JUDGMENT - DESAI A.A., J.:---The appellants/tenants make an endeavour to propound that the landlord is disentitled to seek a relief of eviction against a tenant, if a permission under the Rent Control Order is merely granted on the ground of arrears of rent or habitual defaults, being a law so declared by the Supreme Court, in a case of (Rajkumar v. Mathew Cherian)1, reported in 1990 Mh.L.J. 1284 has a binding effect as envisaged by Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The appellants, therefore, claim to set aside the impugned decree of eviction being in pursuance of a permission under Clause 13(3)(ii) viz., the habitual default. 2. In an appeal by the landlord in case of Rajkumar, cited supra a question was raised as to whether presentation of an appeal against the order of the Rent Controller granting permission to terminate the tenancy, would by itself operate as a stay to keep in abeyance the impugned permission? The Supreme Court in para 4 of its report, answered the question in the negatived and thus reversed the judgment of the High Court. 3. The Supreme Court then proceeded to observe in para 5 of the judgment as under:- "We do not, however, consider that for that reason alone, the landlord is entitled to have the decree for eviction. The eviction sought is not on the ground of bona fide need. It is only on the ground of arrears of rent. It seems to us that the interest of justice will be better served, if the tenant is asked to pay all the arrears up-to-date and also pay future rent at an enhanced rate with certain conditions as indicated below instead of being evicted : (i) The tenant is directed to deposit to pay the entire arrears of rent up-to-date within one month from today; (ii) The tenant shall pay hereafter rent at the enhanced rate of Rs. 300/- per month commencing from May 1990; (iii) If the tenant fails to pay the arrears of rent as directed, the decree of eviction shall stand restored without any further order to that effect; (iv) If tenant commits default in payment of rent for two consecutive months in future, it shall be open to the landlord without any fresh order of permission from the Rent Controller to seek eviction by instituting the suit". (emphasis supplied) 4. (emphasis supplied) 4. I am posed with the question as to whether the Supreme Court has declared the law in para 5 as propounded by the appellant. The Supreme Court in a judgment reported in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1782, (Krishena Kumar v. Union of India and others)2, in para 18 has observed as under :- "The doctrine of precedent, that is being bound by a previous decision, is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it. It does not mean that this Court is bound by the various reasons given in support of it, especially when they contain "propositions wider than the case itself required". This was that Lord Selborne said in (Caledonian Railway Co. v. Walker's Trustees)3, 1882(7) A.C. 259 and Lord Halsbury in (Quinn v. Leathem)4, 1901 A.C. 495(502) Sir Frederic Pollock has also said : "Judicial authority belongs not to the exact words used in this or that judgment, nor even to all the reasons given, but only to the principles accepted and applied as necessary grounds of the decision." The Supreme Court in para 19 of the report drew a conclusion that "In other words, the enunciation of the reason or principle upon which a question before a Court has been decided is alone as a precedent". In view of the test laid down the purport of para 5 in case of Rajkumar (cited supra) needs to be examined. 5. As a judicial principle the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of "Rajkumar, cited supra is to be read in the context of a question as raised and decided. The only question as enumerated was in para 4 of the report. Entitlement for eviction either on the ground of arrears of rent and/or habitual default or validity of Clause 13(3)(i) and (ii) of the Rent Control Order, which inter alia permits the landlord to terminate tenancy was, not under debate. The Supreme Court has not struck down the relevant provisions or nullified its effect. On the contrary, as per condition No. (iv) in para 5 the Supreme Court permitted the landlord to seek eviction by instituting the suit without obtaining the necessary permission from the Rent Controller if the tenant makes defaults in payment as per the terms enumerated therein. The Supreme Court has not struck down the relevant provisions or nullified its effect. On the contrary, as per condition No. (iv) in para 5 the Supreme Court permitted the landlord to seek eviction by instituting the suit without obtaining the necessary permission from the Rent Controller if the tenant makes defaults in payment as per the terms enumerated therein. Moreover, the Supreme Court, as laid down in condition No. (iii) has granted a decree of eviction, making execution thereof, contingent to the failure of a tenant to pay the arrears of rent as indicated. 6. The Supreme Court in the case reported in A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1384, (Dalbir Singh and others v. State of Punjab)5, has held that for the purposes of the doctrine of precedents, statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts, is a vital element in the decision. On scrutiny of para 5 from the judgment in the case of Rajkumar, cited supra, according to me, the Supreme Court has not enunciated any principle of law to resolve the controversy arising out of facts as involved, so as to serve as a law so declared, as envisaged by Article 141 of the Constitution. 7. The Supreme Court has not wiped out the legal right of the landlord to evict the tenant on the ground of arrears of rent, or habitual default. However, in the set of circumstances the Supreme Court with a view to further the cause of justice imposed certain stringent conditions. What is considered while granting such equitable relief could not assume a status of a ratio decidendi, much less the 'law declared' as envisaged under Article 141 of the Constitution. 8. The appellants/tenants even if permitted to draw a logical conclusion, as tried to be canvassed, it would not be a precedent with binding force, in absence of direct involvement of the issue and decision thereon by the Supreme Court . This is the test re-affirmed by the Supreme Court. This is the test re-affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case reported in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 781. (M/s. Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana and another)6. 9. In view of this, appeal must fail. The same is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. -----