K. RAMACHANDRIAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS 5-Year old Revision Petition filed under Section 115, C. P. C. arises out of an eviction petition filed by one Dr. A. S. Rashid Ahmed of Mangalore nearly 20 years back in H. R. C. No. 17/1971 in the Court of the Munsiff, Karkala (for short 'the munsiff or 'the trial Court') against the respondents seeking their eviction under clause (h) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Karaataka Rent control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act') from eviction petition schedule house-cum-landed property situate near the Munsiffs Court, Karkala and described in the eviction petition Schedule 'a' as "tiled storeyed house (Bearing door No. 539/ward II of Karkala Town Panchayat) including well, yards and other appurtenances, situate near the Munsiffs Court, Karkala Kasba of Karkala Taluk (tor short 'the premises' ). " The litigation initiated by filing the said eviction petition has had a chequered career during the past 20 years. Original petitioner-landlord having died during the pendency of this Revision Petition, his widow and children are brought on record as his legal representatives and they have prosecuted this revision Petition which is described by their learned counsel Sri B. P. Holla as "heart burning case" as, according to him, the original landlord and subsequently his Legal Representatives are prevented from using a spacious house which he repeatedly described as a palatial building consisting of ground floor and a first floor covering a total plinth area of 56. 44 sqs. and land appurtenant to the house situate in the heart of Karkala Town and they are not even paid the rent of that valuable property although it is a paltry sum of Rs. 100 and odd for the lands and Rs. 25/- for the building. He has raised in the course of his elaborate and painstaking arguments certain points to which reference will be made shortly. 100 and odd for the lands and Rs. 25/- for the building. He has raised in the course of his elaborate and painstaking arguments certain points to which reference will be made shortly. ( 2 ) THE original landlord claimed eviction of the respondents from the premises by contending in bis eviction petition dated 2-8-1971 that the premises were obtained on monthly lease by late K. Ganapathy Kamath-husband of 4th respondent and father of the other respondents from his mother Tahirabi for the purpose of his residence under a registered partition deed dated 23-1-1945, the premises and some other property were allotted to the share of the petitioner and the lessee K. Ganapathy Kamath attorned the petitioner as his landlord and continued in occupation of the premises on monthly lease under the petitioner till his death. After the death of K. Ganapathy Kamath, the respondents as his heirs have continued in occupation of the premises agreeing to pay a rent of Rs. 25/- per month at the end of every calendar month. Petitioner was living with his wife and children in a rented house at Mangalore and his landlord has been pressing him to vacate the house in his occupation since some years. Therefore, the petitioner requested the respondents to vacate the premises and also issued a lawyer's notice dated 31-12-1970 terminating their tenancy and calling them to quit and surrender vacant possession of the premises to him on 31-1-1971 by informing them in that notice that he had no other house at Mangalore or Karkala and he desires to settle down at Karkala with his family as the premises is the only house belonging to him and it is suitable for his residence and, therefore, he was in reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises for his own use and occupation. Although the said notice is served on the respondents, they have not vacated the premises and instead they have sent a frivolous reply contending that the lease is an agricultural tenancy and, therefore, he was obliged to file the eviction petition. ( 3 ) RESPONDENTS resisted the eviction petition by contending in their objection statement filed by the first respondent in his individual capacity and also as General power of Attorney Holder of the other respondents that the property leased to late k. Ganapathy Kamath was not only the house but also the agricultural lands bearing sy. ( 3 ) RESPONDENTS resisted the eviction petition by contending in their objection statement filed by the first respondent in his individual capacity and also as General power of Attorney Holder of the other respondents that the property leased to late k. Ganapathy Kamath was not only the house but also the agricultural lands bearing sy. No. 89/2,6 and 7 of Karkala kasba village consisting of paddy Fields, garden and house on term of lease for three years from 15-5-1931 under an agreement of lease dated 8-4-1931 and subsequently on an yearly rent of Rs. 250/- and subsequently under another lease deed dated 17-3-1935 at reduced rent of Rs. 150/- per year which he was paying and obtaining receipts from Tahirabi, After the death of tahirabi, petilioners's father himself took a "chalgeni" lease from K. Ganapathy kamath on 20-2-1950 in respect of same property for an yearly rent of Rs. 180/- and he was paying the same under receipt issued by the petitioners' father. Therefore, the leased premises constituted an agricultural lease and not the lease of a house on an yearly rent of Rs, 25/- as alleged in the petition. They further alleged that after the death of K. Ganapathy Kamath, petitioners raised the rent to Rs. 200/- and later to rs, 300/- per year which the first respondent was paying regularly and obtaining receipts from the petitioner. They also pleaded that the petitioners alleged requirement of the premises for his own use and occupation was neither reasonable for bona fide and, therefore, he was net entitled to the reliefs he had sought against them in the petition. He also raised the plea of jurisdiction by contending that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to deal with an agricultural lease as it was governed under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. ( 4 ) AT the trial, both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence 7 documents were tendered in evidence on the side of the petitioner and 41 documents on the side of the respondents marked as Exs. P. 1 to P. 7 and D. 1 to D. 41 respectively. ( 4 ) AT the trial, both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence 7 documents were tendered in evidence on the side of the petitioner and 41 documents on the side of the respondents marked as Exs. P. 1 to P. 7 and D. 1 to D. 41 respectively. ( 5 ) ON a consideration of the said oral and documentary evidence, the learned Principal Munsiff by order dated 11-10-1975 held that the lease of the premises was an agricultural lease and not a building lease and, therefore, the respondents are protected under the Land Reforms Act. However, he accepted the case of the petitioner that he was in reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises for his own use and occupation. But, he eventually dismissed the eviction petition on the ground of want of jurisdiction for the Civil Court to pass an eviction order against the respondents under the Act. Therefore, the landlord filed a Revision petition in the District Court, D. K,, Mangalore in C. R. P. No. 89/1975 which was dismissed by the District Judge by affirming the finding of the trial Court on the point of jurisdiction although he concurred with the other findings of the trial Court on the question of reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises by the father of the petitioners. Therefore, the landlord filed C. R. P. No, 159/1981 in this court. Petitioner also filed I. A. II under Order 29, Rule 9 and Section 151, C. P. C. In the said petition, it prayed that this Court may be pleased to appoint a commissioner and direct him to inspect the property and to submit his report regarding the actual measurements of the building as well as the other lands covered under the lease. By order dated 11-2-1985, this Court allowed I. A. II and also the revision petition, set aside the order of the learned District Judge in C. R. P. No. 89/1975 and remitted back the matter to the learned District Judge with a direction to appoint a commissioner for the purpose of recording a clear finding with regard to the situation of the residential building as well as the extent and nature of the land as it exists presently. Pursuant to the said order and direction of this Court, the learned district Judge appointed a local Advocate as Commissioner for the above mentioned purpose. Pursuant to the said order and direction of this Court, the learned district Judge appointed a local Advocate as Commissioner for the above mentioned purpose. The said Commissioner inspected the premises and submitted three sketches with his report dated 12-8-1985 followed by another report dated 3-10-1985 in view of certain objections raised to his original report by both the parties. On a consideration of the particulars furnished by the said Commissioner in his two reports and the sketches and also other oral and documentary evidence, the learned District Judge has again dismissed the Revision Petition by his order dated 9-1-1986 holding that the lease of the premises was an agricultural lease including house and land appurtenant to it and, therefore, the eviction petition filed under the act was not maintainable and further holding that the petitioner was not in reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises for his own use and occupation at his wife Sabira Banu, who was living with him, hud acquired vacant possession of a house of her own situate in Udupi) for the use and occupation of her husband (petitioner) and children. He also held that the question of comparative hardship was more in favour of the respondents-tenants that in favour of the landlord. It is against the said order that the present Revision Pelition is filed by the original petitioner and now prosecuted by his Legal Representatives. ( 6 ) THIS Revision Petition was once dismissed on the ground that a second Revision Petition under Section 115, C. P. C does not lie in view of the Full Bench ruling of this Court in Yeragatti v Vasanth, 1lr 1987 (2) Karnataka 1286. In view of that order, the petitioner had filed W. P. No. 8650/1987 against the very order of the learned District Judge impugned in this revision petition. In view of the subsequent ruling of the Supreme Court in Shyamaraja Hegde v Venkatesha Bhat, ILR 1987 (4) kar. 3244 holding that a Second Revision Petition under Section 115, C. P. C. is maintainable, this Revision Petition is revived for consideration. That is how this revision Petition has become 5- year old. ( 7 ) THE points which arise for determination in this Revision Petition in the light of the arguments submitted by Sri B. P. Holla, learned counsel for the L. Rs. That is how this revision Petition has become 5- year old. ( 7 ) THE points which arise for determination in this Revision Petition in the light of the arguments submitted by Sri B. P. Holla, learned counsel for the L. Rs. of deceased petitioner and Sri B. V. Acharya, learned Senior Counsel for respondents-1 and 2, may be formulated as under:1. What is the scope of a Second Revision filed under Section 115, C. P. C. in respect of eviction proceedings under the Act?2. Whether the lease of the premises constituted "agricultural lease" under ihc Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 or lease of a "building" or "premises" as defined in Section 3 (a) and 3 (n) respectively of the Act?3. Whether the case put forward by the deceased petitioner that he was in reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises for his use and occupation of himself and his family members under clause (h) of Section 21 of the Act still subsists?4. Whether the Courts below have erred in not making an order of partial eviction against the respondents as contemplated under Section 21 (4) sub-paragraph (2) of the Act?point No. (1) ( 8 ) SRI B. V. Acharya, argued that the scope of this Revision Petition filed under Section 115, C. P. C. against the concurrent orders of the trial Court and the First revisional Court is very much limited. In support of that argument, he placed strong reliance on three decisions of the Supreme Court in Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed v haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai, AIR 1964 SC 1341 ; Dattopant Gopairao Devakate v vithalrao Marutirao, Al R 1975 SC 1111; and M/s. Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and Others v Rangaswanty Chettiar, AIR 1980 SC 1253 in all of which the scope of a revision filed under Section 115, C. P. C. in respect of proceedings under the Rent acts enacted by different Stales arc considered. ( 9 ) IT is observed by a 3 -. ( 9 ) IT is observed by a 3 -. ludge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Vora Abbasbhai Alimahometl, AIR 1964 SC 1341 (vide Head Note al page 1342) with reference to a second Revision filed under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging house Rales Control Act, 1947 thus:"the power of the High Court under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code is not thereby excluded, but the exercise of that power is by the terms of the statute investing it severely restricted. The High Court may exercise its powers in revision only if it appears that in a case decided by a Subordinate Court in which no appeal lies thereto the Subordinate Court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or has acted or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. If the trial Court had jurisdiction to decide a question before it and did decide it, whether it decided it rightly or wrongly, the Court had jurisdiction to decide the case, and even if it decided the question wrongly, it did not exercise its jurfsdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The decision of the District court that the tenant established or failed to establish his readiness and willingness to pay the standard rent does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court conferred by law upon it and by wrongly deciding that a tenant is or is not entitled to protection, the Court does not assume to itself jurisdiction which is not vested in it by law or refuses to exercise a jurisdiction which is vested in it by law. Nor does the Court by arriving at an erroneous conclusion on the plea of the tenant as to his readiness and willingness acts, illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The High Court would be in error in setting aside the decree of the District Court in exercise of the powers in revision under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure". ( 10 ) IN the case of Dattopant Gopalrao Devakate, AIR 1975 SC 1111 , scope of revisional powers under Section 115, C. P. C. with reference to Mysore Rent Control act, 1961 are considered and it is held in paragraph-5 at pages 1112 and 1113 as under:". . . . ( 10 ) IN the case of Dattopant Gopalrao Devakate, AIR 1975 SC 1111 , scope of revisional powers under Section 115, C. P. C. with reference to Mysore Rent Control act, 1961 are considered and it is held in paragraph-5 at pages 1112 and 1113 as under:". . . . A view in favour of the tenant was taken by the trial Court but against him by the Appellate Court. The findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Court were not found to be such by the High Court as to justify the exercise of its revisional power under Section 50 of the Act. It is true that the power conferred on the High Court under Section 50 is not as narrow as the revisional power of the High Court under Scclion 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But at the same time it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second Court of first appeal. We do not think that there are such pressing grounds in this case which would justify our upsetting the views of the High Court confirming those of the lower Appellate Court. . . . . . . " (emphasis supplied) the same view is reiterated again in the case of M/s. Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyety works, AIR 1980 SC 1253 with reference to Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which in parimateria corresponds to Section SO of the Act. In paragraph-3 at pages 1254 and 1255, it is observed as under:". . . . . The language of Section 25 is indeed very wide. But we must attach some significance to the circumstance that both the expressions 'appeal' and 'revision' are employed in the statute. Quite obviously, the expression 'revision' is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression 'appeal'. In fact, it has to be noticed that under Section 25, the High court calls for and examines the record of the appellate authority in order to satisfy itself. Quite obviously, the expression 'revision' is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression 'appeal'. In fact, it has to be noticed that under Section 25, the High court calls for and examines the record of the appellate authority in order to satisfy itself. The dominant idea conveyed by the incorporation of the words to satisfy 'itself under Section 25 appears to be that the power conferred on the high Court under Section 25 is essentially a power of superintendence therefore, despite the wide language employed in Section 25, the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority. The power conferred on the High Court under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent control) Act may not be as narrow as the rcvisional power of ihe High Court under Section 115 of ihe Code of Civil Procedure but in the words of Untawalia, j. in Dattopant Gopalrao's case, AIR 1975 SC 1111 "it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second Court of first appeal". ( 11 ) BUT, Sri B. P. Holla tried to distinguish the observations made in the above mentioned decisions by contending that the decision of the Supreme Court in dattopant Gopalrao's case is overruled by the 7-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanpal Chettiar v Yesodai Animal, AIR 1979 SC 1745 and further contended that this is a case of total lack of jurisdiction inasmuch as the learned Munsiff and the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to record any finding on the question of reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises by ihe petitioner in view of their finding on the vital point that the premises was an agricultural lease falling within the ambit of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, and not under the Act. I propose to refer to this aspect of the argument of Sri B. P. Holla later. I propose to refer to this aspect of the argument of Sri B. P. Holla later. Suffice it to say for the present that the decision of the Supreme Court in Dattpant Gopalrao devakate, AIR 1975 SC 1111 is overruled by the Supreme Court in V. Dhanpal chettiar's case with reference to the necessity to issue a quit notice against the tenant under any State Rent Control Act as required under Section 106 of the T. P. Act and not in respect of the observations made regarding the scope of the revisional powers under Section 115, C. P. C. and, as a matter of fact, the view of the Supreme Court on that point in Dattopant Gopalrao Devakate's case is reaffirmed by the Supreme court in the case of M/s. Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Work's, case by observing that the revisional powers conferred under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 may nol be as narrow as the revisional powers of the high Court under Section 115, C. P. C. but in the words of Unlwalia, J. in Dattopant gopalrao's case "it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second Court of first appeal", as pointed out by Sri B. V, Acharya. ( 12 ) IN the course of reply, Sri B. P. Holla placed reliance on an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Chaube Jagdish Prasad and Another v Ganga Prasad chatwvedi, AIR 1959 SC 492 in which the scope of Revisional Powers under Section 115, C. P. C. is considered at some length in paragraph-19. Material portions of the observations made in paragraph-19 are stated in Head note (b) of the said decision thus:"section 115, Civil Procedure Code, empowers the High Court, in cases where no appeal lies, to salisfy itself on three matters: (a) that the order made by the subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the Court ought to exercise its jurisdiction; (c) lhat in exercising ihe jurisdiction the Court has nol acted illegally, lhat is, in breach of some provision of law or with material irregularity that is by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. Therefore, if an erroneous decision of a subordinate Court resulted in its exercising jurisdiction nol vested in it by law or failing to exercise the jurisdiction so vested or acting with material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of itsjurisdiclion the case for the exercise of powers of revision by the high Court is made out. If a subordinate Court has jurisdiclion to make the order it made and has not acted in breach of any provision of law or committed any error of procedure which is material and may have affecled the ultimate decision, then the High Court has no power to interfere. But if on the other hand it decides ajurisdiclional fact erroneously and thereby assumes jurisdiction not vested in it or deprives itself of jurisdiction so vested then the power of interference under Section 115, Civil P. C. becomes operative. " ( 13 ) IN this connection, I may also usefully refer to another decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Sushila Devi and Others vavinash Chandra Jain and Others, air 1987 SC 1150 in which it is observed in paragraph-3 at page 1151 thus:". . . . It is necessary to emphasize that unlike Section 115 of the Civil P. C, 1908 where the High Court's power of interference in revision touches jurisdiction, the power of the High Court to interfere in revision under sub-section (8) of section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is much wider in scope and enables the High Court to satisfy itself as to whether the decision rendered by the Rent Controller on the facts in issue is in accordance with law, that is to say, in accordance with the well settled principles", ( 14 ) IT is in the light of the said observations that the scathing attack made by Sri B. P. Holla against the impugned order of the learned District Judge has to be examined. ( 15 ) BEFORE going into consideration of Point No. (2), I consider it appropriate to consider Point No. (3), as this Revision Petition is liable to be dismissed if the finding of the learned District Judge on this point does not call for interference as rightly contended by Sri B. V. Acharya. Point No. (3) ( 16 ) WHILE not disputing that deceased petitioner's wife Mrs. Point No. (3) ( 16 ) WHILE not disputing that deceased petitioner's wife Mrs. Sabira Banu (petitioncr-1 (a) herein) has secured possession of a house in Udupi town during the pendency of eviction proceedings under consideration by filing an eviction petition against her tenant under Section 21 (l) (h) of the Act, Sri B. P. Holla argued that if a wife acquires vacant possession of premises of her own, it does not fulfil the need or requirement of her husband. In support of that argument, he placed reliance on a division Bench decision of this Court in Dr. Syed Sibgathulla v C. M. Abdul Azeez khan, ILR 1982 (1) Karnataka 463 and a decision of the Supreme Court in B. R. Mehta v Smt. Atma Devi and Others, AIR 1987 SC 2220 . ( 17 ) IN Dr. Syed Sibgathttlla's case, a Division Bench of this Court has held that the word "family" does not find a place in Section 21 (l) (h) of the Act. The submission that the meaning given to the word "family" in Section 3 (ff) of the Act has to be imported in order to restrict the meaning of the word "himself used in Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act, though the word "family" is not at all used in clause (h), is bereft of any merit. It is further held in that decision that where on an application made by a landlord under proviso (h) to Section 21 (1) of the Act, which enables the recovery of possession of a premises from the tenant if it is bona fide and reasonably required by the landlord for occupation "by himself an order for recovery can be made if it is made out that the premises is required for the residence of his major son. ( 18 ) IN B. R. Mehta's case, the Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Section 14 (1) (h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 which corresponds to Section 21 (p) of the Act has observed that from the fact that the wife of the tenant who was a Head Mistress, was allotted a temporary Government accommodation, it cannot be said that there was admission regarding possession of alternative accommodation by virtue of which the tenant could lose his tenancy inasmuch as the husband has no right or domain or occupation over the flat allotted to his wife because of her official duties. ( 19 ) THE above mentioned observations made in both the decisions on which strong reliance was placed by Sri B. P. Holla are distinguishable from the facts of the case on hand as this is a ease in which the original petitioner is dead and the eviction proceedings are prosecuted by his wife Sabira Banu and his children. Learned district Judge has adverted lo this aspect in great detail in paragraph-14 of the impugned order. Certified copy of the order of this Court in C. R. P. Nos. 802 and 803 of 1980 was produced before him by the respondents as additional evidence. A perusal of that order would go to show that Sabira Banu had become the owner of 59 cents of land consisting of sufficiently bigger building within Udupi town. She instituted eviction proceedings in respect of that building and the land appurtenant to it in H. R. C. No. 30/1973 by filing an eviction petition before the Principal Munsiff, udupi in 1973 against her tenant and was successful in obtaining an eviction order against her tenant in the District Court. Therefore, her tenant Smt. H. Bhavani Bai filed C. R. P. Nos. 802 and 803/1980 not only against Sabira Banu but also against her another landlord Syed Ruky. This Court has dismissed both the Revision Petitions by a common order dated 9-11-1982. Therefore, her tenant Smt. H. Bhavani Bai filed C. R. P. Nos. 802 and 803/1980 not only against Sabira Banu but also against her another landlord Syed Ruky. This Court has dismissed both the Revision Petitions by a common order dated 9-11-1982. With reference to Sabira Bonn's case, it is observed in paragraph-17 of the order of this Court that Sabira Banu was residing with her husband and their four children, aged about 19, 18, 12 and 8 years respectively in a rented premises at Mangalore Town; that Sabira Banu's husband was a Medical Officer attached to Mangalore Municipality and he was about to retire within about three years on attaining the age of superannuation and she stated in her eviction petition that her husband was also doing some private practice after office hours to supplement his income and it was the wish of her husband and herself to permanently stay at Udupi so that he could also practice privately in medicine and that was the reason why she wanted the premises in the occupation of her tenant. She had also stated in the course of her evidence that she and her husband along with their children would migrate to Udupi and reside there permanently. Taking all the said aspects into consideration, this Court has observed that since Sabira Banu's evidence that her husband was about to retire and he must have retired by then, was not seriously in dispute and being a Doctor he can as well set up private practice at Udupi which is also a fairly big and prosperous Town and there was nothing on record successfully rebutting her evidence on that aspect of her case. The husband of Sabira Banu is none other than the deceased petitioner in the case on hand. Therefore, whatever the need the deceased petitioner had in 1971 to claim possession of the premises in question from the respondents under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act, it is no longer subsisting as Sabira Banu has subsequent to the filing of the eviction petition by her husband against the respondents herein secured vacant possession of sufficiently a big building at Udupi town. ( 20 ) THIS Court has also recently taken the view in M. Devaraj v Vijayalakshmi, 1991 (1) All India Rent Control Journal 331 that as a matter of principle, it cannot be said that a wife cannot seek eviction of the tenant from the premises belonging to her under clause (h) of Section 21 (1) of the Act on the ground of her husband's requirement to carry on the business. The law is also well settled that the requirement referred to in Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act must not only exist at the time of filing the eviction petition but it must continue to subsist even at the time of the eventual culmination of the eviction proceedings in the Appellate Court or the revisional Court, as the case may be. So tested, the requirement pleaded by the deceased petitioner in his eviction petition filed in 1971 no longer subsisted even during the pendency of the Revision Petition before the learned District Judge much less at this point of time inasmuch as petitioner No. 1 (a) has secured vacant possession of a sufficiently big building situate an Udupi town by getting her tenant evicted on the ground that the said building was required by her for the benefit of her Doctor husband and their children. Therefore, I hold on Point No. (3) that the learned District Judge was perfectly justified in holding that there was no need for the Legal Representatives of the deceased petitioner to secure vacant possession of the premises under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act. ( 21 ) SRI B. V. Acharya, argued that it is quite unnecessary to go into the question whether eviction petition schedule property is a building or premises as defined in the Act or an agricultural land as defined in Section 2 (18) of the Land Reforms Act as the Revision Petition is liable to be dismissed on the basis of the finding on Point no. (3) even if the case of the petitioners that the eviction petition schedule property is a building or premises under the Act is to be accepted for the sake of argument. In my opinion, the said argument of Sri B. V. Acharya is well founded. (3) even if the case of the petitioners that the eviction petition schedule property is a building or premises under the Act is to be accepted for the sake of argument. In my opinion, the said argument of Sri B. V. Acharya is well founded. Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider Point No. (2) also as Sri B. P. Holla wanted the Court to consider and record its opinion on Point No. (2) also as, according to him, it is the vital point for decision in this Revision Petition. So, I propose to consider Point No. (2 ). Point No. (2) ( 22 ) THE manner in which the subject matter of the eviction petition is described in Schedule 'a' is already extracted in paragraph one above. If 1 may say so, the said description of the property is extremely vague inasmuch as the boundaries of the property, dimensions of the building and its extent are not mentioned. ( 23 ) IN order to appreciate the contentions urged by the learned counsel on both sides, it is necessary to notice the definitions of "building" and "premises" in Section 3 (a) and 3 (h) respectively of the Act and also the definition of "land" in Section 2 (18) of the Land Reforms Act. The Act and also the Land Reforms Act are enacted by the State Legislature in the same year 1961. But, the Act has come into force on 31-12-1961 and its life is being extended from time to time whereas the land Reforms Act has come into force with effect from 2-10-1965. The Act and also the Land Reforms Act are enacted by the State Legislature in the same year 1961. But, the Act has come into force on 31-12-1961 and its life is being extended from time to time whereas the land Reforms Act has come into force with effect from 2-10-1965. ( 24 ) "building" and "premises" are defined in Section 3 (a) and 3 (n) as under: "3 (a) "building" means any building or hut or part of a building or hut other than a farm house, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and includes (i) the garden, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building, hut or part of such building or hut and let or lo be let along with such building or hut or part of building or hut; (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for the use in such building or hut or part of a building or hut; (iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof, but does not include a room or other accommodation in a hotel or a lodging house;3 (n) "premises" means (i) a building as defined in clause (a); (ii) any land not used for agricultural purposes. " land is defined in Section 2 (18) of the Land Reforms Act as follows:" 'land' means agricultural land, that is to say, land which is used or capable of being used for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient thereto and includes horticultural land, forest land, garden land, pasture land, plantation "and tope but does not include house-site or land used exclusively for non-agricultural purposes". (emphasis supplied) ( 25 ) THE test to be applied to determine the nature of the tenancy is enunciated by the Supreme Court in two decisions. In Uttamchand v S. M. Lalwani, AIR 1965 SC 716 , the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph-10 at page 719 thus:". . The question in each case would be what in the dominant part of the demise and what is the purpose for which the building was constructed and let out. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . We must determine the character of the lease by asking ourselves as to what was the dominant intention of the parties in executing the document. . . . . " in Dwaraka Prasad v Dwaraka Das Saraf, AIR 1975 SC 1758 , the Supreme Court. has again observed thus: ". . . . . . Whether the lease is composite and has a plurality of purposes, the decisive test is the dominant purpose of the demise". ( 26 ) REFERENCE is made to the observations made by the Supreme Court in the said two decisions in Noorjehan v Radhakrishna Shenoy and Others, ILR 1979 (1) karoataka 192 in which this Court has applied the test of dominant purpose of the lease in order to find out whether the demised premises in the said decision was "building" or "premises" as defined in Section 3 (a) and 3 (h) of the Act or land as defined under Section 2 (18) of the Land Reforms Act. It would be relevant to observe that the subject matter of decision in Noorjehan's case was also a property situate within Karkala limits and Sri B. P. Holla and Sri B. V. Acharya were appearing for the petitioner and respondents respectively in the said Civil Revision Petition also. ( 27 ) IN view of the observations made in the said decisions, Sri B. P. Holl are peatedly stressed that the dominant purpose of the lease in the case on hand has to be determined with reference to the contents of Exs. D37, dated 17-11-1935 and the rent receipts Exs. D. 1 to D. 15 which have come into existence between 22-11-1947 and 8-12-1968 when there was no dispute between the parties regarding the nature of lease. Sri B. V. Acharya also placed reliance on the same documents and also three sketches produced by the Court Commissioner and his two reports ex. D. 37, dated 17-11-1935 is a 'chalgeni1 chit executed by K. Ganapathy Kamath of karkala in favour of deceased petitioner's mother Tahvrabi. I consider it necessary to set out the full text of that document. It reads thus: Ex. D. 37, dated 17-11-1935 is a 'chalgeni1 chit executed by K. Ganapathy Kamath of karkala in favour of deceased petitioner's mother Tahvrabi. I consider it necessary to set out the full text of that document. It reads thus: Ex. D. 1, dated 28-8-1945 is the receipt issued by the power of Attorney Holder of the deceased petitioner in favour of K. Ganapalhy Kamath. It reads thus:"received Rs. 150/- one hundred and fifty only as per payments made in cash on 3 occasions formerly and today in full settlement of the rent due from Mr. K. G. Kamath,- Vakil, Karkala in respect of the house and fields in Survey No. 89 of karkala situated in Ananthashayana for the year ended on 5-7-1975. No rent in respect of previous years is in arrears. Karkala, Sd/- NA. Beary, 28-8-1945. Power of Attorney Holder on behalf of A. S. R. Ahmed". (emphasis supplied) exs. D. 2 to D. 15 are more or less similarly worded rent receipts issued by the deceased petitioner in favour of K. Ganapathy Kamath and they are dated 22-11-1947, 3-1-1957, 30-5-1957, 11-1-1958, 11-12-1958, 13-12-1959, 4-12-1960, 10-12-1961, 2-12-1962, 5-1-1964, 14-12-1964, 12-12-1965, 25-12-1966 and 8-12-1968. Ex. D. 2, dated 22-11-1947 is in English and it reads thus:"received today from Mr. K. G. Kamath, Vakil, Karkala Rs. 50a (fifty only) out of the rent due from you to me for the house and fields in Survey No. 89 of karkala town for the year ending Fifth May, 1948. In addition to this, I have already received an advance of rupees forty towards the current year's rent. The balance due from you to me out of the current year's rent is therefore rupees seventy only. Your previous years rents have been fully received and there arc no arrears. Sd/- S. A. Ahmed. Received the balance Rs. 60/- (sixty only) in full discharge of the rent due for the year mentioned above. Sd/- A. S. R. Ahmed". Karkala ex. D. 3, dated 3-1-1957 is in Kannada and it reads thus: I do not consider it necessary to set out the contents of the other receipts Exs. D. 4 to D. 15 as they are couched more or less in the same language in which Ex. D. 3 as extracted above is written. It is seen from the particulars of the property {'%,>3d') mentioned in the bottom of Ex. D. 4 to D. 15 as they are couched more or less in the same language in which Ex. D. 3 as extracted above is written. It is seen from the particulars of the property {'%,>3d') mentioned in the bottom of Ex. D. 37 that the leased property consisted 01 three plots of wet lands measuring about one acre approximately and also some 'bhagayat' land and tiled roofed house consisting of first floor etc. , It is mentioned in Ex. D. 1 that rent of Rs. 150/- is received from K. Ganapathy Kamath in respect of the house and fields in Survey No. 89 of Karkala. Under Ex. D. 2, also, rs. 50/- out of the rent due from K. Ganapathy Kamath is received by the deceased petitioner for the house and fields in Survey No. 89 of Karkala town for the year ending 5th May, 1948. Under Ex. D. 3, dated 3-1-1957, deceased petitioner has received Rs. 360/- from K. Ganapathy Kamath towards rent of Survey No. 89 of karkala consisting of tiled roofed storeyed house etc. , for the period 1956 to May, 1957. Similarly, under the remaining receipts Exs. D. 4 to D. 15 also yearly rents of the said property are received although reference is made to house rent separately in Exs. D. 4 to D. 8 by writing on the back of the said receipts in English that certain amounts are received as advance from K. Ganapathy Kamath towards house rent payable by him. Learned counsel on both sides agreed that in Dakshina Kannada district *rfots' means wet land, 'i$ok' means dry land and 'ipsraol^1 means garden land. The nature and incidents of agricultural holdings in the West coast area with particular reference lo Dakshina Kannada District are referred to in Venkatesha Shet v Narayan Achari, 1975 (2) Kar. L. J. 173 on which strong reliance was placed by Sri B. P. Holla. The subject matter of that decision was a tiled house situated on a land of the extent of 27 cents in South Kanara. The question posed for decision in that case was whether the suit property was a land as defined in Section 2 (A) (18) of the Land Reforms Act. The subject matter of that decision was a tiled house situated on a land of the extent of 27 cents in South Kanara. The question posed for decision in that case was whether the suit property was a land as defined in Section 2 (A) (18) of the Land Reforms Act. In that context, it was argued that it was a matter incidental to the determination of the question of tenancy under the Act and since the question of tenancy under the Act can be decided by only the Tribunnal, the civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the issue whether the Act applied to the lease in question. His Lordship Chief Justice Govinda Bhat has held that "since the dispute has arisen in a suit before the Civil Court, the Civil Court has to decide whether the Act applies to the subject matter of the suit. If it comes to the conclusion that the Act is applicable, then the question of tenancy, which is not in dispute in the case, need not be referred lo the Tribunal. If the question of tenancy is in dispute then ihe question has to be referred to the Tribunal once the Civil Court comes to the conclusion that the lease is for agricultural purposes. " It is observed at page 175 as under:"it is common knowledge that throughout the West-Coast, when a house is let there will be some land which forms a compound for the house and within such a compound a frw coconut trees or mango trees or such other fruit trees are grown. Within the area of Mangalore Municipality, it is very rare to find a house with a compound where there is no coconut or mango trees. Similar is the case in other towns in the District. In the instant case, there is no dispute about the extent of the land on which there is a tiled house. The total extent of the land with the house is 27 cents, which is approximately one-fourth of an acre. The defendant contends that there are a few coconut and other fruit trees. In such a case, there is no presumption that the lease is for agricultural purposes. It is also common knowledge that farm-workers are provided with houses by agriculturists. The total extent of the land with the house is 27 cents, which is approximately one-fourth of an acre. The defendant contends that there are a few coconut and other fruit trees. In such a case, there is no presumption that the lease is for agricultural purposes. It is also common knowledge that farm-workers are provided with houses by agriculturists. In the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, there is a special provision made for protection of tenants on such house sites, and such tenants are called 'kudikidappukarans'. There is no corresponding provision under the Act. If the subject matter of the suit is wet land, prima facie the lease will be one for agriculatural purposes and the matter will be one relating to agrarian relations. The land in the instant case has been classified in the revenue records as 'punja'. Under the Survey and Settlement Scheme in the District of S. Kanara, 'punja' lands are lands on which only thatching grass naturally grows. Such lands are not brought under cultivation either as wet land or as garden". (emphasis supplied) as per the particulars pf the property mentioned in Ex. D. 37 already extracted above, the subject matter of the lease was three plots of ' t3iand, rtci rt*' measuring about one acre and also some 'bhagayat' land and a tiled roofed storeyed house situate within (hat property. D, W. 1-C. Gopalakrishna Kamath has stated in the course of his evidence recorded on 24-7-1975 thus:" The extent of the plot is one acre and 11 cents. There were three paddy fields. Only one crop has been raised in those fields. Single rent was payable for house and plot. "sri B. P. Holla argued on the strength of that evidence of D. W. 1 that the learned district Judge has erroneously observed at more than one place in the course of the impugned order that the extent of the leased property was about 3 to 4 acres and he has done so without properly considering the oral and documentary evidence on record. Sri B. V. Acharya fairly conceded that the observations made by the learned district Judge that the extent of the property was 3 to 4 acres is in accurate. Sri B. V. Acharya fairly conceded that the observations made by the learned district Judge that the extent of the property was 3 to 4 acres is in accurate. He further submitted that the extent of the lands in Survey No. 89 was much more than one acre 11 cents of paddy land as could be gathered from the contents of the three sketches and two reports of the Commissioner. He further submitted that even if one acre 11 cents of paddy Gelds are appurtenant to the house in question, then also, the leased property becomes land and not building in view of the observations made in Venkatesha Shet's case that "if the subject matter of the suit is wet land, prima facie the lease will be one for agricultural purposes and the matter will be one relating to agrarian relations". ( 28 ) THE word "appurtenant" employed in the definition of "building" in Section Xa) is not defined in the Act. There fore, Sri B. V. Acharya wanted the Court to know its meaning as explained in "black's Law Dictionary with pronunciations Fifth edition" as under:"appurtenant Belonging to; accessory or incident to; adjunct, appended or annexed to; answering to accessorium in the civil law. Employed in leases for the purpose of including any easements or servitudes used or enjoyed with the demised premises. A thing is "appurtenant" to something else when it stands in relation of an incident to a principal and is necessarily connected with the use and enjoyment of the latter. A thing is deemed to be incidental or appurtenant to land when it is by right used with the land for its benefit, as in the case of way, or water-course, or of a passage for light, air, or heat from or across the land of another". ( 29 ) THE following materials emerge from the three sketches and two reports submitted by the Advocate-Commissioner appointed by the learned District Judge pursuant to the remand order of this Court: (a) tiled storeyed house described in the eviction petition schedule is shown in pink colour in the Commissioner's first sketch. It is situate on the south-east of Survey No, 89 of Karkala. Commissioner has shown different portions of Sy. No. 89 as 89/2-A, 89/2-B, 89/6-A, 89/6-B, 89/6-C, 89/7-A and 89/7-B in that sketch. It is situate on the south-east of Survey No, 89 of Karkala. Commissioner has shown different portions of Sy. No. 89 as 89/2-A, 89/2-B, 89/6-A, 89/6-B, 89/6-C, 89/7-A and 89/7-B in that sketch. The southern strip of that property is shown as 89/1-B and it is mentioned that these different portions are enclosed by stone wall erected all round the property except on the north-eastern portion of the building. Two plots shown in green colour and mentioned in the sketch as 89/2-A and 89/7-B are described at the footnote portion of that sketch as 'ric^rtvb' (wet lands ). Plinth area of the ground floor of that building is 4,613. 06 sq. feet and the plinth area of the tiled roofed first floor is 1,031. 32 sq. feet. The total extent of the building thus comes to 5,644. 38 sq. feet. But the actual extent of the land covered by the ground floor of the building is 4,613. 06 sq. feet corresponding to about 10. 6 cents only. The said building consists of two garages, one hall, one verandah on the western side, another verandah, four rooms, one bed room, one kitchen, one store room, one cow-shed, one well, one bath-room, one firewood shed and two toilet rooms in the ground floor and two rooms and one hall in the first floor. It is no doubt a spacious tiled roofed storeyed building. But, it can by no means be regarded as a palatial building as repeatedly referred to by Sri B. P. Holla in order to get sustenance to his argument that the property originally leased by Tahirabi and subsequently by the petitioner under Ex. D. 37 was essentially a lease of a spacious building. ( 30 ) AS per the particulars furnished by the Commissioner in his sketches and also reports, there arc 18 crop yielding coconut trees, 16 coconut plants, 5jackfruit trees, 2 guava plants, 4 mango trees, 4 mango plants, one cowdung pit, 4 vegetable beds within Sy. No. 89 the whole of which is enclosed by stone wall. The Commissioner has stated in his report lhal Sy. No. 89/2-A consists of 3 paddy fields measuring 1 acre 19 cents and Sy. No. 89/7-B is one paddy field measuring 35 cents. So, there are 4 paddy fields measuring 1 acre 54 cents in all. Extent of the other plots of sy. The Commissioner has stated in his report lhal Sy. No. 89/2-A consists of 3 paddy fields measuring 1 acre 19 cents and Sy. No. 89/7-B is one paddy field measuring 35 cents. So, there are 4 paddy fields measuring 1 acre 54 cents in all. Extent of the other plots of sy. No. 89 situate within the stonewall compound is not mentioned by the Commissioner either in his three sketches or two reports. Petitioner (P. W. 1) has staled in his evidence that he owns only one house and 3-4 acres of land in Karkala. He has further stated that Md. Jalal is another tenant in respect of a house in the same compound wherein the petition premises and other lands are situate. To the specificsuggestion that was put to him in cross-examination regarding the existence of paddy fields in Sy. No. 89, petitioner has given the evasive answer: "i do not know whether there are any paddy fields in that 3-4 acres of land" although he claims to have visited his property one year prior to the issue of quit notice in this case. As Md. Jalal is another tenant of a house even according to the petitioner, it can be reasonably concluded lhal the spacious building and the rest of the land in Sy. No. 89 leased to deceased K. Ganapalhy Kamalh by petitioner's mother in the first instance and later by the petitioner under Ex. D. 37 on yearly rent basis and not on monthly rent basis as deliberately mentioned in the eviction petition. So, Ex. D. 37 can be regarded as a composite lease of a building constructed on an urea of about 10. 6 cents and that loo in a corner of Sy. No. 89 and the remaining land of about 3 acres out of which one acre 54 cenls arc 4 plots of wet lands. The entire land consists of various kinds of trees and plants mentioned above and they arc scattered in different parts of the land. Under the rent receipts-Exs. D. 1 to D. 15, yearly rent is received by the petitioner in advance and in some years house rent is separately received in advance as written by the petitioner himself on the back portions of Exs. D. 4 to D. 8. Under Ex. D. 40, one quintal 11 Kgs. Under the rent receipts-Exs. D. 1 to D. 15, yearly rent is received by the petitioner in advance and in some years house rent is separately received in advance as written by the petitioner himself on the back portions of Exs. D. 4 to D. 8. Under Ex. D. 40, one quintal 11 Kgs. of Paddy are delivered by K. Ganapathy Kamath to KMCS, Karkala on 1-10-1968 as levy paddy as required by clause (3) of Mysore Stale Levy Paddy Collection Order, 1966. But, Sri B. P. Holla tried to overcome the import of Ex. D. 40 by contending that in the absence of levy paddy demand notice, it is not possible to say that Ex. D. 40 relates to paddy grown in Sy. No. 89 as particulars of the land in respect of which levy paddy is paid is not mentioned in Ex. D. 40 and levy paddy is not paid by K. CJanaputhy Kamalh in any of the subsequent years. But, it is nobody's case that K. Ganapathy Kamalh was cultivating any other wet land in Karkala. The evidence of DAV. 1-Gopalakrlshna kamath, who is the son of K. G. Kamalh, lhal levy paddy was demanded from him for one year and thereafter he filed an application to the Tahsildar to exempt him from paying levy paddy is not challenged in cross-examination. Therefore I hold that levy paddy is paid under Ex. D. 40 in respect of paddy grown in thepaddy fields in Sy. No. 89 by the respondents. Land capable of being used for agricultural purposes also comes within the definition of "land" in Section 2 (18) of the Land reforms Act. Therefore, the only irresistible conclusion that could reasonably be reached is that the property leased to K. Ganapalhy Kamath constituted composite lease of a spacious tiled roofed storeyed building which can be termed as a farm house to which wet, dry and bhagayat lands of about 3 acres are appurtenant. One acre 54 cents out of total extent of about 3 acres of land in Sy. No. 89 are 4 plots of wet lands. ( 31 ) IN Uttamchand's case, Dal Mill building with fixed machinery in sound working order and accessories was leased out on an annual rent. The intention of the lessee in accepting the lease was to use the building as a Dal Mill. No. 89 are 4 plots of wet lands. ( 31 ) IN Uttamchand's case, Dal Mill building with fixed machinery in sound working order and accessories was leased out on an annual rent. The intention of the lessee in accepting the lease was to use the building as a Dal Mill. The question was whether the Dal Mill was an accommodation within meaning of Section 3 (a) of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955 and whether the Rent Control Authority had jurisdiction to determine the standard rent. The Supreme Court has held after consideration of the terms of the lease and also applying the test of the dominant intention of the parties "m executing the document lhat the factory was not a building within meaning of Section 3 (a) of the said Act and, therefore, was outside the purview of the said Act. ( 32 ) IN the light of the above mentioned incidents of lease in the instant case and the law enunciated by the Supreme Court and also by this Court in the above referred decisions, I am of the opinion that il can be unhesitatingly concluded that what was originally leased lo K. G anapathy Kamath by petilioners' molher and subsequently by the petitioner under Ex. D37 is a lease of agricultural land and not merely or mainly 'building' or 'premises' as defined in the Act. Point No. (2) is answered accordingly. ( 33 ) REVERTING back to the point of luck of jurisdiction, painstakingly argued by Srib. P, Holla, I consider it worth while lo refer to the argument he had advanced in a similar situation in the case of Mrs. Noorjehan v Radhakrishna Shenoy and Others, ilr 1979 (1) Karnataka 192. In that case, the petitioner had filed an eviction petition against the respondents seeking their eviction from the premises on the grounds falling under the provisions of clauses (f), (h) and (p) of Section 21 (1) of the Act. Respondents had, inter alia, contended that the lease was of an agricultural holding; that they were agricultural tenants and, therefore, they are not liable to be evicted under the Act. The trial Court held that they are not agricultural tenants and, therefore, they are not entitled to the proteclion under the Land Reforms Act. It passed an eviction order. The Appellate Court confirmed the said finding. However, ot allowed the appeal on merits. The trial Court held that they are not agricultural tenants and, therefore, they are not entitled to the proteclion under the Land Reforms Act. It passed an eviction order. The Appellate Court confirmed the said finding. However, ot allowed the appeal on merits. So, the landlord filed the Revision Petition as in the instant case. Sri B. P. Holla appearing for the petitioner-landlord in that case had maintained thai the queslion of ousler of jurisdiction of the Court constituted under the Act does not arise for consideration on the facts and circumstances of the case and the issue of a tenancy between the petitioner-landlord and the respondents tenants in respect of the premises in question need not be referred for adjudication by the Tribunal constituted under the Land Reforms Act since the premises in question was covered by the Act and no part of it gives rise to any queslion which is referable to determination by the Tribunal as contemplated under Section 133 of the Land Reforms Act. On the contrary, Sri B. V. Acharya had argued that Section 133 of the Land Reforms Act excludes the jurisdiction of another Special Court constituted under the Acl for eviction of tenants on the grounds mentioned in Section 21 (1) of the Act. Per conlra, Sri B. P. Holla had sought lo overcome preliminary objection on diverse grounds. He had prefaced his arguments by submitting that the cases cited by Sri B. V. Acharya admittedly related lo agricultural lands which came clearly within the scope of the Land Reforms Act and none of the cases on which mr. B. V. Acharya placed reliance related to ouster of jurisdiction of a Civil Court functioning as Special Court under one Special Act by a Tribunal constituted under another Special Act. B. V. Acharya placed reliance related to ouster of jurisdiction of a Civil Court functioning as Special Court under one Special Act by a Tribunal constituted under another Special Act. His contention was thai the question of tenancy as between the landlord and the tenant and the eviction of the tenant in respect of residential and non-residential premises is controlled by the provisions of the Special Act, namely, the Rent Act and the question involving tenancy relating to agricultural lands is controlled by the provisions of another Special Act, namely, the Land Reforms Act, He had also argued that the Act has to be read as a whole when the Court is confronted with the question of jurisdiction and if the definition of 'building' and 'premises' and the relevant provisions which provide for eviction of tenants from the premises are read together, it is clear thai the lease of a residential building along with lands which include garden, grounds and out-houses appurtenant to such building, is a lease covered by the Rent Act and the eviction of a tenant from such a building is controlled by the provisions of the Rent Act and no queslion of tenancy contemplated under Sections 112 and 133 of the Land Reforms Act arises for consideration. According to Sri B. P. Holla, the Rent Control Court had exclusive powers to determine its jurisdiction and thai cannot be challenged in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhatia Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd. v D. C. Patel, AIR 1953 SC 16 in which the Supreme Court was dealing with the powers of the Civil Court under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code vis-a-vis the power of a small Causes Court under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates control Act, 1947. Eventually, his Lordship Bopanna, J. has held as under:"whenever a question of ouster of jurisdiction arises, it is the duly of the Civil court to examine that question and satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction to decide the lis belwecn the parties despite the provisions in a Special Act, which take away its jurisdiction cither expressly or by necessary implication. The question of jurisdiclion cannot be decided only by the pleadings between the parties. The question of jurisdiclion cannot be decided only by the pleadings between the parties. It is for the Court whose jurisdiction is sought to be ouslcd, to decide whether the defence taken up by the defendant in the proceedings before it properly raise an issue touching Us jurisdiclion. " ( 34 ) IN P. N. Krishnaraj v Gulabi Bat, 1964 Mys, L. J. Supplement 201, his Lordship Narayana Pai, J. (as his Lordship then was) has held with reference to the revisional powers under Section 12-B of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent control) Act, 1949 that the question whether a given lease is or is not a lease of a building within the meaning of the Act is a jurisdictional fact and an erroneous finding of fact touching a jurisdictional fact can be interfered within revision under Section 12-B. It is also observed towards the end of page 202 and in the beginning of page 203 as under: "indeed, even a first appellate Court fully entitled to go into question of fact will not ordinarily interfere with a finding of fact recorded by the original Court in similar circumstances. With particular reference lo Seclion 12-B of the madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Acl of 1949, I should add lhat ihe power of revision under ii is wider than the power conferred under Section 115 of the C. P. C. and extends lo a scrutiny of ihe 'legality, regularity or propriety' of any order passed or proceeding taken under the Act. Where therefore ihe courts or authorities functioning under the statute either confer upon themselves a jurisdiction which they do not possess or refuse to exercise jurisdiclion which they do possess by an erroneous decision, whether of law or on fact, there can be no doubt whatever that such a decision would be improper and proceedings taken pursuant to that decision clearly irregular and illegal. Therefore, I find it difficult to persuade myself to accept the argument of Sri B. P, Holla that the learned Munsiff sitting as a Special Tribunal under the Act and the learned District Judge exercising powers of revision vesled in him under Section 50 (2) of the Act had lacked initial jurisdiction to decide that the lease of the premises in question was an agricultural lease and not the lease of a 'building' or 'premises' under the Act and, in any event, they had no jurisdiction to record finding on the other point of bona fide need and reasonable requirement of the premises by the petitioner-landlord in view of their first finding that the Rent Control Court had no jurisdiction to make an order of eviction against the tenant in respect of the eviction petition schedule properly. ( 35 ) TO sum up, my conclusions are: (a) Land bearing Sy. No. 89 of Karkala leased by late Tahirabi and later by the deceased petitioner in 1935 under Ex. D. 37 to late K. Ganapathy Kamath consists of a spacious building situate on the south-east corner of Sy. No. 89 on about 10. 6 cents of land and the remaining portion of the land of about 3 acres consists of different types of trees and plants and 4 plots of paddy fields measuring 1 acre 54 cents and having regard to the definition of land in Section 2 (18) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act which includes land which is capable of being used for agricultural purposes and the observations made by this Court in the case of Venkatesha Shet that "if the subject matter of the suit is wet land , prima facie the lease will be one for agricultural purposes and the matter will be one relating to agrarian relations", the subject matter of the eviction petition can be no means be regarded as 'building' or 'premises' as defined under the Act and, on the other hand, it is essentially an agricultural lease. (b) Even otherwise, the conclusions reached by the Courts below do not suffer from the vice of tack of jurisdiction or want of jurisdiction or improper or illegal exercise of jurisdiction so as to call for interference in this Revision filed under Section 115, CPC, and (c) Whatever need that existed in 1971 is no longer subsisting as petitioner-1 (a) has acquired possession of a building of her own in Udupi Town. Point No. (4) ( 36 ) IN view of my above conclusion, I hold on Point No. (4) that the question of partial eviction of the respondents from the premises does not arise. If it was possible for this Court to uphold the claim of the petitioners for an order of eviction against the respondents under clause (h), I have no doubt whatsoever in my mind that the petitioners were entitled to an order of partial eviction against the respondents having regard to the nature of accommodation available in the spacious building. ( 37 ) BEFORE concluding, 1 must confess that this order has become unduly lengthy but it was inevitable in view of various aspects repeatedly touched and stressed by sri B. P. Holla, learned counsel for the petitioners, in his own inimitable style saying that he does not want to take any chance in this prolonged litigation in which the petitioners are deprived of palatial building and also land situate at a stone-throw distance from the Munsiffs Court at Karkala. His Lordship Bopanna, J. who decided Noorjehan 's ease referred to above was also put in the same predicament as could be gathered from the observations he has made in paragraph-22 of that decision thai his order appears to be unduly lengthy but he was in good company as justice Megarry while dealing with a knotty problem of construction of wide and limited prohibitions contained in similar statutes had observed in Number 20, Cannon street Ltd. v Singer and Friedlander Ltd. , (1974)2 All E. R. Ch. D. 577 that"mapping untrodden territory is necessarily more laborious than plotting a course from maps made by others". ( 38 ) IT follows from my above conclusions and findings that this Revision Petitioners liable to be dismissed. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case which is indeed heart burning for the petitioners, I consider it not proper to mulct them with costs. ( 38 ) IT follows from my above conclusions and findings that this Revision Petitioners liable to be dismissed. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case which is indeed heart burning for the petitioners, I consider it not proper to mulct them with costs. Further, I earnestly appeal to Sri B. V. Acharya, learned senior counsel for the respondents, to use his good offices and advise the respondents to assuage the feelings and mitigate the hardship of the petitioners by paying not only the past arrears of rent to the petitioners but also to increase the rent substantially and pay the same promptly having regard to the nature and extent of the property in their possession and enjoyment since decades. ( 39 ) IN the result, the Revision Petition is dismissed directing both parties to beartheir own costs throughout. --- *** --- .