JUDGMENT - DESAI A.A., J.:---The Executing Court by order dated 27-6-1990 upheld the objection at the instance of judgment debtor tenant to the executivity of a decree dated 16-12-1981 for recovery of possession of an open plot, being barred under Clause 13-A, since the permission to terminate the tenancy as necessitated by subsequent amendment of 1989 was not obtained in accordance with the provisions under Clause 13(1) of the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Premises and Rent Control Order, 1949 ("the Order"). The landlord decree-holder in this revision has questioned the legality of the order. The events leading to the controversy are as thus :-- 2. On 26-7-1949 the order has come into operation. It was initially titled as "the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949". The order amongst others renders protection to the tenant of houses from being evicted. Clause 13(1) prohibits the landlord to terminate tenancy or require a tenant to vacate the premises unless necessary prior permission is obtained from the Rent Controller. By notification dated 15-2-1952 issued under Clause 30 of the Order the Provincial Government was pleased to exempt from the operation of the order those houses constructed on a site lying vacant on 1-1-1951 or on a site made vacant on or after the date of demolition of any structure on such site. The term "house" as defined under Clause 2(3) then did not include within its scope any open plot not being used for agricultural purposes and licensed premises. 3. This Court by a decision in (Prabhakar Rokade v. State of Maharashtra)1, reported in 1985 Mh.L.J. 548, declared notification dated 15-2-1952 issued under Clause 30 as null and void being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. However, the Court has clarified that this declaration shall not affect any decree which has become final and landlord has already taken the possession in pursuance thereof. 4. By an amendment notified on 27-6-1989 (first amendment) the term "houses" as appearing in the provisions of the Order came to be deleted by substituting the term "premises" thereof. This amendment has deleted Clause 2(3) which defines the term "houses". By incorporating Clause 4-A, it defines the term "premises". Open plot not being used for agricultural purposes and also licensed premises have now been included within the term "premises" for the purposes of the order. This amendment has deleted Clause 2(3) which defines the term "houses". By incorporating Clause 4-A, it defines the term "premises". Open plot not being used for agricultural purposes and also licensed premises have now been included within the term "premises" for the purposes of the order. It has thereby necessitated for a landlord of such open plot and licensed premises to obtain permission under Clause 13(1) of the order to terminate tenancy. 5. By subsequent amendment notified on 26-10-1989 (second amendment), Clause 13-A came to be incorporated in the order. It reads as thus :- "No decree for eviction shall be passed in a suit or proceeding filed and pending against the tenant in any Court or before any Authority unless the landlord produces a written permission of the Controller as required by sub-clause (1) of Clause 13." (emphasis supplied). 6. Mr. Ingle, the learned Counsel appearing for the judgment-debtor made a submission that as a legal principle the Rent Control Legislations being beneficial to the tenants, needs a liberal interpretation, so as to extend benefit to them. Contention, therefore, is that the term "proceedings" under Clause 13-A takes within its ambit also the proceedings for execution. Decree for eviction even if passed earlier to the first Amendment cannot be satisfied in the execution proceedings in absence of a requisite permission. 7. In support, reliance is placed on a decision reported in (H. Shiva Rao v. Cecilia Pereira)2, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 248, wherein the Supreme Court has examined the effect of the provisions in section 21(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act of 1961, which reads thus:- "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or other authority in favour of the landlord against the tenant." The Supreme Court in para 4 has observed:- "While ordinarily substantive rights should not be held to be taken away except by express provision, or clear implication in the case of Rent Control Act, it being a beneficial legislation the provision which confers immunity to the tenant against eviction by the landlord though prospective in form operates to take away the right vested in the landlord by a decree of a Court which has become final, unless there is express provision or clear implication to the contrary .” (emphasis supplied). 8. 8. A bare look to the provision under section 21(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act and Clause 13-A of the Order as reproduced, would testify that they are not pari materia muchless similar in their object and purport. Section 21(1) which opens with non obstante clause, takes within its sweep passing of decree and even an order for recovery of possession. Section 21(1) thus embraces within its fold, proceeding of execution, whereas under Clause 13-A of the order what is prohibited is passing of a decree for eviction only. However, Clause 13-A does not prevent passing of an order in pursuance of such decree. The legislature has declared its intention under Clause 13-A to the contrary to the normal legal principle, as enunciated by the Supreme Court in case of H. Shivarao (cited supra). 9. Besides this the phraseology "no decree for eviction shall be passed in a suit or proceedings" as engaged in Clause 13-A is of definite connotation. The same is not susceptible to any liberal interpretation. The phraseology confines only to those proceedings wherein decree for eviction could be passed. Such proceedings could only be a suit and further appeal or revision arising out of such suit. It does not permit any stretching so as to include anything else. Undisputedly, there could not be passing of a decree in a proceeding of execution. Execution being a post decree proceeding is totally outside the purview of the phraseology. 10. The Supreme Court in a decision reported in (Nathia Agarwalla v. Jahanara Begum)3, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 92, considered the effect of section 5(1) of the Assam Non-agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955, whereunder the landlord has been prohibited from evicting the tenant, excepting on the condition laid down therein. Section is reproduced in para 3 of the report. In para 9, the Supreme Court has observed that: "Clause (a) of the said provisions applied alike to contracts made before or after the commencement of the Act. Section is reproduced in para 3 of the report. In para 9, the Supreme Court has observed that: "Clause (a) of the said provisions applied alike to contracts made before or after the commencement of the Act. This creates some doubt, but as it intends to operate on the rights of the landlord seeking to enforce them against a tenant who claimed that he cannot be evicted, the clause must again contemplate a suit and not execution proceedings." In another decision reported in (Kanai Lal v. Paramnidhi)4, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 957, the Supreme Court considered the effect of section 5(1) of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act of 1949, which is reproduced in para 3 of the report. These provisions require a landlord for eviction a Thika tenant to apply in a prescribed manner to the Controller for an order in that behalf. The Supreme Court in para 7 observed that, "It is quite plain that when a decree-holder seeks to obtain possession of his property in execution of a decree, he cannot be said to obtain such possession on any of the grounds mentioned in section 3. All that he does is to rely upon a decree passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction and to insist upon its execution. Similarly, the proceedings contemplated by section 5(1) cannot, in our opinion, be said to include execution proceedings of this type." 11. Mr. Ingle, the learned Counsel then made a submission that the decree for eviction dated 16-12-1981 though final has now incurred invalidity since not preceded with the necessary permission as now required by first amendment. The decree being nullity is not executable for recovery of possession in view of the rule laid down by this Court in case of Prabhakar (cited supra). Rule laid down in case of Prabhakar (cited supra) has an application to the situation similarly circumstanced as prevailing prior to incorporation of Clause 13-A in the Order. The Rule cannot be extended to the situation as created owing to the first amendment. 12. As a consequence of the first amendment a licensed premises and the open plot not being used for agricultural purposes have now been brought under the control of order. The Rule cannot be extended to the situation as created owing to the first amendment. 12. As a consequence of the first amendment a licensed premises and the open plot not being used for agricultural purposes have now been brought under the control of order. Now, for the landlord of such premises, it has become obligatory to obtain prior permission from the Rent Controller to terminate the tenancy or to require a tenant to vacate the premises under Clause 13-(1) of the Order. As a result of first amendment, decrees passed and suit pending in respect of such premises without there being a necessary prior permission, may suffer from legal infirmity and would entail civil consequences. 12-A. To deal with this situation, Clause 13-A came to be incorporated in the order. This clause renders protection to decrees of eviction which have already been passed from being suffered from the legal consequences of the first amendment. It also renders safeguard to the proceedings for passing a decree of eviction which are already filed and pending, from being untenable. However, it introduces an embargo that in such pending proceedings decree for eviction against a tenant shall not be passed until the landlord furnishes the permission as required under Clause 13(1) of the Order. As a result of an incorporation of Clause 13-A, the permission which was condition precedent as per Clause 13(1) for termination of tenancy for eviction or requiring a tenant to vacate under sub-clause (b), has now become for such pending proceedings, a condition precedent to passing of a decree for eviction. 13. Legislative intention in incorporating Clause 13-A, is definitely not to render the decrees of eviction as passed earlier into nullity so as to make them unenforceable. The object of Clause 13-A, according to me, is to defer the passing of decree for eviction in pending proceedings till the production of a necessary permission of the Rent Controller. However, it does not prevent execution of a decree for eviction if obtained earlier. 14. Reliance of the learned Counsel on a decision dated 7-2-1991 of this Court (Chavan, J.) delivered in Second Appeals Nos. 148 and 149 of 1977 is completely misplaced. This Court set aside a decree for eviction which was passed without there being a prior permission from the Rent Controller and was sub-judiced before this Court in the proceedings under second appeal. 15. Mr. 148 and 149 of 1977 is completely misplaced. This Court set aside a decree for eviction which was passed without there being a prior permission from the Rent Controller and was sub-judiced before this Court in the proceedings under second appeal. 15. Mr. Ingle lastly and faintly urged that the landlord is not entitled to recover possession since he ceased to be an owner owing to vesting of the premises in the State Government in pursuance of acquisition under the Urban Ceiling Act. According to the learned Counsel, the Government has now allotted the suit premises in favour of the judgement-debtor, who is in possession being an owner. However, the learned Counsel failed to substantiate the ground. The executing Court also made a very saual reference to this aspect in the impunged order wihour there being any particular. 16. In view of my judgment, the objection cannot be sustained and the impugned order of the Executing Court is liable to be set aside. 17. In the result, the revision is allowed. Impugned order is set aside and the objection is dismissed. The Executing Court is directed to proceed for recovery of possession in accordance with law. No order as to costs. Revision allowed. -----