JUDGMENT K.G. Balakrishnan, J. 1. This is a writ petition filed under Art.227 of the Constitution of Indiachallenging the order passed by the District Judge in R.C.R.P. 122 of 1983.The landlord is the petitioner. The petition relates to a two storeyed building inBroadway, Ernakulam. This building belonged to his father and as per Ext Algift deed it was given to the petitioner on 30-3-1973. This building was takenon rent originally on 1-9-65 by the father of respondents 8 and 9 herein forconducting a business in the name "Indian Hardware Stores". Monthly rentpayable was Rs.750/-. Petitioner contended before the Rent Control Court thathe wanted the building in question for conducting a stationery business. Thepetition was originally filed against respondents 8 and 9 alleging that thepetitioner bona fide required the building for own occupation. Respondents 8and 9 contended that the building in question was taken on rent by themrepresenting a firm of partners by name "T. H. Ibrahim Karim and Company"for the purpose of doing business in the name and style "Indian HardwareStores" and that the partnership consisted of others also. It was alleged thatthe 8th respondent had retired from the firm and the business was beingconducted by respondents 9 and 4. So, the 4th respondent was subsequentlyimpleaded and this was followed later by impleadment of respondents 5 to 7also. These respondents contended that the lease was obtained on behalf ofthe firm "Indian Hardware Stores" and respondents 8 and 9 retired from thebusiness and the same is being carried on by respondents 4 to 7. Therespondents denied the bona fide requirement of the petitioner. 2. The Rent Controller held that the lease was in favour of respondents 8 and9 and they had filed an earlier application for fixation of fair rent and thereforethe contention that the lease was in favour of a firm was rejected. Thepetitioner's father was having stationery business nearby and the petitionerwas doing business alongwith his father and therefore the Rent Controller heldthat he did not bona fide require the building. This order was challenged by allthe contesting respondents including respondents 8 and 9. The appellateauthority held that respondents 8 and 9 are the real tenants and that thepetitioner bona fide required the building for own occupation. This order waschallenged by respondents 4 to 7 before the District Judge, Ernakulam. This order was challenged by allthe contesting respondents including respondents 8 and 9. The appellateauthority held that respondents 8 and 9 are the real tenants and that thepetitioner bona fide required the building for own occupation. This order waschallenged by respondents 4 to 7 before the District Judge, Ernakulam. TheDistrict Judge by exercising the revisional jurisdiction set aside the orderpassed by the appellate authority and held that the petitioner did not requirethe building and that the petition was only a pretext for evicting therespondents. This finding is challenged in this proceeding. 3. Two fold contentions have been urged by the petitioner's counsel. At first itis contended that the District Judge was not justified in interfering with theorder passed by the appellate authority. The District Judge had onlysupervisory jurisdiction and the reappraisal of the whole evidence and comingto a different conclusion altogether was illegal and unjustified in the facts of thecase. The next contention urged by the petitioner's counsel is thatrespondents 4 to 7 are subtenants and they are bound by the order of evictionpassed against respondents 8 and 9 and they have no right to file a revisionagainst the order of the appellate authority. 4. Under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (Act 2 of 1965) atenant has been defined under S.2(6) and it specifically says that it does notinclude a person placed in occupation of a building by its tenant. So, thedefinition of tenant as such does not take in a subtenant within its purview.Under S.11(4)(i) the landlord is given the right to recover possession of thebuilding if the tenant after the commencement of this Act, without the consentof the landlord, transfers his right under the lease or sublets the entire buildingor any portion thereof if the lease does not confer on him any right to do so.Proviso to S.11(4)(i) is to the effect that an application under S.11(4)(i) shallnot be filed unless the landlord has sent a registered notice to the tenantintimating the contravention of the said condition of the lease and the, tenanthas failed to terminate the transfer or the sublease. S.21 of the Act furthersays that any order for eviction of a tenant passed under this Act shall bebinding on all subtenant under such tenant, whether they were parties to theproceedings or not, provided that such order was not obtained by fraud orcollusion. S.21 of the Act furthersays that any order for eviction of a tenant passed under this Act shall bebinding on all subtenant under such tenant, whether they were parties to theproceedings or not, provided that such order was not obtained by fraud orcollusion. S.21 also says that in case where subletting is allowed under theoriginal agreement of tenancy the subtenant shall be made a party to theproceedings if he had given notice of the subtenancy to the landlord. 5. In Rupchand v. Raghuvanshi (AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1889) the questioncame up for consideration was whether a subtenant can challenge the decreepassed in a suit between the landlord and the tenant. A landlord brought a suitagainst his lessee for ejectment without impleading the sublessee asdefendant. The lessee did not contest and an ex parte decree for eviction waspassed. The sublessee thereupon fled a suit against landlord and the lessorfor declaration that he was not bound by the decree which had been obtainedby collusion between defendants in order to injure the plaintiff and to evict himfrom the premises without the decree being passed against him. Repelling thiscontention the Supreme Court held: "I.......It is clear that the law does not require that the sublessee need be madea party. It has been rightly pointed out by the High Court that in all caseswhere the landlord institutes a suit against the lessee for possession of theland on the basis of a valid notice to quit served on the lessee and does notimplead the sublessee as a party to the suit, the object of the landlord is toeject the sublessee from the land in execution of the decree and such anobject is quite legitimate. The decree in such a suit would bind the sublessee.This may act harshly on the sublessee; but this is a position well understoodby him when he took the sublease: The law allows this and so the omissioncannot be said to be an improper act". In Narayan v. Kalan Bai ( AIR 1986 Raj. 52 ) a Single Judge of the RajasthanHigh Court took the view that the subtenants, unless there is a privity ofcontract between them and the landlord, have no locus standi to challenge thedecree of eviction passed against the tenant in-chief. 6. In Narayan v. Kalan Bai ( AIR 1986 Raj. 52 ) a Single Judge of the RajasthanHigh Court took the view that the subtenants, unless there is a privity ofcontract between them and the landlord, have no locus standi to challenge thedecree of eviction passed against the tenant in-chief. 6. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that a subtenant is anaggrieved party and hence entitled to file an appeal or revision against theorder passed in a proceeding between the landlord and the tenant Reliancewas placed on a decision reported in Kalyanasundaram Pillay v. Ramamoorthy( 1985 KLT 922 ). It was held that a subtenant is a person aggrieved by anorder and he can maintain appeal or revision against the order passed againstthe tenant. It may be noticed that Kalyanasundaram Pillai's case is notapplicable to the facts of this case. Moreover, it is specifically stated that in acase where eviction is sought on the grounds other than the grounds ofsublease different considerations may arise. In Kalyanasundaram Pillai's casethe dictum laid down in Karam Singh v. Pratap Chand (AIR 1964 SC 1035)was followed to hold that sublessee is entitled to challenge the order ofeviction passed against the lessor. I will presently show that the decisionreported in Karam Singh v. Pratap Chand (AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1305)also may not apply to the facts of this case. 7. The decision reported in Karam Singh v. Pratap Chand (AIR 1964 SupremeCourt 1305) is a case coming under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Prior tothe Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 the Act applicable was Delhi and Ajmer RentControl Act 1952 which prohibited eviction of the tenant at the suit of alandlord excepting the case mentioned in proviso to S.13 therein. While such amatter was pending before the High Court, Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 cameinto force. The Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act was repealed by the laterenactment in so far as it relates to the Union Territory of Delhi. However, inDelhi Rent Control Act, 1958 there was a provision that all the pendingproceedings shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with theprovisions of the repealed Act. The question was considered in a proceedingsinitiated by the subtenant. But, it may be remembered that under the DelhiRent Control Act and in the earlier Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 thesubtenant was included under the definitions of a tenant. The question was considered in a proceedingsinitiated by the subtenant. But, it may be remembered that under the DelhiRent Control Act and in the earlier Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 thesubtenant was included under the definitions of a tenant. It is so mentionedunder S.2(l) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. S.14(1)(b) and 14(3) thereinconferred specific rights on the subtenants. It was only under thatcircumstances the Supreme Court held that a subtenant had his own right toappeal from the decree. A subtenant who came into possession prior to theparticular period was given all the benefits of the tenant whereas under KeralaBuildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (Act 2/65) the subtenant is notincluded within the definition of tenant and therefore Karam Singh v. PratapChand ( AIR 1964 SC 1305 ) has no application. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents relying on a decision reported inEbrahim Aboobacker v. Custodian General ( AIR 1952 S.C. 319 ) contendedthat the respondents 4 to 7 who filed revision before the District Judge arepersons aggrieved and that they are entitled to maintain such petitions. It ispointed out that a person who is brought before a court to submit a decision, ifthe decision goes against him thereby "is a person aggrieved by that decision".It may be noted the circumstances under which the respondents 4 to 7 wereimpleaded in the rent control proceedings. Initially the R.C.P. was filed byrespondents 8 and 9 alleging that the petitioner bona fide required the buildingfor own occupation. Respondents 8 and 9 contended that they left thepartnership firm and the fourth respondent was conducting the business. Thenthe fourth respondent herein was impleaded. He later contended that the shopwas in the possession of respondents 5 to 7. They too were impleadedsubsequently. The Rent Control Court found that the original lease was not infavour of the firm and respondents 8 and 9 were alone tenants under thelandlord. It is also important to note that respondents 8 and 9 filed applicationfor fixation of fair rent and at no point of time they contended that the buildingwas let out to a firm. There is no evidence that the landlord gave permission tosublease the building to respondents 4 to 7 herein. Under the abovecircumstances respondents 4 to 7 cannot be held to be persons aggrieved bythe order passed against respondents 8 and 9 as they have no legal right tochallenge the same. 9. There is no evidence that the landlord gave permission tosublease the building to respondents 4 to 7 herein. Under the abovecircumstances respondents 4 to 7 cannot be held to be persons aggrieved bythe order passed against respondents 8 and 9 as they have no legal right tochallenge the same. 9. It may be remembered that in Jadavji Purushottam v. Navnitbhai (AIR 1987SC 2146) the Supreme Court held that if a mortgagee in possession was notempowered to create lease which would be binding on mortgagor afterredemption of mortgage the tenant inducted by mortgagee is liable to beevicted on redemption of mortgage. That was a case in which the mortgagormortgaged a house property with possession to mortgagee. The mortgagedeed provided that the mortgage could be redeemed whenever themortgagors paid the mortgage amount. Under one of the clauses of themortgage deed the mortgagee was permitted to lease out the mortgagedhouse property to any one. The mortgagee later filed a suit for recovery ofmortgage amount which was resulted in consent decree. On making paymentof mortgaged amount the final decree was drawn up. The mortgagor took outexecution application for obtaining possession of disputed premises. It wasalleged by the tenant that though the lease was given by the mortgagee, thelease was binding on the mortgagors as well. The Supreme Court held: "In view of the fact the mortgagors had not empowered the mortgagee tocreate a lease which would be binding on them after the redemption of themortgage and the tenant's rights, as a tenant, did not become enlarged bymeans of any Tenancy legislation which came to be enacted after the leasewas granted, the tenant could claim tenancy rights only as against his landlordviz., the mortgagee and not against the mortgagors. As soon as themortgagee's rights become extinguished by the redemption of the mortgage,neither he nor anyone inducted by him has a right to be in possession of themortgage property. Consequently, the mortgagors were entitled to seekejectment of the mortgagee and the tenant inducted by him. The tenant, hadno independent rights and hence it was not necessary that he should havebeen made a party to the suit filed by the mortgagee or the executionapplication taken out by the mortgagors after the redemption of the mortgage.His position was akin to that of a subtenant whose rights were conterminouswith those of the tenant himself. As such the execution application takenagainst the mortgagee would be binding on the tenant. As such the execution application takenagainst the mortgagee would be binding on the tenant. Having no independentrights of his own, the tenant could not contend that the decrees and theexecution application were not binding on him as he was not made a party tothe proceedings" In Kerala Shoe Company v. K.C. Bhaskaran, (AIR 1989 Supreme Court1110) the Supreme Court re-emphasised this position and held that a tenantcontinuing in possession even after the redemption of mortgage is liable to be evicted in a suit for recovery of possession by the mortgagor and it was heldthat a tenant was not entitled to the protection of Rent Control Act. 10. Under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, the subtenant isexcluded from the definition of tenant The order passed against the tenant isbinding on the subtenant. The position of the subtenant who came intopossession of the premises without the consent of the landlord is akin to thatof a tenant inducted by mortgagee. Merely because he is made a formal partyto the proceedings for eviction it does not clothe him with the sight tochallenge the order of eviction passed in favour of the landlord against theprincipal tenant. The subtenant cannot be construed as a person aggrievedagainst suck an order. Different considerations may arise if the question ofsublease itself is a matter of adjudication and the eviction is sought underS.11(4)(2) i.e., unauthorised sublease. Respondents 4 to 7 have no case thatthe landlord permitted them to occupy the building. Under that circumstancethey were not entitled to challenge the order of eviction passed and therevision filed by them was not maintainable. The revisional authority lackedjurisdiction, hence the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 11. The counsel for the petitioner pointed out that even on the merits of thecase the revisional authority was not justified in reversing the finding of theappellate authority. It is pointed out that the powers of the revisional authorityare only supervisory in character. Whereas the respondents' counselsubmitted that the revisional court was justified in reversing the finding on thequestion of bona fides and the revisional court has got power to consider thepropriety and legality of the order. It may be noted that the petitionercontended that he wanted to start a stationery business in the building ownedby him. Whereas the respondents' counselsubmitted that the revisional court was justified in reversing the finding on thequestion of bona fides and the revisional court has got power to consider thepropriety and legality of the order. It may be noted that the petitionercontended that he wanted to start a stationery business in the building ownedby him. His bona fides were suspected for the reason that his father wasconducting a shop and the petitioner, being the only son, would join thebusiness of his father and that the son did not really want to start a shop of hisown. The revisional authority had also taken note of the fact that the fatherwas suffering from some ailments and the petitioner's help was necessary forhim to conduct the business. There is no such evidence in this case. Theevidence only shows that the petitioner's father suspected that he had someheart ailment. The petitioner's father is having independent business. Thepetitioner wanted to set up a stationery shop of his own and it is alsosubmitted by the petitioner's counsel that after the filing of this petition thepetitioner has started a shop of his own in another part of the town for whichbe obtained a building by paying a heavy rent. This also is relevant fact to bereckoned with in a proceedings for eviction on the ground of bona fide ownoccupation. Recently the Supreme Court held in Gulabhai v. Nalin Narsi Vohra& others (JT 1991 (3) SC 112) that for determining the question of bona fideneed, subsequent events can be considered provided they are relevant fordetermining the question of bona fides. Earlier decisions of Supreme Court inHasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad ( 1981 (3) SCR 605 ); PasupuletiVenkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders ( 1975 (3) SCR 958 ) andAmarjith Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain (1987 (1) SCR 272) also hold theview that for making the right of remedy claimed by the party just andmeaningful and also to accord with the current realities, the court can andmust take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to theinstitution of the proceedings. It is also proved that the petitioner was not inpossession of any building of his own in the near vicinity. It is also proved that the petitioner was not inpossession of any building of his own in the near vicinity. So, the evidenceadduced by the petitioner clearly showed that he bona fide required thebuilding for his own occupation and the appellate authority was justified inreversing the finding of the Rent Control Court and holding that the petitionerbona fide required the building for his own occupation. The revisional courtwas not justified in reversing this finding. In the result, I hold that Ext. P3 order passed by the District Judge in R.C.R.P.122 of 1983 is illegal and unsustainable in law. I set aside the same and directthat the petitioner is entitled to get eviction on the basis of the order dated7-10-1983 passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority in R.G. A 23 of1981. The petitioner is entitled to get costs of this proceedings fromrespondents 4 to 7. Original Petition is allowed.