JUDGMENT 1. 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenges the termination of the services of the petitioner by the State Government vide impugned order dated 11.5.89, annexure P/3 to the writ petition. 2. Briefly, the facts are that the petitioner was appointed as Primary School Teacher on the commencement of academic session but was terminated before summer vacation. A writ petition was filed by the petitioner in 1988 challenging the aforesaid appointment and termination. Following the ratio of Chand Tamboh's case, the writ petition filed by the petitioner was decided. He was initially appointed as Teacher in 1985. His services were terminated w.e.f. 15.5.86. Again, was reappointed on 13.5.87 and terminated at the end of academic session in May 1988. He was reappointed vide order dated 30.6.88 on the basis of stay order in his case. According to the petitioner, it has been the practice of the respondents to appoint him at the start of academic session and dispense with his services at the end of the session. Despite the fact that vacancies existed his services are terminated only to deprive him the salary and allowances of the vacations. The petitioner alleged favouritism, nepotism and corruption on the part of the respondents. 3. Vide order dated 11.5.1989, annexure P/3 to the petition, the services of the petitioner were terminated at the end of the academic session. Against this order, some other persons, who were also aggrieved with the same order, filed D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1656 of 1989 before this Court, wherein the following order was passed: "....meanwhile, the services of the petitioners shall not be terminated." Though, the petitioner was not a party to the aforesaid writ petition, but on the basis of the same, he requested the respondents to give the benefit of the aforesaid order to him. But he was deprived of the benefit. Hence this writ petition. 4. The case of the petitioner is that he was holding a post against substantive and vacant post. On the other hand, the management took a false pretext in justification of the termination order that in order to give opportunity to a better qualified person with experience of teaching for larger number of years than the petitioner had, termination of the services of the petitioner was necessitated. On the other hand, the management took a false pretext in justification of the termination order that in order to give opportunity to a better qualified person with experience of teaching for larger number of years than the petitioner had, termination of the services of the petitioner was necessitated. In the justification of termination, an affidavit was filed and it was stated therein that the petitioner had been re-employed w.e.f. 11.7.89 and that he would be paid the salary to which he would be entitled to. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the order terminating the services of the petitioner was wholly void and illegal. By terminating the petitioner off and on before the commencement of the new academic session and re-employing him at the start of the session, is not permitted under law. The petitioner had also not been given the salary equivalent to those who were doing the same work. What is noteworthy is that the gap between the appointment and termination, off and on, as aforesaid, is very short. This shows the mal-intention of the management, which had no right to terminate the services of a teacher, like the petitioner, who had been working for such a long period. In fact, the petitioner had become entitled for confirmation but the same was also refused to him on the ground that he did not posses the requisite qualification. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that non-possession of requisite qualification, in an after thought invented to justify the aforesaid termination order. By creating artificial break for short period, the respondents created a ground for pleading that the petitioner could not be confirmed. The termination order as well as refusal to confirm the petitioner, is mala fide and the same cannot be sustained in law. The principle of equal pay for equal work has also not been applied in this case and the management has been behaving in utter disregard of this principle as well as the principle of natural justice in this case. In Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation ( AIR 1990 SC 371 ) , law in this regard has been laid down. In Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation ( AIR 1990 SC 371 ) , law in this regard has been laid down. To the same effect is the view taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in U.P. Income Tax Department Contingent paid Staff Welfare Association v. Union of India and Ors. 1987 (Supp.) SCC 658 . 6. For what I have said above, I am of the view that the petitioner deserves for the reliefs claimed by him and the writ petition is liable to be allowed. 7. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. Impugned order dated 11.5.1989, annexure P/3 to the writ petition is set aside and the respondents are directed to pay the petitioner all consequential benefits including back wages for the period between his termination and reappointment (excepting the period in which be himself did not work). Parties shall bear their own costs.Writ Petition Allowed. *******