K. C. JAGADEB ROY, J. ( 1 ) THE complainant in ICC Case No. 88 of 1981 is the petitioner in this case. The complainant made complaint against 23 accused persons. After the inquiry u/s. 202,cr. P. C. , the learned Magistrate directed by his order dated 10-7-84 that cognizance be taken. Notice was issued to all accused persons including Binod Bihari Mohapatra, the present opposite party who appeared in the court and were released on bail. Charge was framed u/s. 342/34, I. P. C. against all the accused persons. While Anadi and Maheswar, two of the accused persons were also charged u/s. 452, 384/34, IPC. By mistake. Binod was not shown in the charge sheet and in place of Binod, the name of Dinabandhu appeared in the charge sheet. The complainant led the evidence and after conclusion of evidence, the case was posted for recording statements of the accused persons. On 17-10-1987 the complainant made a petition before the trial court stating that there was bona fide mistake on the part of the court not showing Binod in the charge sheet. It was alleged that Binod was throughout present in the case and was taking steps on every date subsequent to the charge. The court however, by the impugned order dated 17-10-87 found that oven though prosecution case was closed on 1-8-87 and the case was posted to 21-8-87 for accused statement, the complainant has not pointed out this mistake to the court earlier and law did not permit him to review the order of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhadrak, his predecessor in office. No objection was filed on behalf of the present opp. party, Binod stating that the inserting of his name in the charge sheet at that belated stage would cause prejudice to him. ( 2 ) MISS Dipti Mohapatra, the learned advocate appearing for Binod Bihari Mohapatra has urged here for the first time that complaint petition was filed on 30-3-81, charge was framed on 10-7-84, objection of the complainant-petitioner was filed on 9-9-87 and if the petition will be allowed and the charge sheet will be corrected replacing the name of Binod in place of Dinabandhu, her client will be prejudiced. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel for both the parties, it is necessary to understand certain facts which are relevant to this case. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel for both the parties, it is necessary to understand certain facts which are relevant to this case. There was allegation against 23 persons that they had committed the offence u/ Ss. 342/34, IPC. After inquiry u/s. 202, Cr. P. C. cognizance was taken against the accused persons and notices were issued to the accused persons including Binod (the present petitioner ). All of them appeared in the court and were released on bail on 30-10-81. The petitioner also appeared through his lawyer Sri Tapan Kumar Mohanty and filed his Vekalatnama in favour of the said counsel. The learned counsel Sri Mohanty had also power for other accused persons in that case. On 10-7-84 charges were framed against the accused persons and Binod Bihari Mohapatra was not excluded by the order of the Court. There was nobody by name Dinabandhu mentioned as an accused person in the complaint petition. While drawing the charge sheet against the accused persons, the name of 22 accused persons were correctly mentioned in the charge sheet while by mistake Dinabandhu's name was shown in the charge, sheet in place of Binod. This mistake was not noticed by anybody until 9-9-87, when from the order dated 9-9-87 of the successor in office of the trial court, it transpired that all the accused persons were charged u/s. 384, IPC. except Binod, the present petitioner. The complainant thus came to know that an incorrect name had been shown in the charge sheet as already stated. It maybe stated here that the prosecution case was closed on 18-8-87 and the case was posted to 21-8-87 for accused statement. The order sheet shows that even after the charge, all the accused persons were appearing in the court on every date of hearing and were making petition for representation. In the cross-examination which started on 3-9-85, Binod's lawyer Sri Mohanty had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses and the statements were made by the prosecution witnesses concerning Binod. All these show that even though after the charge on 10-7-84, name of Binod did not find place in the charge sheet and Dinabandhu's name appeared in his place, Binod throughout was with the impression that he was one of the accused persons and was taking stops in the court as an accused person. All these show that even though after the charge on 10-7-84, name of Binod did not find place in the charge sheet and Dinabandhu's name appeared in his place, Binod throughout was with the impression that he was one of the accused persons and was taking stops in the court as an accused person. ( 4 ) THE learned court below has rejected the petition of the complainant dated 9-9-87 for making correction on the impression that the correction would amount to review of the order passed by his predecessor in office,the Judicial Magistrate, First Class. On perusal of the records of the trial court I find that the Magistrate was wrong in Saying that a mere correction of the nature indicated in the petition would amount to review of the order of the Magistrate, First Class Bhadrak. Indeed the order charging the accused per- sons was passed on 10-7-84. Till then it was Binod which was in the list of accused persons and the name of Dinabandhu was nowhere in the record. The learned Magistrate did not pass any order directing to frame Charge against Dinabandhu. A fictitious name 'dinabandhu' just crept in by mistake when the order of the learned Magistrate dated 10-7-84 was being acted upon in drawing the charge sheet. So this correction does notactually amount to review of the previous order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate. ( 5 ) THE next question arises whether it is permissible to make such correction at a belated stage as prayed for in this case. Mr. Das, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the judgments of this Court reported in (1970) 36 CLT 526 and in ILR (1974) Cuttack 1492. The judgments in both the cases have no direct bearing for the decision of this case. ( 6 ) IN case of S. Manesu v. State, reported in (1970) 36 CLT 526 the Division Bench of this Court considered if the judgment passed by the Hon'ble single Judge of this Court in a criminal revision can be corrected to include the name of one of the accused persons whose name slipped off the attention of the Hon'ble single Judge while dealing with the revision. The revision was filed by six accused persons out of whom five were convicted u/s. 323, IPC and the other one was convicted u/s. 324, IPC. The revision was filed by six accused persons out of whom five were convicted u/s. 323, IPC and the other one was convicted u/s. 324, IPC. The Hon'ble Chief Justice Narasimhan who decided the criminal revision, referred only to four accused persons namely the petitioners 1 to 4 in the criminal revision who were convicted u/s. 323, IPC and referred to petitioner No. 6 who was convicted u/s. 324, IPC and left out the name of S. Manesu, who was the petitioner No. 5 and was one of the accused persons who were convicted under S. 323, IPC. Even though he was a petitioner, there was no mention of his name in any part of the order passed by the Hon'ble single Judge. Another criminal Misc. case was, however, preferred before a Division Bench of this Court and the Division Bench found that the Hon'ble Chief Justice in summarising the conviction and sentence of the petitioners before him, missed, by an accidental slip, to mention about the name of the petitioner No. 5 as one of the persons convicted under S. 323, IPC. The Division Bench found that there is absolutely no mention about the case of this petitioner anywhere in the aforesaid judgment though he was also a petitioner in the criminal revision along with petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 and was sentenced to undergo the same period of imprisonment with them. The Division Bench found that the mistake certainly was inadvertent one and had stealthily slipped into the very first sentence of the judgment. The Court held that the mistake or omission in the judgment requiring judicial consideration or determination of the legal or factual aspect of the case can never be construed as clerical error. The omission in that particular case being purely a clerical one, in the interest of justice such a clerical error in the judgment could and should be corrected under the provisions of S. 369, Cr. P. C. (old Code) which is corresponding to S. 362, Cr. P. C. (new Code) and while correcting the error, directed that in the judgment passed by the Chief Justice Narasimham in Crl. Revision No. 173 of 1964, the name of the petitioner No. 5 be properly inserted wherever there isany reference or consideration regarding conviction and sentence to the co-accused persons u/s. 323, IPC was made. P. C. (new Code) and while correcting the error, directed that in the judgment passed by the Chief Justice Narasimham in Crl. Revision No. 173 of 1964, the name of the petitioner No. 5 be properly inserted wherever there isany reference or consideration regarding conviction and sentence to the co-accused persons u/s. 323, IPC was made. ( 7 ) IN the case of (Banshidhar Naik v. Maguni Charan Biswal), reported in ILR (1974) Cuttack 1492, the Hon'ble single Judge of this Court decided the case the facts of which case are somewhat different from the first case. One Mangaraj Biswal was described as member of the first party in S. 145, Cr. P. C. proceeding. Preliminary order was passed on the 13/08/1969 and later the case was referred to the Munsif, Bhadrak u/s. 146, Cr. P. C. the Court found possession in favour of the first party by his order dated 27-8-73. On 13-9-73, the Sub-Divisional Officer passed final order in favour of the first party and issued a writ of delivery of possession on 27-9-73 in favour of the first party in the name of Mangaraj Biswal. The writ of delivery of possession could not be executed as there was no person in that village by name Mangaraj Biswal. Maguni however, filed an application to correct the error in the police report on the basis of which the proceeding u/s. 145, Cr. P. C. was initiated. The Sub-Divisional Officer later on 4-6-1974 passed the order for correction of the name of the first party in the police report as well as in the proceeding under S. 145, Cr. P. C. in exercise of power under Ss. 151 and 152 C. P. C. which was challenged before the Hon'ble single Judge of this Court in the criminal revision. The Court held that the correction of the police report by the Sub-Divisional Officer was clearly wrong as the Magistrate had no power to direct correction of such document and the Court also committed illegality in exercising his power u/ss. 151 and 152, C. P. C. to correct the name which has no application to the criminal proceedings. The Court held that the correction of the police report by the Sub-Divisional Officer was clearly wrong as the Magistrate had no power to direct correction of such document and the Court also committed illegality in exercising his power u/ss. 151 and 152, C. P. C. to correct the name which has no application to the criminal proceedings. The court found from the record of that case that throughout the proceeding it was actually Maguni and not Mangaraj who filed the written statement, affidavits and documents in the proceeding and on the admitted position, the final orders and the writ of delivery of possession should have been passed in the name of Maguni as the first party. The Court observed that though the Code does not vest inherent power in sub-ordinate criminal courts to review or correct their judgments, to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice it is held by courts in India that subordinate criminal courts have limited inherent powers and in exercise of those powers they may review and revise their orders for the ends of justice except in those cases where the Code itself either expressly or by necessary implication prohibits such review or revision and confers on the order some kind of finality until it is set aside by the superior Court in appeal or revision. The court also observed that S. 369 (old Code) Cr. P. C. which is equivalent to S. 362, Cr. P. C. (new Code) provides that no court, when has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same, except to correct a clerical error. In these premises, the court considered the case before him and held that correction of the name of Mangaraj to Maguni amount to correction of a clerical error and while rejecting the direction of the Sub-divisional Officer to correct the police report, upheld his action in correcting the names of Mangaraj Biswal to Maguni Charan Biswal in the final order and in the writ of delivery of possession. ( 8 ) AS indicated above, both the cases referred to above, are cases which deal with the correction of judgments and as such have no direct application to the facts of the present case. ( 8 ) AS indicated above, both the cases referred to above, are cases which deal with the correction of judgments and as such have no direct application to the facts of the present case. It was however held in the case reported in ILR 1974 Cuttack 1492 that a wrong can creep into the proceeding by a clerical error. ( 9 ) IN the present case there was an error which crept into the charge sheet. S. 215, Cr. P. C. deals with effect of errors in the charge and is quoted below :"sec. 215: Effect of errors : No error in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge, and no omission to state the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material, unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission, and it has occasioned a failure of justice. "section 211 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with contents of charge which runs thus :"sec. 211 : Contents of charge : (1) Every charge under this Code shall state the offence with which the accused is charged. (2) If the law which creates the offence gives it any specific name, the offence may be described in the charge by that name only. (3) If the law which creates the offence does not give it any specific name, so much of the definition of the offence must be stated as to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged. (4) The law and section of the law against which the offence is said to have been committed shall be mentioned in the charge. (5) The fact that the charge is made is equivalent to a statement has every legal condition required by law to constitute the offence charged was fulfilled in the particular case. (6) The charge shall be written in the language of the Court. (5) The fact that the charge is made is equivalent to a statement has every legal condition required by law to constitute the offence charged was fulfilled in the particular case. (6) The charge shall be written in the language of the Court. (7) If the accused, having been previously convicted of any offence, is liable, by reason of such previous convictions, to enhanced punishment, or to punishment of a different kind, for a subsequent offence, and it is intended to prove such previous conviction for the purpose of affecting the punishment which the Court may think fit to award for the subsequent offence, the fact, date and place of the previous conviction shall be stated in the charge; and if such statement has been omitted, the court may add it at any time before sentence is passed. "at the very beginning of S. 211 in sub-sec. (1) it is stated that every charge under this Code shall state the offence with which the accused is charged. (The underlining under the word 'accused' is made by me for emphasis.) S. 212, Cr. P. C. deals with the particulars as to time, place and person which reads as follows:"sec. 212. Particulars as to time, place and person : (1) The charge shall contain such particulars as to the time and place of the alleged offence, and the person (if any) against whom, or the thing (if any) in respect of which, it was committed, as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged. (2) When the accused is charged with criminal breach of trust dishonest misappropriation of money or other movable property, it shall be sufficient to specify the gross sum or, as the case may be, describe the movable property in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been committed, without specifying particular items or exact dates, and the charge, so framed shall be deemed to be a charge of one offence within the meaning of S. 219: provided that the time included between the first and last of such dates shall not exceed one year. "section 213, Cr. P. C. deals with the circumstances under which the manner of committing offence must be stated and reads as follows :"sec. "section 213, Cr. P. C. deals with the circumstances under which the manner of committing offence must be stated and reads as follows :"sec. 213 : When manner of committing offence must be stated : when the nature of the case is such that the particulars mentioned in Ss. 211 and 212 do not give the accused sufficient notice of the matter with which he is charged, the charge shall also contain such particulars of the manner in which the alleged offence was committed as will be sufficient for that purpose. "as already stated u/s. 215 Cr. P. C. no error in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge which obviously includes the name of the charge because of S. 211 (1), Cr. P. C, and no omission to state the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material, unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission, and it his occasioned a failure of justice, S. 216, Cr. P. C. gives power to make alteration in the charge. 9a. In the present case the name of the accused was wrongly shown in the charge and such an error could not be treated as material error as the accused in the present case was never mislead by such error occasioning any failure of justice to him and as already held by this Court in the case reported in ILR (1974) Cuttack 1492 that even subordinate criminal courts have limited inherent powers and in exercise of those powers they may review and revise their orders for the ends of justice, this finding is certainly helpful to the present case. There was nothing wrong with the court to make necessary correction by inserting the name of Binod in place of Dinabandhu which was obviously a clerical error. ( 10 ) I find that the court below is wrong in passing the impugned order dated. 17-10-87 for the reasons stated above. Miss Mohapatra had argued that by allowing the charge to be corrected it would amount to commencement of the trial after long lapse of time which would result in miscarriage of justice and in support of her contention she relied on a case reported in (1979) 47 CLT 126 (P. Chiranjivi v. Principal, M. K. C. G. Medical College, Berhampur ). This was a case where criminal proceeding was allowed to continue further after a long lapse of time of fourteen years from the date of alleged commission of offence. In this case the allegation in the complaint petition was that the petitioner secured his admission into M. K. C. G. Medical College, Berhampur by producing a false declaration and false nativity certificate to the effect that he is a permanent resident of Orissa while in fact he was not. This Court observed in this case that on available materials on record, if unrebutted, no prima facie case against the petitioner could be made out and did not constitute a basis for convicting the petitioner of the offence with which he has been charged and on facts and circumstances of the case found that the framing of charges was clearly unjustified and quashed the charges. In continuation, the court also observed that to allow the criminal proceeding to continue further after long lapse of fourteen years from the date of alleged commission of offence would amount to permitting the court proceeding to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and would not, at that stage, achieve any salutary public purpose. In the second case referred to by the learned counsel for the opposite party, reported in (1987) I OLR 119 : (1987 Cri LJ 2022) (K. Achuta Rao v. State of Orissa) the petitioner had sought to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to quash the criminal proceeding in a C. R. case pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jeypore solely on the ground of gross delay in the commencement of the trial which would constitute denial of justice and allowing such a proceeding to continue after long lapse of years would not only amount to gross miscarriage of justice but would also violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial envisaged under Art. 21 of the Constitution. In that case from the FIR and the other documents appended to the same, it appeared that the misappropriation in question occurred in between 1970 and 1971 but the FIR itself was lodged in January 1979 and after the endless investigation which continued till September, 1985, the police submitted charge-sheet and ultimately in January 1986 charges had been framed. The facts in these two cases as already indicated are completely different from the one under consideration now. The facts in these two cases as already indicated are completely different from the one under consideration now. In this case there was no delay in lodging the FIR and the proceeding was started in time and there was no allegation by anybody that the charge against the petitioner was frivolous and no charge could have been framed against him as per the allegation made in the FIR or he was being unnecessarily dragged into litigation after an unusually long time. Here, in S. 202, Cr. P. C. inquiry, the Magistrate was satisfied to take cognizance against all the accused persons including the present opposite party and directed the charges to be framed against them. This framing of the charge has not been challenged as stated above. It was only a clerical error that occurred in the charge made by the court which is sought to be corrected. Therefore, these cases will in no way help the Opp. party. ( 11 ) MISS Mohapatra, learned counsel for the Opp. party has referred to another case decided by this Court, reported in 1984 (1) OLR 724 : (1985 Cri LJ 227) (Sashibhusan Tripathy v. State ). This case speaks of the proposition of law that the court cannot alter or review the same after it signed the judgment but can only make the correction of aclerical error. As already discussed above, there was no prayer being made by the petitioner for correcting the judgment or review of the judgment or order but only to make a correction. This case, therefore, does not help the case of the Opp. party, rather helps the contention of the petitioner. The other case referred to by the learned counsel for the opp. party namely (Banibaru Gouda v. Makunda Madkani alias Muka) reported in (1987) (2) OLR 270 is also of no help in accepting the contention of the Opp. party. In this case the Division Bench decided that once the Magistrate found one party in possession by ex parte order, it could not review the final order except the correction of clerical or arithmetical error. I have already discussed above that the non-mention of the name of the petitioner in the charge was merely a clerical error and could be corrected. I have already discussed above that the non-mention of the name of the petitioner in the charge was merely a clerical error and could be corrected. ( 12 ) IN the result, the criminal revision is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the trial court is directed to make necessary correction in the charge sheet by bringing in the name of Binod Behari Mohapatra in place of Dinabandhu. Revision allowed.