JUDGMENT Monoranjan Mallick J. These two appeals have been heard analogously as the original suits on the basis of which these two appeals have been preferred have also been tried analogously. The facts may be briefly stated as follows :- 2. The plaintiffs claiming to be the Trustees of the Trust Estate of Surajmal Gokuldas Mundhra Charitable Trust (hereinafter referred to as the 'Said Trust') has brought the ejectment Suit nos. 1359/73 and.1996/73 for eviction of the defendants who are occupying two different floors at premises no. 20/1, Ratan Sarkar Garden Street under two different tenancies from the time of predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claim to have purchased the said premises by two registered Deeds of Conveyance dated 6th February, 1970 and 13th May, 1970 in the name of the said Trust in respect of which the plaintiffs being the Trustees have been and still are in the management, control and supervision of the same. One tenancy was in respect of the ground floor of the premises held by the defendant at a monthly rental of Rs. 145.19 payable according to the Bengali Calendar month and the other in respect of the first and second floor of the said premises at a monthly rental of Rs. 173.81p. also payable according to Bengali Calendar month. The tenancies of the suit premises was duly terminated by service of notice and the defendant not having vacated the said two tenancies in terms of that notice. The plaintiffs have brought both the suits for eviction under the provision of W.B. Premises Tenancy Act. The grounds of ejectment taken in both the suits are–– 1) Default. 2) Reasonable requirement. 3) Illegal sub-letting. 4) Making additions or alterations in the premises which are of permanent nature without the knowledge and consent of the landlord. 5) Committing act of waste and negligence resulting in material deterioration of the premises. 3. The defendant contested both the suits by filing separate written statements. In the written statement in both the suits the locus standi of the plaintiff to file the suit has been challenged. The ownership of the properties by the Trustees was also challenged. The service of notice of ejectment was also denied and each and every ground for ejectment was also denied by the defendant. In the written statement in both the suits the locus standi of the plaintiff to file the suit has been challenged. The ownership of the properties by the Trustees was also challenged. The service of notice of ejectment was also denied and each and every ground for ejectment was also denied by the defendant. The Learned Trial Judge who heard both the suits analogously has come to the finding that the plaintiffs are the sole Trustees of the Surajmal Gokuldas Mundhra Charitable Trust and by purchase of the suit property by the said Trust Estate the suit property has become the part of the Trust property of the said Trust Estate and the plaintiffs are the Trustees and, thus, owners of the disputed premises that even though the said Trust Estate has been registered as Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, the legal title in the property still vest in the Trustees and consequently the suit is maintainable. As regards the service of notice the finding of the Learned Trial Judge is that notices terminating the two tenancies have been duly served upon the defendant when they have been served upon the defendant by post sent under the Certificate of Posting as well as personally tendered and refused by the defendant. The Learned Trial Judge has found that as the defendant has deposited the arrear and current rents in Court, he is entitled to get the protection for eviction under s. 17(4). As regards the other grounds for eviction the Learned Trial Judge has only accepted the ground of reasonable requirement to be the valid ground of eviction and has granted the decree for eviction of the defendant in respect of the said two tenancies on the ground of the reasonable requirement. Being aggrieved these two appeals have been preferred by the defendant. Before us the appellant has raised the following three points:- 1) The Trust Estate having been registered as a Society, it is the Society which has to file the present suits and not the Trustees of the Trust Estate. Being aggrieved these two appeals have been preferred by the defendant. Before us the appellant has raised the following three points:- 1) The Trust Estate having been registered as a Society, it is the Society which has to file the present suits and not the Trustees of the Trust Estate. 2) Under s. 6 of the Registration Act a suit by the society has to be filed either in the name of the President, Chairman or Principal Secretary or the Trustees as shall be directed by the Rules and Regulations of the Society and in default of such determination in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion. But the Rules and Regulations of the Society have not been exhibited and it is not known as to whether Trustees have the authority to file these two suits on behalf of the Society. 3) Notices of an ejectment have not been duly served upon the defendant in respect of any of these two tenancies. 4) The respondent being a Public Trust in view of the new Clause (ff) of s. 13(1) of the W. B. Premises Tenancy Act, the Public Trust cannot file a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement because in respect of the Public Trust, the general public being indeterminate body of persons and who are beneficiaries of any Public Trust do not come within the purview of the expression Clause (ff) of s. 13(1) namely "Any person for whose benefit the premises are held" in clause (ff) of s. 13(1) because such expression will mean determinate body of persons not indeterminate body or persons like members of general public. Both the appeals have been contested by the respondent. 4. It is contended that s. 6 of the Societies Registration Act, is enabling Section when the property is the Trust property. The Trustees being the legal owners are entitled to file the suit for or on behalf of the Trust and s. 6 of the Societies Registration Act not being mandatory, these two suits filed by all the three Trustees of the Trust Estate are quite maintainable. The Trustees being the legal owners are entitled to file the suit for or on behalf of the Trust and s. 6 of the Societies Registration Act not being mandatory, these two suits filed by all the three Trustees of the Trust Estate are quite maintainable. It is also contended that there is a presumption of service of notice sent under Certificate of Posting and there was also personal tender and refusal of the service followed by the affixation of the copy of the notice on the front door of the premises in suit and consequently the service of notice must be held to have been duly proved. His also urged that the appellant's Learned Advocate seeks to make narrow interpretation of the expression "any person for whose benefit the premises are held" and it is preposterous to imagine that a Public Trust is not entitled to evict the tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement and it is too narrow an interpretation that the beneficiaries will have to be determinate body of persons and that in case of Public Trust in order to fulfil the object of the Trust the premises can be reasonably required by the Trustees and eviction for such requirement is quite permissible under the law. 5. We would now first come to the maintainability of these two suits. Admittedly, the suit properties have been purchased by the Trust Estate. There is also no dispute that the present three plaintiffs are the Trustees of the Trust Estate. The registered Trust Deed has also been produced and exhibited in this case. It is true that the Trust has been registered as a Society under the Societies Registration Act. The question arises in these two appeals as to whether when a Trust is registered as a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, the suit has to be filed only in accordance with the provision of s. 6 of the Societies Registration Act or not. The question arises in these two appeals as to whether when a Trust is registered as a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, the suit has to be filed only in accordance with the provision of s. 6 of the Societies Registration Act or not. The Learned Trial Judge before whom such a contention was made has negatived that contention by holding that s. 6 is merely an enabling provision that a Society under the Societies Registration Act is a merely an association of persons, that it is not a corporation but a legal entity, that although such a Society can sue yet the suit is regarded as one on behalf of the members of the Society, that under s. 6 of the Act that the members of the Society are also entitled to sue on behalf of the Society, that the plaintiffs-trustees are the members of the Society and that consequently the suit by the Trustees appear to be quite maintainable. On behalf of the appellant the decision of Division Bench of our High Court reported in AIR 1953 Cal. page 140 (Harinarayan v. Gobardhan Das) has been referred to us. It is submitted that the Division Bench of our High Court while construing s. 5 of the Societies Registration Act has held that the property which was vested in the Trustees of an unregistered Society, before registration of the Society becomes as from the date of registration of the Society, the property belonging to the Society and must be deemed to be the property of the Society. It is, therefore, argued that when after registration the Trust property becomes the property of the Society then the Society has become the owner of property and the Society has to sue for which provision have been made in s. 6 of the Act." 5A. It is, therefore, argued that when after registration the Trust property becomes the property of the Society then the Society has become the owner of property and the Society has to sue for which provision have been made in s. 6 of the Act." 5A. On carefully considering the above Division Bench decision and s. 5 of the Societies Registration Act, we are of die view that even after the registration of the Trust as a Society under the Societies Registration Act the Trustees continue to be owners of the Trust property, This is quite clear from the observation of the above Division Bench at page 142 which reads as follows :- "By operation of the provision contained in s. 5 of the Act and the very purpose for which the registration is provided in the Act the registered Society automatically obtained rights over the property. The property is at the disposal of the Society, subject, no doubt, to the Trust. The properties continue to be vested in the Trustees as before. Under s. 5 of the Act, a property whether vested in Trustees or be "deemed to be vested in the governing body of such Society" may still belong to a Society registered under the Act". In this connection, s. 5 of the Societies Registration Act may be noted. That section is in the following terms :- "Property, movable or immovable, belonging to a Society registered under this Act, if not vested in the Trustees, shall be deemed to be vested for the time being in the governing body of such Society, and in all proceedings Civil and Criminal, may be described as the property of the governing body of such Society by their proper title." 6. The above section makes it clear that if the properties are already with the Trustees they will continue to be so vested and s. 5 with the use of the expression "may be described as the property of the governing body of such Society" is nothing but an enabling provision and where the Trustees by virtue of the registered Trust have under the law become the lawful owners of the Trust property, the registration of the said Trust as a Society under the Societies Registration Act would not alter the position. Therefore, the Trustees being the legal owners of the Trust property can maintain the suit to recover the property of the said Trust Estate from the tenants under the law. 7. The next point for decision is whether the suit filed by the Trustees are proper or not. Section 6, however, contemplates that such suit may also be filed by the Trustees if permissible under the Rules. Mr. Banerjee appearing for the appellant submits that the Rules & Regulations of the registered Society have not been produced and it is not known whether the Trustees have been given such power or not. But we are in full agreement with the Learned Trial Judge that s. 6 is nothing but an enabling provision. In the decision referred to by the Learned Advocate for the appellant namely AIR 1953 Cal. 140 under the Rules of the Society the Executive Committee of the Society delegated one of the Trustees to file the suit and that was challenged in the said decision as illegal. The Division Bench negatived that contention and held that when the Executive Committee authorised one of the Trustees to file the suit, the same is quite maintainable. Such filing of the suit on behalf of the Society on being delegated by the Executive Committee does not strictly come within the purview of s. 6 of the Societies Registration Act. Even then the Division Bench held that the delegation is valid and the suit filed by one of the Trustees is maintainable. That s. 6 is not mandatory. On behalf of the respondent another Division Bench judgment of Calcutta High Court reported AIR 1959 Cal. 361 (N. B. Asram v. Commissioner of Nabadwip Municipality) has been cited before us. The Division Bench without decision has held that the provision contained in ss. 6 and 7 of the Societies Registration Act for institution of suits by or against the registered Society are not mandatory and do not militate against the registered Society suing or being sued in its registered name and that in the absence of any express provision in the statute barring the institution of suits by or against the Society in its registered name, a Rule framed by an Association providing that the Association shall sue and be sued in the name of the Association cannot be held to be the ultra vires the Act. In view of this clear decision of the Division Bench we are unable to hold that only because the suit has not been filed strictly in accordance with the s. 6 of the Societies Registration Act, the present suit would fail. We are of the view that even if a Trust is registered as a Society under the Societies Registration Act it continues to be a Trust and the property of the said Trust continues to be vested in the Trustees and the Trustees in their own rights as Trustees can file a suit for recovery of possession of the Trust property from the tenants. 8. In view of the above the first contention of the appellant fails. The second contention of the appellant is that the respondent has failed to prove that the notice has been duly served upon the appellant. In both the suits the respondents have sought to cause the service of notice to quit firstly by sending notices by registered post and also under the Certificate of Posting and have alto caused personal service of the notice by tendering the notice personally upon the tenant. 9. It is found from the evidence that the notices sent by the registered post was returned 'Unserved'. The defendant has denied that any notice sent under Certificate of Posting was received by him. There is no doubt that the notices under Certificate of Posting were properly addressed. It is also found from the defendant's own evidence that about the time when the said notice was sent under Certificate of Posting he was residing in the premises in suit and was not out of station for the whole month. The question would, therefore, arise as to whether in such circumstance the presumption of the service of notice under Certificate of posting can be drawn or not. It has been held that although the presumption under s. 27 of the General Clause Act it does not apply to a case of a letter sent under Certificate of Posting, the presumption under s. 14 (e) of the Evidence Act would apply in such a case and the Court will, however, be at liberty to see if such presumption has been rebutted in view of the evidence on record and the facts and circumstances of this case. Reference may be made to a decisions of our High Court reported in Jitendra Nath Das v. Bijoylal Das, A.I.R. 1976 Cal. 478 and Bhadra v. Mrinalini Ghosh 90 CWN 413. 10. On behalf of the appellant our attention has been drawn to the decision of A.I.R. 1978 Cal. page 123 J. Mc. Gaffin v. L.I.C. India and it has been submitted that in that decision the Division Bench has held that when a Certificate of Positing does not indicate as to whether the letter posted was an envelope, Inland letter or a Post Card and there is no direct evidence on record that the original letter was actually put into the envelope and it was posted under Certificate of Posting the Court cannot draw presumption under s. 114 (2) of the Evidence Act. Me. Banerjee submits that there is no direct evidence on the point as to whether the letters containing the notices were actually put inside the envelope and posted in the Post Office and the evidence in this respect is only of one of the Trustees. We have perused the Certificates of Posting which are exhibited as Exts.6 and 6(a). The Certificates of Posting show that the letters were posted at Khangrapati Post Office addressed to Sri Manick Lal Ghosh, the present appellant. There is, however, no indication that as to whether it was sent under an envelope or not. The Advocate through whom the letter was sent has not been examined, nor was the person who actually posted the letter in the Post Office. Therefore, in view of the above decision of our High Court it will be difficult for us to hold that there is a presumption of service of notice in this case sent under Certificate of Posting. 11. However, ejectment notice was also tendered personally to the appellant and the proof to the effect has been given by P.W.2, one of the Trustees. The Division Bench of our High Court in Md. Shahariar Baig v. R.P. Val 91 CWN 268 has observed that when s. 13(6) of the W. B. Premises Tenancy Act has not prescribed any mode of service of notice the same has got to be served in such manner which under the general principle of law would amount to service, like personal tender or delivery by post. In Thakur Chandra Nandi v. Arun Kumar AIR 1986 Cal. In Thakur Chandra Nandi v. Arun Kumar AIR 1986 Cal. 249 it has been held that notice of ejectment when is tendered personally and is refused is proper service and thereafter service on any member of any tenants' family or service by affixation is unnecessary. In this case it has been proved that one Joy Karan Singh accompanied by P.W.2 Gokuldas Mundhra went to the premises in suit on 24.9.73 and tendered the notices in connection with these two ejectment suits upon the defendant and the defendant refused to accept it and thereafter the notice was served by affixation. The report made by Joy Karan Singh regarding such service have been exhibited in this case on being proved by Gokaldas Mundhra who claims to have been present when such tender and refusal was made. The defendant has, however, denied such tender in his evidence but he admits that he was in the premises in the whole month of September, 1973. On behalf of the appellant it is submitted that there is no satisfactory proof of such tender when Joy Karan Singh has not been examined. But in our view the failure of the plaintiff to examine Joy Karan Singh would not be fatal when the other person namely, Gokuldas accompanying Joy Karan was examined and the report of Joy Karan has been duly proved. In our view the notices of ejectment in these two suits were duly tendered by Joy Karan Singh on 24.9.73 for and on behalf of the plaintiffs and the defendant having refused to accept such tender the notice of ejectment must be held to have been duly served upon the defendant in connection with both the suits. This contention also fails. 12. We would now come to decide as to whether the plaintiffs who have filed the suit as Trustees of the Trust Estate can evict the present appellant from the suit premises on the ground of reasonable requirement. We have carefully considered the Trust Deed exhibited in this case. It is a Public Trust. One of the objects of the said Trust is to establish and run Dharamsalas in the City of Calcutta. It is the case of the plaintiffs/Trustees that as the Trustees do not have any other reasonably suitable accommodation for fulfilment of the object of this Trust, namely, to establish of Dharamsala they require the suit premises reasonably. One of the objects of the said Trust is to establish and run Dharamsalas in the City of Calcutta. It is the case of the plaintiffs/Trustees that as the Trustees do not have any other reasonably suitable accommodation for fulfilment of the object of this Trust, namely, to establish of Dharamsala they require the suit premises reasonably. The Learned Trial Judge on considering the evidence on record has accepted the said case of the appellant that the Trustees required the suit premises for the purpose of establishing which is one of the objects for which the Trust has been created. That is why the Learned Trial Judge has decreed both the suits as the defendant-appellant could not seriously contend as regards such requirement. Before us, however, Mr. Banerjee appearing for the appellant has taken a legal point, namely, that a Public Trust is not entitled to recover property from the tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement because the Public Trust has not been given such right under Clause (ff) of s. 13(1) of the Premises Tenancy Act. On behalf of the respondent the Division Bench judgment of our High Court reported in 70 CWN 371 (N. Banerjee v. Sokhi Sana Dashi) has been referred to in which the Division Bench of oar High Court has held that when the property is a Public Trust and the plaintiff is the Trustee or in essence a Trust the requirement for a purpose provided for and specified in the Trust Deed is, obviously a reasonable requirement for the purposes of the Trust for which the property in question is held by the Trustee/plaintiff. The Division Bench on the basis of the materials before them were unable to hold that there was anything to show that the plea of the plaintiff of such requirement is malafide on the part of the plaintiff and they were, therefore, in complete agreement with the Learned Trial Judge about the plaintiff's requirement of the disputed premises for his own occupation. Mr. Mr. Banerjee has sought to distinguish the above decision of this Court by submitting that the said decision was rendered under original Clause (f) of s. 13(1) and there is a material change in the language of the present Clause (ff) and in view of such material change we have to hold that the legislature has not provided for a Public Trust to recover property from his tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement. 13. Original Clause (f) which has now been substituted as a present Clause (f) and (ff) by the W. B. Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act of 1969 is reproduced below:- "(f) where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord either for purpose for building or re-building or for making thereto substantial additions or alterations or for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held." The present Clause (ff) reads as follows :- "(ff) subject to the provision of sub-section 3(A), where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held and the landlord or such person is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation ;" 13. Mr. Banerjee submits that the use of the expression "landlord or such person" has made the substantial difference in the language of the present Clause (ff). According to him, the expression "such person" must be a single person or determinate body of person for whose benefit the premises are held and when in the case of Public Trust the beneficiaries are not determinate body of person but indeterminate body of person being members of the general public, then when the beneficiaries being indeterminate body of person like members of the general public, then for occupation of such indeterminate body of person the Trustees of the Public Trust cannot evict the tenant under Clause (ff), because such indeterminate body of persons cannot enforce the right to recover the premises if denied. 13A. Mr. Dasgupta appearing for the respondent has submitted that the language after amendment remains substantially the same. 13A. Mr. Dasgupta appearing for the respondent has submitted that the language after amendment remains substantially the same. The words "the landlord or such person" has to be used because under the new Clause (ff) the Court has to be satisfied before granting a decree for reasonable requirement that the landlord or such person for whose benefit the premises are held is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere and that provision was not there in original clause (f). He, therefore, submits, that the above language does not alter the law at all and the decision of 70 CWN 371 applies with all force to the facts of this case and if a Public Trust in order to fulfil the purpose for which the Trust has been created reasonably requires the premises and such Trust does not have any other reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere, then Clause (ff) is fully satisfied for the Trustees for obtaining the decree for recovery of possession from the tenants. 14. In order to substantiate that the person for whose benefit the premises are held must be determinate body of person Mr. Banerjee relies upon a decision of the Learned Single Judge of Born bay High Court interpreting the similar expression used in s. 13(1)(g) of Bombay Rents Hotel & Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 The Learned Judge in that decision has held that such expression would mean that the person in question must have a right to occupy the suit premises which right that person can enforce, if denied. 15. We have carefully considered the above decision of the Learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court reported in 1969 Rent Control Journal page 721 (Khan Saheb v. R.R. Gibson). The Learned Judge of Bombay High Court in that decision was interpreting the provision of 13 (1) (g) of the above Bombay Act. 15. We have carefully considered the above decision of the Learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court reported in 1969 Rent Control Journal page 721 (Khan Saheb v. R.R. Gibson). The Learned Judge of Bombay High Court in that decision was interpreting the provision of 13 (1) (g) of the above Bombay Act. Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Act reads as follows :- "13 (1) (g) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a Trustee of Public Charitable Trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the Trust........." Therefore, the Bombay High Court has specially provided for three categories of landlords who can evict the tenant on the ground of reasonable and bonafide requirement namely–– (1) owner landlord; (2) person for whose benefit the premises are held; and (3) landlord who is a Trustee of Public Charitable Trust. In such a context the Learned Judge of the Bombay High Court has interpreted the expression 'any person for whose benefit the premises are held' to denote a private Trust in which there are determinate person or persons for whose benefit the property is held. 16. So far as Clause (ff) of s. 13(1) is concerned the expression 'the person for whose benefit the premises are held' must include all kinds of Trust whether private or public and no narrow view can be taken that it would only refer to Private Trust and not Public Trust. Therefore, on the basis of the decision of the Learned Single Judge in 1969 RCJ. page 721 we are unable to hold that under the W. B. Premises Tenancy Act a Public Trust cannot evict the tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement even if such requirement is for the purpose of which the Trust has been created. Therefore, on the basis of the decision of the Learned Single Judge in 1969 RCJ. page 721 we are unable to hold that under the W. B. Premises Tenancy Act a Public Trust cannot evict the tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement even if such requirement is for the purpose of which the Trust has been created. It is true the Supreme Court in Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar AIR 1957 SC : 1956 SCR 756 had held that in case of public endowment the beneficiaries are the general public or a class thereof, but in our view even in respect of a Public, Trust, the beneficiaries of which are the general public then under the provision of the Clause (ff), such Public Trust in order to fulfil the object of the Trust, namely establishment of a Dharamsala of which the members or the Public or a class thereof will be the beneficiaries, the Trustees can very well get the decree for reasonable requirement when it is established that the Trust does not have any other reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere to fulfil the purpose of the Trust. 17. In that view of the matter we are unable to accept the contentions of the Learned Advocate for the appellant that the respondents are not entitled to get the decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement. In our view the principle laid down in 70 CWN 371 is clearly applicable even after the amendment of original Clause (f) of s. 13(i) and the introduction of new Clause (ff) by the W. B. Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act, 1969. 18. In the result all the contentions raised by the appellant in these two appeals fail. Both the appeals are, therefore, dismissed with costs. The defendant-appellant is given two months time to quit and vacate the premises in each of the two suits, failing which the plaintiffs/respondents shall be at liberty to execute this decree and get possession of these two premises in suit through Court. Manabendra Nath Roy, J. : I agree. Appeal dismissed with costs.