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1991 DIGILAW 358 (BOM)

Dyes and Chemical Workers Union v. Asian Chemical Works and others

1991-08-06

H.H.KANTHARIA

body1991
X JUDGMENT - H.H. KANTHARIA, J.:---The petitioner-union filed a complaint of unfair labour practice, being Complaint (ULP) No. 195 of 1979, in the Industrial Court at Bombay alleging that the first respondent-company had indulged in unfair labour practice covered under Item Nos. 6 and 9 of Schedule IV and 4(a) and 5 of Schedule II of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act. 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the MRTU PULP Act'). In the Industrial Court, the petitioner-union examined four workmen and the first respondent-company examined its Managing partner by name J.C. Katharani. On appreciation of the evidence adduced before him, the learned Member of the Industrial Court (second respondent) came to the conclusion that the petitioner-union failed to prove that the first respondent-company had indulged in unfair labour practice covered under Item 9 of Schedule IV and 4(a) and 5 of Schedule II of the MRTU PULP Act. So long as item 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU PULP Act is concerned, he was of the opinion that admittedly the petitioner-union was not a recognised union under the MRTU PULP Act and, therefore, a complaint by it under item 6 of Schedule IV cannot be filed as barred by the provisions of section 21 of the said Act. He, therefore, did not enter into the merits of the matter so far as Item 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU A PULP- Act is concerned and concluded that it would not be worthwhile to discuss the evidence in detail as the complaint itself was misconceived. He, accordingly, by his judgment and order dated September 11, 1984 dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner-union. 2. Being aggrieved, the petitioner-union invoked the supervisory writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution by filing the present writ petition. 3. At the hearing, Mrs. He, accordingly, by his judgment and order dated September 11, 1984 dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner-union. 2. Being aggrieved, the petitioner-union invoked the supervisory writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution by filing the present writ petition. 3. At the hearing, Mrs. Mhatre appearing on behalf of the petitioner-union urged that in view of a judgment of this Court in case of (Petroleum Employees' Union and others v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited and anr.)1, reported in 1983 Maharashtra Law Journal 618, the finding of the learned Member of the Industrial Court that a complaint by an unrecognised union was not maintainable under the provisions of section 21 of the MRTU PULP Act is patently incorrect and that being so, the impugned order passed by the learned Member of the Industrial Court to that extent be quashed and set aside and the matter be remanded back to the Industrial Court for allowing the parties to adduce fresh evidence and dispose of the unfair labour practice complaint of the petitioner-union covered by Item 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU PULP Act on merits. Controverting her arguments, Mr. Bukhari, appearing on behalf of the first respondent-company, submitted that at the time of hearing of admission of this writ petition on February 18,1985 this Court (Coram: Mrs. Sujata Manohar, J.) had ruled that the ratio of the Supreme Court judgment in Balmer Lawrie Workers Union v. Balmer Lawrie and Co. Ltd, dated December 21, 1984 covered the question of validity of section 21 of the MRTU PULP Act and no intervention was called for on other points and accordingly the writ petition was rejected but by a subsequent order the same learned Judge of this Court had admitted this writ petition on March 4,1985 and had limited the Rule to the question whether an unrecognised union had a right to represent workmen under section 21 of the MRTU PULP Act only and, therefore, the question of remanding the matter back to the Industrial Court does not arise even if I am of the view that an unrecognised union can represent workmen under section 21 of the said Act. 4. Now, section 21 of the MRTU PULP Act reads as under: "21. 4. Now, section 21 of the MRTU PULP Act reads as under: "21. Right to appear or act in proceedings relating to certain unfair labour practices.---(l) No employee in an undertaking to which the provisions of the Central Act for the time being apply, shall be allowed to appear or act or allowed to be represented in any proceeding relating to unfair labour practices specified in Items 2 and 6 of Schedule IV of this Act except through the recognised union. Provided that where there is no recognised union to appear, the employee may himself appear or act in any proceeding relating to any such unfair labour practices. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Bombay Act, no employee in any industry to which the provisions of the Bombay Act, for the time being apply, shall be allowed to appear or act or allowed to be represented in any proceeding relating to unfair labour practices specified in Items 2 and 6 of Schedule IV of this Act except through the representative of employees entitled to appear under section 30 of the Bombay Act". Thus, under this provision of law, a complaint of unfair labour practice covered by Item Nos. 2 and 6 of Schedule IV can be filed by a recognised union and if there was no recognised union in the establishment, the employee/employees may appear in person in any proceeding related to such unfair labour practices. The provisions of section 21 of the MRTU PULP Act had come up for consideration before this Court (Coram: Bharucha, J.) in the case of (Petroleum Employees' Union and ors. v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd and anr.)1, 1983 MLJ 618, and my learned Brother Mr. Justice Bharucha laid down the following principles of law in para 5 of his judgement as under : "The correct interpretation to place upon section 21 is this : Where there is a recognised union only that recognised union can be allowed, on behalf of an employee, to appear or act or be represented in proceedings relating to unfair labour practices specified in Items 2 and 6 of the Fourth Schedule. Where there is no recognised union an employee may himself appear or act in any proceeding relating to such unfair labour practice. This does not mean that an unrecognised union cannot act or appear in a proceeding relating to such unfair labour practice. Where there is no recognised union an employee may himself appear or act in any proceeding relating to such unfair labour practice. This does not mean that an unrecognised union cannot act or appear in a proceeding relating to such unfair labour practice. It can represent an employee or the employee may appear himself if be so chooses". Mr. Justice Bharucha had thus ruled that where there was no recognised union, an employee himself can appear or act in a proceeding relating to unfair labour practices covered by Items 2 and 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU PULP Act which does not mean that an unrecognised union cannot act or appear in such a proceeding. Mr. Justice Bharucha had categorically ruled that an unrecognised union can represent an employee in such a proceeding. I am in respectful agreement with the view held by Mr. Justice Bharucha and in that view of the matter, the learned Member of the Industrial Court was wrong in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner-union could not have filed a complaint of unfair labour practice covered by Item 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU PULP Act and could not have represented the workman in the Industrial Court under section 21 of the MRTU PULP Act. 5. Now, the crucial point is whether this matter should be remabed back to the Court of the second respondent, Member of the Industrial Court, Bombay, for reconsidering the matter on merits so long as Item 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU PULP Act is concerned. In order to appreciate the rival contentions raised by the learned Counsel at the Bar, it would be worthwhile to incorporate here the two orders made by my learned Sister Mrs. Justice Sujata Manohar on February 18,1985 and March 4, 1985. The first order reads as under : "The ratio of the Supreme Court judgment in Balmer Lawrie Workers Union v Balmer Lawrie and Co. Ltd., D.A. Desai Khalid. JJ. dated 21-12-1984 covers the question of validity of section 21. No intervention is called for on other points. Rejected" It appears that afterwards the judgment of Mr. Justice Bharucha in the case of Petroleum Employees Union (supra) was brought to the notice of Mrs. Justice Sujata Manohar on account of which she reviewed her earlier order and passed the following order on 4-3-1985. No intervention is called for on other points. Rejected" It appears that afterwards the judgment of Mr. Justice Bharucha in the case of Petroleum Employees Union (supra) was brought to the notice of Mrs. Justice Sujata Manohar on account of which she reviewed her earlier order and passed the following order on 4-3-1985. "Miss Pradhan has applied for a review of the order and drawn my attention to a decision of a learned Judge of this High Court in 1983 Mh.L.J. at page 618. In view of the observations in the judgment, this is a fit case where rule shall issue on the question whether an unrecognised union has a right to represent workmen under section 21 of the M.R. T.U. P.U.L.P. Act. Rule limited to the aforesaid question". From the aforesaid two orders passed by my learned Sister Mrs. Justice Sujata Manohar, it is quite clear that she had restricted the rule to the question whether an unrecognised union has a right to represent workmen under section 21 of the MRTU PULP Act. Now it is held, as stated here in above, that an unrecognised union under section 21 of the MRTU PULP Act has a right to represent workmen in a complaint of unfair labour practice under ltem 6 of Schedule IV of the Act. The sequitur of such a decision now arrived at in this writ petition would be that all the consequences flowing from the impugned order passed by the second respondent dismissing the complaint of the petitioner-union on the ground that an unrecognised union cannot represent the workmen as barred by section 21 of the MRTU PULP Act should be set at naught. In other words, the impugned order of the learned Member of the Industrial Court dismissing the complaint of the petitioner-union with regard to Item 6 of Schedule IV on the ground that it was misconceived and not maintainable under section 21 of the MRTU PULP Act should be quashed and set aside and as the learned Member of the Industrial Court refused to go into the merits of the matter to that extent and did not discuss all the oral and documentary evidence on record should be called upon to rectify his mistake. The net result would be that the petitioner-union should be given a reasonable opportunity to prove its case whether the first respondent-company indulged in unfair labour practice covered by Item 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU PULP Act. I find no substance in the argument of Mr. Bukhari that according to Mrs. Justice Sujata Manohar no intervention was called for on other points and, therefore, the matter was finally closed even on merits and as such the proceedings may not be remanded back to the trial Court. In her earlier order dated February 18,1985 the learned Judge had held that since the question of validity of section 21 of the MRTU PULP Act was covered by the Supreme Court judgment in Balmer Lawrie Workers Union and no intervention was called for on other points, the writ petition was rejected but later in her order dated March 4,1985 she had restricted the rule to the question whether an unrecognised union had a right to represent the workmen under section 21 of the MRTU PULP Act which would mean that if the unrecognised union had such a right, then an unfair labour practice covered by Item 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU PULP Act had to be looked into on merits by the Industrial Court. That being so, it would only mean that a complaint which was otherwise maintainable was thrown away by the Industrial Court on a fallacious ground that it was not so maintainable and the same will have to be looked into on merits but to the limited extent whether or not the first respondent-company had indulged in unfair labour practice covered by Item 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU PULP Act. 6. In this view of the matter, the writ petition partially succeeds and thus partially allowed. The impugned order passed by the second respondent is quashed and set aside to the extent of the holding that an unrecognised union cannot represent workmen in a complaint of unfair labour practice covered by Item 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU PULP Act under section 21 of the said Act. The impugned order passed by the second respondent is quashed and set aside to the extent of the holding that an unrecognised union cannot represent workmen in a complaint of unfair labour practice covered by Item 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU PULP Act under section 21 of the said Act. The matter is remanded back to the Industrial Court with a direction to allow the petitioner-union to adduce further evidence, if they so desired, and it goes without saying that in that case the first respondent-company shall also be permitted to adduce whatever evidence they want to in rebuttal of the case of the petitioner-union. The learned Member of the Industrial Court thereafter, after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard to both sides, dispose of the unfair labour practice complaint of the petitioner-union to the extent of Item 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU PULP Act on merits. 7. Rule is made absolute in the terms aforesaid but with no order as to costs. 8. Office is directed to send down the writ to the trial Court immediately. Parties are directed, through their respective advocates, to remain present in the Court of the second respondent or his successor on 19th August, 1991 and the second respondent is directed to dispose of the unfair labour practice complaint as early as possible but at any rate by the end of December, 1991. Rule made absolute. -----