RATNACHANDRIAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a tenants' Revision Petition directed against the common order dated 23-6-1989 in h. R. C No. 1997/1984 and H. R. C. No. 3015/1984 on the file of the Chief Judge, Court of Small causes, Bangalore City (for short 'the (rial court' or 'the trial Judge') allowing the eviction petition filed by the respondent-landlady against deceased Smt. Mangala Gouri mother of petitioners and one other tenant by name Sri rangacharya under clauses (h) and (j) of Section 21 (1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act') and directing both the said tenants to vacate the respective residential premises in their occupation within six months from the date of his order. ( 2 ) AGAINST the said order, Sri H. S. Ran-gacharya, the sole respondent in H. R. C. No. 3015/1984 had filed C. R. P. No. 45/1990 which is decided by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice on 12-1- 1990 by passing the following order:"after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, I am clearly of the view in this case the order of the Court below directing eviction under Section 21 (l) (h) of the Karnataka rent Control Act is fully warranted. The evidence discloses that the landlady T. S. Gcctha alias Geetha Ramakrishna is residing in a rented house. Law does not say that even though she has a house of her own, she must continue to live in a rented house to enable the tenant to continue in the premises belonging to her. Further, it is clear that the will stated to have been executed by the mother of geetha cannot be pressed into service because the legatee is Geetha's daughter sumati, whose guardian is Geetha's sister. In any event, that cannot weigh in favour of geetha because she is not the legatee. Admittedly, this is the only property owned by her, where the three tenants have already vacated. 2. Under these circumstances, I uphold the order of eviction and dismiss the Civil revision Petition. Time to vacate is granted till 30th of April, 1990". In any event, that cannot weigh in favour of geetha because she is not the legatee. Admittedly, this is the only property owned by her, where the three tenants have already vacated. 2. Under these circumstances, I uphold the order of eviction and dismiss the Civil revision Petition. Time to vacate is granted till 30th of April, 1990". A review petition filed by Sri H. S. Ran- gacharya against the said order i. n C. P. No. 102/1990 is also dismissed by the Hon'ble the chief Justice by order dated 5-7-1990 since the order in C. P. No. 45/1990 was passed on merits and granting time to the said tenant till 5-8-1990 finally to vacate the premises. It was submitted at the time of arguments of this Revision Petition that Sri H. S. Rangacharya has since vacated the premises in his occupation. ( 3 ) REFERENCE will herein after be made to the parties to this Revision Petition with reference to the positions they occupied in H. R. C. No. 1997/1984 in the trial Court. ( 4 ) RESPONDENT-LANDLADY filed eviction petition against both Smt. Mangala Gouri and Sri h. S. Rangacharya on 26-7-1984 seeking their eviction from the respective premises in their occupation in the premises bearing No. 8 (New No. 64), Shankar Mutt Road, Rajamahal Vilas Extension, bangalore (for short 'the premises') under clauses (h) and 0 of Section 21 (1) of the act. Original tenant Smt. Mangala Gouri having died during the initial stages of eviction petition, her 13 sons and one daughter, who are petitioners in this Revision Petition, were brought on record and petitioners 5 and 12 only had filed objections opposing the prayer of the landlady. ( 5 ) THE common averments made in both thee viction petitions by the landlady were that she is the absolute owner of the premises in occupation of the two tenants, that the original tenant Smt. Mangala Gouri was in occupation of a portion of the premises on a rent of Rs. 9007- and the other tenant Sri Rangacharya was in occupation of another portion on a rent of Rs. 250/- per month. The landlady was staying in the premises of her mother as she does not have any residential premises of her own except the premises. She could not continue to stay with her mother. 9007- and the other tenant Sri Rangacharya was in occupation of another portion on a rent of Rs. 250/- per month. The landlady was staying in the premises of her mother as she does not have any residential premises of her own except the premises. She could not continue to stay with her mother. Therefore, she was in reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises for her own residence after demolishing portions in occupation of five different tenants including Smt. Man- gala Gouri and H. S. Rangacharya and putting up a new construction suitable for her and her family consisting of her husband, who was working as professor in the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore and her daughter out of sufficient funds she was having for the purpose of putting up a new construction. Subsequently, the landlady had to shift her residence to II Floor of No. 36/2, i Main, I Cross, Vyyalikaval, Bangalore paying a rent of Rs. 1,200/- and advance of Rs. 25,000/- for certain reasons which were beyond her control. Therefore, she was facing great hardship in paying heavy rent for want of her own house. She had also got an approved plan sanctioned by the corporation for putting up a new construction. She had also filed eviction petition against three other tenants. She wanted to demolish the very old building occupied by the five tenants. She had to file eviction petition since the tenants did not comply with her request to vacate the premises. ( 6 ) AS per the submission made by Sri P. D. Surana, learned counsel for the petitioners- tenants, the premises is sufficiently a huge building built on a site measuring 86' x 150' consisting of five independent tenements of which a portion of 4 1/2 squares was in occupation of one Saras- wathi, another 5 squares was in the occupation of one Anasuya, another 81/2 squares was in the occupation of Sri H. S. Rangacharya, another portion measuring 9 squares was in the occupation of one G. S. Paramashivaiah and Smt. Man- gala Gouri was in occupation of the remaining portion. Leaving apart the space occupied by the said building, there was still an open space measuring 27' x 120' on the south of the tenements facing the main road and an area measuring 36 x 84' was facing the main road itself on which the landlady could put up a new construction as per the approved plan she was said to have obtained at the time of filing the eviction petition without disturbing any of the five tenants in the occupation of the existing building. That was also the defence taken up by the L. Rs. of respondents 5 and 12 out of 14 L-Rs. of deceased Smt. Man- gala Gouri in the trial. Court. By agreement of parties, both the eviction cases filed against Smt. M. Mangala Gouri and Sri H. S. Rangacharya were clubbed by the trial Court and disposed of on the basis of the common evidence adduced by both parties. The trial Court has observed in paragraph-14 of its common order passed in both the cases as under:"14. The petitioner has thus established that she has no other premises which is suitable and convenient to her for her residence, that she has been residing in a rented premises paying heavy rent and advance, that she has got the necessary funds to construct new construction after demolishing the existing building in the schedule property, that she has already applied for grant of plan for the new construction and that her claim will have to be found to be bonafide for the reasons stated above. "therefore, it held on the first point that the petitioner-landlady required the premises for the purpose of demolition of the existing building and reconstruction of a new building on it and her said requirement was both reasonable and bona fide. The trial Court further held that the petitioner had demonstrated by documentary evidence, namely, fixed deposit receit-Ex. P. 4 of the Bank of Maharastra, Basavanagudi Branch, bangalore that she had deposited a sum of Rs. 4 lakhs in a fixed deposit being the amount got by her from out of the LIC policy and Provident fund of her deceased husband Prof. Ramakrish- na who was working as Professor in the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore and who unfortunately expired during January, 1985 and she was entitled to get on maturity of the said deposit on 22-/-1990 a sum of Rs. Ramakrish- na who was working as Professor in the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore and who unfortunately expired during January, 1985 and she was entitled to get on maturity of the said deposit on 22-/-1990 a sum of Rs. 4,82,400/- and the said case of the landlady was not seriously challenged in cross examination except making a vague suggestion that the amount the landlady had kept in deposit was the amount she had taken as loan from somebody for the purpose of this case, and, therefore, she had no money of her own for the purpose of putting up a new construction of about 20 squares after demolishing the existing building. ( 7 ) ON the question of partial eviction, the Trial Court held that partial eviction was not possible as the proposed new construction could not be put up as per the approved plan by allowing the tenants to remain in occupation of the portion of the premises. The trial Court also held on the question of comparative hardship that the landlady would be subjected to greater hardship than the tenants as she was in occupation of a rented premises in the II floor of a building on payment of huge advance of Rs. 25,000/- and exorbitant rent of Rs. 1,200/- per month whereas the tenants would not be put to such a hardship if they were to vacate the premises. Consequently, the trial Court allowed both the eviction petitions. ( 8 ) AS already mentioned above, the eviction order passed by the trial Court against Sri H. S. Rangacharya has been affirmed by this Court and the said tenant has also vacated the premises in his occupation within the extended time granted by this Court. ( 9 ) SRI P. O. Surana also submitted that the other three tenants, Saraswathi, Anasuya and g. S. Paramashivaiah - have also vacated the portions in their occupation. However, he argued that the landlady's alleged reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises in the occupation of the petitioners-tenants is not reasonable and bonafide as the need pleaded by her did not exist at all and the alleged will dated 18-5-1985 said to have been executed by her mother as per ex. However, he argued that the landlady's alleged reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises in the occupation of the petitioners-tenants is not reasonable and bonafide as the need pleaded by her did not exist at all and the alleged will dated 18-5-1985 said to have been executed by her mother as per ex. R. 6 bequeathing her property in favour of landlady's daughter Sumathi was a make-believe one and it could not be taken into consideration as the mother was alive on the date of the petition. He also argued that the landlady had no funds at her credit at the time of filing the eviction petition for putting up the proposed new construction and the alleged funds are acquired by her only after her husband's death in 1985 whereas the eviction petition was filed in 1984. For these reasons, he urged that the trial Court has committed errors of fact and also law in ordering eviction of the petitioners-tenants. ( 10 ) IN my opinion, there is no merit in any of the said contentions inasmuch as, the Supreme court has held in MM. Quasim v Manohar Lal sharma, AIR 1981 SC 1113 , that the Appellate court can take note of subsequent events even by allowing additional evidence under Order 41, rule 27, C. P. C. and mould relief accordingly and again in Amarjit Singh v Smt. Khatoon quamarain, AIR 1987 SC 740 that the Court should take cognizance of events subsequent to filing of suit or application. Further, it is clear from the above extracted order of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice in C. R. P. No. 45/1990 that the landlady's requirement is accepted as reasonable and bonafide inasmuch as she was residing in a rented house and law does not say that even though she has a house of her own, she must continue to live in a rented house to enable the tenant to continue in the premises belonging to her. Regarding the Will executed by landlady's mother in favour of landlady's daughter Sumati, it is held that the legatee under the Will is Sumati whose guardian is landlady's sister and in any event, that cannot weigh in favour of Geetha because she is not the legatee and admittedly this is the only property owned by her, where the three tenants have already vacated. It has to be mentioned at the risk of repetition that the 4th tenant rangacharya has also vacated the premises in his occupation and it is only the petitioners-tenants who are coming in the way of the desire of the landlady to put up new construction by demolishing the entire old building consisting of five tenements. ( 11 ) SRI S, Shivaswamy, learned counsel for the respondent-landlady, invited my attention to the observations made by the Supreme Court in Smt. Somavanti and Others v The State of Punjab and others, AIR 1963 SC 151 in paragraph-22 on pages 160 and 161 that "binding effect of a decision does not depend upon whether a particular argument was considered therein or not, provided that the point with reference to which an argument was subsequently advanced was actually decided. " Sri P. D. Surana, distinguished the said observations by contending that whatever observations are made in C. R. P. No. 45/1990 do not bind the petitioners-tenants herein as they were not parties to C. R. P. No. 45/1990. Il is nodoubt true that the observations made in C. R. P. No. 45/1990 do not operate as res judicate against the petitioners-tenants therein as they were not parties. Nevertheless, the observations made in C. R. P. No. 45/1990 filed against the common order of the trial Court will enure to the benefit of the landlady in respect of her claim that she was in reasonable and bonafide requirement of the premises as she was living in a rented house and she has no other house except the building in question and she could not claim any right in the property bequeathed by her mother in favour of her daughter Sumati by appointing her sister as the guardian and not the landlady herself. ( 12 ) HOWEVER, Sri Surana argued on the strength of the decision of this Court in Abdul haq v Mahaboob Khan, 1lr 1987 (4) Karnataka 3853 that claim for eviction on both grounds may be combined only where order can be made without defeating provisions of law and ordinarily such combining taking away rights of tcnanl under clause (j) is not permissible and that extent of premises required for personal use has to be decided on facts before ordering eviction under (h) and requirement for business has to be pleaded with details. A perusal of the text of that order would show that this Court has held towards the end of para-11 and in paragraph-12 at page 3863 and 3864 as under:". . . . . . . . . . . . . THE claim for eviction on both the grounds under clauses (h) and (j) maybe combined where it is possible to make an order of eviction under clauses (h) and (j) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act without defeating the provisions of the law. 12. While considering such requirement, the Court has also to be satisfied about the extent of the premises required for his personal use. Therefore, each case has to be decided on its own facts taking into consideration the nature of the existing building and the new building proposed to be constructed in place of existing one and the intended use before making the order of eviction under clause (h) of Section 21{1) of the Act. For instance, if a landlord seeks eviction both under clauses (h) and (j) on the ground that he requires the promises for immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction and for personal use and occupation and has planned or proposes to construct multistoreyed building or a shopping complex, in place of existing one, it would not be reasonable to allow eviction under clause (h) alone because there would not be any difficulty in such cases to make an order of eviction under both the clauses in compliance of Sections 21 (2), 26 and 27 of the act" ( 13 ) ON this point, there is a recent decision of this Court iap. K. Upadhyaya va. Venkatesh and others, 1991 (1) All India Rent Control Journal 266 in which K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. , has observed in paragraph-11 at pages 270 and 271 as under:"11. Clause G) of Section 21 (1) is a provision which guarantees reentry of the tenants to the newly built premises, by virtue of the provisions which are supplemental to clause (j) of Section 21 (1), such as, Sections 26 to 28 of the Act. To tnat extent, it guarantees the tenant of the new premises so-that he may either reside in the newly built premises or carry on his business there, as he was doing hitherto, prior to reconstruction. To tnat extent, it guarantees the tenant of the new premises so-that he may either reside in the newly built premises or carry on his business there, as he was doing hitherto, prior to reconstruction. At the same time, Section 21 (1) (j) also provides a facility to the landlord to put up a reconstruction in the place of the existing structures whenever such a requirement is reasonably and bona fide made out by the landlord. Having regard to the scarcity of accommodation whether residential or non-residential in the urban areas it is necessary to encourage new construction so that those who are in search of accommodations can be provided with some space to live or carry on business activities for living. An order under Section 21 (l) (j) thus not only safeguards the interest of the tenant to some extent, but also provides scope for encouraging building activities. A landlord who is capable of demolishing and putting up new constructions, though motivated by profit motive, contributes to the reduction of the shortage of premises, to that extent. In these circumstances, if there is a choice for the Court between clauses (h) and (j) for directing eviction of a tenant, the Court will have to lean in favour of clause (j) rather than ordering eviction under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act. If the entire reconstructed premises is required by the landlord for his own occupation, section 21 (l) (h) will be applicable. But, if the reconstructed premises could accommodate the tenants and also would reasonably satisfy the requirements of the landlord, then an eviction order under Section 21 (1) (j) would advance the object of the act. Facts of each case has to be examined carefully in this regard. There may be a case wherein a substantial portion ol the reconstructed premises will be required by the landlord and the balance area is so small that it cannot satisfy the tenant's reentry and in such a situation, again, only clause (h) will have to be applied for eviction. But, a landlord cannot obtain an order of eviction under Section 21 (l) (h) only, by satisfying the court lhat he requires a part of the reconstructed premises for his own use and occupation. But, a landlord cannot obtain an order of eviction under Section 21 (l) (h) only, by satisfying the court lhat he requires a part of the reconstructed premises for his own use and occupation. "in my opinion, the said observations aptly apply to the facts of the case on hand in au fours in so far as it relates to the claim of the landlady for eviction under clause (j) in as much as her claim that she was in reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises for putting up a new construction in place of existing old building cannot be characterised as unreasonable or mala fide. As already noticed above, she has secured a sanctioned plan and was also having at her credit 4,82,400/- for putting up new construction. Therefore, the only question that requires consideration is whether the landlady would be in need of the entire proposed new construction after the construction work is completed for her own residence and whether the petitioners can claim a reentry in respect of the premises in their occupation after the new building as per the approved plan is constructed by the landlady. On this point,-Sri p. D. Surana invited my attention to the observations made by the Supreme Court in jivaram Ranchhoddas Thakkar and Another v tulsiram Ratanchand Mantri and Others, AIR 1977 SC 1357 that while making eviction orders the court must adopt humanist approach to 'live and let live. In that case, the tenant was directed to surrender half of the portion in his occupation in the interest of justice after getting it partitioned in equal share as it would serve the requirement of the landlord and at the same time safeguarding the interest of the tenant for whose benefit the Rent Acts are enacted. In the instant case also, the landlady may not require the entire 20 square building after it is reconstructed as her husband Prof. Ramakrishna is dead and the only other member of her family is her daughter Sumathi. In the instant case also, the landlady may not require the entire 20 square building after it is reconstructed as her husband Prof. Ramakrishna is dead and the only other member of her family is her daughter Sumathi. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the impugned order of the trial court deserves to be affirmed by making a slight modification by holding that the petitioners-tenants are entitled to the right of reentry in respect of the portion of the premises in their occupation after the new building as constructed in accordance with the provisions of Section 21 (l) (j) read with sections 26 to 28 of the Act. ( 14 ) IN view of my above conclusion, 1 do not consider it necessary to advert to the other decision in Narayana Gangasa BHure v ramachandra Ambasa Kalburg, 1977 (2) Kar. LJ. 202, MM. Quasim v Manohar Lai Sharma, air 1981 SC 1113 , the case of Amarjit Singh, air 1987 SC 740 and also Mis. Champion Industries v pukhraj and Others, ILR 1991 Kar. 1222 cited by Sri P. D. Surana on the point that the landlord has no unfettered right to seek eviction of tenants when he has alternative accommodation which would meet his requirement. ( 15 ) IN C. R. P. No. 3976/1987 decided on 26-10-1990, the pleadings lacked the required particulars and the landlord had mixed up the non-residential requirement with the requirement for residence. Therefore, K. Shivashankar bhat, J. has held that the Court's approach will be different in such a case and the requirement of the landlord also will be different for those two purposes and, therefore, it is not possible to uphold the order of the trial Court. In my opinion, the said decision has no relevance to the facts of the case on hand. In my opinion, the said decision has no relevance to the facts of the case on hand. ( 16 ) IN the result, for the foregoing reasons, the Revision Petition is disposed of by confirming the impugned order of eviction of the trial Court against the petitioners-tenants by granting them four months' time from that date to vacate the premises and further directing the respondent- landlord to commence the demolition work of the existing building and proceed to put up the proposed new building within three months from the date of getting possession of the premises from the petitioners-tenants and complete the work of construction of the new building as ex- peditiously as possible and further ordering that the petitioners-tenants are entitled to a right of reentry in respect of a portion of the premises in the new building to the extent of the area of the premises now in their occupation. Both parties are to be governed by the provisions of Section 21 (1)0 read with Sections 26 to 28 of the Act. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, both the parties are directed to bear their own costs in this Revision Petition. --- *** --- .