Judgment D.R. DHANUKA, J.:---The plaintiff has filed this suit against the defendants for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,07,39,807.77 plus interest and costs. By this suit, the plaintiff bank is inter alia seeking to realise various securities created by the 1st defendant in its favour including the security created in respect of the premises described in Exhibit 'H' to the plaint. The said premises consist of Shop No. 6-A and 7-A forming part of the building known as Mamta Building situate at Prabhadevi, Bombay. 2. Originally, this notice of motion was was taken out by the plaintiff against defendant No. 1, defendant No. 2 and M/s. Vishal Surgical Equipment company the respondent No. 1, only. Subsequently, by an amendment made in this notice of motion with the leave of the Court, Mr. Ramesh Ahuja, partner of M/s. Vishal Surgical Equipment Company, has been impleaded in this proceeding. By this notice of motion, the plaintiff is seeking an order of punishment against defendant No. 2 and respondent No. 1-a under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 on the ground that the said individuals have wilfully, deliberately and contemptuosly interfered with and/or obstructed the possession of the Court Receiver in respect of the abovereferred premises by creating and/or attempting to create third party rights in respect thereof. In substance, it is alleged that respondent Nos. 1 and 1-A were not in possession of the said premises or any part thereof when the Court Receiver took charge and they have been inducted in the premises only in April 1989 by defendant No. 2, who was merely permitted user thereof in view of the defendant No. 1 having been appointed by the Court as an agent of the Receiver and the wrongful act consists of causing interference and intermeddling with the premises which were custodia legis by a third party who also asserts rights to use the said premises under an agreement dated 21st April 1989 executed between respondent No. 1-A and defendant No. 2. 3. This notice of motion involves consideration of the following two questions under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 :-- (1) Whether the defendant No. 2 Mr. Philip Lobo committed contempt of Court by entering into an agreement dated 21st April, 1989 with respondents Nos. 3. This notice of motion involves consideration of the following two questions under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 :-- (1) Whether the defendant No. 2 Mr. Philip Lobo committed contempt of Court by entering into an agreement dated 21st April, 1989 with respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A (Respondent No. 1-A being a partner of respondent No. 1 who actually dealt with the matter throughout) conferring right on them to share office accommodation in Shop No. 6-A and 7-A in building 'Mamta' situate at Prabhadevi Road for carrying on of their business thereat on monthly payment of Rs. 3,500/- with exclusive facility of telephone telex etc., for a period of 11 months after obtaining a sum of Rs. 1 lac as security deposit with provision for renewal thereof and by inducting the said third party into the said premises so as to interfere and intermeddle with the possession of the premises which were custodia legis without obtaining leave of the Court and the Court Receiver? Whether the Receiver's agent merely permitted to use the premises personally commits contempt of Court by entering into such agreement behind the back of the receiver and such an arrangement amounts to interfering and intermeddling with the possession of the property in charge of the receiver by such agent as well as by a third party who is so inducted in the premises ? (2) Whether respondent No. 1-A Mr. Ramesh Ahuja, the third party, committed contempt of Court by interfering and intermeddling with the property which was custodia legis by obtaining third party rights under the said agreement dated 21st April, 1989, by indulging in acts calculated to change the status quo prevailing on the day when the Court Receiver took charge of the premises, with knowledge that the Court Receiver, High Court, Bombay, was in possession of the said premises and the said premises were custodia legis ? 4. The relevant facts which are required to be stated for decision of this notice of motion are as under :-- (a) By an order dated 13th April, 1988 passed on Notice of Motion No. 1116 of 1988, Guttal, J., appointed Court Receiver, High Court, Bombay, as ad-interim receiver of the premises described in Exhibit 'H' to the plaint i.e. the premises consisting of Shops Nos. 6-A and 7-A on the ground floor of 'Mamta' Building constructed on Plot No. 926, TPS TV Mahim area, Appasaheb Marathe Marg, Prabhadevi, Bombay 400 025. By the said order, this Court authorised the Court Receiver to appoint the defendant No. 1 as his agent to use the said premises. (b) On 26th April 1988, the Court Receiver took possession of the suit premises and affixed his two possession boards thereon. This fact is recorded in the report made by the Court Receiver's representative dated 26th May, 1988 marked as Exhibit 'N' in the notes of evidence recorded in this case. Correctness of the said report is an admitted fact. (c) At the time when the Court Receiver's representative took possession of the said premises, defendant No. 2 Mr. Philip Lobo, the managing Director of defendant No. 1, was present at the premises. Since the Court had permitted the Court Receiver to appoint defendant No. 1 as his agent to use the said premises, the Court Receiver inquired of the said Mr. philip Lobo (hereinafter referred to as defendant No. 2) as to whether defendant No. 1 or defendant No. 2 in his capacity as Director of defendant No. 1 was willing to remain in possession of the suit premises for and on behalf of the Court Receiver as his agent on the terms to be finalised by the Court Receiver. On 26th May, 1988, defendant No. 2 executed an undertaking in favour of the Court Receiver. On 26th May, 1988, defendant No. 2 executed an undertaking in favour of the Court Receiver stating that the 1st defendant shall not part with possession of the said premises without the permission of the Court Receiver. It was also stated in the said premises without the permission of the Court Receiver. It was also stated in the said undertaking that the 1st defendant shall return possession of the said premises to the Court Receiver as and when demanded by the Court Receiver. (d) At the material time, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were represented by M/s. Dhru Co., Advocates. Along with their letter dated 31st August, 1988, M/s. Dhru Co., forwarded the originals of the agency agreement and the undertaking on stamp paper of Rs. 10/- duly signed by defendant No. 2. (d) At the material time, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were represented by M/s. Dhru Co., Advocates. Along with their letter dated 31st August, 1988, M/s. Dhru Co., forwarded the originals of the agency agreement and the undertaking on stamp paper of Rs. 10/- duly signed by defendant No. 2. In the said undertaking, it is, inter alia, stated as under :-- "I, Philip Lobo, Managing Director of Senior Travels Pvt. Ltd., having their office at Mamta 'A', marathe marg, Prabhadevi, Bombay 400 025, do hereby make oath and say that I on behalf of the company hereby undertake to this Hon'ble Court that we shall not dispose off or part with or assign or transfer or sell or encumber or mortgage or exchange or offer as security or otherwise in any way alienate or deal with the premises viz., business carried on at (1) Mamta, 6-A 2(2)7-A, ground floor, A. Marathe Marg, Prabhadevi, Bombay 400 025, which has been allowed by the Court Receiver to us to use and occupy the same as his Agent under an Agreement signed by us in that behalf". Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were allowed to use the said premises personally and there was a clear prohibition against them from dealing with the said premises in any manner whatsoever. In other words, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were prohibited by law as well as by virtue of the said undertaking from inducting any third party in the said premises or any part thereof. The Court Receiver continued to be in possession of the said premises and defendant No. 1 was merely permitted the use of the said premises personally as agent of the Court Receiver. (e) By an order dated 12th April, 1989 passed by Pendse, J., the appointment of Court Receiver, High Court, Bombay, as ad-interim receiver in respect of the abovereferred premises was confirmed. By this order also it was provided that the Court Receiver may permit the defendant No. 1 to occupy the said premises as agent of the Court Receiver under the terms and conditions to be settled without security. (f) On 21st April, 1989, a written agreement was arrived at between defendant No. 2 on the one part and Ramesh Ahuja, respondent No. 1-A, on the second part. (f) On 21st April, 1989, a written agreement was arrived at between defendant No. 2 on the one part and Ramesh Ahuja, respondent No. 1-A, on the second part. The execution of the said agreement is now admitted, although it was denied by defendant No. 2 in his affidavits filed in reply to this notice of motion. By the said agreement, it was provided that defendant No. 2 had agreed to share the abovereferred premises i.e. Shops Nos. 6 and 7 on the ground floor of the building 'Mamta-A' for conducting of the business by respondent No. 1-A in the name and style of M/s. Vishal Surgical Equipment Company. It was provided by the said agreement that respondent No. 1-A shall be entitled to exclusive use of Telephone No. 4223970 and that respondent No. 1-A shall be liable to pay the amount of the telephone bill pertaining to the said telephone. It was provided by Clause 2 of the said agreement that respondent No. 1-a shall pay the amount of the telephone bills in respect of the said telephone either to defendant No. 2 or directly to Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. Respondent No. 1-A agreed to pay compensation of Rs. 3,500/- per month as provided under Clause 1 of the said agreement. Defendant No. 2 agreed to provide telex facilities to respondent No. 1-A on payment of proportionate charges therefor. Elaborate provisions were made in the said agreement for sharing of electricity charges, etc. Clause 5 of the said agreement is of special significance. The said clause reads as under :- "This agreement would be for a period of 11 months and would be renewed on mutual consent on expiry of the said period". Clause 7 of the said agreement provided that the respondent No. 1-A had kept with defendant No. 2 a certain amount of security deposit. Clause 8 of the said agreement provided that on respondent No. 1-A discontinuing the office premises, the said security deposit shall be refunded. Clause 9 of the said agreement provided that in the event of respondent No. 1-A using the said premises for activities other than carrying on of their own business under the name and style of M/s. Vishal Surgical Equipment Company, defendant No. 2 shall be entitled to terminate the said agreement at any time before the expiry of 11 months. Clause 9 of the said agreement provided that in the event of respondent No. 1-A using the said premises for activities other than carrying on of their own business under the name and style of M/s. Vishal Surgical Equipment Company, defendant No. 2 shall be entitled to terminate the said agreement at any time before the expiry of 11 months. The said agreement was admitted in evidence of respondent No. 1-A as Exhibit 13 and was again admitted in evidence led on behalf of the plaintiff as Exhibit 'E'. A receipt issued by defendant No. 2 for a sum of Rs. 1 lac in favour of respondent No. 1-A reads as under : "Receipt" "Received from Mr. Ramesh Ahuja of M/s. Vishal Surgical Equipment Co., a sum of Rs. 1 lac (Rupees one lac only) being the amount of security deposit towards sharing of the office premises namely Gr. 6-7 situate at Mamta Market, Prabhadevi, Bombay". The later portion of the said receipt is not relevant. The plaintiff bank came to know, sometime prior to taking out of this notice of motion for contempt, that a third party had been inducted in the said premises which were custodia legis. The plaintiff, therefore, made a complaint to the Court Receiver by a letter dated 12th May, 1989 addressed by the plaintiff's Solicitors. In view of the said letter, the Court Receiver decided to depute a representative on the spot and verify as to who was in possession of the said premises. The report of the Court Receiver's representative dated 15th May, 1989, copy whereof is Exhibit 3 to the affidavit in support of the notice of motion, and also admitted in evidence, is of considerable significance. Mr. Suryakant Tawde, representative of the Court Receiver, found, soon after reaching the said premises, situate at 7-A, Mamta Building, that the signboard of M/s. Vishal Surgical Equipment Co., was put on the front entrance glass door of the said premises and the said sign-board read as under :-- "VISHAL SURGICAL EQUIPMENT COMPANY, 7, Mamta-A, Marathe Marg, Prabhadevi, BOMBAY 400 025." One Mr. Rakesh Puri, who was admittedly the Manager employed by respondent No. 1-A, was found at the said premises. The said Mr. Rakesh Puri was asked by the Court Receiver's representative as to where was defendant No. 2. At that time, there was no sign-board of the 1st defendant on these premises. Mr. Rakesh Puri, who was admittedly the Manager employed by respondent No. 1-A, was found at the said premises. The said Mr. Rakesh Puri was asked by the Court Receiver's representative as to where was defendant No. 2. At that time, there was no sign-board of the 1st defendant on these premises. Mr. Rakesh Puri was sitting in the shop premises at 7-A of the same building. Mr. Rakesh Puri is said to have informed Mr. Tawde that the proprietor of M/s. Senior Travels Pvt. Ltd. i.e., defendant No. 2 must be sitting in the premises at 6-A of the same building. It was however found that the premises at 6-A of the said building were locked. (h) it is also recorded in the said report dated 15th May, 1989 that Mr. Rajesh Samant of M/s. Wadia Ghandy Co., Solicitors, had handed over to him three photographs taken by the representative of the plaintiff for his reference. (i) In this view of the matter, the plaintiff moved Variava, J., for ad-interim order on 17th May, 1989 in terms of prayer (c) of the notice of motion. The advocates for the plaintiff had served notice on M/s. Dhru Co., advocates, representing defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 6 at that time before making the said application. It is recorded in the minutes of the order dated 17th May, 1989 that Mr. Merchant, the learned Counsel for the said defendants, presumably on instructions of his client, informed the Court that there was no company in existence like Vishal Surgical Equipment Company. In view of the Court Receiver's report dated 15th May, 1989 and the photographs showing the sign-board of M/s. Vishal Surgical Equipment Company, the learned Judge was satisfied that the agent of the Court Receiver had parted with possession of the said premises and had inducted a third party therein. The Court Receiver was, therefore, directed to take actual physical possession of the said premises situate at 6-A and 7-A, Mamta Building, forthwith and put his seal thereon. The Court Receiver was requested by M/s.Dhru Co., not to execute the said order immediately as their clients were intending to file an appeal. Ultimately, the Court Receiver's representative visited the said premises on 26th June, 1989 for the purpose of execution of the said order dated 17th May, 1989. The Court Receiver was authorised to take police assistance for execution of the said order. Ultimately, the Court Receiver's representative visited the said premises on 26th June, 1989 for the purpose of execution of the said order dated 17th May, 1989. The Court Receiver was authorised to take police assistance for execution of the said order. Copies of the two reports marked as Exhibits 'L' and 'M' in the notes of evidence clearly indicate as to who was substantially in possession of the said premises. The said reports also make mention of the several articles found lying therein at that time. It is, inter alia, stated in the said report (Ex. M) as under :--- "Thereafter Shri Rakesh Puri with the help of his other staff removed their office files, tables, typewriters, tubelight fittings and telephone instruments belonging to M/s. Vishal Surgical Equipment Co., and handed over the vacant possession of the suit premises No. 7-A to me on your behalf, I then locked and sealed the said premises in presence of Managing Clerk, Article Clerk of M/s. Wadia Ghandy Co., and bank Manager at 2.30 p.m.". As regards premises bearing No. 6-A are concerned, it is stated in the said report that the said premises were found locked. It is stated in the said report that the Court Receiver's representative was informed that shifting of articles, things and furniture was in progress since last night. Since the said shop premises bearing No. 6-A were found locked, the Court Receiver put his locks on the said premises also and thus the Court Receiver took actual physical possession of both the premises i.e., shop No. 7-A from Mr. Rakesh Puri, Manager of respondent No. 1 company, and shop No. 6-A in the manner stated above. (j) None of the reports of the Court Receiver's representative shows that any member of the staff employed by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 was found in the said premises during the course of any of his visits. 5. The defendant No. 2 Philip Lobo and respondent No. 1-A Ramesh Ahuja are the individuals directly and personally responsible for the contempt committed by their wrongful, deliberate and substantial interference and intermeddling with the possession of the Court Receiver in respect of the said premises and for aggravation thereof by raising pleas in justification, which are found to be false. It is a gross case of contempt. It will be a travesty of justice if the contemners are not adequately punished. It is a gross case of contempt. It will be a travesty of justice if the contemners are not adequately punished. Once the offence of contempt is proved beyond reasonable doubt, as in this case, the contemners must be punished adequately in order to maintain purity of administration of justice. By their wrongful and deliberate actions, the said contemners have substantially interfered with due administration of justice and attempted to strike at the very authority of law by their total indifference to respect the possession of the receiver. The contemners are educated businessmen and appear to believe that they can indulge in all sorts of strategies to change the status quo prevailing on the date when the receiver took charge of the premises. After a careful analysis of the material on record, I have concluded that the contemners have made several false statements on oath. It is unfortunate that the evil of perjury has increased out of all proportions and even judiciary has done too little to eradicate the evils of perjury. If no action is taken in spite of clear proof of perjury, litigants are bound to feel encouraged to tell more and more lies on oath to suit their own selfish ends and impose excessive burden on our legal system which is already under great stress and strain. I have therefore decided to probe further in the matter and issue show cause notice to the contemners as to why their prosecution should not be sanctioned for having committed perjury as it is just and expedient, in the interests of justice and to eradicate the evil of perjury that thorough probe be held and the offenders be brought to book if the offence is proved. Full opportunity will be granted to the contemners at the hearing of show cause notices in relation to proposed prosecution for perjury. The list of alleged false statements on oath in respect whereof the abovereferred inquiry for prosecution will be held is appended in the Schedule hereto. 6. In paragraph 6 of the affidavit in reply dated 18th November, 1989, the defendant No. 2 denied that he had entered into any agreement or any arrangement with M/s. Vishal Surgical Equipment Co. as alleged or otherwise. 6. In paragraph 6 of the affidavit in reply dated 18th November, 1989, the defendant No. 2 denied that he had entered into any agreement or any arrangement with M/s. Vishal Surgical Equipment Co. as alleged or otherwise. In paragraph 10(a) of the said affidavit, the defendant No.2 set up a case to the effect that respondent No.1-A was negotiating for acquisition of appropriate premises on tenancy basis in connection with a branch office to be opened by him at Bombay and he wanted facility of using some space for holding interviews of the proposed employees. In paragraph 10(a) of the said affidavit, the defendant No.2 stated that he had permitted respondent No.1-A and Mr. Rakesh Puri merely to hold such interviews at the premises. Defendant No.2 further stated in the said affidavit that he had not parted with possession or created any interest whatsoever in respect of the said premises in favour of respondent No.1-A. The said affidavit suffers from suppressio veri as well suggestio falsi. In the said affidavit, no reference is to be found to the agreement dated 21st April, 1989 or receipt for Rs. 1 lac as and by way of security deposit. In the said affidavit, no reference is to be found to the arrangement whereunder respondent No. 1-A was to have exclusive use of a particular telephone and telex facility and a right of renewal of the said agreement after the expiry of eleven months. It is obvious that these material document were deliberately suppressed from the Court. After setting out the above-referred false justification in defence of an indefensible case, the defendant No. 2 further stated, in paragraph 16 of the said affidavit, as under:--- "In any event, I tender unconditional apology for allowing 1st respondent's representative to take interview in the said premises." 7. In his oral evidence, the defendant No. 2 hesitated that the said agreement dated 21st April, 1989 was in the nature of secret document and it was not intended to be acted upon. It is alleged that such was the understanding between defendant No. 2 and respondent No. 1- A. The defendant No. 2 has further stated in his evidence that in the situation in which he was placed, he required a friendly loan Rs. It is alleged that such was the understanding between defendant No. 2 and respondent No. 1- A. The defendant No. 2 has further stated in his evidence that in the situation in which he was placed, he required a friendly loan Rs. 1 lac and he had, therefore, signed whatever document was prepared by Respondent No. 1-A. The defendant No.2 has further deposed that he had specifically brought it to the notice of respondent No. 1-A that the Court Receiver was in charge of the said premises and he could not part with possession of the said premises. The plaintiff came to know of the said agreement dated 21st April, 1989. The said agreement by itself constitutes sufficient proof of contempt in absence of satisfactory explanation. In the affidavit in rejoinder dated 18th December, 1989, reference was made to the said agreement and copy thereof was annexed to the said affidavit. It was stated in the said affidavit in rejoinder that the defendants and respondents concerned had wilfully interfered with the possession of the said premises with the Court Receiver. It was denied in paragraph 10 of the said affidavit in rejoinder that merely a thin cardboard was pasted on the glass door for the purpose of holding interviews. 8. It is necessary now to refer to the affidavit dated 20th September, 1990 sworn by defendant No. 2 in sur-rejoinder. The defendant No. 2 was asked by the learned cross-examiner as to whether he had gone through the copy of the affidavit in rejoinder dated 18th December, 1989 at the material time, to which he replied in the negative. The defendant No. 2 was then shown his original affidavit in sur-rejoinder in which he had admitted that he had gone through the copy of the said affidavit in rejoinder. A copy of the said agreement dated 21st April, 1989 was annexed to the affidavit in rejoinder. The defendant No. 2 had then no answer. the defendant No. 2 had then to admit that his earlier answers were false. A copy of the said agreement dated 21st April, 1989 was annexed to the affidavit in rejoinder. The defendant No. 2 had then no answer. the defendant No. 2 had then to admit that his earlier answers were false. In paragraph 5 of the said affidavit in sur-rejoinder dated 20th September, 1990, the defendant No. 2 has stated as under:--- "I deny I have signed any Agreement between myself of the part and Respondent No. 1 of the other on or about 21st April, 1989 or any other date as alleged." A direct question was then put to defendant No. 2 that in view of his admission now in his deposition that he had signed the said agreement with alleged understanding that the said agreement will not be acted upon, why did he state in his aboverferred affidavit in surrejoinder that he had not signed any agreement between him and respondent No. 1. The defendant No. 2 had then to admit in his deposition that his statement in paragraph 5 of the said affidavit in sur-rejoinder was false. The defendant No. 2 stated in his deposition at several places that several of his statements in the said affidavit were false. 9. It is clear from the Court Receiver's reports that at the time when the court Receiver executed the order dated 17th May, 1989 passed by Variava, J., respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A were in possession of Shop No. 7-A. It is clear from the said reports that respondent No. 1 company had brought in furnitures, typewriters, files, papers etc., at the said premises. The Respondent No. 1-A has admitted in his evidence that he had brought all these items of furniture at the said premises. The respondent No. 1-A does not subscribe to the case of defendant No. 2 that he had taken these premises for a few days only for the purpose of holding interviews for selection of employees for his branch office in the offing. The defendant No. 2 has stated in his deposition that no furniture whatsoever was brought by respondent No. 1 company in the said premises, but that the entire furniture belonged to defendant No. 1. It is a fact that on 26th June, 1989, Mr. Rakesh Puri, Manager of respondent No. 1 and 1-A, removed all these costly furniture from the premises on the footing that it belonged to respondents Nos. It is a fact that on 26th June, 1989, Mr. Rakesh Puri, Manager of respondent No. 1 and 1-A, removed all these costly furniture from the premises on the footing that it belonged to respondents Nos. 1 and A. The defendant No. 2 wants the Court to believe that Mr. Rakesh Purit removed the furniture of defendant No. 2 worth about Rs. 60,000/- illegally and wrongfully when the Court Receiver took possession of the premises in execution of order dated 17th May, 1989 passed by Variava, J., and respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A had not brought any furniture in the said premises at any time. The question to be asked is as to why defendant No. 2 did not make any complaint to the Court Receiver or to the police or at least address a letter to respondent No. 1-A in that respect. The defendant No. 2 did nothing of the sort. Even in the affidavits filed by the defendant No. 2, no such grievance is made. The defendant No. 2 says that the value of the said furniture was Rs. 60,000/-. The defendant No. 2, says that the abovereferred furniture belonging to defendant No. 1 was illegally removed by Rakesh Puri from the said premises. The defendant No. 2 has not stated a word in any of his affidavits to the effect that Rakesh Puri or respondent No. 1-A had removed his furniture worth Rs. 60,000/- from the said premises. The defendant No. 2 says that he had complained of the above referred illegal act of Mr. Rakesh Puri to respondent No. 1-A on telephone. The story of defendant No. 2 appears to be totally false in view of his prior and subsequent conduct. I hold that the respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A had brought their own furniture in the premises as they had acquired the premises substantially for carrying on their own business under the agreement dated 21st April, 1989 after making payment of security deposit of Rs. 1 lac to defendant No. 2 and they were entitled to remove the same when they lost possession in view of execution of order dated 17th May, 1989 passed by Variava, J. It was nowhere pleaded by defendant No. 2 in any of his affidavits that the said agreement was not to be acted upon. Even otherwise, the said plea is false and unbelievable. Even otherwise, the said plea is false and unbelievable. In fact, the conduct of defendant No. 2 as well as respondent No. 1-A shows that the said agreement was acted upon. The learned cross-examiner on behalf of the plaintiff put almost every single clause of the said agreement to the defendant No. 2 in his cross-examination and asked him as to whether the clauses represented the truth and the answers given by the defendant No. 2 were in the affirmative. Thus defendant No. 2 admitted the efficacy of the agreement in his cross-examination. The evidence of defendant No. 2 is thus full of contradictions and falsehoods. I have no doubt in my mind that there is a clinching evidence to hold that an agreement was entered into between the defendant No. 2 and respondent No. 1-A on 21st April, 1989 and the said agreement represents the truth. Since entering into of the said agreement itself would amount to contempt, false defences were evolved since it was realised that the said agreement could not be suppressed any more. I have no doubt in my mind that the defendant no. 2 did take from respondent No. 1-A security deposit of Rs. 1 lac and thereafter parted with possession of the said premises in favour of respondent No. 1-A substantially nominally keeping some sort of right to enter and use part of the premises i.e. shop No. 6-A. When defendant No. 2 was asked about the telephone bill in respect of the telephone which was being exclusively used by him, the respondent No. 1-A, the defendant No. 2 admitted that the entire bill used to be paid by respondent no. 1-A. The totality of admitted or proved facts leave no manner of doubt in my mind that defendant No. 2 misused his agency as agent of the Court Receiver and interfered with the Receiver's possession by inducting a third party into the said premises without leave of the Court or of the Court Receiver. The story put forward in the affidavit in reply to the effect that only for a few days, respondent No. 1-A had been permitted to use the said premises for purpose of holding interviews for selection of the staff is totally unbelievable and is clearly falsified by the documentary evidence on record. 10. The story put forward in the affidavit in reply to the effect that only for a few days, respondent No. 1-A had been permitted to use the said premises for purpose of holding interviews for selection of the staff is totally unbelievable and is clearly falsified by the documentary evidence on record. 10. The defendant No. 2 was asked in his evidence as to whether he had paid salary to any of his employees who are supposed to have looked after the premises in his absence and the answer was that no salary was paid after January 1989. Even assuming that possession of the said premises was not parted with by defendant No. 2 and there was merely an arrangement of sharing the accommodation between him and respondent No. 1-A, even that would be enough to hold defendant No. 2 guilty of contempt. No party who is permitted to use the premises as agent of the Court Receiver is allowed under law to share the said accommodation with another party under an arrangement of the kind which is evidenced by the agreement dated 21st April, 1989. It was stated by defendant No. 2 in his deposition that he had handed over a cheque for Rs. 90,000/- to the respondent No. 1-A on 24th May, 1989 . It was stated by defendant No. 2 that the respondent No. 1-A ought to have encashed the said cheque and this cheque therefore should have been treated as a payment. This story is equally fantastic and is clearly false. If the cheque was handed over by the defendant No. 2 to respondent No. 1-A on 24th May ,1989, there is no reason why respondent No. 1-A would not have encashed the said cheque. It is impossible to believe that any such cheque was handed over or any such payment was made. The defendant No. 2 has not produced any proof in support of his this assertion. It is impossible to believe that any such cheque was handed over or any such payment was made. The defendant No. 2 has not produced any proof in support of his this assertion. It must, however, be stated that this aspect is besides the point as the real question is whether defendant No. 2 had inducted third party in the premises which were custodia legis and had permitted a third party to interfere and intermeddle with the possession of the Court Receiver wholly or partly and whether the defendant No. 2 had created or attempted to create third party rights in respect of the premises which were custodia legis and thus substantially change the status quo in the position prevailing on the day when the Court Receiver took possession of the premises. In my opinion, the answer to these question has to be affirmative in view of overwhelming documentary evidence in the case. 11. Mr. Suryakant Tawde, the Court Receiver's representative, has stated in his evidence that there was a regular sign-board put on the said premises by M/s. Vishal Surgical Equipment Company. I have no reason to disbelieve this evidence. At typed page 45 of the notes of evidence, the defendant No. 2 has deposed as under:--- "Q: You have stated in para 5 of your affidavit as under:--- "I deny I have signed any agreement between myself of one part and respondent on the other on or about 21st April 1989 or any other date as alleged." Do you agree that this statement was false? A : I admit that this statement is false. I was victim of circumstances." Similarly at page 46 of the notes of evidence, the defendant No. 2 was confronted with another statement appearing in paragraph 5 of his affidavit dated 20th September, 1990. The question reads as under:--- "Q : (Shown statement appearing in para 5 of the affidavit of the witness dated 20th September, 1990). "I say that in any event, no agreement of any nature indicated in Ex. A to the rejoinder has been executed by me.' Do you agree that this statement is false? A: I agree that this statement is false." 12. The learned Counsel for defendants Nos. "I say that in any event, no agreement of any nature indicated in Ex. A to the rejoinder has been executed by me.' Do you agree that this statement is false? A: I agree that this statement is false." 12. The learned Counsel for defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 6 has submitted that the defendant No. 2 has not parted with possession of the said premises, but had retained his control over the said premises along with respondent No. 1-A even after the agreement dated 21st April, 1989 is to be believed. It appears from the record that the defendant No. 2 had not totally and absolutely parted with possession of the said premises in favour respondent No. 1-A. That factor, however, is irrelevant as the Court Receiver was in full possession of the entire premises on 26th April 1988 and the Receiver's agent had no right to change the status quo by inducting an outsider in the premises even on the basis that the premises will be substantially shared between the agent and the outsider and the outsider will be allowed to carry on his business at these premises without leave of the Court or of the Receiver. Mr. Sequeira, the learned Counsel, has submitted that the defendant No. 2 used to visit the said premises on some occasions. It may or may not be correct. Since the agreement dated 21st April 1989 is proved and this agreement is merely an agreement to share the accommodation between two parties, it is possible that the defendant No. 2 might be visiting the said premises on few occasions. It makes no difference. The learned Counsel for defendant No. 2 has then submitted that the agreement dated 21st April 1989 was not to be acted upon. It is not possible to accept this plea. Off and on some sort of apology is also offered in the passing. Such an offer of belated apology is meaningless. It lacks sincerity and adds insult to injury. In my judgment, the fact remains that the defendant No. 2 wilfully and deliberately caused interference and intermedding with the possession of the court Receiver in respect of the said premises by a third party which were custodia legis without leave of the Court and has set up several false defences in the affidavits in reply and some more in his oral evidence. I am prepared to believe the testimony of defendant No. 2 only to the extent when he pleads that he had brought it to the notice of respondent No. 1-A that Court Receiver was already in charge of the said premises. In my opinion, the rest of his testimony is false in material particulars. 13. The Court Receiver was exclusively in possession of the entire premises on 26th April, 1988. The Court Receiver permitted his agent, the defendant No. 1 or defendant No. 2 representing defendant No. 1, to use the premises personally. The question to be asked is as to whether the defendant No. 2 could enter into the agreement dated 21st April, 1989 with respondent No. 1-A for substantial sharing of the premises which were custodia legis on leave and licence for a period 11 months with provision for renewal on payment of monthly compensation of Rs. 3,500/- coupled with provision for exclusive use of telephone, telex etc., and accept a sum of Rs. 1 lac as security deposit. The question to be asked is as to whether defendant No. 2 could induct respondent No. 1-A in the property which was custodia legis so as to permit him to carry on business of M/S. Vishal Surgical Equipment Co., and thus permit intermeddling with the premises which were custodia legis?. The answer obviously is in the negative. third party rights were clearly created by defendant No. 2 in favour of respondent No. 1-A and his firm in respect of the said premises of whatever nature. The defendant No. 2 struck at the very authority of law and if the Receiver by acting in this manner without obtaining leave of the Court and without obtaining leave of the Receiver. I have recorded a finding of fact that respondent No. 1-A was aware of the fact that the Court Receiver was in possession of the said premises and in spite of knowledge of this fact, the respondent No. 1-A entered into the agreement dated 21st April, 1989 with the defendant No. 2 and interfered and intermeddled with the premises which were custodia legis delibebrately, intentionally and substantially. It is irrelevant that the defendant No. 2 retained right to use portion of the said premises if he so liked. The Court Receiver took possession of Shop No. 7-A from respondents Nos. It is irrelevant that the defendant No. 2 retained right to use portion of the said premises if he so liked. The Court Receiver took possession of Shop No. 7-A from respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A in execution of order dated 17th May, 1989 passed by Brother Justice Variava after their Manager Mr. Rakesh Puri removed his files, papers, typewriters, furniture etc., alleged to be worth Rs. 60,000/-. Still the defendant No. 2 justifies the wrongful act by contending that the defendant No. 2 had not parted with possession of the said premises and had merely permitted the respondent No. 1-A to take interviews of candidates to be employed at the Bombay Branch of respondent No. 1 company to be opened at some other place. The respondent No. 1-A does not say that he had entered into these premises only for the purpose of taking interviews of candidates as alleged by defendant No. 2. The aboverferred defence of defendant No. 2 is totally falsified by the agreement dated 21st April, 1989 coupled with receipt for Rs. 1 lac towards security deposit. 14. The respondent No. 1-A has stated in his affidavits as well as in his oral deposition that he had no knowledge about appointment of Court Receiver in respect of the said premises. It is not possible to accept this plea. The Court Receiver had placed two possession boards on the said premises on 26th April, 1988. It is then suggested that these boards might have been removed by someone from the said premises and respondent No. 1-A or Mr. Rakesh Puri might have been misled. There is no evidence to that effect. Merely indulging in conjectures like this does not help the Court to record a finding of fact that the boards might have been removed by someone. At page 8 of his evidence, respondent No. 1-A has stated that Mr. Rakesh Puri was contacted by the representative of the plaintiff Bank in the month of April 1989 itself soon after the 1st respondent firm occupied the premises. I read this evidence to mean in the context that at least soon after such occupation of the premises, Mr. Rakesh Puri was told by the representative of the plaintiff that the Court Receiver was already appointed as receiver of the said premises. The relevant portion of the evidence reads as under:--- "Mr. I read this evidence to mean in the context that at least soon after such occupation of the premises, Mr. Rakesh Puri was told by the representative of the plaintiff that the Court Receiver was already appointed as receiver of the said premises. The relevant portion of the evidence reads as under:--- "Mr. Rakesh Puri was the Manager of Vishal Surgical Equipment Co., appointed by me. Mr. Rakesh Puri was told by the Bank people that the Bank had got the Court Receiver appointed as receiver of the Bank. Mr. Rakesh Puri was contacted by the representative of the Bank in the month of April 1989 itself soon after we occupied the premises." I have no hesitation in holding that respondent No. 1-A intermeddled with the premises which are custodia legis with the full knowledge that the said premises were in charge of Court Receiver and his plea to the effect that he had no such knowledge is not true. The respondent No. 1-A has not impressed me as made witness of truth. Admittedly he has told some lies as his affidavit in this motion is conflicting with his oral testimony. On one occasion, the respondent No. 1-A was forced to admit in his cross-examination that the statements appearing in paragraph 7 of his affidavit were false. I am of the view that the statement a in paragraph 7 of his affidavit dated 25th January, 1991 as well as his deposition to the effect that defendant No. 2 Mr. Lobo had engaged M/s B. Amin Company, advocates, to appear for respondent No. 1 both are false. 15. It has been submitted by the learned Counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A that no averment is to be found in the affidavit in support of the notice of motion that the said respondents had knowledge about appointment of Court Receiver as the receiver of the said premises. When a specific question was put by me to the learned Counsel during the course of arguments as to whether his clients were challenging the truth of the statements appearing in the reports of the Court Receiver's representative to the effect that possession boards were affixed to the said premises, the learned Counsel was fair and candid enough to say that he was not challenging the truth of the said statements. The learned Counsel, however, submitted that the possibility of the Receiver's boards from the said premises having been removed prior to respondent No. 1 entering into the premises could not be ruled out. The state of affairs which exist on a particular day is presumed to continue unless contrary is proved by those who are alleging that the said state of affairs had ceased to exist. Having regard to the material on record. I hold that the respondent No. 1-A had knowledge that the property was custodia legis. Even when Mr. Rakesh Puri and respondent No. 1-A came to know from the Bank's representative that the Court Receiver was in charge of the premises and photographs were taken of the board of respondent No. 1, the respondents did nothing to purge the contempt. Ultimately, order dated 17th May, 1989 was required to be executed with the help of police. After giving anxious thought, I have come to the conclusion that the respondent No. 1-A was in pari delicto with defendant No. 2 and the conduct of both is blameworthy and contumacious. I hold that the respondent Nos. 1, 1-A and Mr. Rakesh Puri had complete knowledge of the fact that the Court Receiver was in possession of the said premises prior to 21-4-1989. 16. There is one more aspect of this matter which is interlinked with the case, though not directly the subject -matter of this notice of motion for contempt. That aspect is extremely important from point of view of another branch of law of contempt and the obligation of this Court to protect the Advocates and Counsel practising in this Court from being unnecessarily maligned. 17. On 7th/8th August 1989, M/s. B. Amin Co. Advocates Solicitors, filed Vakalatnama on behalf of M/s, Vishal Surgical Equipment Co., in this Court. The said Vakalatnama purports to have been signed by respondent No. 1-A. It is now not in controversy that the said Vakalatnama is in fact not signed by respondent No. 1-A. It is represented on behalf of M/s. B. Amin Co., that the said Vakalatnama was handed over to Mr. Niranjan Amin, Advocate/Solicitor, by Mr. Rakesh Puri, Manager employed by respondent No. 1 in Bombay and Mr. Niranjan Amin presumed that the Vakalatnama must have been signed by respondent No. 1-A, partner of respondent No.1 company. Niranjan Amin, Advocate/Solicitor, by Mr. Rakesh Puri, Manager employed by respondent No. 1 in Bombay and Mr. Niranjan Amin presumed that the Vakalatnama must have been signed by respondent No. 1-A, partner of respondent No.1 company. It is amply proved by the admitted correspondence exchanged between M/s.B/ Amin Co., and respondent Nos. 1 and 1-A that the respondent Nos. 1 and 1-A had engaged M/s. B. Amin Co., as their Advocates and they later on disowned their authority in order to hoodwink the Court and anyhow obtain an adjournment from the Court. I shall first summarie the admitted correspondence referred to hereinabove. (a) Along with their letter dated 8th August, 1990, M/s. B. Amin Co., advocates, forwarded a draft affidavit in reply to respondent No. 1-A. The said covering letter, admittedly received by respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A reads as under:--- "Pursuant to your instructions we have prepared your affidavit in reply to the above Notice of Motion and the same is enclosed herewith. If you find the same in order, you are requested to have it affirmed before an officer who is duly authorised to administer oath and thereafter immediately return the same duly affirmed by you..." (b) The respondent No. 1-A has admittedly received this letter. the respondent No. 1-A replied to this letter. Copy of the reply letter dated 13th August ,1990 from Vishal Surgical Equipment Company is marked in evidence as Exhibit 2. By the said letter, vishal Surgical Equipment Co., informed M/s. B. Amin Co., that Vishal Surgical Equipment Co., had neither the received Notice of copy of the motion no. 1205 dated 17-5-1989 nor received copy of the affidavit of Smt. Charusheela Rajaahinha Kalambale in support. In the said letter, it is not stated that M/s. B. Amin Co., were imposing their services on M/s. Vishal Surgical Equipment Co., at the instance of someone else or otherwise or that M/s. Vishal Surgical Equipment Co., had never instructed M/s. B. Amin Co., to prepare any affidavit or that M/s. Vishal Surgical Equipment Co., had never engaged M/s. B. Amin Co. (c) On 18th August, 1990, M/s. B. Amin Co., replied to the said letter. The said letter dated 18th August, 1990 was admittedly received by Mr. Vishal Surgical Equipment Co. Along with the said letter, M/s B. Amin Co. (c) On 18th August, 1990, M/s. B. Amin Co., replied to the said letter. The said letter dated 18th August, 1990 was admittedly received by Mr. Vishal Surgical Equipment Co. Along with the said letter, M/s B. Amin Co. forwarded a copy of the Notice of Motion No. 1205 of 1989 together with copy of the affidavit in support thereof as desired by the respondents. It was stated in the said letter that since this notice of motion may reach hearing on any day, affidavit in reply be forwarded to them expeditiously. By the said letter, respondent No. 1 was requested to put M/s. B. Amin Co., in adequate funds. The respondent Nos. 1 and 1-A admittedly received this letter. (d) Along with their letter dated 9th November, 1990 addressed to respondent No. 1, M/s. B. Amin Co., advocates, forwarded copy of the affidavit in rejoinder received from the plaintiff and sought immediate instructions in the matter. It appears from the said letter that M/s . B. Amin Co., had forwarded unaffirmed copy of affidavit in reply to the advocates for plaintiff in anticipation of the notice of motion reaching hearing. By the said letter, the respondent No. 1 was informed by M/s. B. Amin Co., that the notice of motion may be listed for hearing in the near furture. Reference is to be found in the said letter to the telephonic conversation which respondent No. 1-A had with Mr. Amin on the subject. (e) By a letter dated 19th November, 1990, respondent No. 1 informed M/s. B. Amin Co., that defendant No. 2 owed moneys to respondent No. 1 company which were paid to him as advance and that defendant No. 2 Philip Lobo should be asked to settle account of respondent No. 1 company in this behalf. The last paragraph of this letter is relied upon by Mr. Sathe, the learned Counsel for the respondents, in support of his submissions, to which I will make reference little later. The last paragraph of the said letter reads as under:--- "If you need any further clarification/ details, please get in touch with our advocate at Bombay." A copy of the said letter was endorsed to Mr. P. Sankaranarayanan, Advocate, Bombay. In my opinion, the last paragraph of this letter does not indicate that the respondents Nos. The last paragraph of the said letter reads as under:--- "If you need any further clarification/ details, please get in touch with our advocate at Bombay." A copy of the said letter was endorsed to Mr. P. Sankaranarayanan, Advocate, Bombay. In my opinion, the last paragraph of this letter does not indicate that the respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A had not engaged M/s. B. Amin Co., advocates for this particular matter i.e. the contempt motion herein. It merely means that respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A were not the general clients of M/s. B. amin Co., advocates. 18. This notice of motion reached hearing before me on 15th January, 1991. On the request of the parties, I adjourned the matter to 18th January, 1991 and directed that the alleged contemners shall have to remain personally present on the adjourned date of hearing and the notice of motion shall have to be heard expeditously, on merits. I had then suggested to M/s. B. Amin Co., to send a letter and telegram to respondent No. 1 forthwith as respondent No. 1 was a Madras party. Accordingly letter and telegram were sent by Ms. B. Amin Co. to respondent No. 1-A informing that the contempt motion will be proceeded with on merits on 18th January, 1991. At this stage, respondent No. 1 sent a telegram and a letter to M/s. B/ Amin and Co. to the effect that the respondent No. 1 had never engaged M/s. B. Amin Co., advocates, to represent the respondent No. 1 and had never signed any Vakalatnama in their favour. The relevant portion of the said telegram reads is under :--- "ATTN : NIRANJAN B. AMIN. RECEIVED YOUR LETTER AND AN AFFIDAVIT REQUESTING ME TO AFFIRM AND SIGN. I ALREADY INFORMED CONFIRMING TO YOU THAT I HAVE NOT SIGNED ANY VAKALAT OR ENGAGED YOU TO REPRESENT VISHAL SURGICAL EQUIPMENT COMPANY. REQUEST YOU AND PHILIP LOBO TO SIGN AFFIDAVIT NOT ACCEPTED. DO NOT MAKE ANY REPRESENTATION OR ACT ON MY BEHALF ANY FURTHER." 19. Thereupon, M/s. B. Amin Co. took discharge in the matter and Mr. R.R. Sharma, advocate, filed his vakalatnama for respondent Nos. 1 and 1-A. 20. It is averred in paragraph 7 of the affidavit of respondent No. 1-A dated 25th January ,1991 attested by Mr. DO NOT MAKE ANY REPRESENTATION OR ACT ON MY BEHALF ANY FURTHER." 19. Thereupon, M/s. B. Amin Co. took discharge in the matter and Mr. R.R. Sharma, advocate, filed his vakalatnama for respondent Nos. 1 and 1-A. 20. It is averred in paragraph 7 of the affidavit of respondent No. 1-A dated 25th January ,1991 attested by Mr. R.R. Sharma, advocate, against whom respondent No. 1-A has no grievance, that he did not know who had engaged M/s. B. Amin and Co, on his behalf and at whose instance they had acted in the present proceedings. The respondent No. 1-A chose to make contradictory statement on the subject while he was in the witness box. In his deposition, respondent No. 1-A stated on oath that defendant No. 2 Mr. Philip Lobo had engaged M/s. B. Amin Co., advocates to represent respondent No. 1-A and M/s. B. Amin Co. had unauthorisedly represented them in the matter. When respondent No. 1-A was asked by the learned cross-examiner Mr. S.H. Doctor as to which of the two statements was true and why he had made such a statement from the witness box when he had stated in paragraph 7 of the said affidavit that he did not know who had engaged M/s. B. Amin Co. on his behalf, the respondent No. 1-A replied that the statement made by him in paragraph 7 of his affidavit was false. In my opinion, both the statements are equally false. In my opinion, both the statements are equally false. I shall now analyse the evidence of respondent No. 1-A on the various relevant aspects. 21. The respondent No. 1 first stated in his evidence that he had not received any eclosure along with letter dated 8th August, 1990 from M/s. B. Amin Co. The respondent No. 1-A was then asked as to whether he had made a grievance to that effect by writing a letter to M/s. B. Amin Co. The respondent No. 1-A replied that he had written letter dated 13th August, 1990 to M/s. B. Amin Co. in this behalf . Thereafter the attention of respondent No. 1-A was invited to contents of letter dated 13th August, 1990 as the said contents do not make any reference to the alleged grievance in respect of enclosure to letter dated 8th August, 1990 having not been received by respondent No. 1. in this behalf . Thereafter the attention of respondent No. 1-A was invited to contents of letter dated 13th August, 1990 as the said contents do not make any reference to the alleged grievance in respect of enclosure to letter dated 8th August, 1990 having not been received by respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1-A ultimately admitted in his evidence that he had received the enclosure along with letter dated 8th August, 1990. The respondent No. 1 stated in his evidence that his earlier statement to the effect that he had not received the enclosures with the letter dated 8th August, 1990 was mistaken. In my opinion, the respondent No. 1-A has given false evidence in this case intentionally and deliberately. 22. When the learned Counsel for M/s. B. Amin and Co. repeatedly respondent No. 1-A as to why he had not written in any of his reply letters that he had not instructed them to act on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A and he did not want M/s. B. Amin Co. to represent them in this case, no reply was forthcoming. Respondent No. 1-A was asked by the learned Counsel on behalf of M/s. B. Amin Co. as to why it was not stated in any of the letters that respondent No. 1-A had not given any instruction to M/s. Amin Co. to prepare any affidavit in reply when M/s .B. Amin Co. had stated in their very first letter i.e letter dated 8th August, 1990 that they had prepared the draft affidavit in reply to the contempt notice of motion under instructions from respondent No. 1, no cogent reply was given by respondent No. 1-A. The entire evidence of defendant No. 1-A is as unsatisfactory as the evidence of defendant No. 2. Two of the answers of respondent No. 1-A on this aspect are being extracted below illustratively. At page 11 of his deposition, the following questions and answers appear :- "Q : In letter dated 8th August, 1990 addressed by M/s. B. Amin Co. to you it was stated that the affidavit in reply to the motion for contempt was prepared under your instructions. You have not denied this statement? A: I have not denied this statement. The truth however remains that I have not instructed M/s. B. Amin Co. to prepare any affidavit in reply. to you it was stated that the affidavit in reply to the motion for contempt was prepared under your instructions. You have not denied this statement? A: I have not denied this statement. The truth however remains that I have not instructed M/s. B. Amin Co. to prepare any affidavit in reply. Q : Can you give any reason to the Court for not denying the fact that you had given instructions for preparation of the affidavit in reply? A: I was only interested in refund of my money". (Emphasis supplied) 23. At page 16 of his evidence, the respondent No. 1-A says that defendant No. 2 had engaged M/s. B. Amin Co. When respondent No. 1-A was confronted with his statement in paragraph 7 of his affidavit dated 25th January, 1991, he stated that his statement in paragraph 7 of the affidavit was false. It was put to respondent No. 1-A that Rakesh Puri had handed over the Vakalatnama filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 to M/s. B. Amin Co. and M/s. B. Amin Co. believed Mr. Rajesh Puri when he represented that the Vakalatnama was signed by respondent No. 1-A as partner of respondent No. 1 respondent No. 1-A denied the suggestion made by the learned cross-examiner. 24. It is now not disputed by anyone that the Vakalatnama was infact not signed by respondent No. 1-A. It is therefore obvious that someone had played some mischief. The question still remains as to whether M/s. B. Amin Co. appeared in Court and acted in the matter on instructions of M/s. Vishal Surgical Equipment Co. and under their authority. The correspondence referred to above leaves no doubt in my mind that M/s. B. Amin Co. were engaged by respondent No. 1 company. M/s. B. Amin Co. were directly corresponding with respondent No. 1 company and rendering their professional services by forwarding copies of the notice of motion, affidavit in support to the notice of motion and draft affidavit in reply, copy of the affidavit in rejoinder and by posting respondent No. 1 company with the developments of the case. Having regard to the statement made in paragraph 7 of his affidavit filed by respondent No. 1-A, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the evidence of respondent No.1-A to the effect that defendant No. 2 had engaged M/s. B.Amin Co. is an afterthought. Having regard to the statement made in paragraph 7 of his affidavit filed by respondent No. 1-A, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the evidence of respondent No.1-A to the effect that defendant No. 2 had engaged M/s. B.Amin Co. is an afterthought. I have also no doubt in my mind that a very strong prima facie case is made out against respondent No. 1-A in respect of the contention of M/s. B. Amin Co. that they are being maligned by respondent No.1-A without any justification whatsoever and that they have acted for him on his instructions. Casting aspersions of this kind on integrity of an advocate so as to interfere with due course of justice is held to be contempt of Court. The present case prima facie appears to fall in this category. I, therefore, direct the Prothonotary and Senior Master to issue a suo motu notice to respondent No. 1-A to show cause as to why he should not be held guilty for casting aspersion on M/s. B. Amin Co. that they acted in this matter without their instructions or their authority. The said notice shall be issued to respondent No. 1-A as respondent No. 1-A appears to be the individual concerned. 25. Before I discuss the relevant statutory provisions and case law having bearing on the subject, certain well established principles of law shall have to be re-stated as a matter of convenience. (1) The law of contempt is of fundamental importance in our legal system. In (Morris v. The Crown Office)1, 1970(1) All.E.R. 1079 (at 1081), Lord Denning observed : "The course of justice must not be deflected or interfered with. Those who strike at it strike at the very foundations of our society". (2) The offence of contempt consists in interfering with the administration of law in impeding and preventing the course of justice, observed Lord President Clyde in the well-known Scottish case of (Johson v. Grant)2, 1923 S.C. 789 (at 790) duly extracted in the well known Phillmore Committee Report on Contempt of Court (please see Appendix X to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 by Jagdish Swarup and Vinod Swarup). (3) Interference or intermeddling with the possession of Receiver amounts to interference with the administration of justice itself. Parties to the suit as well as strangers are bound to respect the possession of the Receiver. (3) Interference or intermeddling with the possession of Receiver amounts to interference with the administration of justice itself. Parties to the suit as well as strangers are bound to respect the possession of the Receiver. Even a person claiming paramount title cannot enter the premises in possession of the Receiver without leave of the Court which has appointed the Receiver and interfere or intermeddle with the possession. His remedy is to make an application to the Court which has appointed the Receiver for appropriate reliefs. Please also see (Kilachand Devchand Co. v. Ajodhyaprasad Sukhanand)3, 36 Bom.L.R. 992. No one can get into possession of the property which is custodia legis without leave of the Court or without leave of the Receiver. Even filing of a suit against the Receiver without obtaining leave of the court appointing the Receiver amounts to contempt. It has been so held by the Apex Court. (4) When a party to the suit is appointed as the Receiver's agent, possession of the property is still that of the Receiver and the agent is merely permitted to use the property personally under the control and supervision of the Receiver. Such agent is prohibited by law from entering into any agreement with a statement to share the accommodation or to grant leave and licence or to enter into any arrangement of the kind which was entered into by defendant No.2 with respondent No. 1-A in this case. If the stranger concerned is not aware of the property being custodia legis, such stranger may not be punished if he purges the contempt immediately on coming to know that the property is Custodia legis. It is therefore, irrelevant that the agent of the Receiver has not fully and completely parted with possession of the premises and had retained some control over the premises or has stipulated joint user of the premises with the third party. In all such cases, the conduct of the Receiver's agent as well as the third party is blameworthy and it amounts to contempt. No one can be allowed to adopt a strategy or device to get into possession of the property which is custodia legis and change status quo prevailing on the day on which the Court Receiver has taken charge of the property. 26. No one can be allowed to adopt a strategy or device to get into possession of the property which is custodia legis and change status quo prevailing on the day on which the Court Receiver has taken charge of the property. 26. In (Thirumalaiappa v. Kumaraswami)4, A.I.R. 196 Madras, 621, the High Court of Madras approved the statement of law laid down in the English case of (French v. French)5, 1824(1) Hog. 138, and the passages from the classic work of Oswald on Contempt and observed at page 623 as under :- "Advocates who appear for the parties being officers of Court, any abuse or insult or aspersions cast on them, which would interfere with the course of administration of justice, must necessarily be held to amount contempt of Court." These observations were approved by the Division Bench of our High Court in the case of (Damayanti v. Vaney)6, LXVII Bom.L.R. 380. Prima facie, making of flase allegations against an advocate that he appeared for respondent No.1 without any instructions and without any authority and at the instance of another contemner i.e. defendant No. 2 herein amounts to casting aspersions on the integrity of the advocate so as to interfere with the course of justice. If the statement made by respondent No. 1-A against M/s. B. Amin Co. to the above effect is proved to be false, the respondent No. 1-A shall have to face separate suo motu action for contempt in the interest of purity of administration of justice as the Court is duty bound to protect advocates from being harassed and maligned by the suitors particularly when the wrongful act of the contemner interferes with due course of justice. 27. Mr. Sathe, the learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 1-A has submitted that the notice of motion for contempt must specify the particulars of the alleged contempt and in absence of such particulars the notice of motion is bound to fail on this groud alone. Mr. Sathe relied upon the judgment of the court of Appeal in the case of (Chiltern district Council v. Keane)7, 1985(2) All.E.R. 118 and the judgment of Kania, J., in Kilachand Devchand Co. v. Ajodhyaprasad Sukhanand, XXXVI Bom.L.R. 992, in support of his contentions. Mr. Sathe submitted that no proper particulars of the alleged contempt are set out in the notice of motion at least in so far as respondents Nos. v. Ajodhyaprasad Sukhanand, XXXVI Bom.L.R. 992, in support of his contentions. Mr. Sathe submitted that no proper particulars of the alleged contempt are set out in the notice of motion at least in so far as respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A are concerned. Mr. Sathe submitted that it is not stated in the notice of motion that the respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A were aware of the order of this Court appointing the Court Receiver as the receiver of the said premises. Mr. Sathe submitted that it is not stated in the notice of motion as to what was the nature of interference with the possession of the court Receiver which is supposed to have been caused by respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A. Mr. Sathe submitted that it is not stated i n the notice of motion as to what third party right was exactly created by defendant No. 2 in favour of respondent No. 1 during the time when defendant No. 2 was receiver's agent. I am not impressed by these submissions of Mr. Sathe for the following reasons : 28. The object of the abovementioned rule of practice pointed out by Mr. Sathe is to provide fair and reasonable opportunity to the contemner to defend himself on the charge of contempt. This rule of practice is based on principles of natural justice. At no stage the respondent No. 1 or respondent No. 1-A asked for any particulars in respect of the alleged charge of contempt imputed to them. When the Court Receiver is in exclusive possession of the premises and the premises are custodia legis, mere entry into these premises under some agreement or other without anything more amounts to interference and intermeddling with the receiver's possession by the third party. In this case, such interference and intermeddling by the third party with the receiver's possession of the premises was with active assistance of the receiver's agent. What agreement was executed between defendant No. 2 and respondent No. 1 was within the knowledge either of defendant No. 2 or respondent Nos. 1 and 1-A. The respondent No. 1 had put his board on the premises. The respondent No. 1 had brought his furniture in the premises. The respondent No. 1 had engaged his staff to work in the said premises. The respondent No. 1 was exclusively using the telephone in the said premises. 1 and 1-A. The respondent No. 1 had put his board on the premises. The respondent No. 1 had brought his furniture in the premises. The respondent No. 1 had engaged his staff to work in the said premises. The respondent No. 1 was exclusively using the telephone in the said premises. It is hereby clarified that no distinction is being made for the purpose of this contempt motion between the respondent No. 1 and the respondent No. 1-A as the transaction is with respondent No. 1 firm and the individual who actually operated the transaction was respondent No. 1-A. No case so far decided has held that notice of motion must necessarily be dismissed for not furnishing of adequate particulars in the motion even though all such particulars are within the special knowledge of the alleged contemner. In this case, fullest opportunity was given to the parties to adduce oral and documentary evidence and cross-examine the witnesses. In this view of the matter, I have not the slightest hesitation in holding that the particulars set out in the notice of motion for contempt are sufficient to meet the charge of contempt. In alternative I hold that the contemners have not suffered any prejudice even if particulars set out in the notice of motion for contempt are inadequate. Thus I see no merit in this technical contention urged by Mr. Sathe on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A. After all, every case has to be decided on its own facts and no hard and fast rule has been laid down in either of the two cases cited by Mr. Sathe as to what particulars should be considered as sufficient in a given case. 29. On merits of the allegations against the respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A, Mr. Sathe, the learned Counsel for the said respondents, submitted as under :- (1) There was no board of the Receiver on the said premises at the time when respondent No. 1 started using the same the agreement dated 21st April, 1989. (2) Notice of motion for contempt was served on respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A only on 21st January, 1991. Whatever knowledge of contempt proceedings or orders of this Court the respondents had prior to 21st January, 1991 will have to be thus ignored. (3) Letter dated 19th November, 1990 from Respondent No. 1 to M/s. B. Amin co. (2) Notice of motion for contempt was served on respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A only on 21st January, 1991. Whatever knowledge of contempt proceedings or orders of this Court the respondents had prior to 21st January, 1991 will have to be thus ignored. (3) Letter dated 19th November, 1990 from Respondent No. 1 to M/s. B. Amin co. showed that respondent No. 1 had not appointed M/s. B. Amin Co. as their advocates. By this letter, respondent No. 1 had asked M/s. B. Amin Co. to get in touch with their advocate at Bombay." (4) Agreement dated 21st April, 1989 represented the truth and was in fact acted upon. The defendant No. 2's case to the contrary was false. (5) The respondent No. 1-A did not write in any of the letters that he had not engaged M/s. B. Amin Co. or that the affidavit in reply was prepared by M/s. B. Amin Co. without his authority or instructions because he was interested in obtaining refund of security deposit of Rs. 1 lac from defendant No. 2 and he could not afford to displease M/s. B. Amin Co. Whose good offices he wanted to utilise for obtaining the said refund. (6) Mr. Amin was agent of defendant No. 2. Respondent No. 1-A saw no difference between Mr. Niranjan Amin and defendant No. 2. (7) Mr. Amin should have stepped into the witness box. (8) The report of the Court Receiver's representative dated 28th June, 1989 supported the inference of respondent No. 1-A that the Court Receiver's board must have been removed from the said premises by the interested party at the material times. (9) If the Court held that respondent No. 1-A was guilty of contempt, he could be reprimanded and the case was not a fit one for substantial punishment. 30. In respect of the abovereferred contentions of Mr. Sathe, I hold as under :- (a) The Court Receiver had placed his board on the said premises. The respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A had knowledge of the fact that the Court Receiver was in possession of the said premises before they started using the premises. In any event, immediately after starting use of the said premises, respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A came to know of the fact of the Court Receiver being in charge of the said premises, as admittedly by respondent No. 1-A in his own evidence. In any event, immediately after starting use of the said premises, respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A came to know of the fact of the Court Receiver being in charge of the said premises, as admittedly by respondent No. 1-A in his own evidence. Still, the said respondents continued to use the said premises. (b) Knowledge of the respondents Nos. 1 and 1-a in respect of the relevant facts acquired prior to 21st January, 1991 cannot be ignored. (c) Letter dated 19th November, 1990 does not indicate that respondent No. 1 had not engaged M/s. B. Amin Co. The respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A were not the general clients of M/s. B Amin Co. Respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A are factually right that the agreement dated 21st April, 1989 was actually acted upon. This very agreement constitutes act of contempt both on the part of defendant No. 2 as well as on the part of respondent No. 1-A. (d) It was not necessaryfor Mr. Amin to step into the witness box in view of the correspondence on record and in view of totally unsatisfactory evidence of respondent No. 1-A. (e) Report of the Court Receiver's representative dated 28th June, 1989 does not support the inference that the Court Receiver's board was removed prior to 21st April, 1989 by someone and respondent No. 1-A had acted innocently and in good faith. 31. In my judgment, it is sufficiently pointed out in the present notice of motion that the possession of the Court Receiver was interfered with or intermeddled by creation of third party rights by defendant No. 2 in favour of respondent No. 1. It is sufficiently indicated that the third party concerned was respondent No. 1. In my judgment, the alleged defect of insufficiency of particulars in a contempt motion cannot be overstretched and the plea of lack of sufficient particulars is required to be examined by asking the question as to whether the contemner has suffered any prejudice by reason of alleged lack of more particulars or details which could have been perhaps set out in the notice of motion. The respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A were never handicapped in meeting the charge. No grievance was made in this respect except during course of argument. The matter has been fought out valiantly on merits. The respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A were never handicapped in meeting the charge. No grievance was made in this respect except during course of argument. The matter has been fought out valiantly on merits. The respondent No. 1 and 1-A were themselves in possession of all the facts relating to their entry and use of the premises which were custodia legis. Once the propery is custodia legis, mere entry and user of the property by a third party amounts to contempt. The contempt is aggravated if the party interfering or intermeddling with the receiver's possession of the premises had knnowledge of the fact that the property was in charge of the Court Receiver. If the parties who have clearly committed contempt of Court are allowed to escape from the consequences of the offence committed by them on the ground that some more particulars ought to have been set out in the notice of motion in respect of the offence with which they were charged, the very purpose for which this rule of practice was evolved will be defeated. After all, the rule is a rule of natural jutice and the object of the rule is that the contemner must be able to defend himself. In this case, the rule of practice as well as the principle of natural justice has been complied with. Neither defendant No. 2 nor respondent No. 1-A has suffered any prejudice on the ground of alleged lack of detailed particulars in the notice of motion for contempt. The matter has been heard for several days. Witnesses have been examined and cross-examined. All facilities for inspection of documents etc., have been granted. The so-called preliminary objection to the maintainability of the motion for lack of particulars is without any merit. 32. Several authorities were cited by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 having bearing on the law of apology. It is not necessary to deal with any of these cases as no sincere unconditional apology showing genuine repentance was even offered. The conduct of the contemner amounts to gross contempt and interference with authority of law is intentional, deliberate and substantial. 33. It has then been argued that the definition of the word "contempt" itself requires that the disobedinece should be wilful. The conduct of the contemner amounts to gross contempt and interference with authority of law is intentional, deliberate and substantial. 33. It has then been argued that the definition of the word "contempt" itself requires that the disobedinece should be wilful. It is argued that the defendant No. 2 was a vitim of financial difficulties at the time when the agreement dated 21st April, 1989 was entered into. It has been submitted that there was no mens rea on the part of defendant No. 2. The defendant No. 2 knew that the Court Receiver was in charge of the property. A person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act. I have no hesitation in holding that whatever was done was wilful, intentional and deliberate. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel Mr. Sequeira and Mr. Sathe on section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It was submitted by the learned Counsel that the Court ought not to impose any punishment unless the interference by the contemners with the due coure of justice was substantial. It was pointed out by Mr. Sequeira that the lapse, if any, was rectified very soon and this is not a case where the alleged wrong has a tendency to substantially interfere with the due course of justice. I have no hesitation in rejecting this submission. Litigants in this State and elsewhere must know that they are obliged to follow the law of the land and they cannot interfere with the due course of justice with immunity. 34. In (Balramsingh v. Bhikam Chand)8, A.I.R. 1985 Supreme Court, 1726, it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it would be travesty of justice if the Court allowed gross contempt of Court to go unpunished without an adequate sentence. There are no extenuating circumstances. False pleas of justification have aggravated the contempt. 34-A. I am strongly of the view, subject to holding or further enquiry, that the defendant No. 2 and respondent No. 1-A have made false statements on oath in their respective affidavits as listed in the Schedule annexed to this judment and have also made false statements in their oral depositions at the trial of Notice of Motion No. 1205 of 1989 in Suit No. 1191 of 1988 with the knowledge that the said statement were false or, in any event without believing the same to be true. It appears that the said statements were made intentionally, deliberately and consciously in order to mislead the Court on material points or on matters of substance concerning disposal of this notice of motion. Respondent No.1 made some of these false statements on oath in order to cast aspersions on the intergrity of Advocates M/s. B. Amin Co. so as to cause interference with the due course of justice as more particularly discussed elsewhere in this judgment. The Court is thus strongly of the view, subject to holding further enquiry, that both defendant No. 2 and respondent No. 1-A committed offence punishable under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code by giving false evidence. The Court in prima facie of the opinion that there are sufficient and reasonable grounds for setting the machinery of criminal law in motion and for initiating proceedings for sanction of prosecution for perjury aginst defendant No. 2 and respondent No. 1-A. Accordingly it is decided to issue a show cause notice in this behalf following the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in its judgment in (Dr. S.P. Kohli v. The High Court of Punjab Haryana)9, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1753. 35. In the result, I hold as under :- (1) Defendant No. 2 Philip Lobo is held guilty of contempt of the Court as he has wilfully, deliberately and substantially interfered with the possession of the premises which were custodia legis by allowing respondent No. 1-A, Mr. Ramesh Ahuja of M/s. Vishal Surgical Equipment Co., to enter upon the abovereferred premises and intermeddle with the same, create third party rights in their favour and accept large amounts in consideration thereof as security deposit. Defendant No. 2 Mr. Philip Lobo is sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period of three months and is also directed to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. In default of payment of fine, the defendant No. 2 shall undergo further imprisonment for a period of one month. The defendant No. 2 shall also pay cost of this notice of motion fixed at Rs. 1,500/- to the plaintiff. (2) Respondent No. 1-A, Mr. Ramesh Ahuja, is held guilty of contempt of the Court for having intentionally, deliberately and substantially intermeddled with the possession fo the aboverefered premises which were custodia legis with full knowledge that Court Receiver was in charge thereof. 1,500/- to the plaintiff. (2) Respondent No. 1-A, Mr. Ramesh Ahuja, is held guilty of contempt of the Court for having intentionally, deliberately and substantially intermeddled with the possession fo the aboverefered premises which were custodia legis with full knowledge that Court Receiver was in charge thereof. Respondent No. 1-A is also sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. In default of the payment of fine, respondent No. 1-A shall undergo further imprisonment for a period of one month. Respondent No. 1-A is also directed to pay cost of this notice of moition fixed at Rs. 1,500/- to the plaintiff. (3) Suo motu notice for contempt will be issued by the Prothonotary and Senior Master forthwith to Mr. Ramesh Ahuja, respondent No. 1-A, returnable on 9th September, 1991, calling upon respondent No. 1-A to show cause as to why he should not be punished for casting false asperisons on Mr. Niranjan Amin of M/s. B. Amin Co., to the effect that the said firm of advocates was acting in this matter without authority or instructions of respondent Nos. 1 and 1-A and by falsely disowning his authority, even though he had instructed him to act for respondents Nos. 1 and 1-A in this matter as their advocate. It is clarified that this is only a tentative prima facie view on this aspect of the matter. (4) The Prothonotary Senior Master shall issue a show cause notice to defendant No. 2, Mr. Philip Lobo, and Mr. Ramesh Ahuja, respondent No. 1-A, calling upon them as to why they should not be prosecuted for perjury in respect of the false statements listed in the Schedule hereto. The said notice shall be returnable on 9th September, 1991. It appears that the defendant No. 2 and respondent No. 1-A made the said false statement wilfully and intentionally and with the knowledge that the same were false and the above action is necessary and expedient to eradicate the rampant and growing evil of perjury. (5) No cost are being awarded to M/s. B. Amin and Co. 36. While I was dictating this judgment and the order of sentence on defendant No. 2, the learned Counsel for defendant No. 2 intervened and stated that defendant No. 2 shall tender an unconditional apology. Apology lacks sincerity and is totally belated. (5) No cost are being awarded to M/s. B. Amin and Co. 36. While I was dictating this judgment and the order of sentence on defendant No. 2, the learned Counsel for defendant No. 2 intervened and stated that defendant No. 2 shall tender an unconditional apology. Apology lacks sincerity and is totally belated. The defendant No. 2 has raised several false defences in his affidavits and added some false defences in his oral evidence. I have thus no hesitation in rejecting the request of learned Counsel for defendant No. 2 to accept an apology. In my opinion, it is a gross case of contempt. 37. I must give a chance to the contemners to file an appeal against my order and apply for stay of this order from the appeal Court, if the appeal Court is so persuaded. Accordingly, the order of imprisonment passed by me on defendant No. 2 and respondent No. 1-A is stayed till 9th of September, 1991 on their complying with the following conditions :- (1) The defendant No. 2 and respondent No. 1-A shall file a written undertaking in this Court on or before 13th August, 1991 to the effect that in the event of their being not able to get stay from the appeal Court by 9th September, 1991, they will surrender to the Sheriff of Bombay on 10th September, 1991 before 5 p.m. As far as the fine imposed is concerned, no stay is granted. (2) In the event of the contemners i.e. the defendant No. 2 and respondent No. 1-A not paying the amount on fine of or before 13th August, 1991, the stay of this order shall not operate. 38. I am thankful to all the learned Counsel appearing in this case for their valuable assistance and particularly to the learned Counsel who have appeared as amicus curiae. 39. Ad-interim order dated 17th May, 1989 passed by Variava, J., is confirmed. 40. Notice of Motion is disposed of in terms aforesaid. 41. Issue notice to the Government Pleader, High Court, Original Side, Bombay, in respect of hearing of suo motu contempt notice and perjury notices. 42. Issue of certified copy expedited. Order accordingly. -----