Judgment :- Abdul Hadi, J.: These writ petitions challenge the respective land acquisition proceedings certain common questions are involved in them, they are taken up together and disposed One common question which was argued in most of these writ petitions is whether respective Sec.4(1) notifications in them could be quashed, on the ground that they suffered from the vice of vagueness or indefiniteness. We shall first deal with that question. 2. Both W.P.No.2758 of 1983 and W.P.No.9654 of 1986 are by the same petitioner Mrs.Marian Joseph. The first of the said two, is for a mandamus to forbearing respondents from proceeding further in pursuance of the notice of the second respondent therein under Sec.9(3) and 10 of the Land Acquisition Act, (For convenience hereinafter be referred to as Act) in his No.Ka/3264/72/A dated 18.9.1983 against petitioner. The same petitioner has subsequently filed W.P.No.9654 of 1986 for a certiorari for quashing the same Land Acquisition proceedings. 3. W.P.Nos.2758 of 1983, 9654 of 1986, 9764 of 1986 and 9561 of 1983 - all relate same Sec.4(1) notification G.O.R.No.124 Housing, dated 8.5.1975, the material portion which runs as follows: "No.II(2)/HOU/1861/75 - Whereas it appears to the Government of Tamil Nadu that lands specified below are needed for a public purpose, to wit, for the implementation Housing Schemes, to meet the demands made by various sectors of the population "Kalaignar Karunanidhi Nagar Further Extension Scheme", notice to that effect is given to all whom it may concern in accordance with the provisions of Sub-sec(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, (Central Act I of 1894);" The lands involved in these petitions are in Nerkundram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District in W.P.Nos.2758 of 1983 and 9654 of 1986, the extent of the land involved is 4 grounds and 18 Sq.ft., Sec.No.70/2. In W.P.No.9764 of 1986 the extent involved is 7 grounds and 1223 Sec.No.20, 70/2, 74/1 and 74/2. In W.P.No.9561 of 1983, the extent involved is 0.04 in Sec.No.93. 4. In W.P.No.9764 of 1986 the extent involved is 7 grounds and 1223 Sec.No.20, 70/2, 74/1 and 74/2. In W.P.No.9561 of 1983, the extent involved is 0.04 in Sec.No.93. 4. The material portion of the Sec.4(1) notification in W.P.No.6169 of 1983, G.O.R.221, Housing, dated 29.8.1975 runs as follows: "No.II(2)/HOU/3459/75 - Whereas it appears to the Government of Tamil Nadu that lands specified below are needed for a public purpose, to wit, for the creation of neighbourhood, known as Kalaignar Karunanidhi Nagar Part II Schemes, notice to that is hereby given to all whom it may concern in accordance with the provisions of Sub of the Sec.4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act I of 1894)............." The lands involved in this writ petition are in Koyambedu Village, Saidapet Chengalpattu District and the extent thereof are 20.60 acres in S.No.164/1, 165, 167-1B, 167-2, 167/5,167/6 and 168. 5. The material portion of the Sec.4(1) notification G.O.R.No.367, Housing, dated 19.2.1975 in W.P.No.10474 of 1982 runs as follows: "No.II(2)/HOU/983/75 - Whereas it appears to the Government of Tamil Nadu that the specified below are needed for a public purpose to wit, for increasing accommodation for the development of South Madras neighbourhood, notice to that hereby given to all whom it may concern in accordance with the provisions of Sub Sec.4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, (Central Act I of 1894)..........". The land involved in this writ petition is in No.141, Kottivakkam Village, Saidapet Chengalpattu District and the extent thereon is 10 acres and 33 cents in Sec.No.232/lE, this W.P. in W.M.P.No.814 of 1991 the subsequent purchaser of 4.46 acres out abovesaid 10.33 acres has also been impleaded. 6. The submission of the respective learned counsel for the petitioners in each of those petitions is that, applying the decision of the Bench of this Court is The State of Tamil v. A.Mohammed Yousuf and others, (1990)2 M.L.J. 149 , the respective Sec.4(1) notifications should be quashed on the ground of vagueness thereon. In the said decision, the portion of the notification therein runs as follows: "Whereas it appears to the Government of Tamil Nadu that the lands specified below...... In the said decision, the portion of the notification therein runs as follows: "Whereas it appears to the Government of Tamil Nadu that the lands specified below...... needed for a public purpose, to wit for development of the area by construction of houses the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, notice that effect is hereby given to all whom it may in accordance with the provision of Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.4 of the Land Acquisition Act, (Central Act I of 1894)." In the context of the abovesaid notification therein the Bench of this court observed follows in the abovesaid decision: "That apart, the expression ‘public purpose viz.," for development of the construction of houses by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board" is most indefinite and vague. now well settled that in a notification under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, it obligation on the part of the acquiring authority to state the ‘ public purpose’ with particulars and clarity. The mere mention in the notification that the land was being for development of the area by construction of houses by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, wholly insufficient and conveys no ideas as to the specific purpose for which the site be utilised. Even in the counter affidavit filed to the writ petition, the public purpose spelt out with any clarity or particularity. No other material was also placed on record to show the exact purpose for which the land was to be acquired. A bare statement that houses were proposed to be constructed on the site by the Housing Board, indicating either the class of persons for whom they were to be constructed or the necessity for the same, is not sufficient compliance with the requirement of law. Reliance placed learned Government Pleader on the object for which the Housing Board has been constructed to justify the existence of ‘ public purpose’ cannot advance the case because we find there is no whisper in the counter as regards the requirements of Secs.40 and 41 Tamil Nadu State Housing Board Act, 1961. Reliance placed learned Government Pleader on the object for which the Housing Board has been constructed to justify the existence of ‘ public purpose’ cannot advance the case because we find there is no whisper in the counter as regards the requirements of Secs.40 and 41 Tamil Nadu State Housing Board Act, 1961. “The Bench came to this conclusion relying on the case reported in Munshi Singh v. India, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1150: (1974)2 S.C.C. 337, and the Bench while relying on Supreme Court decision further observed as follows: “In Munshi Singh v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1150: (1974)2 S.C.C. 337, Lordships of the Supreme Court interfered with the notification issued under Sec.4(1) Land Acquisition Act on the ground that it was vague and indefinite and on account of defects the persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired did not have a opportunity to file objections. It was held that such a defective notification, which formed basis of subsequent proceedings, could not be sustained. In view of the legal position settled by the Supreme Court, it is thus open to a party to question a notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act. Of course, the Court would interfere only in case it finds said notification suffers from the vice of vagueness, indefi-niteness and the like which prevent the parties from making effective objections in the enquiry under Sec.5 the Act. We accordingly hold that the abstract proposition of law laid down in N.Krishnappa Mudaliar and another v. The Government of Tamil Nadu and another, (1977)1 M.L.J. no longer good law and a writ petition calling in question a notification under Sec.4(1) maintainable where the notification suffers from the vice of vagueness, indefiniteness similar grounds. The maintainability of the writ petition would depend upon the nature challenge to the validity of the notification issued under Sec.4(1) of the Act.” 7. Now we find that the abovesaid Bench decision and the Supreme Court Decision squarely apply to the present writ petitions also. The maintainability of the writ petition would depend upon the nature challenge to the validity of the notification issued under Sec.4(1) of the Act.” 7. Now we find that the abovesaid Bench decision and the Supreme Court Decision squarely apply to the present writ petitions also. In the above referred to notifications relating to these writ petitions also we find the similar vagueness and indefiniteness first of the above referred to three notifications involved in these writ petitions the purpose is stated as” for the implementation of the Housing schemes to meet the demands made by sectors of the population under ‘ Kalaignar Karunanidhi Nagar Further Extension Scheme Likewise in the second it is, ” for the creation of a new neighbourhood, known as Kalaignar Karunanidhi Nagar, Schemes, “Likewise in the third, it is,” for increasing housing accommodation development of South Madras Neighbourhood. “In all these cases also, there is no indication of either the class of persons for whom houses were to be constructed or of the necessity for the same. In all the above addition there is also no reference to the Housing Board. So we find that the said decision squarely applies to the present writ petitions also on the abovesaid question also find that the said Bench decision was also followed in the case reported in Raju and three others v. The State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Secretary Government, Housing and Urban Development Department, Madras-9,1990 T.L.N.J. There are also the public purpose was stated to be, ” for the formation Madurai North Neighbourhood Project in Madurai North Taluk, District “ There, the learned Judge has observed, It is not even stated that the lands are needed for providing house-sites to the members the public or for the formation of a residential colony. The Madurai North Neighbourhood Project may mean anything. It is now well settled that the Land Acquisition Act exproprietory should not only conform to the procedure prescribed under the Act but also specific and afford reasonable opportunity to the land owners to submit their objections. From the above notification and declaration, it will not be possible for the land owners submit their objections because they do not know for what purpose, the land is sought acquired. In 1984 T.L.N.J. 21, Mohan J. (as he then was) invalidated a notification because the word “Harijan” was omitted while describing the purpose of acquisition. From the above notification and declaration, it will not be possible for the land owners submit their objections because they do not know for what purpose, the land is sought acquired. In 1984 T.L.N.J. 21, Mohan J. (as he then was) invalidated a notification because the word “Harijan” was omitted while describing the purpose of acquisition. The Learned Judge has given adequate reasons why such small omissions in acquisition proceedings should be considered as fatal to the acquisition itself.” 8. No doubt, we find in the affidavit filed in support of the W.P.No.2758 of 1983 that contention based on the vagueness of Sec.4(1) notification has not been raised. But same writ petitioner who has filed the other Writ Petition No.9654 of 1986 against the land acquisition proceedings, has stated in her affidavit filed in support of the said letter petition as follows: ” The notification under Sec.4(1) expressing the need for acquisition for a vague purpose, which may or may not arise on the pegged down market value without any concrete scheme in existence as on the date of the 4(1) notification would amount to a colourable exercise of power and abuse power by the State........... “That apart in W.P.No.9654 of 1986 she has also filed additional affidavit taking this specifically. In W.P.No.9764ofl986andW.P.No.9561of 1983 also the affidavit filed, takes the abovesaid point specifically. 9. Therefore, in W.P.Nos.2758 of 1983, 9654 of 1986, 9764 of 1986 and 9561 of 1983, above referred to respective notifications under Sec.4(1) of the Act are liable to be quashed as illegal on the abovesaid sole ground alone. 10. But, we find that in W.P.No.6169 of 1983, the above point based on vagueness indefinite-ness of Sec.4(1) notification was not specifically taken up either in the original affidavit filed in support of the writ petition or in the supplemental affidavits filed by the petitioner therein. However a different question is raised therein as follows: Sanction layout of the land in question therein was obtained as early as 16.11.1970, from the Director of Town Planning and Villivakkam Panchayat. By virtue of G.O.Ms.No.837, dated 15.6.1976, the first respondent therein excluded from acquisition the said land in Koyambedu Village certain other lands on the ground that the said sanction was obtained. By virtue of G.O.Ms.No.837, dated 15.6.1976, the first respondent therein excluded from acquisition the said land in Koyambedu Village certain other lands on the ground that the said sanction was obtained. Subsequently the respondent therein by its another G.O.Ms.No.125, Housing Department, dated 20.1.1978 waived the earlier G.O.Ms.No.837, in so far as it related to Koyambedu Village (where land in question in this W.P. is situate) ” So that the Madras Metropolitan Development Authority could acquire the lands in that area for the peripheral outstation bus terminal for organising a wholesale market in textiles. ‘‘ Subsequently by G.O.Ms.No.413, Housing Urban Development Department, dated 3.3.1979, the first respondent further modified G.O.Ms.No.837, and granted the abovesaid exclusion only on condition that the abovesaid layout should have been approved by the Town Planning authorities before the publication the notification under Sec.4(1) and that the said lay-out should be on the fringe scheme area without affecting the scheme. While so, when this W.P.No.6169 of 1983 up for final disposal earlier on 12.11.1984 before Sathar Syed, J. it was contended by petitioners that they had obtained the above said approval of the Director of the Planning with respect to the land in question prior to the coming into force of G.O.Ms.No.413 and that the said G.O. was not applicable to the said land. The learned Judge however found that a batch of writ petitioner (W.P.No.10351 of 1982 etc.) had been heard Division Bench of this Court, inter alia, on the question of the validity of the G.O.Ms.No.837 etc. and orders had been reserved. So the learned Judge directed posting W.P.No.6169 of 1983 after the disposal of the above said batch. Hence the said W.P.No.6169 of 1983 has been now posted before us after the disposal of the said batch by judgment dated 8.1.1988. The said Bench Judgment has held that these G.Os. ‘ are statutory character and that the rights of the parties should be governed by the law that stood date of Sec.4(1) notification, and that therefore the rights have to be marked out only accordance with G.O.Ms.No.837 and not G.O. 413. The Bench also relied on (1955)2 49 (D.B.) (atp.61), for coming to this conclusion. So holding, the Bench allowed W.P.No.10351 and 10373 of 1981 which came under the batch of writ petitions. The argument in the present W.P.No.6169 of 1983 is that on same reasoning the said W.P. also should be allowed. The Bench also relied on (1955)2 49 (D.B.) (atp.61), for coming to this conclusion. So holding, the Bench allowed W.P.No.10351 and 10373 of 1981 which came under the batch of writ petitions. The argument in the present W.P.No.6169 of 1983 is that on same reasoning the said W.P. also should be allowed. We also feel that the said argument has to be accepted. 11. Thus, on the above said conclusions reached, all the writ petition herein have allowed. However, since certain other points were also argued before us, we shall deal them also. 12. One another common point that was urged in some of these writ petitions is about unreasonable delay in making an award after issuance of the notification under Sec.4(1). this connection, the cases reported in P.Appalamurthy v. State, A.I.R.1981 A.P. 278 Vengeeswarar Alagarpenunal Devasthanam v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1984)2 M.L.J.427, relied on. In A.I.R.1981 A. P. 278, the explanation for the delay was that the Government was expecting that because of the Land Ceiling Act, or the Ceiling Act on urban vacant it might may get some lands at a very low compensation under those enactments and therefore, it need not proceed to acquire those lands at the market value under the Acquisition Act. In that context, the Andhra Pradesh High Court observed as follows: "If the Government wanted to wait for the result of the proceedings under the ceiling laws, was welcome to do so, provided it withdrew the notification issued under the Land Acquisition Act. But, it cannot have both ways." It cannot say that it will keep the notification issued under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act alive and, at the same time, wait for the result of the proceedings under the Ceiling so as to ultimately opt for the more advantageous alternative. This would be unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power. A notification cannot be issued for the purpose of pegging down the price, or for freezing the price, as the case may be, and then wait convenient and opportune time to pass an award. Such aline of thinking and the course conduct is alien to the scheme and intendment of the Land Acquisition Act. A notification cannot be issued for the purpose of pegging down the price, or for freezing the price, as the case may be, and then wait convenient and opportune time to pass an award. Such aline of thinking and the course conduct is alien to the scheme and intendment of the Land Acquisition Act. As the Supreme Court has observed in Ambalal v. Ahmedabad Municipality, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1223 p.1227): "We are not hereby to be understood as suggesting that after issue of the notification Secs.4 and 6 the appropriate Government would be justified in allowing the matters to and to take in hand the proceedings for assessment of compensation whenever they think proper to do. It is intended by the scheme of the Act that the notification under Sec.6 Land Acquisition Act must be followed by a proceeding for determination of compensation without any unreasonable delay......‘. Reference in this connection may also be made decision of a Learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in Krishna Iyer v: State Madras, (1967)2 M.L.J. 422 The learned Judge observed: As the compensation has to be determined with reference to the date of the notification under Sec.4(1) the person whose land is to be acquired may stand to lose if there is a delay between the notification under Sec.4(1) and the notification under Sec.6(1) in prices have risen in the meantime. Though the statute does not prescribe any time limit issuing the Sec6(1) declaration after the Sec.4(1) notification or for passing an award at subsequent stage, that circumstance does not deprive the aggrieved party of a remedy where undue prolongation of the proceedings has operated in an oppressive manner on owner of the land, especially in circumstances where land values have increased by leaps and bounds in the intervening time............". The same principle was reiterated in (1984)2 M.L.J. 427 also. In the present case, W.P.No.10474 of 1982also in para 10 of the counter affidavit we find a similar explanation follows: "Further, clearance under Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978, from the Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax and under Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 1961 from the Authorised Officer, Kancheepuram was also required for finalising the acquisition proceedings. As the clearance could not be obtained from Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax and Authorised Officer, Land Reforms in time, Government were moved for exemption. As the clearance could not be obtained from Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax and Authorised Officer, Land Reforms in time, Government were moved for exemption. So the contention of the petitioner that the Sec.4(1) notification was published with a view to peg the prices of the land is not at all correct. “Similarly, explanation is found in the Counter affidavit in W.P.No.2758 of 1983 Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.10474 of 1982 and W.P.No.2758 of 1983, relying on the above referred to observations in A.I.R. 1981 A.P. 278, that waiting for the result of the proceedings under Ceiling laws so as to ultimately opt for the advantageous alternative, would be an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power. A.I.R. 1981 A.P. 278, after due declaration under Sec.6, there was a lull for a period of three years, in which the notice under Secs.9(3) and (10) of the Act were issued and then again, the Land Acquisition Officer from the proceedings almost for 5 years when he passed award. Likewise, in (1984)2 M.L.J. 427 , there was a delay of 20 years. In the present cases also, the Sec.4(1) notifications in the year 1975 and the Sec.6 - declarations were published in the year 1978. Awards were passed in all the above said writ petitions, excepting in case W.P.No.10474 of 1982, in 1983, that is, about 5 years after the publication of declaration. In W.P.No.10474 of 1982 also till the writ petition was filed in the year 1982, award was not passed. No doubt, in view of the interim stay on further proceedings, granted therein in 1982, the award could not be passed subsequently. Thus, in all these cases, find that there is delay in passing the award and the reason given by the respondents themselves is that they were waiting for the benefits under the provisions of the Ceiling Laws. Even Sec.11-A of the Land Acquisition Act which was introduced by Act 68 of 1984 came into force on 24.9.1984, stipulates that the land acquisition proceedings shall lapse the award is not made within a period of two years from the date of publication of declaration. No doubt this Sec.11-A will not be applicable in the abovesaid cases awards were passed in 1983 itself. But, the period between Sec.6 declaration and the date passing of award was as much as 6 years. No doubt this Sec.11-A will not be applicable in the abovesaid cases awards were passed in 1983 itself. But, the period between Sec.6 declaration and the date passing of award was as much as 6 years. Under the Board standing Orders 90(12) also Land Acquisition Officer should pass the award as promptly as possible. The said order (12) is one of the administrative instructions of the Board of Revenue, (1983)1 An W.R. has also held, relying on A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1628 (at p.1635), that such instructions constituted a quasi law and enforceable. Proviso to Sec.11-A no doubt says that award be made within a period of 2 years from the date of commencement of the aforesaid Amending Act 68 of 1984 i.e., 24.9.1984. But the said proviso will apply only to a case award has not been passed before that date. Even in W.P.No.10474 of 1982, the period between the publication of Sec.6 declaration and the interim stay order granted in the W.P. was about 5 years. The judgment dated 17.7.1990 by a Bench of this Court W.ANo.214 of 1986, which dealt with a case of award passed after the aforesaid coming force of Amended Act 68/84 and of the consequent applicability of the said proviso to Sec.11 -A, has no application to the present cases. Similar decision reported in Kaliappan Kerala, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 239, relied on in the above said W.ANo.214 of 1986, also has application to the present cases. Under these circumstances, the above said decision of Andhra Pradesh Court and that of this Court in (1984)2 M.L.J. 427 , (1967)2 M.L. J. 422, that of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1223, alone do apply to the facts of present case. 13. One another common point urged in some of these writ petitions is that in all cases, Rule 3(b) and (c) of the Rules made by the Government of Tamil Nadu pursuant Sec.55(1) of the Land acquisition Act, has not been followed. The said Rule 3(b) and (c) as follows: “If any objections are received from a person interested in the land and within the prescribed in Sub-sec(1) of Sec.5-A the Collector shall fix a date of hearing the objections and give notice thereof to the objector as well as to the department or company requiring land, where such department is not the Revenue Department. Copies of the objections also be forwarded to such department of Company. The Department or company may file or before the date fixed by the Collector a statement by way of answer to the objections may also depute a representative to attend the enquiry, (c) On the date fixed for enquiry any other date to which the enquiry may be adjourned by the Collector, the Collector shall hear the objector or his pleader and the representative, if any of the department or company and record any evidence that may be produced in support of the objections." 14. The submission of the Learned counsel for the petitioner in the writ petition No.10474 1982 is that though as per para 4 of the counter affidavit of the respondents, the remarks the Tamil Nadu Housing Board were communicated to the writ petitioner on 8.2.1978 it is stated in the said counter affidavit that the enquiry contemplated under Rule 3(b) and was held. But we find on the other hand, that there is no allegation in the affidavit of petitioner himself in this writ petition that the above said enquiry was not held. So when said petitioner himself has not chosen to allege that the said enquiry was not held, it cannot be concluded that there was no such enquiry simply on the footing that in the counter of respondent there was no mention about such enquiry. 15. In W.P.No.9561 of 1983 also similar contention was put forth by the Learned counsel the petitioner herein. But, there, we find in the affidavit in support of the writ petition that specific allegation has been made that such an enquiry was not held (vide para 7(b) of affidavit of the petitioner) We also find that there is no counter affidavit filed in W.P.No.9561 of 1983. In these circumstances in W.P.No.9561 of 1983 this contention based on the above said Rule 3 has to be accepted. In W.P.No.9764 of 1982 also similar contention has been raised based on Rule 3. In this writ petition also there is no counter. Therefore, in this petition also the above said contention has to be accepted. 16. One other contention raised by the Learned Counsel for the respondents is these petitions have been belatedly filed. But in this contention there is no substance. In this writ petition also there is no counter. Therefore, in this petition also the above said contention has to be accepted. 16. One other contention raised by the Learned Counsel for the respondents is these petitions have been belatedly filed. But in this contention there is no substance. In decision reported in Hari Singh v. State of U.P.,A.I.R. 1984S.C. 1020, no doubt it was that a writ petition challenging the validity of Sec.4 notification filed after 2 1/2 years of notification was liable to be dismissed. But, there it was a case of emergency acquisition. There was notification under Sec.17(4) of the Act also. While Sec.16 of the Act provides take possession of land by the Collector after the award, Sec.17 deals with taking possession of the land by the Collector before award in case of urgency. So, the said decision is applicable to the present case. In fact, in the decision reported in Kadiravel Mudaliar of Tamil Nadu, 1987 Writ L.R. 182, also it was found that there were latches on the part the authorities themselves and that the authorities also did not comply with the above Rule 3(b) and (c) which are mandatory. In these circumstances, it was held therein, that contention based on delay or latches should not be put against the petitioner to him appropriate relief. In the present case also, there were laches on the part of the authorities and there was also similar violation of law by the authorities and therefore, the contention the learned counsel for the respondents cannot be accepted. 17. In the above circumstances, all the writ petitions are allowed. Rule Nisi is made absolute. However, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.