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1991 DIGILAW 36 (ALL)

Jai Ram Gupta v. Vii Additional District Judge, Kanpur

1991-01-08

S.C.VERMA

body1991
JUDGMENT S C. Verma, J. 1. The dispute in the present writ petition relates to premises No. 127/LIG/2 Block 'W Kidwai Nagar, Kanpur which has been released in favour of the landlord by the impugned orders dated 5-11-1986 and 23-4-1988 passed by the Prescribed Authority and the appellate authority, VII the Additional District Judge, Kanpur respectively. 2. The respondent no. 3 filed release application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', on the ground that he has retired from Government service on 28-2-1982 and he wants to settle at Kanpur and needs the disputed accommodation for his residence. The application was contested by the petitioner tenant and it has been alleged that the respondent no. 3, after retirement, has settled at Lucknow where he was practising as an Advocate and residing in House No. 9-A, Rakabganj, Lucknow with his family. The wife of respondent no. 3 who is an officer in the Education Department has also been allotted a house in Mahanagar locality. The sole motive of getting the house released was to sell it for high consideration. 3. The Prescribed Authority vide order dated 5-11-1986 held that the need of the landlord is bonafide and genuine and on comparative hardship it was also found that the landlord will be put to greater hardship. The findings of fact recorded by the Prescribed Authority were upheld 'by the learned VII Additional District Judge, Kanpur by judgment dated 23-4-1988. 4. In the present case, the only point argued before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner Sri S. N. Verma, Senior Counsel, was that the courts below did not consider the case of the parties as provided under Rule 16 (1) (d) of the Rules framed under the Act. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, even if the plea was not raised by the tenant, it was the duty of the court to take into account the requirements laid down under the aforesaid Rule. The learned counsel, in support of his proposition, relied on the case Smt. Rajrani Mehrotra v. II Additional District Judge, 1980 ARC 311 (SC). Sri Mohd. Sher Siddiqui v. Ill Addl. District Judge, Aligarh, 1982 (1) ARC 305 and Munni Devi v. Additional District Judge, 1985 (l) ARC 219. The learned counsel, in support of his proposition, relied on the case Smt. Rajrani Mehrotra v. II Additional District Judge, 1980 ARC 311 (SC). Sri Mohd. Sher Siddiqui v. Ill Addl. District Judge, Aligarh, 1982 (1) ARC 305 and Munni Devi v. Additional District Judge, 1985 (l) ARC 219. It is no doubt correct that it was the duty of the Courts to consider the question of the needs of the landlord and tenant as required to be considered under Rule 16 (1) (d) of the Rules even though a plea in this regard has not been taken in the written statement but in my opinion, whenever such a plea is raised before any Court, the matter should be examined on the basis of the material on record. This would be necessary because it may be possible that even though this plea is raised but no benefit under the provisions of the Rule could be given. In some cases, the accommodation may not be such which could be apportioned or in some case even if the entire accommodation is released, it may not be sufficient to the requirement of the landlord or may be just sufficient. 5. In such cases, where the plea is raised for the first time before this Court, it has to be prima facie seen as to what is the nature of the disputed accommodation and as to whether it could be appartioned in such a way that it may be utilised by the parties as also the extent of the accommodation in possession of the parties and their requirement for extra accommodation. The present case when examined on the basis of the aforesaid observations, it would be clear that for the family of the landlord which consists of self, wife, married son and his family, the accommodation of three rooms, kitchen, one bath and latrine would be just sufficient for their requirement. The disputed accommodation also which consists of three rooms, kitchan, two verandah, bath and latrine is not such which could be apportioned. Thus the accommodation available and the requirement of the landlord indicates that it can not be divided and the accommodation sought to be released is just sufficient for the requirement of the landlord. The disputed accommodation also which consists of three rooms, kitchan, two verandah, bath and latrine is not such which could be apportioned. Thus the accommodation available and the requirement of the landlord indicates that it can not be divided and the accommodation sought to be released is just sufficient for the requirement of the landlord. The same view has been expressed in the cases Krishna Pal Singh v. V Additional District Judge, Moradabad, 1986 (1) ARC 158, Devi Prasad Misra v. II Additional District Judge, Bareilly, 1986 (I) ARC 247, Har Prasad v. VII Additional District Judge, Kanpur, 1986 (2) ARC 106 and Mata Prasad Dwivedi v. I Additional District Judge, Lucknow, 1985 (1) ARC 9. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents also contended before me that on the basis of the material on record, it would not be possible to partly release the accommodation in their favour as there is no provision in the accommodation to accommodate two separate familities. For the reasons stated above, there is no force in the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and it is not necessary that the case be remanded for consideration of this question by the court below. The petition is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for time to vacate the disputed premises. Considering the entire circumstances of the case, it would meet the ends of justice if the petitioner is granted one year's time to vacate the premises provided the petitioner furnishes an undertaking to this effect before the Prescribed Authority within a period of 15 days after a certified copy of this order is received. Petition dismissed.