Judgment :- RAJU, J. The Revenue has come up in revision aggrieved against the order of the Tribunal holding that the sales turnover relating to the sale of chicory and chicory seeds are eligible for exemption under the exemption notification made by the Government in exercise of its powers under section17 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, in G.O. Ms. No. 1982 Revenue dated April 22, 1960 which read thus : "In exercise of the powers conferred by section17 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (Madras Act 1 of 1959), the Governor of Madras hereby exempts, with effect on and from the 1st April, 1960 the sales of vegetable seeds, fruit, plants, flower seeds and flower plants, from the tax payable under the said Act." 2. The assessee was a manufacturer and dealer in tin containers. It is not in dispute that he had also dealings in chicory. The sales turnover of such chicory seeds during the assessment year 1978-79 was to the tune of Rs. 1, 46, 921.43. After examination of the accounts, the respondent/assessee was assessed on a total and taxable turnover of Rs. 13, 78, 571.21 which was inclusive of the sales of chicory seeds and penalty under section12(3) of the Act was also levied. On appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the assessment on the turnover relating to the sales of chicory seeds at 4 per cent. was sustained, but the levy of penalty under section12(3) of the Act was set aside. The assessee pursued the matter further before the Tribunal which came to the conclusion that the sales of chicory seeds will be sales of vegetable seeds coming within the scope of the exemption notification referred to supra and, therefore, stood exempt from the levy of sales tax. The Tribunal was of the view that chicory, though not used as a principal item of the meal, its contents are used for mixing with coffee powder which forms a subsidiary meal item, and, therefore, it satisfies the terms of the exemption notification. 3. Mr. R. Lokapriya, the learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the Revenue contended that the sales of chicory seeds cannot be considered to be sales of "vegetable seeds" and consequently the turnover in respect thereof is not entitled to the exemption under the notification referred to supra. 3. Mr. R. Lokapriya, the learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the Revenue contended that the sales of chicory seeds cannot be considered to be sales of "vegetable seeds" and consequently the turnover in respect thereof is not entitled to the exemption under the notification referred to supra. Learned counsel further contended that the Tribunal misdirected itself as to the true scope and meaning of the words "vegetable seeds" contained in the notification in question and that the approach of the Tribunal is opposed to the decision of the Supreme Court as well as this Court in the matter of construction of such entries. Mr. R. Venkataraman, learned counsel appearing for the assessee, reiterated the reasoning of the Tribunal and submitted that the view of the Tribunal is unexceptionable and no interference is called for. 4. Learned counsel for the department referred to the decisions reported in 1977 AIR(SC) 1638, 1977 (39) STC 378, 1977 (2) SCC 246 , 1977 (3) SCR 149 , 1977 UJ 268 , 1977 (6) CTR 183, 1977 TaxLR 2042, 1977 SCC(Tax) 278 (SC) (State of West Bengal v. Washi Ahmed); 1984 (56) STC 53 (Mad.) (M. R. Arumuga Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu) and 1985 AIR(SC) 1644, 1985 (S2) SCR 339, 1985 (4) SCC 30 , 1985 (2) SCALE 291 , 1985 (60) STC 80, 1985 (2) Scale 291 , 1986 (1) UJ 368 , 1985 UPTC 1141 (SC) (P. A. Thillai Chidambara Nadar. Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner). In State of West Bengal v. Washi Ahmed 1977 AIR(SC) 1638, 1977 (39) STC 378, 1977 (2) SCC 246 , 1977 (3) SCR 149 , 1977 UJ 268 , 1977 (6) CTR 183, 1977 TaxLR 2042, 1977 SCC(Tax) 278, the apex Court was concerned with the question as to whether green ginger will fall within the word "vegetable" as found in item 6 of the First Schedule to the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. After discussing about the approach that is to be adopted in the matter of construction of similar words which are not by themselves defined under the Act, the apex Court held as follows : "It will, therefore, be seen that the word 'vegetable' in item 6 of Schedule I to the Act must be construed as understood in common parlance and it must be given its popular sense meaning 'that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it' and so construed, it denotes those classes of vegetables which are grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and are used for the table. Now, obviously green ginger is a vegetable grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and is used for the table. It may not be used as a principal item of the meal but it certainly forms part of the meal as a subsidiary item. It is an item which is ordinarily sold by a vegetable vendor and both the vegetable vendor who everyday use deals in vegetables and the housewife who daily goes to the market to purchase vegetables would unhesitatingly regard green ginger as vegetable. The assessee in fact placed evidence before the sales tax authorities showing that the railway authorities also treated green ginger as vegetable for the purpose of railway tariff and charged for the carriage of green ginger at the reduced rate applicable to vegetables and even the Corporation of Calcutta included green ginger in the category of vegetable in the market bulletin published by it fortnightly showing the rates in the municipal market. There can, therefore, be little doubt that green ginger is generally regarded as included within the meaning of the word 'vegetable' as understood in common parlance. That apart, we find that item 6 speaks not simply of vegetables but 'vegetables-commonly known as "sabji, tarkari or sak"' and the Division Bench of the High Court held green ginger to fall within the meaning of the words 'sabji, tarkari or sak'. We should certainly be very slow to disturb a meaning placed on these words in Bengali language by two Judges of the High Court who may reasonably be expected to be quite conversant with that language. We should certainly be very slow to disturb a meaning placed on these words in Bengali language by two Judges of the High Court who may reasonably be expected to be quite conversant with that language. We are accordingly of the view that green ginger is included within the meaning of the words 'vegetables-commonly known as "sabji, tarkari or sak"' in item 6 of Schedule I and its sales must be held to be exempt from tax under section6 of the Act." 5. In M. R. Arumuga Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu 1984 (56) STC 53 , a Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the question as to whether "red ripe or fruit chillies" can be considered to be "vegetables" in respect of a similar exemption notification in G.O. Ms. No. 1764, Revenue, dated April 5, 1960. The Division Bench, after referring to the earlier case law on the subject and that too of the decisions of the apex Court, held thus : "In State of West Bengal v. Washi Ahmed 1977 AIR(SC) 1638, 1977 (39) STC 378, 1977 (2) SCC 246 , 1977 (3) SCR 149 , 1977 UJ 268 , 1977 (6) CTR 183, 1977 TaxLR 2042, 1977 SCC(Tax) 278 (SC), the Supreme Court had to consider whether green ginger is included in the expression 'vegetables' in item 6 of Schedule I to the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. After referring to the decisions in Madhya Pradesh Pan Merchants Association v. Stare of Madhya Pradesh 1956 (7) STC 99 and Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tar Officer 1961 AIR(SC) 1325, 1961 (12) STC 286, 1962 (1) SCJ 43, 1962 (1) SCR 279 , 1962 (1) MLJ(SC) 27, 1962 (1) MLJ 27 (SC) and Motipur Zamindary Co. (Private) Ltd. v. State of Bihar 1962 AIR(SC) 660, 1962 (13) STC 1, 1962 (2) SCJ 288, 1962 (S1) SCR 498 (SC) the Supreme Court emphasised that the construction of the word 'vegetables' should be as understood in common parlance and be given its popular sense meaning and if so construed, would denote those classes of vegetables grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and used for the table. Applying the rule of construction so laid down in the cases referred to above, it is at once obvious that 'red ripe or fruit chillies' though grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm, are never used for the table. Certainly it is not used either as a principal or even as a subsidiary item in a meal. It is also not a commodity normally and ordinarily sold by a vegetable vendor. More than this, the housewife desiring to make purchases of' vegetables' in a market would not regard 'red ripe or fruit chillies' as 'vegetables'. Equally, the vegetable vendor, who every day deals in vegetables, would not consider 'red ripe or fruit chillies' as 'vegetables'. There can, therefore, be no doubt that 'red ripe or fruit chillies' cannot appropriately be included within the meaning of 'vegetables', as understood in common parlance." 6. In Thillai Chidambara Nadar v. Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner 1985 AIR(SC) 1644, 1985 (S2) SCR 339, 1985 (4) SCC 30 , 1985 (2) SCALE 291 , 1985 (60) STC 80, 1985 (2) Scale 291 , 1986 (1) UJ 368 , 1985 UPTC 1141, the apex Court was considering the exemption notification in G.O. Ms. No. 1764, Revenue, dated April 5, 1960 in the context of the position of "ripened coconuts". The appeal before the Supreme Court was one arising under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, from a judgment of this Court. That was a case in which the assessee, a dealer in groceries, claimed that his sales turnover of ripened coconuts was exempt under the notification referred to above which gave exemption in respect of sales of "fresh fruits" or "vegetables" in addition to certain other items also. The apex Court once again considered about the construction to be adopted in such a case and laid down the following principles : "The canon of construction to be invoked in these types of statutes has been repeatedly enunciated in several decisions of this Court but it is not necessary to refer to all of them. The apex Court once again considered about the construction to be adopted in such a case and laid down the following principles : "The canon of construction to be invoked in these types of statutes has been repeatedly enunciated in several decisions of this Court but it is not necessary to refer to all of them. In Indo International Industries v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1981 (47) STC 359, 1981 AIR(SC) 1079, 1981 (3) SCR 294 , 1981 (2) SCC 528 , 1981 (1) SCALE 582 , 1981 (8) ELT 325 , 1981 (1) Scale 582 , 1981 UJ 372 , 1981 UPTC 481, 1981 TaxLR 2963, STI 1981 SC 202, 1981 SCC(Tax) 130, 1986 (7) ECR 284 this Court rules thus : 'It is well-settled that in interpreting items in statutes like the Excise Tax Acts or Sales Tax Acts, whose primary object is to raise revenue and for which purpose they classify diverse products, articles and substances, resort should be had not to the scientific and technical meaning of the terms or expressions used but to their popular meaning, that is to say, the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. If any term or expression has been defined in the enactment then it must be understood in the sense in which it is defined but in the absence of any definition being given in the enactment the meaning of the term in common parlance or commercial parlance has to be adopted.'If regard be had to this rule of construction, the question raised will have to be answered against the appellant. On the first aspect of the question it cannot be disputed that a coconut would be a 'fruit' in the botanical sense but unless it can be said to be a 'fresh fruit' it will not fall within the exemption notification. Similarly a coconut may be available in a vegetable market but because of that it does not become a 'vegetable'. It is well-known that the kernel of the coconut is used as an ingredient in the culinary preparations for adding taste to the food but it is hardly used as a substantial article of food on the table. Similarly a coconut may be available in a vegetable market but because of that it does not become a 'vegetable'. It is well-known that the kernel of the coconut is used as an ingredient in the culinary preparations for adding taste to the food but it is hardly used as a substantial article of food on the table. The concerned articles, namely, 'fresh fruits' and 'vegetables' being household articles of everyday use for the table these will have to be construed in their popular sense meaning the sense in which every householder will understand them. Viewed from this angle, the most apposite test would be the one adopted in the case of His Majesty the King v. Planters Nut and Chocolate Company Limited [1951] CLR (Ex) 122 (which decision was approved by this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh 1967 AIR(SC) 1454, 1967 (2) SCR 720 , 1967 (19) STC 469). Would a householder when asked to bring home 'fresh fruit' and some 'vegetable' for the evening meal bring coconut ? Obviously, the answer is in the negative." 7. Considering the point in issue before us in the light of the consistent and categorical declaration of law by the apex Court, we are of the view that the sales of chicory seeds in question can by no stretch of imagination be equated to or characterised as sales of "vegetable seeds" within the meaning of the notification in question. In our view, unless an approach from the botanical point of view is adopted, chicory cannot be considered to be a "vegetable" and its seeds cannot be deemed to be "vegetable seeds". " Vegetable" and "vegetable seeds" are words of everyday use and they have to be construed ascribing to them the meaning attributable to them in common parlance and in the sense in which every house-holder will understand them. It is not only improbable but would be too artificial to assume that when in an ordinary day-to-day use, vegetable is asked to be purchased, chicory can substitute its place and one is asked to get vegetable seeds, the purchase of chicory seeds will answer the demand or requirement of the common man. It is not only improbable but would be too artificial to assume that when in an ordinary day-to-day use, vegetable is asked to be purchased, chicory can substitute its place and one is asked to get vegetable seeds, the purchase of chicory seeds will answer the demand or requirement of the common man. Consequently, except by doing violence to the language as well as transgressing the object of the use of the word "vegetable seeds" in the notification in question, chicory seeds cannot be brought within its meaning. We are of the view that the object of the notification appears to be to exempt plants of the specified variety as well as seeds of vegetables, fruits and flowers and the notification cannot be so construed as to bring within it the whole gamut of seeds of vegetables in the botanical sense of the term. Neither it appears to be the intention of the notification nor in our view the language adopted or the terms of the notification warrant such a construction being placed on the words carefully thought of and deliberately used therein. An exemption notification is required to be strictly and not loosely construed. 8. That apart, the Tribunal, in our view, really misdirected itself and misconstrued the scope of the word "vegetable" and "vegetable seeds". This is obvious from the observation that "it may not be sold as vegetable by a vegetable vendor in India, but it is treated as vegetable seeds in foreign countries". It is only on the basis of such assumptions and certain literature pertaining to the import from the international market of the seeds in question that the Tribunal has chosen to come to such a conclusion. This, in our opinion, is the practice which the Supreme Court has often deprecated and advocated as the one to be avoided. The test should be as to how those in public in this country in their normal day-to-day activities deal with and handle a particular commodity. The construction in a popular or commercial sense means going by the meaning ascribed by those who everyday use or deal in such commodity in this country. Thus viewed, we are unable to persuade ourselves to subscribe to the view taken by the Tribunal identifying and equating the chicory or chicory seeds with either "vegetable" or "vegetable seeds". The construction in a popular or commercial sense means going by the meaning ascribed by those who everyday use or deal in such commodity in this country. Thus viewed, we are unable to persuade ourselves to subscribe to the view taken by the Tribunal identifying and equating the chicory or chicory seeds with either "vegetable" or "vegetable seeds". We hold that the sales turnover of chicory seeds will not be eligible for exemption as "vegetable seeds" within the meaning of the notification contained in G.O. Ms. No. 1982, Revenue dated April 22, 1960. Consequently, we are of the view that the order of the Tribunal cannot be allowed to stand and is, therefore, liable to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside. 9. In the result, this tax revision case is allowed; but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.