. PARIPOORNAN, J. - The Revenue is the appellant in both the cases. The appeals are filed from the judgment of the same learned single Judge, rendered in O.P. No. 8154 of 1989 and O.P. No. 240 of 1990, dated June 11, 1990. The original petitions were heard together, though separate judgments were passed in the two original petitions. The respondent in both the writ appeals - the same petitioner in both the original petitions - is an assessee under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act (in short "the Act"). He is the owner of a factory at Alleppey manufacturing rubberised coir. The factory was registered as a small-scale industrial unit. According to the assessee (respondent) he is entitled to the benefit of S.R.O. No. 585/80 (G.O.Ms. No. 46/80/TD dated June 4, 1980 and S.R.O. No. 641/81 (G.O.Ms. No. 46/81/TD dated June 2, 1981) and so he is entitled to the benefit of lower rate of tax on the purchase of rubber made by him for use of such rubber in his units for the manufacture of finished products. The complaint voiced in the original petitions in that such benefit has been denied to him improperly and illegally. In O.P. No. 8154 of 1989 (Writ Appeal No. 578 of 1990) the petitioner prayed for a direction to the first respondent (assessing authority) to extend the benefits of S.R.O. No. 585/80 and for a declaration that rule 21(9) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Rules (in short "the Rules") is ultra vires the Act and is void and unenforceable and that the first respondent (assessing authority) has no power to make the provisional assessment on the monthly return submitted by the petitioner. Exhibit P8 dated September 4, 1989, is the "provisional" monthly assessment made on the petitioner for the months of April to July, 1989 which was attacked as illegal and devoid of jurisdiction. In O.P. No. 219 of 1990 (Writ Appeal No. 591 of 1990) the petitioner prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash exhibit P2 (provisional assessment for August, 1989 dated October 10, 1989), P2(a) (the relevant notice of demand therefor), exhibit P3, (notice for provisional assessments for September, 1989) and exhibit P8 (assessment for the year 1987-88). In O.P. No. 219 of 1990 (Writ Appeal No. 591 of 1990) the petitioner prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash exhibit P2 (provisional assessment for August, 1989 dated October 10, 1989), P2(a) (the relevant notice of demand therefor), exhibit P3, (notice for provisional assessments for September, 1989) and exhibit P8 (assessment for the year 1987-88). He has also prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus to the second respondent (a mistake for the third respondent, the Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Sales Tax) to dispose of exhibit P9 appeal dated November 19, 1989 filed for the year 1987-88. (The assessment for 1987-88 is exhibit P8). There was also a prayer to declare that rule 21(9) of the Rules is ultra vires the Act and is void and unenforceable and the first respondent has no power to make the provisional assessment on the monthly return submitted by the petitioner. In O.P. No. 240 of 1990 in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the original petition the petitioner had stated that the dispute between the petitioner (assessee) and the first respondent (assessing authority) is regarding the rate of tax, whether 6 per cent or 3 per cent which is payable by the petitioner on the purchase turnover of latex used as raw material in the manufacture of rubberised coir. The petitioner contends that he is entitled to the lower rate of 3 per cent. The petitioner has also categorically stated that it is the denial of the benefit of the above notification, which necessitated the filing of O.P. No. 240 of 1990 and O.P. No. 8154 of 1989. He has stated in paragraph 7 of the original petition that for the year 1987-88 the first respondent (assessing authority) denied the benefit of the above notification and completed the assessment, exhibit P8. The petitioner has further stated that he filed an appeal against exhibit P8 and also a stay petition, evidenced by exhibits P9 and P10, before the third respondent, the Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Sales Tax, and they are even now pending. 2. The learned single Judge delivered the main judgment in O.P. No. 8154 of 1989 (Writ Appeal No. 587 of 1990). It was followed in O.P. No. 240 of 1990. 2. The learned single Judge delivered the main judgment in O.P. No. 8154 of 1989 (Writ Appeal No. 587 of 1990). It was followed in O.P. No. 240 of 1990. He construed the Notification S.R.O. No. 585 of 1980 and held that the petitioner is liable to pay purchase tax on the rubber latex purchased for the manufacture of their product only at the rate of 3 per cent. A declaration to that effect was made in the original petition. It was followed in O.P. No. 240 of 1990 (Writ Appeal No. 591 of 1990). The learned single Judge in delivering the judgment in O.P. No. 240 of 1990, held that the judgment delivered by him in O.P. No. 8154 of 1989 shall be kept in view by the third respondent, who shall dispose of exhibit P9 appeal expeditiously. Aggrieved by the judgments rendered in the two original petitions by the learned single Judge, the Revenue has come up in writ appeals. 3. In O.P. No. 240 of 1990, the Revenue has filed a detailed counter-affidavit, dated June 8, 1990. According to the Revenue the assessee is not entitled to the reduced rate of tax on its purchase turnover of rubber latex. The Revenue has also stated that exhibit P8 order is valid and legal since, according to it, the assessments (provisional and regular) were made in accordance with law and the assessing authority passed the orders properly. Exhibit P4 assessment order is also stated to be one in accordance with law. The Revenue has taken up the plea that the petitioner has an alternative remedy against exhibit P8 (by way of appeal) and also against the provisional assessment orders (by way of revisions) rejecting its claim of exemption of lower rate of tax. According to the Revenue, the petitioner is not entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. We heard counsel for the appellant (Revenue) as also counsel for the respondent (assessee). Rival pleas have been put forward before us regarding the scope of S.R.O. No. 641/81 and S.R.O. No. 585/80. The relevant files were also produced before us. 4. We heard counsel for the appellant (Revenue) as also counsel for the respondent (assessee). Rival pleas have been put forward before us regarding the scope of S.R.O. No. 641/81 and S.R.O. No. 585/80. The relevant files were also produced before us. The counsel for the Revenue raised the fundamental plea that the petitioner-assessee has got equally efficacious remedy provided by the statute to assail the provisional and regular assessment and this is not a case where the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India could be invoked or exercised and a mere declaration granted regarding the scope of the relevant notification. Counsel for the Revenue submitted that from exhibit P8 (assessment order) an appeal is maintainable. The petitioner himself has filed an appeal and a petition for stay, evidenced by exhibits P9 and P10, before the third respondent. From the other provisional assessments and demands, revisional remedies are available before the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax and the Board of Revenue. The appellate as well as the revisional authorities are competent to interpret the scope of the relevant notifications - S.R.O. No. 585 of 1980 and S.R.O. No. 641 of 1981. Having filed an appeal against exhibit P8 before the appellate authority, evidenced by exhibit P9, the petitioner was incompetent to file the original petition assailing exhibit P8 in proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution of India. So also, the petitioner has not alleged or shown as to why the alternate remedy provided by the statute, by way of appeal and revision, are not efficacious remedies or not pursued and how the discretionary jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India could be or is invoked for a mere declaration about the scope and content of a statutory notification. On the other hand, counsel for the respondent (assessee) submitted that the availability of an alternate remedy by way of appeal or revision is no bar for this Court to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India. Counsel contended that though from exhibit P8 assessment, the assessee has filed exhibit P9 appeal, which is still pending, it is no bar to assail exhibit P8 in proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was also submitted that from the provisional assessments an appeal will not lie; a revision will lie. Counsel contended that though from exhibit P8 assessment, the assessee has filed exhibit P9 appeal, which is still pending, it is no bar to assail exhibit P8 in proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was also submitted that from the provisional assessments an appeal will not lie; a revision will lie. But according to counsel, the very provision, under which the provisional assessments were made, viz., rule 21(9) of the Rules, is ultra vires the Act and the assessing authority has no power to make the provisional assessments, on the basis of monthly returns submitted by the petitioner. In this view, it was contended that all the provisional assessments are void and the original petition assailing such provisional assessments is competent. Both sides brought to our notice a few decisions in support of their rival contentions. 5. In both the original petitions a declaration is sought that rule 21(9) of the Rules is ultra vires the Act and the assessing authority has no power to make provisional assessment on the basis of the monthly returns submitted by the petitioner. The basis for stating that rule 21(9) of the Rules is ultra vires, is that section 18, providing for provisional assessment, was omitted from the statute with effect from April 1, 1982 by the Kerala General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1983 and after the omission or deletion of the said section, a provisional assessment cannot be made under rule 21(9) of the Rules. A similar contention came up for consideration before a Bench of this Court in Asoka Oil Mills v. Sales Tax Officer [1985] 58 STC 282 and a Division Bench of this Court held that notwithstanding the deletion of section 18 of the Act from the statute with effect from April 1, 1982, rule 21(7) to 21(14) of the Rules, retained with minor modifications, could validly operate even after deletion of section 18 of the Act and sections 5, 16, 17 and 57(1) of the Act were more than sufficient to support rule 21(7) to 21(14) of the Rules. In other words, a Bench of this Court upheld the validity of rule 21(7) to 21(14) inclusive of sub-rule (9). The judgment was rendered on April 3, 1984. In other words, a Bench of this Court upheld the validity of rule 21(7) to 21(14) inclusive of sub-rule (9). The judgment was rendered on April 3, 1984. S.L.P. (Civil) No. 4216 of 1985 filed before the Supreme Court was not successful and the Supreme Court held that the question of validity of the sub-rules sought to be challenged is merely academic and it did not arise for consideration in that case in view of the directions contained in paragraph 14 of the judgment under appeal. 6. We perused the above Bench decision with care. Though counsel for the assessee pressed that the above Bench decision requires reconsideration, having bestowed our anxious thoughts, we are not inclined to take a different view. The said Bench decision has not been departed from, so far. In the light of the Bench decision in Asoka Oil Mills case [1985] 58 STC 282 (Ker), the prayer for a declaration that rule 21(9) of the Rules is ultra vires and so the assessing authority has no power to make a provisional assessment on the monthly return submitted by the petitioner, is devoid of substance. It is common ground that from the provisional assessments made, the assessee has got a right of revision. The revisional authority is competent to interpret or construe the relevant notification. There was no challenge against any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules, other than the challenge against rule 21(9) as ultra vires of the Act. 7. It is true that the availability of an alternate remedy is no bar for the exercise of jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution by this Court but that is a very cogent and relevant factor to be looked into, in considering whether the discretionary power should be exercised or not. Since the assessee (petitioner) has got an efficacious remedy from the provisional assessment orders, by way of revisions, before the statutory authority, we see no reason as to why this Court should, in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India, scrutinise the legality of the provisional assessment orders. There are no extraordinary circumstances in this case. The respondent (assessee) has no case that the revisional authorities are incompetent in law to construe the impact of the notifications or that there was any denial of natural justice by the assessing authority before passing the provisional assessments. There are no extraordinary circumstances in this case. The respondent (assessee) has no case that the revisional authorities are incompetent in law to construe the impact of the notifications or that there was any denial of natural justice by the assessing authority before passing the provisional assessments. In such cases, the respondent (assessee) should pursue the statutory remedy by way of revision and was not justified in invoking the extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India - See Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1983] 53 STC 315 (SC); AIR 1983 SC 603 . Again in Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd. [1985] 154 ITR 172 at page 176; AIR 1985 SC 330 at page 332, paragraph 3, the Supreme Court stated the law thus : "Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to by-pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged." 8. The only other aspect, which we would like to stress is that in O.P. No. 240 of 1990, the appellant has assailed exhibit P8, which is pending in appeal before the third respondent, evidenced by exhibit P9. This is so stated in paragraph 7 of the original petition itself. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged." 8. The only other aspect, which we would like to stress is that in O.P. No. 240 of 1990, the appellant has assailed exhibit P8, which is pending in appeal before the third respondent, evidenced by exhibit P9. This is so stated in paragraph 7 of the original petition itself. When an appeal from exhibit P8 assessment order is pending, the assessee was incompetent to assail the said order in proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution of India - See K. S. Rashid and Son v. Income-tax Investigation Commission [1954] 25 ITR 167 (SC) at page 174; AIR 1954 SC 207 at page 210, paragraph 4, Jai Singh v. Union of India AIR 1977 SC 898 at page 899, paragraph 4, Kunjahammad Haji v. State of Kerala 1960 KLT 930 (Ker) and McDowell & Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax [1986] 62 STC 164 (Ker); 1985 KLT 428 (Ker). The grant of the declaration in O.P. No. 240 of 1990 (Writ Appeal No. 591 of 1990) and directing the appellate authority to keep in view the judgment in O.P. No. 8154 of 1989, will act as a fetter for the appellate authority to exercise its statutory duty effectively. It was not called for; nor is the grant of declaration, in such circumstances, in accordance with law. - See McDowell & Co. Ltd. Case [1989] 62 STC 164 (Ker) at page 167; 1985 KLT 428 at page 431, paragraph 5. 9. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view, that the learned single Judge failed to exercise the discretion vested in him in accordance with law in granting the declaration as he did, adjudicating the scope of the notification on the merits. This is a fit and proper case, in which the learned single Judge should have directed the assessee to pursue the statutory remedy open to him. In proceeding to adjudicate the matter on the merits, the learned single Judge failed to apply the binding decisions of the Supreme Court and the earlier Bench decisions of this Court, which, we have referred to above. The discretionary jurisdiction vested in this Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India has not been exercised in accordance with law and as interpreted by the binding decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court, as stated above. The discretionary jurisdiction vested in this Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India has not been exercised in accordance with law and as interpreted by the binding decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court, as stated above. On these grounds, we set aside the judgments under appeals. 10. We hold that the original petitions are not maintainable. However, if the assessee files revisions from the provisional assessment orders within 30 days from today before the appropriate authority, the said revisions shall be disposed of on the merits, as if they are filed within time. The assessee is free to pursue exhibit P9 appeal. It is open to the revisional and appellate authorities to interpret the relevant notifications and dispose of the revisions and appeal in accordance with law. 11. Before concluding, we would only highlight the fact that the provisional assessments are for varying months in 1989-90, and now that the year is over, it is time for making the final assessment itself. The Revenue would do well to consider that aspect and expedite the final assessment for the year itself being effected. So also the Revenue would do well to see that the appeal, exhibit P9, for the year 1987-88 is disposed of expeditiously. The writ appeals are disposed of as above. Writ appeals allowed.