Judgment : This is a revision filed by A-1 in C.C. No. 1/89 on the file of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, against confirmation of his conviction under S. 193, IPC and sentence to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 3,000 by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad. 2. The facts of the case as deposed to by the material prosecution witnesses are : The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau Anantapur Range, filed complaint alleging that the 2nd accused, Raghava Rao, who, as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner herein, was acquitted by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, on a separate appeal filed by him, reported to the Inspector of Police, ACB at Anantapur on 14-11-1984 that one M. Narayana Reddy, S.I. of Police of Patnam Police Station, Kadiri Taluk was demanding a bribe of Rs. 2,000/-from him. It was also alleged by A-2 that the said sub-inspector also demanded Rs. 2,500/- towards illegal gratification for release of Velluka Reddy and when an amount of Rs. 350/- was paid by A-1 to the S.O. of Police the said Velluka Reddy was released. A-2 made a further allegation that he was wrongfully detained by the said S.I. of Police from 12-11-1984 to 13-11-1984 and when he promised to pay Rs. 1,000/- within four or five days, the said S.I. of Police released him, and that since he was unwilling to pay the bribe, he was reporting the matter to the ACB. On the said report of A-2 a case in Cr. No. 19/ACB/Kurnool/84 u/S. 161, IPC and u/S. 5(2) and S. 5(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was registered against the S.I. of Police, a regular investigation was initiated and the 2nd accused was sent to him with ten hundred rupee notes to trap him but the same could not be successful as the S.I. of Police was not available in the Police Station. It is further alleged in the complaint that a case before the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) was filed and the same was numbered as 47/86 and during the course of inquiry of the said case, A-1 was examined as P.W. 1 on 16-1-1987 and cross-examined on 17-1-1987 while A-2 was examined on 17-1-1987. A-1 in his examination-in-chief on oath on 16-1-1987 deposed that he paid Rs. A-1 in his examination-in-chief on oath on 16-1-1987 deposed that he paid Rs. 350/- to the S.I. of Police, Narayana Reddy by way of bribe to release his relative Velluka Reddy. However, A-1 who was cross-examined on oath on 17-1-1987, resiled from his earlier evidence in Chief-examination on oath contradicted his own statements in Chief-examination by deposing in cross-examination that what all he deposed on 16-1-1987 is false and what all he is deposing on 17-1-1987 is true and thereby he supported the S.I. of Police against whom a charge of bribe is levelled. Thus the petitioner herein turned hostile to the prosecution. So he was cross-examined by the prosecution, but he supported the S.I. of Police, the charged officer. 3. After completion of enquiry, the learned Member of the Tribunal observed in his order dated 27-2-1987 that both the accused contradicted their statements. A-1 contradicted his own statement in Chief-examination given on oath whereas A-2 deliberately contradicted his earlier report given to the police with a view to help the charged officer they have committed an offence of perjury. The learned Member of the Tribunal issued a show-cause notice to both the accused to explain why action should not be taken against them. Though the accused received notice on 17-3-1987 they did not choose to reply. Then the member of the Tribunal addressed the Government to take action against the accused for an offence of perjury. In pursuance of that, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused u/S. 193, IPC by the Deputy Superintendent of Police. 4. The prosecution in all examined P.Ws. 1 to 3 and marked Exs. P-1 and P-5. When questioned as to the commission of offence they denied the same. The trial court after considering the entire material on record convicted the accused as stated supra. On appeal by A-1 the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad confirmed the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court against him. However, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, on a separate appeal by A-2, he was acquitted of the charges framed against him. A-1, petitioner herein, filed this revision challenging the conviction and sentence confirmed against him. 5. However, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, on a separate appeal by A-2, he was acquitted of the charges framed against him. A-1, petitioner herein, filed this revision challenging the conviction and sentence confirmed against him. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, contends that the Tribunal for Disciplinary proceedings is a Court within the meaning of S. 195(2)(B) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that therefore the Deputy Superintendent of Police cannot file a chargesheet against the accused as the Tribunal itself has to file a complaint. It must be noted that the offence u/S. 193, IPC is an offence against the public justice. Therefore, complaint for the said offence cannot be filed by any other authority, except by the court when the offence is committed before the Court. According to S. 195(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the term Court is defined as a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court and includes a Tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of S. 195 of the Code Criminal Procedure. In such a case the complaint has to be filed by the Court itself following the procedure laid down under S. 195, Cr.P.C. No provision declaring the Tribunal herein to be a Court or equivalent to a court for the purpose of S. 195, Cr.P.C. is brought to my notice. Interpretating a similar situation the Supreme Court in Balram v. Justice P. B. Lentin AIR 1988 SC 2267 : (1989 Cri LJ 306) held that a Commission of Inquiry is not a Court to be so called. A Commission is obviously appointed by the appropriate Government for the information of its mind in order for it to decide as to the course of action to be followed. It is, therefore, a fact finding body not required to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and has no adjudicatory functions. The Government is not bound to accept its recommendations or act upon its findings. The mere fact that the procedure adopted by it is of a legal character and it has the power to administer an oath will not impart to it the statute of a Court. The Government is not bound to accept its recommendations or act upon its findings. The mere fact that the procedure adopted by it is of a legal character and it has the power to administer an oath will not impart to it the statute of a Court. It is a familiar feature of modern legislation to set up bodies and tribunals, and entrust them with work of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative character, but they are not Courts in the accepted sense of that term, though they may possess some of the trappings of a court. In my view, the same proposition applies to the tribunal for disciplinary proceedings. 6. Further it is also not brought to my notice that there is any provision in the Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal Act declaring the tribunal as the Court for the purpose of S. 195, Cr.P.C. Therefore, I see no force in the contention. 7. It is contended by Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy learned counsel for the petitioner, that the offence u/S. 193, IPC is an offence punishable with seven years rigorous imprisonment and therefore the same has to be tried as a warrant case. But in the present case the accused has been tried under summons procedure and therefore the entire proceedings are vitiated and illegal. On that count itself, the learned counsel submits, the accused is entitled for acquittal. The learned Public Prosecutor submitting that it is a fact that the case is triable as a warrant case, contended that though the accused was tried under sommons procedure and proceedings are valid since no prejudice is caused to the accused. He points out that unless some prejudice is shown to have been caused to the accused it cannot be said that the trial is vitiated. Further it is submitted that though this point was raised before the appellate court the same was not sought to be made a ground to assail the conviction and sentence and therefore it is not open to the petitioner to press that point in the revision for purposes of urging that the proceedings stand vitiated on this ground. Further it is submitted that though this point was raised before the appellate court the same was not sought to be made a ground to assail the conviction and sentence and therefore it is not open to the petitioner to press that point in the revision for purposes of urging that the proceedings stand vitiated on this ground. It is pertinent to notice that in para 17 of the judgment of the appellate Court, it is observed as follows : "The learned Counsel has also submitted, in the passing that though an offence under S. 193, IPC is a warrant case, but the learned trial judge has tried it by summons case procedure, but since he did not seek to assail the conviction of the appellant on this ground I do not consider it necessary to go into this question." Thus, before the appellate Court, as submitted the conviction of the petitioner (A. 1) was not assailed on the ground of trying the accused under summons procedure instead of under warrant procedure. The learned counsel for the petitioner now contends that the concession made on behalf of the accused during the course of the appeal is not binding at the revision stage. In this regard he relied upon a decision in Public Prosecutor v. Subbanna, AIR 1947 Mad 239 : (1947) 48 Cri LJ 112 wherein it was held (at page 115 (of Cri LJ)) :- "A concession wrongly made on behalf of the accused cannot stand in the way of the appellate court setting aside a conviction based on such a concession; similarly a concession wrongly made by the public prosecutor should not stand in the way of an appeal against an acquittal based on that concession being allowed. There is no distinction as regards the powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal between an appeal from an order of acquittal and an appeal from a conviction." 8. The above proposition of law was also accepted and followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Re Narayana AIR 1962 AP 166 : (1962 (1) Cri LJ 394). It is thus clear that a wrong concession made by the accused or the advocate for the accused, will not bind the appellate court and it is open to such court to consider the case on merits and that this proposition extends even to revisions. It is thus clear that a wrong concession made by the accused or the advocate for the accused, will not bind the appellate court and it is open to such court to consider the case on merits and that this proposition extends even to revisions. The learned counsel submits that the revisional court, therefore, can consider the case on merits irrespective of the concessions made by the advocate for the accused or the public prosecutor in the course of appeal. I see sufficient force in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 9. The main question therefore that is to be considered in this revision, is whether the trial of an accused under summons procedure instead of under warrant procedure renders the trial vitiated. 10. In this case the petitioner, A-1 was charged for the offence u/S. 193 of the Indian Indian Indian Penal Code for which the maximum sentence prescribed is rigorous imprisonment up to seven years. It being so, the offence is triable under warrant procedure. However, the Court below tried the case under summons procedure. In this case the complaint was filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police at the instance of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings. Therefore, it is to be treated as a case instituted otherwise that on a police report attracting the procedure laid down u/Ss. 244 to 248 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The benefits available to the accused under the warrant procedure are not wholly open in summons procedure to the accused. The legislature with great care and caution provided a particular procedure for warrant cases as the accused therein has to face a grave charge for which the punishment prescribed is more than two years. In summons case the punishment prescribed is less than two years, and therefore the procedure prescribed thereunder is almost simple and comparatively summary in nature. Therefore, the benefits made available by the legislature to the accused tried under warrant procedure and different and varied. As such in cases where the accused was tried under summons procedure instead of under warrant procedure, he suffers deprivation of the opportunities and benefits available otherwise under the warrant procedure. Every right of the accused is well knit in the Code of Criminal Procedure in order to link it with the protection available under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. Every right of the accused is well knit in the Code of Criminal Procedure in order to link it with the protection available under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, mandatory for the Courts to follow meticulously the procedure - either warrant or summons - prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure in trying the accused, lest it may attract the consequences that flow from violation of the mandatory procedure prescribed by law culminating in deprivation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. 11. The contention of the learned Public Prosecutor that there is no prejudice caused to the accused to render the trial vitiated is not acceptable since it does deprive him of certain benefits and opportunities available under the warrant procedure. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon a decision of the Kerala High Court in State v. Haskaran AIR 1971 Kerala 188 : (1971 Cri LJ 955) where it was held (at page 956 (of Cri LJ)) : "The procedures prescribed for warrant and summons cases are entirely different. The procedure prescribed for summons cases is simpler and speedier than that prescribed for warrant cases. Warrant cases as they deal with offences graver than those in summons cases cannot be tried in the same simple and speedy fashion as summons cases. Greater opportunities for defence are offered to the accused in a warrant case than in a summons case. Unlike in a summons case a charge has to be framed in a warrant case and the accused has also a right to reserve cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses till a last stage. These are substantial and valuable rights which an accused has if the procedure prescribed in Chapter XXI is followed and he cannot be deprived of them. The difference between the two forms of trial is not therefore merely one of form importing more irregularity curable u/S. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. On the other hand, it is so vital that there is an almost indefeasible presumption of prejudice to the accused if a warrant case is tried as a summons case." 12. The difference between the two forms of trial is not therefore merely one of form importing more irregularity curable u/S. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. On the other hand, it is so vital that there is an almost indefeasible presumption of prejudice to the accused if a warrant case is tried as a summons case." 12. The learned counsel took me through another decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Public Prosecutor v. Vaijanth AIR 1971 AP 48 : (1971 Cri LJ 205) wherein also it is held that the trial of a warrant case under summons procedure amounts to an illegality and not an irregularity curable u/S. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908 (equivalent to S. 465, Cr.P.C. 1973). 13. Therefore, the Court below has committed an illegality in trying the warrant case under summons procedure and deprived the accused of the benefits available under warrant procedure. Accordingly, the trial of the accused is vitiated. 14. The learned Public Prosecutor next contended that even if the trial is vitiated, the matter has to be remanded to the Court below for trial afresh as the offence is one of perjury. In this case the offence took place some time between 1984 and 1987. In view of this long lapse of time, I do not think this case to be a fit and proper one for remand to the Court below for trial afresh. 15. In the result, the revision is allowed by setting aside the conviction and sentence awarded to the petitioner. The fine amount, if paid, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Revision allowed.