R. K. ABICHANDANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners seek to challenge the notification issued by the election authority and Dy. Collector, Dantiwada on 24-10-1982 at Annexure a to the petition cancelling the declaration of the election programme and proceedings pursuant thereto in respect of the Gram panchayats mentioned therein. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners, terms of many of the Gram Panchayats in surendranagar district were about to expire and these Panchayats were required to be reconstituted under the provisions of Section 17 of the Gujarat panchayats Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) and accordingly, the panchayats of villages juna Nava Sadala, Malvan and Porda were required to be reconstituted. Therefore, the election authority published a notification dated 16th August 1982 fixing the date of election and notifying other election programme with regard to the villages Juna Nava Sadala and Malavan and the similar notification on 3rd August 1982 for village Porda. ( 3 ) IT appears that in Juna Nava Sadala gram Panchayat elections, as scheduled under the aforesaid notification, there was no contest for the seat of Sarpanch and five wards and therefore, the returning officer and Circle Inspector issued notification dated 13th September 1982 at Annexure d to the petition declaring the persons named therein as elected without contest. As regards ward No. 6, election was to take place because there were two contesting candidates. The village Panchayat of Porda consisted of sarpanch and eight other members and it appears that by notification dated 22-09-1982 at Annexure e to the petition issued under Rule 14 (1) of the Gujarat gram and Nagar Panchayats Election Rules, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the said rules) declaring the Sarpanch and all the members therein were elected without contest and a copy of the said notification was forwarded to the election authority for publication under Rule 36 of the said rules. As regards Village Malavan, there were two contesting candidates for the office of Sarpanch and there was to be a contest in all the wards except ward no. 6 where a member was declared elected uncontested. ( 4 ) IT was contended by the learned counsel, Mr. Tushar Mehta, appearing for the petitioners that the election authority had no power to cancel the notification under which the election programme was declared. 6 where a member was declared elected uncontested. ( 4 ) IT was contended by the learned counsel, Mr. Tushar Mehta, appearing for the petitioners that the election authority had no power to cancel the notification under which the election programme was declared. He submitted that there was no provision in the said Act or said Rules empowering the election authority to cancel the election programme already announced. He submitted that if such power is to be inferred from the provisions of Section 21 of the General clauses Act, it might lead to abuse. He also submitted that the notification cancelling the earlier election programme adversely affected a large number of members who were declared elected by the returning officer and the notification was issued mala fide with an ulterior motive to help the party in power in the state as alleged in the petition. ( 5 ) ON the allegation of mala fides, occurring in paragraph 15 of the petition, that the impugned notification was issued mala fide with an ulterior motive of helping the party in power, there is nothing on the record to indicate that the election authority had acted with any such ulterior purpose. Merely from the fact that the notification was issued by the election authority cancelling earlier notification declaring the election programme, no such inference of mala fide can be drawn against the election authority. In the impugned notification, it has been mentioned that the original programme notified was being cancelled because the procedure required to be followed as laid down in the statutory provisions was not followed before declaring that earlier programme. The allegation that the notification was issued mala fide has been specifically denied in the affidavit-in-reply filed by the Assistant collector and the election authority on 25-10-1982 in paragraph 12 thereof and it has been stated that the election authority was not aware of the political alliances of the candidates who were declared uncontested. The allegation made by the petitioners that the impugned notification is issued mala fide is vague of a sweeping nature without any basis, and therefore has no substance in it. The allegation made by the petitioners that the impugned notification is issued mala fide is vague of a sweeping nature without any basis, and therefore has no substance in it. ( 6 ) UNDER Section 21 of the Bombay general Clauses Act it has been provided that a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or by-laws would include a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions, if any, to add to amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or by-laws so issued. The impugned notification mentions the fact that it has been issued in accordance with the provisions of section 21 of the Bombay General Clauses act. According to the petitioners, once the election process started, the election authority had no power to withdraw the election process by cancelling the earlier notification declaring the election programme. ( 7 ) IN Mohd. Younus v. Shiv Kumar case, reported in AIR 1974, Supreme court, 1218, while examining the question whether the Election Commission had power to alter the date of poll under section 30 of the Representation of People act, 1961 read with Section 21 of the general Clauses Act (which is identical to Section 21 of the Bombay General clauses Act) it was held that since power was conferred on the Election commission under Section 30 of that Act, under which he issued notification appointing various dates mentioned therein for the purpose specified, the power to amend the same which would include alteration of the dates of poll, can be exercised under Section 21 of the general Clauses Act. The Supreme Court rejected the contention that the Election commission had no power or jurisdiction to alter the date of poll in the remaining constituencies as was sought to be done. In the case before the Supreme Court, the last date for making nominations was february 3, 1971 and of the withdrawal of candidatures was February 6, 1971 and elections were to be held on various dates between March 1, 1971 to March 5, 1971 in different constituencies. It appears that due to some local disturbances, the date of poll which was scheduled to take place in some segments on March 3, 1971 was postponed by the Election Commission from March 3, 1971 to March 9, 1971. It appears that due to some local disturbances, the date of poll which was scheduled to take place in some segments on March 3, 1971 was postponed by the Election Commission from March 3, 1971 to March 9, 1971. The Supreme Court upheld the power of the Election Commission to alter the date of the poll on the footing that power to amend the notification, appointing the various dates for the purpose mentioned in the notification included the power to alter the dates of poll which can be exercised under Section 21 of the General clauses Act. ( 8 ) THE provisions of Section 21 of bombay General Clauses Act in context of an election matter came to be considered by a full bench of this Court in Ranjit Zeena v. Collector, Broach reported in 7 GLR, 341, in which it was held that on a correct interpretation of section 10 of the Bombay Village panchayats Act, 1958 read with the rule of interpretation embodied in Section 21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 the power to constitute wards would also include the power to rescind an order passed by the Collector and thereafter to issue a fresh order constituting the wards and allocating the reserved seats. In that case, the Block Development officer had issued an order on May 3, 1962 under the Village Panchayats election Rules, 1959 setting out various stages of election starting with June 4, 1962 as the date for submitting the nominations. The Collector, however, on may 29, 1962 issued the notification, which was challenged in that case, directing the re-constitution of the wards for the election. It was contended before the full bench that once the process of election started and a step was taken in that process, there was no retracing and therefore, there was no possibility of the same process being repeated again so, once a step of election process was taken by the Collector by dividing the village into wards, defining their extent and allocating the reserved seats to such wards, there was no provision in the Act whereunder the Collector could retrace such a step already taken by him and it was obligatory upon him to go to the next stage of election prescribed under the Act and the Rules. The Full Bench came to the conclusion that the power to rescind embodied in the rule of interpretation in Section 21 of the bombay General Clauses Act must be held to be without any limitation or conditions, and the power to constitute wards conferred by Section 10 of the Bombay village Panchayats Act, 1958 would in view of the provisions of Section 21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act also include the power to rescind an order passed by the Collector and thereafter to issue a fresh order constituting the wards and allocating the reserved seats under that section. It would, thus, be clear that merely because election programme was declared under a notification that by itself did not prevent the election authority from rescinding or amending the notification. It will, however, be noticed that in both the cases, viz. , Mohd. Younus (supra) and Ranchhod Zeena (supra) the change which was sought to be made by amending the notification or order was prior to the date of the election. In other words, the process of election declared in the programme had not completed as would be the case where the election actually takes place and the results are declared. In the present case, admittedly, in many of the seats which were open to contest in these three villages for reconstituting the Gram panchayats, there was actually no contest and candidates were declared elected in absence of such contest in view of the provisions of Rule 14 of the said Rule. As regards the seats for which the contest was yet to be held, it is clear that in view of the decisions of the Supreme court Mohd. Younus (supra) and Full bench of this Court in Ranchhod Zeenas case, the competent authority had the power to rescind or amend the notification and therefore, fresh programme could have been notified after following the necessary statutory procedure. Therefore, to the extent that the impugned notification at Annexure a affects the election to the seats in which there was contest, it would clearly be valid and it will not be open on the part of the petitioners to challenge it on the ground that the election process had started. Therefore, to the extent that the impugned notification at Annexure a affects the election to the seats in which there was contest, it would clearly be valid and it will not be open on the part of the petitioners to challenge it on the ground that the election process had started. However, different considerations would apply where the results of the elections can be declared under Rule 14 of the said Rules in which it is inter alia provided that if there is only one candidate contesting as Sarpanch or the member, as the case may be, the candidate so contesting shall be declared by the returning officer to have been elected without any votes being taken and the returning officer shall thereupon forthwith communicate the name of that candidate to the election authority and on such communication being made, the election authority is required to publish the name of such candidate in the manner specified in Rule 36 of the said Rules. ( 9 ) THUS, once it becomes clear that there is no contest since only one candidate remains in the fray, a statutory duty is cast upon the Returning Officer to declare such candidate as elected and to forward his name to the election authority who is required to publish the name of such elected candidate in the manner specified in Rule 36. In other words, so far as the uncontested election of an elected candidate is concerned, the process gets completed on his being declared as elected under the Rule 14 and it is not necessary for the Returning Officer to postpone the declaration of such uncontested election until the date of polling. This would, therefore, leave no scope for exercising power under Section 21 of the Bombay general Clauses Act, to revise the election programme in the contest of the candidates who have already been declared elected in accordance with the rule 14 by the Returning Officer. If the election of such candidate declared elected is to be challenged, then the remedy would lie elsewhere and not by nullifying their election by issuing a notification under Section 21 of the bombay General Clauses Act purporting to change the election programme. If the election of such candidate declared elected is to be challenged, then the remedy would lie elsewhere and not by nullifying their election by issuing a notification under Section 21 of the bombay General Clauses Act purporting to change the election programme. Therefore, the impugned notification at annexure a cannot nullify the effect of the declaration made by the Returning officer under Rule 14 of the names of the candidates as Sarpanch or the member, as the case may be. ( 10 ) HOWEVER, the question still remains whether the petitioners would be entitled for any relief in view of the peculiar facts of this case. Admittedly, after the election programmes were cancelled by the impugned notification, these Gram panchayats were not reconstituted and therefore, the term of the existing Gram panchayats was extended upto 28-2-1983 under Section 17 (2) of the said Act by order of the Collector dated 6-12-1982 which was never challenged. A copy of that order is on record of this case being annexure to Civil Application No. 64/83 filed in this petition. It appears that terms of Village Panchayats were further extended upto 30th August 1983 as stated in the Civil Application No. 1647/87 filed in this petition. It also appears that thereafter the administrator was appointed to look after the administration of these panchayats and the administrators have been in charge of these panchayats as has been stated in civil Application No. 1647 of 1987 filed on 17-9-1987. The fact that the administrators are in charge of these panchayats was not disputed at the time of hearing of this petition. Therefore, for a number of years not only the existing panchayats term was extended but administrators have been functioning and the petitioners did not challenge either the orders extending the terms of the existing panchayats or the orders appointing administrators. When officer is appointed by the State Government to exercise and perform the duties of the panchayat, when the panchayat could not be reconstituted as mentioned in Section 303b of the said Act, the State government is required by sub-Section 4 to take steps to reconstitute the panchayat in the manner provided in the act before the expiry of the period specified in the notification issued under sub-Section (1) or extended under proviso to sub-Section 2 of 303b of the said Act. The petitioners have allowed the term of the existing panchayat to be extended and have accepted the administrators having been appointed by the State Government. The Panchayat is required, to be reconstituted under sub-section 4 of 303b of said Act and therefore, the petitioners would not be entitled to any relief at this belated stage. It may also be mentioned that since the panchayat was not constituted at the first meeting as envisaged by Section 17 (1) read with Section 44 (1) and (2) no right accrued in favour of the petitioners to continue for a period of five years under section 17 (1) of the said Act. In any event, the period of five years has long back elapsed and nearly a decade has passed at which distance of time, it can now hardly be stated with any authenticity that the petitioners represent the electorate of the relevant wards of these Panchayats. 11. This is, therefore, not a fit case for exercising writ jurisdiction and no relief can be granted in favour of the petitioners as prayed for by them. Rule is, therefore, discharged with no order as to costs. As a result, the interim relief granted in Civil Application No. 64/83 is vacated and the Civil Application stands rejected with no order as to costs. (RPV) Rule discharged. .