JUDGMENT Kamlesh Sharma, J —This Revision petition is directed against the judgment, dated 11-1-1991 passed by the District Judge, Mandi, Kullu and Lahaul and Spiti Districts at Mandi in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 3 of 1991 By his order, the District Judge had disposed of the appeal on the concession of the Counsel for the parties. The Counsel for the respondents-defendants, S/sh. Narain Singh and Ranbir Singh had undertaken that "in case it is ultimately found that the site on which the defendants-appellants are raising construction is in excess of their share in the land along the National Highway, they shall demolish the structure to the extent it is found in excess of their share." The Counsel for the petitioners-plaintiffs, S/ Sh. Parduman Singh and Basant Singh had consented to the proposal and the District Judge proceeded to order accordingly. He set aside the judgment, dated 7-12-1990 of Sub-Judge, Sundernagar, whereby the application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. for interim injunction of S/Sh. Parduman Singh and Basant Singh was allowed and status qua was ordered. 2. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. S/Sh. Parduman Singh and Basant Singh had filed a Civil suit for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining S/Sh. Narain Singh and Ranbir Singh from making construction over the suit land and in the alternative for mandatory injunction of demolishing the structure, if any, raised during the pendendy of the suit. The suit land measures 332.97 Square Meters and is comprised in Khasra No 1606 situated in Bhojpur Bazar, Sundernagar, District Mandi, on National Highway No. 21. Admittedly, it is joint between the parties though a dispute regarding the extent of their shares is pending The claim of each party is that their share is two-third in the suit land. 3. Sh. Dalip Sharma learned Counsel for S/Sh. Parduman Singh and Basant Singh, has vehemently argued that the Counsel appearing on behalf of S/Sh, Parduman Singh and Basant Singh before the District Judge had no express authority to give his consent to the proposal of S/Sh Narain Singh and Ranbir Singh. Sh Basant Singh has also filed his affidavit that he was not present in the Court on 11-1-1991 to instruct his Counsel. Sh Basant Singh has also filed his affidavit that he was not present in the Court on 11-1-1991 to instruct his Counsel. According to him, as there was no offer of the kind, as given by S/Sh Narain Singh and Ranbir Singh in the Court of District Judge on 11-1-1991, there was no occasion for him to give any instructions to his Counsel earlier These allegations are denied by Sh Narain Singh by filing a counter-affidavit. 4. Shri Bimal Gupta, learned Counsel for S/Sh. Narain Singh and Ranbir Singh has drawn my attention to Order 3, Rules I and 4 C P. C to emphasise that the Advocate of S/Sh Parduman Singh and Basant Singh had the implied authority to act by way of agreeing to the proposal of S/Sh. Narain Singh and Ranbir Singh. Hs has drawn my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Jarnilahai Abdul Kadar v. Shankarlat Gulabchand and others, AIR 1975 SC 2202, wherein, after examining the then existing case law on the point it was observed :— "……..we must uphold the actual, though implied, authority of a pleader (which is a generic expression including all legal practitioners as indicated in section 2 (15), Civil P. C.) to act by way of compromising a case in which he is engaged even without specific consent from his client, subject undoubtedly to two overriding consideration (1) He must act in good faith and for the benefit of his client, otherwise the power fails, (2). It is prudent and proper to consult his client and take his consent if there is tine and opportunity. In any case, if there is any instruction to the contrary or withdrawal of authority, the implicit power to compromise in the pleader will fall to the ground…….." 5. In view of the above decision of the Honble Supreme Court, I have no hesitation to hold that the Advocate of S/Sh Parduman Singh and Basant Singh had the implied authority to give his consent to the proposal of S/Sh. Narain Singh and Ranbir Singh, S/Sh Parduman Singh and Basant Singh have not been able to show to this Court that they had given any specific instruction to their Counsel not to agree to such a proposal They have also not been able to make out a case that their Advocate had not acted in good faith for their benefit. Narain Singh and Ranbir Singh, S/Sh Parduman Singh and Basant Singh have not been able to show to this Court that they had given any specific instruction to their Counsel not to agree to such a proposal They have also not been able to make out a case that their Advocate had not acted in good faith for their benefit. If the litigants are permitted to make such allegations, they will challenge all those actions of their Counsel which they later on find inconvenient to them. But as suggested by the Supreme Court in Smt. Jamilabai’s case (supra), it is always in the interest of the Counsel to have specific instructions from his clients before giving any concession or entering into a compromise. 6. The next point raised by Sh. Dalip Sharma is that by the impugned judgment, the suit of Sh. Parduman Singh and Basant Singh has become infructuous. If S/Sh. Narain Singh and Ranbir Singh are permitted to make construction that will be the end of the matter as partition of land and thereafter determination of the question whether they have made construction over the land in excess of their share will take number of years as the dispute of inheritance of l/3rd of the joint land including the suit land is still pending before the revenue authorities. He further urges that till the dispute of inheritance is finally settled and partition is effected, S/Sh. Narain Singh and Ranbir Singh have no right to raise construction over the suit land as it will adversely affect the rights of his clients. He has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Harish Chander Verma v. Kayastha Pathshala Trust and others, JT (1988) I SC 625, to emphasise that whenever a suit for permanent injunction is filed by a co-owner to restrain another co-owner from making construction on the joint land, the interim order permitting the defendant to raise construction subject to final decision is not an appropriate order. 7. On the other hand, according to Mr. Bimal Gupta, the Supreme Court decision is distinguishable as in that case the decree for permanent prohibitory injunction was already passed whereas m the present case only suit has been filed. In my opinion, there is a substance in the contention of Mr. Dalip Sharma. 7. On the other hand, according to Mr. Bimal Gupta, the Supreme Court decision is distinguishable as in that case the decree for permanent prohibitory injunction was already passed whereas m the present case only suit has been filed. In my opinion, there is a substance in the contention of Mr. Dalip Sharma. No doubt, in the case before the Supreme Court, decree for permanent injunction was already in existence when the High Court had permitted the defendants-respondents to raise construction subject to the condition that in the event of the decree being affirmed, the construction would be pulled down but while judging the propriety of the interim order passed by the High Court, the Supreme Court has laid down larger principles in the following words ? — "Apart from the convenience the parties and equity arising in the facts of the case, a larger principle is involved in the matter. On the face of a decree for permanent injunction is it appropriate for the appellate Court to allow it to be nullified before the appeal is disposed of. We are of the view that the answer has to be in the negative.” From the ratio of this judgment, it is clear that in the civil suit for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from raising any construction on the joint land, it is not proper for the Court to allow them to continue and complete the construction on the condition that it will be demolished if it is ultimately found that they have no right to make construction or they have exceeded their right in making the construction. For coming to this conclusion, I draw support from Ram Kalap v. IV Additional Distt. Judge, Gorakhpur and another, AIR 1989 All 157. 8. In a case of the type with which this Court is presently concerned, the appropriate interim order is status-quo. But before passing this order, factors for grant of interim order are to be considered. The most important factor is prima facie case that the land in dispute is joint between the parties and the defendants have no right to make construction over it to the disadvantage of the plaintiffs. If prima facie case is made out in favour of the plaintiffs, the other factors of irreparable loss, balance of convenience etc. etc. will follow. The most important factor is prima facie case that the land in dispute is joint between the parties and the defendants have no right to make construction over it to the disadvantage of the plaintiffs. If prima facie case is made out in favour of the plaintiffs, the other factors of irreparable loss, balance of convenience etc. etc. will follow. In the present case, S/Shri Narain Singh and Ranbir Singh, respondents-defendants have admitted that the suit land is joint but according to them they have a right to make construction over a portion of the suit land as it is not more than their share besides other reasons given by them in their written statement and reply. 9. In view of the facts and circumstances of this case and the above cited judgment of the Supreme Court in Harish Chander Verma’s case (supra), it is not proper for this Court to confirm the judgment, dated 11-1-1991 of the District Judge. Therefore, it is set aside. The parties are directed to maintain status quo as of today on the suit land during the pendency of the suit. In view of the fact that S/Sh. Narain Singh and Ranbir Singh are in the midst of their construction, the trial Judge is directed to expedite the decision of the suit. The Revision Petition is allowed but the parties are left to bear their own costs. Revision petition allowed.