T. N. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) YESTERDAY Shri Lokendra Gupta was not before me. He is in this appeal respondent No. 2 and today he has argued his own case. Yesterday I heard Shri R. D. Jain, appearing for respondent No. 1, who fought valiantly a lost cause. It was Yesterday itself that I told him about Gaurishankar, AIR 1927 PC 246, star which shines on Indian Judicial firmament. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has not overruled that and has, on the other hand, reinforced that law-embodying a very fundamental principle of Hindu Law. ( 2 ) TODAY Shri J. P. Gupta who appears for the appellants, has tried to improve upon the performance of counsel of the appeal to which reference I had made in yesterday's order. In Vasudeo v. Tikaram (F. As. Nos. 25/84 and 8/91 decided on 5-8-1991), as noted yesterday in this matter, I applied Gaurishankar (supra) and ordered retrial of the suit framing a specific issue, heeding the clear, unambiguous and clarion call of Gaurishankar (supra ). On factual aspects, this appeal assembles materially Vasudeo's case (supra ). Only the relevant dates in regard to the crucial contention raised and decided in this appeal may be stated to outline briefly the case of parties set up in this appeal. Plaintiffs-appellants traced the title through their grandfather Gopinath and their father Chironji Lal stating that after Gopinath's death there was a partition in the year 1960 and that the suit property fell in the share of Chironjilal. Defendant-Respondent No. 1 got on 27-7-1970 a sale deed from Chironjilal fradulently which was without consideration and it was not for legal necessity or benefit of the estate. That alienation was challenged in the suit from which this appeal arises. ( 3 ) RELIANCE today of Shri J. P. Gupta on Prasad v. Govindaswami Mudaliar, (1982) 1 SCC 185 , I hold appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case, because Shri Lokendra Gupta very forcefully argued that plaintiff-appellants did not raise the plea of inadequacy of the consideration for the impugned sale. He has submitted that there was, therefore, no duty on the trial Court to strike any issue and no evidence or finding had to be recorded. He further submitted that in the written statement plea was taken that consideration was adequate. He has submitted that there was, therefore, no duty on the trial Court to strike any issue and no evidence or finding had to be recorded. He further submitted that in the written statement plea was taken that consideration was adequate. In para 63 of the report in Prasad's case (supra) the legal principle stated in Gaurishankar (supra) is buttressed holding that "there is, however, another condition which must be satisfied before the son could be held liable, i. e. , that the father or the manager acted like a prudent man and did not sacrifice the property for an inadequate consideration" (emphasis added ). That holding, according to Shri Gupta, implies that burden was on the defendant in the suit in which alienation in his favour by the father is challenged. He is to plead and "satisfy the Court" that the vendor acted like a prudent man; that for good, valid and adequate consideration sale was made. ( 4 ) I have taken the view in Vasudeo (supra) that in a suit in which alienation of H. U. F. property is challenged by the coparcener, there arises a duty on the Court to frame an issue and to decide that by recording a clear-cut, affirmative finding, positive or negative, as to the adequacy of the consideration. Support for that view I read in Prasad's case ( AIR 1982 SC 84 ) cited today. Shri Lokendra Gupta still pressed for reconsideration of that view submitting that the Court had no obligation to frame issue because defendant's plea was unilateral and that it was not bilateral because the plaintiff made no plea. That contention must be repelled as not only Prasad's holding rebuffs that, otherwise that is not countenanced by Order 14, C. P. C. , Rule 1 (4) in clear terms underlines the proposition that issues may be either of fact or of law and indeed when issue of fact arises there has to be pleadings by parties. When father's alienation is challenged, an issue of law is inherent in the plea of plaintiff for declaring father's alienation of coparcenary property void. ( 5 ) THE Hindu Law authoritatively stated in Gaurishankar (supra) is that dehors any other plea, such an alienation when made for adequate consideration can only be held valid. This view, as stated earlier, has been buttressed in Prasad's case (supra ). ( 5 ) THE Hindu Law authoritatively stated in Gaurishankar (supra) is that dehors any other plea, such an alienation when made for adequate consideration can only be held valid. This view, as stated earlier, has been buttressed in Prasad's case (supra ). I am also very clear in my mind that the duty in regard to framing of the issue is of the Court which it has to discharge because it has to try the suit and it has to give notice to parties to lead evidence with reference to the issues framed. Reference to Court's "satisfaction" in Prasad's case also implies that duty. I, therefore, find no force in the contention of Shri Lokendra Gupta that because the plaintiff did not apply for framing of issue in regard to adequacy of consideration, Court's default in that regard is condonable. Rule 5 of Order 14, C. P. C. empowers the Court to amend issues or frame additional issues at any stage of proceedings and it does not contemplate that the power must be exercised when application is made; on the other hand, it saddles on the Court duty to exercise power suo motu "for determining the matters in controversy between the parties", if that was necessary to do so. When the question of exercise of jurisdiction is in issue that is to be considered in appeal as to whether there was abdication of jurisdiction or it was exercised illegally or with material irregularity. The judgment and decree impugned in this appeal, I hold, both suffers from jurisdictional defect of non-framing of the material issue. I reiterate, therefore, the second contention of Shri Lokendra Gupta imploring me to reconsider my decision in Vasudeo (supra) has also no merits. ( 6 ) FOR all the aforesaid reasons this appeal too must follow the same course as that of Vasudeo (supra ). The suit is remanded for retrial but only in respect of the following specific issue: "whether the consideration for the purchase of the suit house as per sale deed dated 27-7-1970 (Ex. D-11) was unreasonable and if on that ground itself the alienation is liable to be set aside?" in the course of retrial parties would be required to adduce evidence only in respect of the issue as hereinabove framed. For that they shall be given three month's time. D-11) was unreasonable and if on that ground itself the alienation is liable to be set aside?" in the course of retrial parties would be required to adduce evidence only in respect of the issue as hereinabove framed. For that they shall be given three month's time. However, the findings already recorded in the impugned judgment on other issues shall remain ( 7 ) UNDISTURBED; it shall be open to the aggrieved party after fresh judgment is rendered to reagitate any finding earlier recorded by the trial Court in its judgment originally rendered along with the finding subsequently recorded on the additional issues, hereinabove framed. ( 8 ) COUNSEL shall appear in the trial Court on 10-9-1991 and take further orders there at for retrial of the suit. A fresh judgment and decree shall be passed as per law laid down and directions made herein. There shall be no order as to costs in this appeal. ( 9 ) BECAUSE retrial is ordered, Registry shall issue a certificate to the appellant for refund of the Court-fees paid on the appeal filed in this Court, acting under the provisions of Section 13 of the Court-fees Act. Order accordingly. .