Jivendra Nath Kaul v. State of U. P. — 1991 DIGILAW 360 (ALL)

JUDGMENT B.P. Singh, J. - Both these Writ Petitions are being disposed of by this judgment as they were heard together. Writ Petition No. 8460 of 1990 was filed by Sri J.N. Kaul, who was elected as President of Zila Parishad, Lucknow from 2511989, on 2781990 for a writ of certiorari to set aside the notification dated 16th April, 1990 and the general information dated 14th January, 1989 so far as they related to opposite parties No. 2 and 3. It was also prayed that the names of opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 be deleted from the list of members of Zila Parishad, Lucknow and they may be restrained from functioning as members of Zila Parishad, Lucknow. The prayer for a writ of quowarranto was also made directing the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 not to function as members. A prayer in the nature of a writ of mandamus was also prayed for directing opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 not to vote against the petitioner in respect of a no confidence motion which was going to be held in the near future. No restraining interim order was passed in Writ petition No. 8460 of 1990. 2. On 17th August 1990 Sri Bhagwati Singh, M.L.C., Lucknow had given notice to the collector, Lucknow under Section 28 of U.P. Kshhetra Samiti and Zila Parishad Adhiniyam, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Adhiniyam for the sake of brevity) regarding no confidence motion against the petitioner. This motion of no confidence was signed by 36 members of Zila Parishad, Lucknow. On 28th August, 1990 Collector, Lucknow, who is also an exofficio District Election Officer, Lucknow, issued notices through registered post to all the members of the Zila Parishad, Lucknow, including the petitioner, intimating that a meeting, to consider the motion of no confidence moved against the petitioner, would be held on 14th September, 1990 at 11 A.M. in the Zila Parishad office, Lucknow. Alongwith the notice dated 28th August, 1990 a photostat copy of the no confidence motion presented by Sri Bhagwati Singh on 17th August, 1990 containing the signatures of 36 members of Zila Parishad was also sent to every member of the Zila Parishad. A copy of the said notice dated 28th August, 1990 was also posted on the notice board of the Zila Parishad in accordance with the rules framed under the Adhiniyam. 3. A copy of the said notice dated 28th August, 1990 was also posted on the notice board of the Zila Parishad in accordance with the rules framed under the Adhiniyam. 3. On 24th August, 1990, before issuing notice dated 28th August, 1990, Collector Lucknow had requested the District Judge, Lucknow for nominating a judicial officer to preside over the intended meeting of no confidence as required under subsection (4) of Section 28 of the Adhiniyam. On 25th August, 1990 District Judge, Lucknow had nominated Sri Sushil Kumar Srivastava, IInd Additional District Judge, Lucknow as Presiding Officer of the meeting for considering the no confidence motion against the petitioner. The date 14th September, 1990 was fixed by Collector, Lucknow on 25th August, 1990. 4. While the meeting scheduled for 14th September, 1990 was yet to be held, the petitioner filed writ petition No. 9514 of 1990 on 13th September, 1990 with a prayer in the nature of certiorari quashing the notice dated 28th August, 1990 by which the meeting to consider the motion of no confidence against the petitioner was to be held on 14th September, 1990 at 11 A.M. at Zila Parishad compound, Lucknow. It was also prayed by the petitioner that IInd Additional District Judge, Lucknow may be directed not to hold or preside over the meeting scheduled for 14th September, 1990. In the alternative a prayer was made that the result of the meeting should not be declared and that the result of the motion of no confidence should not be implemented, if the meeting was allowed to be held on 14th September, 1990. This petition alongwith writ petition No. 8460 of 1990 came up for hearing before K.K. Birla and R.K. Agrawal, JJ. The Judges heard learned counsel for the petitioner on 13th September, 1990 and passed the following order: Arguments partly heard. The remaining argument will continue till tomorrow. The proceedings of the motion of no confidence may be continued. The declaration of the result of this motion is not stayed. However, after declaration of the result the Presiding Officer will keep the record of the voting done by Sri D.K. Anand and Sri Nand Kishore Verma, Opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 in writ petition No. 8460 of 1990 in a sealed cover so as not to affect the secrecy of the voting and also it may be available if required at any subsequent stage. 2 and 3 in writ petition No. 8460 of 1990 in a sealed cover so as not to affect the secrecy of the voting and also it may be available if required at any subsequent stage. It has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that till further orders the implementation of the motion of no confidence, if passed, be stayed. As even if such motion is passed it will not be given effect to before 15th September, 1990, therefore, no order is being passed in this regard and it will be considered tomorrow. The respondents will produce necessary records tomorrow. Learned counsel for the parties are permitted to copy out this order as it is not possible to supply them certified copy of this order today. On 14th September, 1990 Dr. R.R. Misra and R.K. Agrawal, JJ. ordered that the two petitions be put up on 15th as unlisted. On 15th September, 1990 the prayer for interim stay did not find favour with the Bench and the prayer for interim relief was refused and the cases were ordered to be listed in ordinary course. 5. The meeting to consider the motion of no confidence against the petitioner was held on 14th September, 1990 in the Zila Parishad as planned and was presided over by Sri Sushil Kumar Srivastava, IInd Additional District Judge, Lucknow, Out of total of 61 members of the Zila Parishad 34 members were present at the meeting. When the motion was put to vote in the meeting 33 members voted in favour of the motion of no confidence while one member voted against the motion. As such the motion of no confidence against the petitioner was carried out. 6. On 15th September, 1990 Sri Ram Manohar Misra, Upadhyaksha, Zila Parishad, Lucknow took over the charge of the office of the Adhyaksha, Zila Parishad, Lucknow. 7. After the motion of no confidence was passed against the petitioner, the petitioner applied for amendment of writ petition No. 8460 of 1990. The prayer was allowed. The petitioner, in addition to some pleas, has also added the relief for a writ of mandamus directing the opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 not to give effect to the illegally passed motion of no confidence in the meeting held on 14th September, 1990 and to further direct the opposite parties Nos. The prayer was allowed. The petitioner, in addition to some pleas, has also added the relief for a writ of mandamus directing the opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 not to give effect to the illegally passed motion of no confidence in the meeting held on 14th September, 1990 and to further direct the opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 not to interfere with the petitioner's working as Adhyaksha of Zila Parishad, Lucknow on the basis of the resolution dated 14th September, 1990. It was also prayed that the motion of no confidence adopted should be quashed after excluding the null and void votes of opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3. Counter and Rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged in the case. 8. The case of the petitioner is that the State Government had nominated one person, namely, Sri D.K. Anand (opposite party No. 2) as a member of the Zila Parishad vide its notification dated 16th April, 1990 (Annexure1) treating Sri D.K. Anand as one of the persons engaged in social, cultural, literary and professional activities. D.K. Anand is none else than Sri Dinesh Kumar Jaiswar (Opposite Party No. 2). Sri D.K. Jaiswar posing himself as D.K. Anand got the nomination from the State Government. He is employed in the Central Government as Telecom maintainer and now promoted as Telecom Inspectorin the northeastern railway. 9. Sri Nand Kishore Verma (Opposite Party No. 3) was treated as a member of Zila Parishad, Lucknow on the claim that he was a representative elected from cooperative societies. Sri Nand Kishore Verma is also a State Government employee as he is working as Assistant Teacher in Basic Shiksha Parishad, Junior Basic Vidyalaya, Amethi, Block Gosaiganj, District Lucknow and he is drawing his salary from the State Government treasury. Both opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 cannot legally act and function as members of Zila Parishad, Lucknow. 10. On 17th August, 1990 a notice of intention to move no confidence motion against the petitioner was given to the District Magistrate, Lucknow and opposite parties No. 2 and 3 were amongst the signatories as members of Zila Parishad. Because opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 are not qualified to act and function as members of Zila Parishad, they have no right to give notice of no confidence. The opposite parties Nos. Because opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 are not qualified to act and function as members of Zila Parishad, they have no right to give notice of no confidence. The opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 have no right to attend the proposed meeting of no confidence or to vote on the said motion in the said meeting. The names of opposite parties No. 2 and 3 in the list of members of Zila Parishad, Lucknow are liable to be quashed. The list of members of Zila Parishad, Lucknow is to be cancelled so far as it relates to opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3. 11. On the basis of hearsay report the petitioner came to know about the notice dated 17th August, 1990 which was submitted to Collector/District Magistrate, Lucknow against the petitioner. On 3rd September, 1990 the petitioner applied to the Collector/District Magistrate, Lucknow for permission to inspect the file relating to the motion of no confidence against the petitioner. The petitioner was permitted to inspect the said file. The petitioner did inspect the file but he was not permitted to copy out or to make notes of the contents of the file. 12. The notice dated 2881990 was received by the petitioner on 1191990 at 2 P.M. Thereafter the petitioner made enquiries from the Upper Mukhya Adhikari, Zila Parishad, Lucknow, whether any such notice was received for publication by affixation on the notice board of Zila Parishad as required under Section 28(3)(ii) of the Adhiniyam read with Rule 2 of the Rules for motion of no confidence in Adhyaksha/Upadhyaksha. On being informed that no such notice was received or was in fact affixed till 1291990 upon the notice board of Zila Parishad, the petitioner gave an application to the Collector/District Magistrate, Lucknow intimating the above noncompliance of the mandatory provision of the Adhiniyam and requested for postponement of the meeting scheduled for 1491990. The Collector/District Magistrate, Lucknow did not accede to the request of postponement of meeting made by the petitioner. 13. In the no confidence meeting 35 members took part out of whom 33 voted for the motion, one member voted against the motion while remaining one member did not exercise his right to vote. The Collector/District Magistrate, Lucknow did not accede to the request of postponement of meeting made by the petitioner. 13. In the no confidence meeting 35 members took part out of whom 33 voted for the motion, one member voted against the motion while remaining one member did not exercise his right to vote. The total strength of the members of the Zila Parishad as supplied to the Presiding Officer by the Zila Parishad office was 62 and under the law the motion of no confidence could be passed only by a majority of more than 50%. Thus the notice was carried out by one vote by the petitioner. 14. In the meeting the Presiding Officer had kept two votes cast by opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 in a separate sealed envelop and maintained the secrecy in respect of their votes whether they were cast in favour or against the motion of no confidence. However, the petitioner has every reason to presume that since both opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 were signatories to the motion of no confidence they must have voted against the petitioner in the said meeting. The petitioner was present in the meeting in which active part was taken by opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3. The opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 were not competent to sign the motion of intention to move motion of no confidence and as such initial notice given in From A to the Collector/District Magistrate, Lucknow on 17th August, 1990 was illegal, null and void because the same was signed by these two persons. 15. Learned Advocate General had put in appearance for opposite parties Nos. 1 and 4 while affidavit of service on opposite parties was filed by the petitioner on 4th October, 1990. Opposite Party No. 2 has not filed any counter affidavit. Sri Nand Kishor Verma, opposite party No. 3, has contested the writ petitions and has contended that the writ petitions can be dismissed on a short question of maintainability and as such there was no need to file any detailed counter affidavit in the case. Opposite Party No. 3 has further contended that his election was held as back as on 8th November, 1989 as representative of coopertive societies as provided under section 27(2) of the Adhiniyam read with Rules of Zila Parishad (Choosing of Representatives of Cooperative Societies) Rules, 1963. Opposite Party No. 3 has further contended that his election was held as back as on 8th November, 1989 as representative of coopertive societies as provided under section 27(2) of the Adhiniyam read with Rules of Zila Parishad (Choosing of Representatives of Cooperative Societies) Rules, 1963. The period of limitation for challenging the election of opposite party No. 3 was only 30 days and because no such steps were taken by the petitioner or anybody else, the election of opposite party No. 3 as member of the Zila Parishad could not be challenged at this stage. The proper procedure for challenging the election of opposite party No. 3 is provided in the above mentioned Zila Parishad (Choosing of Representatives of Cooperative Societies) Rules, 1963. Furthermore when the petitioner contested the election for Adhyaksha of the Zila Parishad he himself had approached opposite party No. 3 to second the proposal of his nomination paper. Opposite party No. 3 had acceded to the request of the petitioner and had seconded the proposal of the petitioner when the petitioner was nominated as a candidate for the office of the Adhyaksha of Zila Parishad. The nomination paper of the petitioner for the office of Adhyaksha of the Zila Parishad was accepted on the basis of the nomination form which was duly seconded by opposite party No. 3. In case opposite party No. 3 had not seconded the nomination form the petitioner's nomination form would not have been accepted and he would not have been elected as Adhyaksha of Zila Parishad. The petitioner had accepted the opposite party No. 3 as duly elected member of Zila Parishad, Lucknow and having obtained advantage of becoming a candidate for the office of Adhyaksha on the basis of nomination paper which was seconded by opposite party No. 3, and now it was not open to the petitioner to challenge the validity of election of opposite party No. 3 at the present stage, especially when motion of no confidence was already voted for. The petitioner was now estopped from questioning the election of opposite party No. 3 as an elected member of Zila Parishad, Lucknow. The petitioner was not qualified to challenge the election of opposite party No. 3 as a member of Zila Parishad as contemplated under U.P. Zila Parishad (Choosing of Representatives of Cooperative Societies) Rules, 1963. 16. The petitioner was now estopped from questioning the election of opposite party No. 3 as an elected member of Zila Parishad, Lucknow. The petitioner was not qualified to challenge the election of opposite party No. 3 as a member of Zila Parishad as contemplated under U.P. Zila Parishad (Choosing of Representatives of Cooperative Societies) Rules, 1963. 16. The Collector/District Magistrate, Lucknow (opposite party No. 1 in writ petition No. 9514 of 1990) also filed his counter affidavit in which the various steps taken by him regarding the notice of intention of the motion of no confidence against the petitioner, were enumerated. The Collector/District Magistrate, Lucknow has averred that all the formalities required for the holding of the meeting of no confidence were complied with. There were no irregularities or illegalities in the conduct of the proceedings prior to the stage when the meeting actually started which was presided over by the IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow. In paragraph 5 of his affidavit District Magistrate/Collector, Lucknow has categorically stated that on 28th August, 1990 notices Were issued through registered post to all the members of Zila Parishad, Lucknow including the petitioner, intimating that 14th September, 1990 was fixed in the Zila Parishad, Lucknow at 10 A.M. for considering no confidence motion which was moved against the petitioner. He has also maintained that photostat copy of motion of no confidence was also sent to all the members alongwith the notice of the date. 17. In his rejoinder affidavit to the counter affidavit of Opposite Party No. 3, the petitioner has averred that most of the allegations in the counter affidavit of opposite party No. 3 were argumentative and will be replied at the time of argument. The petitioner further contended that the writ petition was not barred by Section 27(2) of the Adhiniyam read with rules framed thereunder. Prior to 17th August, 1990 the petitioner was not aware of the fact that Nand Kishore Verma (opposite party No. 3) was an Assistant Teacher in Basic Vidyalaya, Amethi, Lucknow and as such there is no question of petitioner being barred from raising controversy in the writ petition. Four nomination papers were filed proposing the name of the petitioner for the office of the Adhyaksha of Zila Parishad, Lucknow. Out of these, two nomination papers did bear the signatures of opposite party No. 3 as seconder. Four nomination papers were filed proposing the name of the petitioner for the office of the Adhyaksha of Zila Parishad, Lucknow. Out of these, two nomination papers did bear the signatures of opposite party No. 3 as seconder. This was done in ignorance of the fact that opposite party No. 3 Was a government employee. The remaining two nomination papers were in order and were proposed and seconded by other members who were fully qualified to be members of Zila Parishad. The claim of the State Government that the notices were served upon all the members of Zila Parishad, Lucknow was not correct. The State Government has not indicated anything about the service of notice upon the members of Zila Parishad. It is not disclosed as to when and of what date notices were served upon the 62 members of Zila Parishad. The notice upon the petitioner was served on 11th September, 1990 by registered post and there was every reason to believe that notices upon the remaining members of Zila Parishad were not served in time. The time of 15 clear days was not given to the members of Zila Parishad as was provided under the Adhiniyam and the rules framed thereunder. The assertion of the opposite parties that the notice of intention to move no confidence motion was also pasted upon the notice board of the Zila Parishad, was not correct. The claim of the State Government with the number of members of the Zila Parishad was not correct. The correct position is that the total strength of members of Zila Parishad including Chairman (as exofficio member) is 62 and this can be verified from the report of the Presiding Officer, Sri Sushil Kumar Srivastava. The motion of no confidence was not passed in accordance with law. 18. During the course of argument, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the resolution passed on the motion of no confidence was liable to be setaside. The main contentions are that the motion of no confidence passed on 14th September, 1990 was liable to be set aside for the following reasons, i.e., firstly, the very notice of intention to make the motion of no confidence, was unlawful and liable to be quashed because opposite parties Nos. The main contentions are that the motion of no confidence passed on 14th September, 1990 was liable to be set aside for the following reasons, i.e., firstly, the very notice of intention to make the motion of no confidence, was unlawful and liable to be quashed because opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3, who had signed the notice in question could not be treated as members of the Zila Parishad; secondly, that the meeting held on 14th September, 1990 in which the motion of no confidence was passed was illegal and liable to be quashed because mandatory provisions of Section 26(3)(ii) were not complied with as neither 15 days' clear notice was served upon the Parishad's members nor the notice of the scheduled meeting was published by affixation on the notice board of Zila Parishad till 12th September, 1990; thirdly, that the participation of opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 in the deliberation of meeting held on 14th September, 1990 vitiates the entire proceedings of the meeting as the persons, who could not be the members of Zila Parishad, did take part in the meeting and did, in fact, influence the result of the meeting; and lastly, the required more than half of the present members of the Parishad did not vote for the same. 19. As regards first contention, the admitted position is that opposite parties No. 2 and 3 did sign the notice of intention to make the motion of no confidence dated 17th August, 1990. The question arises, if opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 were not competent and qualified to sign the said notice as they were government servants. On the other hand the contention of respondents is that opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 continued to be members of the Parishad as their membership was not terminated till to date in accordance with the provisions contained in U.P. Zila Parishad (Settlement of disputes relating to membership) Rules, 1963. 20. Section 18 of the Adhiniyam deals with the composition of Zila Parishad. Section 18(1)(iv)(c) and Section 18(1)(v) are relevant for the purposes of the present case and are as under: Section 18(1)(iv)(c) a representative, to be chosen in the manner prescribed, of such Cooperative Society or Cooperative Societies, as the State Government may, having regard to the usefulness of it so their activity in the District, specify for each district and..... Section 18(1)(iv)(c) and Section 18(1)(v) are relevant for the purposes of the present case and are as under: Section 18(1)(iv)(c) a representative, to be chosen in the manner prescribed, of such Cooperative Society or Cooperative Societies, as the State Government may, having regard to the usefulness of it so their activity in the District, specify for each district and..... Section 18(1)(v) so many persons not exceeding three as may be specified, to be chosen by the State Government from among persons engaged in social, cultural, literary or professional activities; 21. Admittedly opposite party No. 3 was elected under Section 18(1)(iv)(c) and opposite party No. 2 was nominated under Section 18(1)(v). Section 13 of the Adhiniyam deals with the disqualification for being chosen or coopted as member of the Zila Parishad and is as under: 13. Admittedly opposite party No. 3 was elected under Section 18(1)(iv)(c) and opposite party No. 2 was nominated under Section 18(1)(v). Section 13 of the Adhiniyam deals with the disqualification for being chosen or coopted as member of the Zila Parishad and is as under: 13. Disqualifications for being chosen or coopted as member A person shall be disqualified for being chosen a member of a Kshettra Samiti under clause (iii) of subsection (1) of Section 6 or coopted as a member of a Kshettra Samiti under subsection (2) of that section or for being elected as Pramukh under Section 7 if he (a) has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding six months or to transportation for contravention of any order made under the Essential Supplies (Temporary powers) Act, 1946, or the U.P. Control of Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1947, or for an offence which is declared by the State Government to imply such moral turpitude as to render him unfit to be a member, or has been ordered to file security for good behaviour in consequence of proceedings taken under Section 109 or 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, such sentence or order not having been subsequently reversed or remitted or the offender pardoned or a period of five years not having elapsed since the compliance with the order or completion of the sentence; (b) is an undischarged insolvent; (c) holds any place of profit in the gift or disposal of Government or any local authority including a Gaon Sabha or is an honorary magistrate or an honorary assistant collector, or an honorary munsif; (d) having held any office tinder Government or any Zila Parishad, Kshettra Samiti, Gaon Sabha, Nyaya Panchayat, Municipal Board, Notified Area Committee, Town Area Committee or any cooperative society registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912, has been dismissed for corruption or disloyality to the State unless a period of five years has elapsed since his dismissal; (e) is debarred from practising as a legal practitioner by order of any competent authority; (f) is suffering from leprosy or is suffering from any of the infectious diseases to be specified by the State Government by order and has been declared by a medical officer not below the rank of a Civil Surgeon to be incurable of such disease; (g) has been declared under Section 23 to have committed any corrupt practice within the meaning of that section and such declaration continues to be effective. 22. Sections 26 and 27 of the Adhiniyam, which relate to the disputes as to the membership or disqualification of the members of Zila Parishad, are as under: 26. Disqualification for being a member or an Adhyaksha A person, who is subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 13, shall be disqualified for being chosen a member of a Zila Parishad under clauses (iv) and (v) and subsection (1) of Section 18, or coopted a member under subsection (2) of that section or elected as an Adhyaksha under Section 19. 27. Disputes as to membership or disqualification. (1) If any dispute arises as to whether a particular person is a member of the Zila Parishad under clause (i), clause (iii), clause (vi) or clause (vii) of subsection (1) of Section 18, the dispute shall be referred in the manner prescribed to the State Government shall be final and binding. (2) If a dispute arises as to whether a person (a) has been lawfully chosen or coopted a member of Zila Parishad under Section 18, or (b) has ceased to remain eligible for being chosen or cotopted a member of the Zila Parishad for the purposes of Section 20, or (c) has become disqualified to be Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha for the purposes of Section 19. The dispute shall be referred in the manner prescribed to the judge whose decision shall be final and binding. 23. On a perusal of above cited provisions of the Adhiniyam it is quite clear that a person, who holds any place of profit in the gift or disposal of Government or any local authority including Gaon Sabha or is an honorary magistrate or an honorary assistant collector or an honorary munsif shall be disqualified for being chosen a member of Kshettra Samiti under clause (iii) of subsection (1) of Section 13 or coopted as piember of the Kshettra Samiti under subsection (2) of that Section. The fact that opposite party No. 2 is an employee of Central Government has not been disputed. The fact that opposite party No. 2 is an employee of Central Government has not been disputed. The fact that opposite party No. 3 is an assistant teacher in Basic Shiksha Parishad Junior Basic Vidyalaya, Amethi, Block Gogaiganj, District Lucknow and was drawing his salary from Government Treasury in the Basic Shiksha Parishad as a government servant is not open for debate because this question has been finally resolved by the Supreme Court in the case of Biharilal Dobray v. Roshan Lal Dobray ( AIR 1984 SC 385 ). 24. In Biharilal Dobray's case, the Supreme Court had the occasion to discuss the question if an assistant teacher employed in a Basic Primary School run by U.P. Board of Basic Education constituted under the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 34 of 1972) is disqualified fof being chosen as a member of the State Legislative Assembly under Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution. In this case Roshan Lal Dobray was one of the candidates for the election to the U.P. Legislative Assembly from Kannauj (scheduled caste seat). His nomination paper was filed before the Returning Officer but was rejected on the ground that he was holding an office of profit under the Government of Uttar Pradesh and, as such, he was disqualified under Article 191(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. Thereafter, Roshan Lal Dobray challenged the said rejection of his nomination paper through an election petition in the High Court. The High Court allowed the writ Petition and held that an assistant teacher employed in Basic Primary School of the Basic Education Department in U.P. was not holding an office of profit under the State Government. Biharilal Dobray went in appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court, while allowing the appeal, held that an assistant teacher employed in a Basic Primary School run by the U.P. Board of Basic Education constituted under the U.P. Act No. 34 of 1972 was disqualified for being chosen as a member of the State Legislative Assembly under Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, as he was holding an office of profit under the State Government. The provisions of Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution and Section 13(1)(c) of the Adhiniyam are almost similar. Thus, it is quite obvious that both opposite parties Nos. The provisions of Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution and Section 13(1)(c) of the Adhiniyam are almost similar. Thus, it is quite obvious that both opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 were disqualified for being chosen as members of the Zila Parishad, as the disqualification contained in Section 13(1)(c) of the Adhiniyam was attracted. 25. As an alternative argument, learned counsel for the opposite parties contended that even if it is conceded for the sake of argument that opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 were holding an office of profit under the State Government, the petitioner was not entitled to claim any relief ini this regard because he had an alternative remedy as provided under Section 27 of the Adhiniyam and that under Section 27 of the Adhiniyam read with Rules of the Zila Parishad (Choosing of Representatives of Cooperative societies) Rules, 1963. The period of limitation for challenging the election of opposite party No. 3 was only 30 days. No steps to challenge the election of opposite party No. 3 as a member of the Zila Parishad were taken by the petitioner within 30 days and now he was debarred from doing so. It was also contended that since opposite party No. 3 had seconded the proposal of the petitioner when he had contested the election as President of the Zila Parishad, he was estopped from challenging the membership of opposite party No. 3. In this connection, we may observe that the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are very wide to issue writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quowarranto and certiorari or any one of them for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose in appropriate cases. There is no rule of law which provides that the High Court will not interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution if there was any alternative remedy available to a petitioner. Of course, it is always a matter of discretion with the High Court and there may be cases when a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution may not be entertained if the petitioner had an effective, adequate and efficacious remedy available to him. Of course, it is always a matter of discretion with the High Court and there may be cases when a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution may not be entertained if the petitioner had an effective, adequate and efficacious remedy available to him. In the present case, the motion of no confidence was to come up for hearing within a few days and the petitioner, in case he had proceeded under Section 27 of the Adhiniyam, would not have succeeded in obtaining any adequate or effective relief from the authorities concerned. Thus, the petition cannot be dismissed on this ground. Furthermore, the period of limitation of 30 days as provided under the rule cannot be made applicable to a writ petition under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. The contention of opposite party No. 3 mat the the petitioner was estopped from questioning his membership of the Zila Parishad, as he had approached opposite party No. 3 for filing a nomination paper when he had put up himself as a candidate for the of ice of President of Zila Parishad, has no force. There can be no estoppel against law. If a man was ineligible to be a candidate for the election to the office of the member of the Zila Parishad, no amount of acquiescence on the part of any one can deprive him of his legal right to question the membership of such a person. Both opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 were basically disqualified to be members of the Zila Parishad and they could not have been legally elected or nominated as member of the Zila Parishad. 26. Now the question arises whether the notice of intention to make the motion of no confidence was unlawful and liable to be quashed because opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 had signed the same. In our opinion, the mere signing of the notice of intention to make the motion of no confidence by opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 would not invalidate the entire notice. If the notice was signed by not less than one half of the total number of members of the Zila Parishad for the time being, the notice will be valid. According to the main allegation made in para 10 of the petition read with Annexure3, the total number of the members of Zila Parishad, Lucknow at the relevant time was 61. According to the main allegation made in para 10 of the petition read with Annexure3, the total number of the members of Zila Parishad, Lucknow at the relevant time was 61. The notice in question (AnnexureCA 1) was signed by 36 members of the Zila Parishad. Thus, even if the names of opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 are excluded from the members, who had signed the notice in question, the number of members signing the notice was 34 i.e. not less than one half of the total number of members of the Zila Parishad at the relevant time. 27. The second contention of the petitioner is that the meeting held on 14th September, 1990, in which the motion of no confidence was passed, was illegal and liable to be quashed because the mandatory provisions of Section 28(3)(ii) were not complied with, as neither 15 days' notice was served upon the Zila Parishad members nor the notice of the scheduled meeting was published by affixation on the notice board of Zila Parishad till 12th September, 1990. Section 28 of the Adhiniyam, which deals with the procedure relating to the motion of no confidence in Adhyaksha of the Zila Parishad is complete in itself and is reproduced hereunder: Motion of nonconfidence in Adhyaksha: (1) A motion expressing want of confidence in the Adhyaksha of a Zila Parishad may be made and proceeded with in accordance with the procedure laid down in the following subsection. (2) A written notice of intention to make the motion in such form as may be prescribed signed by not less than one half of the total number of members of the Zila Parishad for the time being together with a copy of proposed motion, shall be delivered in person, by any one of the members signing the notice, to Collector having jurisdiction over the Zila Parishad. (3) The Collector shall thereupon (i) convene a meeting of the Zila Parishad for the consideration of the motion at the office of the Zila Parishad on the date appointed by him, which shall not be later than thirty days from the date on which the notice under subsection (2) was delivered to him; and (ii) give to the members notice of not less than fifteen days of such meeting in such manner as prescribed, Explanation. In computing the period of thirty days specified in this subsection, the period during which a stay order, if any issued by a competent court on a petition filed against the motion made under this section is in force plus such further time as may be required in the issue of fresh notices of the meeting to the members shall be excluded. (4) The Collector shall arrange with the District Judge of the district to preside at such meeting. Provided that the District Judge may instead of presiding himself direct a Civil Judicial Officer not below the rank of a Civil Judge subordinate to him to preside at the meeting. (4A). If within an hour from the time appointed for the meeting such officer is not present to preside at the meeting, the meeting shall stand adjourned to the date and time to be appointed by him under sub section (4B). (4B). If the officer mentioned in subsection (4) is unable to preside at the meeting, he may, after recording his reasons, adjourn the meeting to such other date and time as he may appoint, but not later than 25 days from the date appointed for the meeting under subsection (3). He shall without delay inform the Collector in writing of the meeting. The Collector shall give to the members at least ten days' notice of the next meeting in the manner prescribed under subsection (3). (5) Save as provided in subsection (4A) and (4B), a meeting convened for the purpose of considering a motion under this section shall not be adjourned. (6) As soon as the meeting convened under this section commences, the presiding officer shall read to the Zila Parishad the motion for the consideration of which the meeting has been convened and declare it to be open for debate. (7) No debate on the motion under this section shall be adjourned. (8) Such debate shall automatically terminate on the expiration of two hours from the time appointed for the commencement of the meeting if it is not concluded earlier. On the conclusion of the debate or on the expiration of the said period of two hours, whichever is earlier, the motion shall be put to vote (which shall be held in the prescribed manner to secret ballot). On the conclusion of the debate or on the expiration of the said period of two hours, whichever is earlier, the motion shall be put to vote (which shall be held in the prescribed manner to secret ballot). (9) The presiding officer shall not speak on the merits of the motion and he shall not be entitled to vote thereon. (10) A copy of the minutes of the meeting, together with a copy of the motion and the result of the voting thereon shall be forwarded forthwith on the termination of the meeting by the presiding officer to the State Government and to the Collector. (11) If the motion is carried with the support of more than half of the total number of members of the Zila Parishad for the time being (a) the presiding officer shall cause the fact to be published by affixing forthwith a notice thereof on the notice board of the office of the Zila Parishad and also by notifying the same in the Gazette, and (b) the Adhyaksha shall cease to hold office as such and vacate the same on and from the date next following that on which the said notice is affixed on the notice board of Zila Parishad. (12) If the motion is not carried as aforesaid or if the meeting could not be held for want of quorum, no notice of any subsequent motion expressing want of confidence in the Adhyaksha shall be received until after the expiration of (two years) from the date of such meeting. (13) No notice of a motion under this section shall be received within the (two years) of the assumption of office by an Adhyaksha. 28. Under the scheme of Section 28 of the Adhiniyam, the Collector on receiving the written notice of intention to make the motion of no confidence signed by not less than one half of the total number of members of the Zila Parishad for the time being shall convene a meeting of the Zila Parishad for the consideration of the motion at the office of Zila Parishad on a date appointed by him, which shall not be later than 30 days from the date on which the notice in question was delivered to him and the Collector shall also give to the members notice of not less than 15 days' of such meeting in the manner as may be prescribed. The Collector is also required to annex a copy of the motion alongwith the notice to the members. 29. It is significant to note that no other members of the Zila Parishad except the petitioner, who was the President of the Zila Parishad, has come forward to state that the notice of the motion of no confidence was not served upon him within the time stipulated. Petitioner's contention is that 15 days' notice was not given to him and most of the members of the Parishad as a result of which some of the members of the Zila Parishad could not take part in the meeting. It was further contended by the petitioner that under the Rules the notice was to be served by publication also by affixation on the notice board of the office of the Zila Parishad. On the other hand, the case of the opposite parties is that Section 28(2) consists of two parts i.e. firstly, that a notice of the date of the meeting of the motion of no confidence is to be given by the Collector to the members of Zila Parishad alongwith the copy of the motion and, secondly, the notice should give clear 15 days' time and that a copy of the notice should also be posted upon the notice board of the office of the Zila Parishad. The contention is that the first part of the provision is mandatory and the second part is only directory and in case it is shown that the Collector has sent the notice by post well in time giving 15 days' clear margin then it shall be presumed that the notice was validity given. It was also contended that nonaffixation of the notice upon the notice board would not invalidate the meeting. 30. A provision similar to the provision contained in Section 28(2) of the Adhiniyam finds place in Section 87A(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (Act No. 2 of 1916). Under the first part of Section 87A(3) of the Act, the District Magistrate is to convene a meeting of the Board and to send notice of the meeting to the members and under the second part of this section the manner of sending notice to the members of the Board is provided. Under the first part of Section 87A(3) of the Act, the District Magistrate is to convene a meeting of the Board and to send notice of the meeting to the members and under the second part of this section the manner of sending notice to the members of the Board is provided. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Gyan Singh v. District Magistrate, Bijnor, ( AIR 1975 All 315 ) had the occasion to consider the provisions of Section 87A(3) of the Municipalities Act. The question in Gyan Singh's case for consideration was whether the provisions of Section 87A(3) of the Act were mandatory or directory. The Full Bench held as follows: The above discussion shows that the preponderance of the Judicial opinion is that the second part of subsection (3) of Section 87A is directory, its literal compliance is not necessary. A substantial compliance in regard to service of notice of the meeting for consideration of the motion of no confidence on the members will be sufficient and any literal noncompliance of the said provision will not invalidate the meeting or the motion of no confidence which may be adopted at the said meeting. In view of the above discussion I am of the opinion that the second part of subsection (3) of Section 87A of the Act laying down manner for sending the notice to the members of the Board is directory, while the first part of the said subsection requiring the District Magistrate to convene a meeting and to send notices to the members is mandatory. It would be sufficient compliance of the directory provision of this subsection if notice is served on the members not by registered post but by any other mode and in that situation the motion of no confidence which may be carried at the said meeting cannot be nullified on the ground of any literal noncompliance of service of notice by registered post. 31. The question whether only first part of Section 28(3) was mandatory and the second part was only directory also came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satish Chandra Agarwal v. State of U.P. and others (Writ Petition No. 6038 of 1990) which Was decided on 7111990, a certified copy of the judgment is on the record. Relying upon the cases of Yadunath Pandey v. The District Panchayat Raj Officer, district Ballia (1986 UPLBEC, 632), Pioneer Motors (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Nagercoil Municipal Council (AIR 1967 SCJ 634); Gyan Singh v. The District Magistrate, Bijnor and others ( AIR 1975 All 315 ); Jai Charan Lal Anal v. The State of U.P. and others ( AIR 1968 SC 5 ) and K. Narasimhiah v. H.C. Singri Gowda and others (AllR 1966 SC 330), the Division Bench had held in Satish Chandra Agarwal's case that the provision in regard to the time occurring in clause (ii) of subsection (3) of Section 28 in the context is directory and not mandatory. While giving to the members notice is mandatory and cannot be dispensed with but not the period prescribed for attending a meeting to consider the motion of no confidence. We find no reason to disagree with the view taken in Satish Chandra Agarwal's case. We are in full agreement with the view expressed therein. 32. As already observed, excluding the petitioner no other member of the Parishad has come forward to state that the notice of the meeting of no confidence which was scheduled for 14th September, 1990, was not served upon him. The question arises whether the petitioner had proper and sufficient notice of the meeting of no confidence. In this connection, we may point out that this writ petition was presented before the Registrar of the Court on 2581990 and came up before a Division Bench of this Court on 2781990. In para 15 of the petition, the petitioner had categorically stated that on 17th August, 1990, the notice of intention to move no confidence motion against the petitioner to the District Magistrate, Lucknow, was given by opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 who were not lawful members of the Zila Parishad. This assertion in para 15 of the petitions leaves no room for doubt that atleast on 25th August, 1990, the petitioner did have the knowledge of the notice of intention dated 17th August, 1990, which was moved by opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 and others to the Collector, Lucknow. The petitioner has claimed in para 21B of the petition that he moved an application for inspection before the Collector, Lucknow, on 391990. 2 and 3 and others to the Collector, Lucknow. The petitioner has claimed in para 21B of the petition that he moved an application for inspection before the Collector, Lucknow, on 391990. He admits that he did inspect the file although he was not permitted to copy out or make notes from the file. The petitioner has not offered any explanation as to why he did not apply for the inspection of the file on 25th August, 1990 or within a day or so thereafter when he had come to know about the notice of no confidence. The essential part is the knowledge of the petitioner. A man can have knowledge of a meeting even if he reads a notice which was served upon one of his colleagues. In that case he cannot come and say that the notice was not served upon him individually. After all the intention of giving notice is to inform the members of the Parishad about the date, time and place of the meeting in which a motion of no confidence is to be considered. In case a member is vigilant, he can always come to the office of the Parishad (after all he is a member of the Parishad) and he can make enquiries from the members of the staff including the executive officer. Thus, when the petitioner had the knowledge of the notice of motion of no confidence on 25th August, 1990, he could have very well obtained information from the District Magistrate as to which was the date fixed for the meeting. At least on 3rd September, 1990 the petitioner must have come to know of the fact that 14th September, 1990 was fixed for the meeting. Admittedly, the petitioner did attend the meeting in question and he was not prejudiced in any manner for the simple reason that the notice in fact wals served upon him on 11th September, 1990. At the cost of repetition we may again refer to the affidavit of Sri Ashok Priyadarshi, District Magistrate/Collector, Lucknow, in this connection. Admittedly, the petitioner did attend the meeting in question and he was not prejudiced in any manner for the simple reason that the notice in fact wals served upon him on 11th September, 1990. At the cost of repetition we may again refer to the affidavit of Sri Ashok Priyadarshi, District Magistrate/Collector, Lucknow, in this connection. Sri Priyadarshi, in paragraphs 5 and 6 of his affidavit, has categorically stated that he (ex officio District Election Officer, Lucknow) had issued notices through registered post to all the members of the Zila Parishad, Lucknow, including the petitioner, on 28th August, 1990, intimating that 14th September, 1990 was fixed for consideration of noconfidence motion moved against the petitioner and the meeting was to be held in Zila Parishad office, Lucknow at 11 A.M. He has also stated that alongwith the notice a photostat copy of the noconfidence motion dated 17th August, 1990 containing the signatures of 36 members of the Parishad was also sent and that a copy of the notice was also posted on the Notice Board of the office of the Zila Parishad, Lucknow as provided under the Rules. There is dispute regarding posting of the notice on the notice board of Zila Parishad, Luckikow, but we have no reason to disbelieve the averment made by the Collector, Lucknow in his affidavit that on 28th Augusts 1990 he had sent notices, through registered post, of the time and date of the meeting alongwith the copy of the motion of noconfidence, to all the members of Zila Parishad, Lucknow. Sri Priyadarshi, in his capacity as District Magistrate/Collector, Lucknow was the District Election Officer of the Zila Parishad, Lucknow. He has no personal interest in the case and was stating regarding his acts which were performed by him in the discharge of his official functions and duties. He was required to act in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 28 of the Adhiniyam and had no rhyme or reason to perjure himself by filing an affidavit based on incorrect facts. 33. The fact that notices were in fact issued, finds corroboration in the own admission of the petitioner. The petitioner, in his supplementary affidavit has submitted that the notice of the meeting was received by him on 11th September, 1990. The delay may have been due to the vagaries of the postal department. 33. The fact that notices were in fact issued, finds corroboration in the own admission of the petitioner. The petitioner, in his supplementary affidavit has submitted that the notice of the meeting was received by him on 11th September, 1990. The delay may have been due to the vagaries of the postal department. Thus, the noticies were sent on 28th August, 1990 and 14th September, 1990 was the date fixed. If we exclude these two days i.e. 28th August, 1990 and 14th September, 1990, a clear 15 days' time was given to the members as contemplated under the provisions of Section 28 of the Adhiniyam. Since no other member of the Parishad has come forward to state regarding nonreceipt of the notice, the mere fact that the notice was not posted on the notice board of the Zila Parishad, Lucknow, would not invalidate the meeting. After all the purpose of issuing notice is to intimate the members of the date, time and place of the meeting well in time so that they may come prepared to take part in the meeting. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the cases of Gajanand Narayan Patil and others v. Dattatraya Woman Patil and others, ( AIR 1990 SC 1023 ) and Yadunath Pande v. District Panchayat Raj Officer, Ballia (1986 UPLBEC 632). We have gone through these decisions. With great respect we may observe that the facts of the above cited cases are entirely different and the principles of law enunciated therein are not applicable to the facts of the present case. In Gajanand Narayan Patil's case the conclusion of the Supreme Court was that the special meeting called for the consideration of the no confidence motion against the Chairman of the Sanjay Sahkari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. was convened without giving notices to the representatives of the financial institutions as well as the coopted expert nominee. It was in this background that the meeting was held to be illegal because the representatives of the financial institutions as well as coopted expert nominee were entitled to participate and vote in the said meeting. In Yadunath Pande's case the conclusion reached by a Division Bench of this Court was that 15 days' notice was not given to the members for the meeting which was to consider the motion of no confidence against the Pradhan. In Yadunath Pande's case the conclusion reached by a Division Bench of this Court was that 15 days' notice was not given to the members for the meeting which was to consider the motion of no confidence against the Pradhan. It was for this reason that the said meeting, held to consider the motion of no confidence, was held to be illegal. In the present case we have already observed that 15 days' clear notice was given to the members of the Parishad. 34. Thus we conclude that the meeting held on 14th September, 1990 was not liable to be quashed for the reason that compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 26(3)(ii) of the Adhiniyam was not made. 35. The third and fourth contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner are that the participation of opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 in the deliberations of the meeting held on 14th September, 1990 vitiates the proceedings of the meeting as they could not be lawful members of the Parishad and their participation did, in fact, influence the result of the meeting and that the required more than half of the present members of the Parishad did not vote for the said motion of no confidence. On the other hand the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondent are that the meeting, held to consider the motion of no confidence, was not illegal for the simple reason that opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 had participated in the meeting and that more than half of the members of the Parishad at the relevant time had voted for the motion of no confidence. 36. Reference was also made by the learned counsel for the opposite parties to Section 98(2) of the Adhiniyam. Section 98(2) of the Adhiniyam provides that no disqualification or defect in the election, cooption or appointment of a person acting as a member of Zila Parishad or of a committee or subcommittee appointed under this Act or as the Presiding Officer of a meeting of a Zila Parishad or of such committee or subcommittee, shall be deemed to vitiate any act or proceeding of the Zila Parishad, committee or subcommittee, if the majority of the persons present at the time of the act being done, or proceeding being taken were members of the Zila Parishad or committee or subcommittee without any such disqualification or defect. Thus, Section 98(2) is quite clear on the point that if the majority of the persons present at the time of a meeting of Zila Parishad did not suffer from any disqualification or defect, the said meeting would be valid and legal, even if it was attended by those persons who were legal members, for one or the other reason, of the Parishad at the time the meeting was held. 37. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that Section 98(2) would apply only if the motion for the consideration of no confidence motion can be treated as a proceeding of Zila Parishad. His argument is that a meeting held for the consideration of a motion of no confidence cannot be termed as a proceeding of Zila Parishad. This argument does not appear to be tenable. Section 19(1) of the Adhiniyam lays down that every Zila Parishad shall have an Adhyaksha (President) who shall be elected by secret ballot by the members of Zila Parishad in the manner provided by the Rules which shall also provide for resolution of doubts and dispute regarding election of Adhyaksha. Thus, it is obvious that the meeting held for the election of Adhyaksha of Zila Parishad is a proceeding of Zila Parishad. The necessary corollary that the meeting to decide the motion of noconfidence against the Adhyaksha (President) of the Zila Parishad is also a proceeding of the Zila Parishad. The simple fact that a meeting convened for the consideration of the motion of no confidence is to be presided by a judge would not change the complexion of the meeting itself. After all, the meeting remains a meeting of the members of Zila Parishad. The judge as Presiding Officer simply presides over the meeting and has no active part so far as the casting of votes by the members and deliberations of meeting is concerned. In this connection we may also refer to the case of Mool Chand Sharma v. State of U.P. and others ( AIR 1967 SC 112 ) and Nirpendra Bahadur Singh v. Jai Ram Sharma and others ( AIR 1977 SC 1992 ). In this connection we may also refer to the case of Mool Chand Sharma v. State of U.P. and others ( AIR 1967 SC 112 ) and Nirpendra Bahadur Singh v. Jai Ram Sharma and others ( AIR 1977 SC 1992 ). In Mool Chand Sharma's case the Supreme Court has held, while considering the Section 87(a) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, that the proceedings of a meeting held in pursuance of the provisions of Section 87(a) of the U.P. Municipalities Act and the resolution passed thereat, adopting a motion of no confidence against the President of Municipal Board, are valid notwithstanding of the fact some of the members, who had signed the notice of motion and had taken part in the proceedings, had incurred the disqualification under clause (g) of Section 13D. In Nirpendra Bahadur Singh's case the election was held to the State Legislative Council from a local authority's constituency. The names of some of the members of Kshettra Samitis, who had ceased to be members, continued in the electoral rolls and these persons did participate in the election. The Supreme Court has held that participation by such members does not render the election illegal. 38. Thus, we are of the view that the participation by opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 in the meeting in question does not make the said meeting illegal and the proceedings of the meeting are not vitiated due to their said participation. 39. Now we come to the last question, i.e., whether the motion of no confidence was passed with the support of more than half of total members of Zila Parishad for the time being. 40. We have the report of the Presiding Officer, Sri Sushil Kumar Srivastava, as Annexure 3 to the counter affidavit of the Collector, Lucknow. The report is quite revealing. The report shows that in all 34 members of the Parishad were present. After deliberations 32 members voted in favour of the motion of no confidence and one member voted against the motion of no confidence. The remaining vote of the 34th member was debated because the mark made by the voter was not made in the column meant for Yes. After deliberations 32 members voted in favour of the motion of no confidence and one member voted against the motion of no confidence. The remaining vote of the 34th member was debated because the mark made by the voter was not made in the column meant for Yes. Initially the Presiding Officer was of the view that the vote was invalid but when the Assistant Election Officer informed the Presiding Officer that it was not explained to the members as to at what place the mark was to be placed by the voter, the Presiding Officer was of the view that since the mark was above the column meant for yes the vote was valid and was cast in favour of the motion of no confidence. Thus, a total of 38 members voted for the motion of no confidence when the total strength at that time was 62. It was not disputed that both opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 voted for the motion of no confidence. We have already held that they were not lawful members of the Parishad and, as such, their names are to be ignored. If we ignore these two members, then the total strength of the members of the Parishad for the time being comes to 60 and if these two names are also excluded from the number of members, who voted for the motion of no confidence, the number of such members, who voted for the motion of no confidence, comes to 31, Thus, 31 members voted for the motion of no confidence out of total strength of 60 members. The conclusion was irresistible that the motion of no confidence was carried out by more than half of the total number of members of the Zila Parishad for the time being. 41. In the result, the writ Petition No. 8460 of 1990 Jivendra Nath Kaul v. State of U.P. and others is partly allowed. The names of opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3, Sri D.K. Anand and Sri Nand Kishore Verma, are deleted from the list of members of Zila Parishad, Lucknow and they are restrained from functioning as members of the Zila Parishad, Lucknow. This writ petition is dismissed so far as the remaining reliefs are concerned. 42. The Writ Petition No. 9514 of 1990 J.N. Kaul v. The Collector, Lucknow and others is dismissed.