JUDGMENT S.H.S. ABIDI, J. 1. Purushottam Das Goswami since deceased (petitioner no. 1), Keshav Narain Banerjee (petitioner no. 2) M/s. Central Manbhum Coal Company Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Dubrajpur Rice Mill, Company Pvt. Ltd. and Yadav Lal Trust Estate (petitioners 3, 4 and respectively) have filed this application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for Short Cr. P.C.) for quashing the entire criminal proceeding constituting the Special Case No. 172 of 1980 including the order dated 27.2.1986 passed by the learned Special Judge, Patna by which he has rejected the prayer of the petitioner for discharging them from the offence under sections 1203, 467, 468, 428, 471 and 477 of the Indian penal Code (for thou I.P.C.) and section 5(2) read with section 5 (1), (c) and (d) of the prevention of Corruption Act. Petitioner no. 1 Purushottam Das Goswami has died. 2. By the order dated 27.2.1986 the learned Special Judge had discharged the other accused, namely, D.C.L.R. (2) the Additional Collector Cum Compensation Officer & (3) the Collector Dhanbad against which the State of Bihar and the Cabinet Vigilance Department Government of Bihar filed Cr. Misc. No 8113 of 1986. On 25.2.1987 a request was made that as the common question is involved in both the cases (Cr. Misc. Nos. 4073 and 8113 of 1986) the same be listed for hearing together and so they were heard together by a Bench which referred the matter to a large Bench to decide the question also whether the Compensation Officer is a court. On the said reference a Full Bench on 15.1.1990 held:– "The compensation officer appointed under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, is not a court properly so called. It is not a Civil. Revenue or Criminal Court in the ordinary sense of that term. The Act under which the compensation officer is appointed does not contain any provision declaring such officer a court for the purpose of section 195 of the Code under the circumstance, the compensation officer cannot be held to be a court within the meaning of section 195 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Act under which the compensation officer is appointed does not contain any provision declaring such officer a court for the purpose of section 195 of the Code under the circumstance, the compensation officer cannot be held to be a court within the meaning of section 195 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The decision in 1975 B.B.C.J. 656 is attracted in cases where the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are applicable so far as the present case is concerned, my answer to the question referred to the Full Bench is that a compensation officer appointed under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reform Act, 1950, cannot be held to be a Court within the meaning of section 195 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973." Against this judgment of the full Bench in Cr. Misc. No. 4073/1986 petitioner no. 2 Keshav Narain Banerjee went to Supreme Court being petition. For Special Lean to Appeal (Criminal) No. 885 of 19 where it has been ordered:– "The main criminal petition is still pending before the Division Bench of the Patna High Court. We think that the appropriate course would be to adjourn this matter till that matter is disposed of so that if the petitioner wish to seek any remedies there against that may also be available to them. The matter is adjourned to 1st week of March 1991" 3. From the record it appears that Cr. Misc. No. 8113/1986 has been allowed by a Bench of this Court on 5.9.1990 holding. "On the facts and circumstances mentioned above it is difficult to appreciate the finding recorded by the learned Special Judge that opposite party no. 1 came in picture only after the matter was over and he had made the draft compensation roll in a routine manner. It need not be emphasised that the scope of evidence at the stage of framing of the charge is wide as at the final stage of the trial. It is not the stage to balance the materials produced by the prosecution on a sensitive scale to find out whether there are sufficient evidence for conviction of the accused. If the material on the record creates strong suspicion against the accused that is only for framing the charge. It is not the stage to balance the materials produced by the prosecution on a sensitive scale to find out whether there are sufficient evidence for conviction of the accused. If the material on the record creates strong suspicion against the accused that is only for framing the charge. In view of the foregoing discussion this petition is allowed and the order so far relates to opposite party nos. 1, 2 and 3 is set aside. The case is remitted to the learned Special Judge for passing a fresh order in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made "above." 4. As regards the present petition Cr. Misc. No. 4073 of 1986 some facts are needed to be given out at the outset, which also common to the other Cr. Misc. 8113 of 1986 and both of them arise out of the same order of the Special Judge dated 27.2.1986. The Cr. Misc. 4073/1986 has been filed by Purushottam Das Goswami, Keshav Narain Banerjee beside three trusts and firms, namely M/s. Central Manbhum Coal Company Pvt. Ltd., M/s Dubrajpur Rice Mills Company Pvt. Ltd and Yadav Lal Trust Estates, Petitioner no. 1 Purushottam Das Goswami is dead. 5. The case of the prosecution is that petitioner Keshav Narain Banerjee had filed an application for compensation for mining Interest on behalf of M/s. Central Manbhum Coal Company Pvt. Ltd. M/s Dubrajpur Rice Mills Company Pvt. Ltd. and Yadav Lal Trust Estate as the interest of mines and minerals Estate lessee had vested in the State with effect from 27th October, 1964 and such lessees were to get compensation for their mining interest according to the provisions of Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 (for short Act 1950). A Banerjee the then Additional Collector accepted the claim of the petitioner and held the petitioner entitled to get the compensation on the basis of forged and fabricated deeds and documents furnished by the petitioner. A Banerjee the then Additional Collector accepted the claim of the petitioner and held the petitioner entitled to get the compensation on the basis of forged and fabricated deeds and documents furnished by the petitioner. It has been alleged that in that process the accused Government employees entered into a conspiracy among themselves and with others and the compensation in cash and zamindary abolition bond for the mining interest were fraudulently paid to Keshav Narain Banerjee for the said three firms and so the accused Government servant obtained undue pecuniary benefits for themselves and for others misusing their official position in Compensation Cases: (1) Dhanbad Compensation Case No. 1/74-75; (2) Dhanbad Compensation Case No. 3/74-75 (3) Dhanbad Compensation Case No. 1/71-72 Hence this prosecution. In Dhanbad Compensation Case No. 1/74-75 in respect of M/s Central Manbhum Coal Company Pvt. Ltd. Keshav Narain Banerjee was paid compensation to the tune to Rs. 48,60,950/- in the shape of bonds end a sum of Rs. 34,66,229 and Rs. 1,08,367 as interim payment and also Rs. 1,43,366/- on redeemed value of Bihar Zamindary abolition bond. 6. (1) Dhanbad Compensation Case No.1/74-75 is in respect of payment of compensation for the under ground interest of M/s Central manbhum Coal Company Pvt. Ltd. of an area of 990 bighas in village Bhagebond. It is said that Raja, Jharia, had executed a Mokarir Patta in favour of Jadolal Bandhopadhya, Mukund Lal Nayak and Krishna Kishore Adhikari for under ground rights for 990 bighas of land of village Bhagebond Keshav Narain Banerjee said that Krishna Kishore Adhikari and Mukund Lal Nayak had leased out their share of undergrounds or mining interest of the said land by deed no. 662 of 1901 and in support there of a plan copy of deed was presented by but the prosecution says that although the deed no. 662 of 1901 had been executed by Krishna Kishore Adhikari and Mukund Lal Nayak but the same did not relate to the mining interest of 990 bighas of land in village Bhagebond. Further it was said by the prosecution that a partnership firm was formed in respect of the mining interest of the aforesaid 990 bighas of land in which there were nine partners inducing Yadav Lal Nayak. Further it was said by the prosecution that a partnership firm was formed in respect of the mining interest of the aforesaid 990 bighas of land in which there were nine partners inducing Yadav Lal Nayak. According to this partnership Yadolal Bandhopadhaya the grand father of Keshav Narain Banerjee had only 4 annas interest only a dispute arose between the sons of Yadolal Bandhopadhaya Atulshiv Banerjee filed a partition suit no. 395/1911 in the court of learned Subordinate Judge Manbhum, Purlia, for partition of the mining interest in the said 990 bighas. Although the suit was dismissed but the entire property remained under the management of the receiver appointed by the court for receiving the royalty and its distribution to the co-shares. The petitioner Keshav Narain Banerjee has said that mining interest of 990 bighags along with others was transferred to M/s. Birbhum Colliery Company by registered deed no. 208 dated 17.1.1921 deed no. 209 dated 20.2.1921 and deed no. 362 of 1921 by Atulshiv Banerjee. Nirmalshiv Banerjee and Satishiv Banerjee. The rate of royalty per tonne was shown at Rs.1.25 paise. M/s Birbhum Pvt. Ltd. transferred its mining rights of 990 bighas of Bhagebond to Bisheshwari Trust Estate vide attested deed no. 3137 dated 9.5.1938 Then Bisheshwari Trust Estate in its turn transferred its mining sight in 990 bighas land of village Bhagebond to M/s Kajara Pioneer Company Pvt. Ltd. by attested deed no. 3263 of 1944 and finally M/s Kajara pioneer Pvt. Ltd. Company transferred its mining rights in 990 bighas of land in Bhagebond to M/s Central Manbhum Coal Company Pvt. Ltd vide attested deed no. 10804 dated 14.6.1950 and on that basis the petitioner Keshav Narain Banerjee as Director of M/s Central Coal Company Pvt. Ltd. claimed compensation in respect of the entire 990 bighas of land. (ii) Dhanbad Compensation Case No. 3/74-75 relates to M/s Dubrajpur Rice Mills Company Pvt. Ltd. for the underground rights in respect of the collieries i.e. Loading, Bararl and Kapasra. Petitioner Keshav Banerjee claimed compensation on a number of deeds and claimed that Shasti Kinkar Banerjee son of late Yadolal Bandhopadhaya donated all the above collieries to Lebi Kamal Trust vide gift deed no. 511 dated 3.11.1951. Then Lebi Kamal Trust transferred the right of collecting royalties from all the said four collieries to M/s Dubrajpur Rice Mills Company Pvt. Ltd. vide deed no. 511 dated 3.11.1951. Then Lebi Kamal Trust transferred the right of collecting royalties from all the said four collieries to M/s Dubrajpur Rice Mills Company Pvt. Ltd. vide deed no. 4501 dated 30.9.1954 and thus M/s Dubjraj Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. became absolute owner of these collieries and was entitled to its compensation. (iii) The third Compensation Case No. 1/71-72 was filed by Yaco Lal Trust Estate for undermining leasc in Begabandh, Jitpur, Hariladin, Jharlakhas, Jenijdra Khas Jharia, Khas Kepa. In all 13 collieries are in district Manbhum West Bengal. The prosecution said that though Trust was there but it was under liquidation and the official assignee at Calcutta was entitled to compensation, that the official assignee also filed return to the Bihar Government for compensation of mining lease and in this way the petitioner was not entitled to get compensation in respect of the said 13 collieries of Yaco Lal Trust Estate. 7. It will appear that A.K. Banerjee was compensation officer. Gauri Shanker Lal was Head clerk in his office. N.N. Jha was Mining Officer who had also reported that the appellant K.N. Banerjee was entitled to receive the compensation in respect of collieries in question during the period of claim of compensation by the petitioners and on the basis of attested copies of dec1 compensation was allowed. Binod Bihari Mahto and Basudeo Pd. Head Assistant attached to the office of the District Mining Officer had their part in giving the report. Lakshman Shukla the then L.R.D.C. and Shamlendu Choudhary were attached to the office of the L.R.D.C. Dhanbad. Final compensation was determined on 17.9.1974 on the basis of the approval and determination of the amounts of final compensation by the State Government. The compensation assessment rolls were checked and Lakshman Shukla signed the draft application of the compensation D.P. Yadav and Shamlendu Choudhary had attested certain deeds to be true. It was apparent that final compensation was received by the petitioners on 7.8 1977. 8. In July, 1979 the then compensation officer–cum–Additional Collector, Dhanbad issued notice, Annexure–3 and 3/A (to the petition in Cr. Misc. No. 4073/86). It Annexure–3 it was said that Rs. 52,28,000 had been paid to the petitioner K.N. Banerjee in the shape of bonds as director of M/s Central Manbhum Coal Company Pvt. Ltd. on 17.7.1981, although the actual amount payable to him worked out of Rs. Misc. No. 4073/86). It Annexure–3 it was said that Rs. 52,28,000 had been paid to the petitioner K.N. Banerjee in the shape of bonds as director of M/s Central Manbhum Coal Company Pvt. Ltd. on 17.7.1981, although the actual amount payable to him worked out of Rs. 14,65,448/- and as the petitioner had executed indemnity bond while receiving the above amount from the State Government and that the amount paid to him is in excess said to be recoverable under the law, so he (compensation officer) exercise of powers vested in him under section 151 C.P.C. objecting to compensation proceeding taken under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, he reviewed the final order passed in the said case by R.S.P. Sinha and ordered that the payment of said amount already paid on being made in the shape of bonds issued in favour of M/s Central Manbhum Coal Company Pvt. Ltd. be suspended pending further investigation in the matter. In the second notice (Annexure–3/A) it was said that suspicion bad arisen with regard to the legality of claim of M/s Dubrajpur Rice. Mills (P) Ltd. and Central Manbhum Coal Company Pvt. Ltd. to receive compensation in respect of the mining lease hold in the district of Dhanbad and suspicion had also a risen as to the quantum of royalty at the rate of Rs. 1.25 paise then fixed in the case appears to be unsual and this might ban resulted in excess payment or compensation money, then it could have been actually and legitimately payable to the compensation holder and the circumstance under which excess payment might have been made required through investigation. So he (S.C. Chakravarty) being successor in office of late R.S.P. Sinha the compensation officer in Compensation Case No. 1/74-75 and 3/74-75 in exercise of the powers under section 151 C.P.C. and the relevant orders ordered that the payment in the bonds in the above case shall remain suspended till further orders. 9. So he (S.C. Chakravarty) being successor in office of late R.S.P. Sinha the compensation officer in Compensation Case No. 1/74-75 and 3/74-75 in exercise of the powers under section 151 C.P.C. and the relevant orders ordered that the payment in the bonds in the above case shall remain suspended till further orders. 9. Preliminary enquiry as held and after that first information report (Annexure–A to the counter–affidavit) filed by Ramashray Lal the Deputy Superintendent of police Cabinet Vigilance Department of Bihar was filed by R.S. Banerjee, Inspector of police, Cabinet vigilance Department, Government of Bihar being vigilance P.S. Case No. 45 (7) of 1979 u/s 1208/467/468/480/471 and 488 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) read with section 5 (1) (c) and (d) of the prevention of Corruption Act no. 2 of 1947 against A.K. Banerjee, K.N. Banerjee, Ramnath Jha, Ramsunder Prasad, Deputy Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, whereafter investigation proceeded. In this lengthy first Information report it has been stated that K.N. Banerjee entered into a criminal conspiracy with A.K. Banerjee and R.S.P. Sinha (since deceased) Additional Collector and other accused including Ram Sunder Prasad the then deputy secretary of Revenue Departments, Bihar, during the years 1974 to 1977 and obtained payment of Government money amounting to Rs. 1,48,60,960/- in bonds and Rs. 65,11,265.14 in cash by way of compensation falsely claiming certain mines to be his own (which had vested in the state Government under the provisions of Bihar Land Reforms Act 1915) on the basis of forged receipts and forged documents showing him as director and constituted attorney of Central Manghum Coal Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and Dubrajpur Rice Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. as the Managing Trustee of Yadolal Trust. A true copy of the first information report is Annexure–A to the counter–affidavit in which all the details have been given which need not be reproduced here. K.N. Banerjee filed a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta challenging the said two orders of the compensation officer as well as this first information report and prayed to command the State to forbear from proceeding on that footing and from taking any step in furtherance of the first information report and from executing any prosecution or further proceeding in respect the thereof and also prayed that the said orders of the Additional Collector, Dhanbad, be not given effect to. He obtained rule nisi in terms of the said prayer. However, while disposing of the rule the prayer of the petitioners was rejected in respect of the first information report and the proceedings instituted therein, but this Court granted reliefs to the petitioners by setting aside the two orders of the Additional Collector. Two petitions in appeal were filed in the Calcutta High Court being P.M.A.I. No. 3/27 of 1981 filed by the petitioners while the State of Bihar filed F.M.A.T. No. 1073 of 1982 in which the State challenged the quashing of the orders of the Additional Collector. On 27.7.1982 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dismissed the appeal of K.N. Banerjee and Central Manbum Coal Company Pvt. Ltd. but allowed the appeal of the State of Bihar. The judgment of the Calcutta High Court has been reported in AIR 983 Calcutta 92. This judgment of the Calcutta High Court has been confirmed in at by the Supreme Court. 10. During the pendency of the investigation at the instance of the Inspector Central of police Cabinet vigilance Department, Government of Bihar the properties of the accused said to have been acquire though the money alleged to have been obtained from the Government of Bihar by the accused by way of compensation which was involved Vigilance P.S. Case No. 45/7/79 were attached. 11. One of the accused Nanonath Jha, filed Cr. Misc. Petition being Cr. Misc. No. 1238 of 1982 (R) in the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court for quashing of the investigation but the High Court by its order dated 12.1.1983 refused to quash the investigation though directed the investigation to be completed as soon as possible. 12. The investigation was completed and chargesheet was submitted on 20.8.1984 on the basis of which learned Special Judge took cognizance of the offence against the accused on 12.7.1984 and the case proceeded. 13. After submission of the chargesheet the learned Additional District Judge, Alipore by order dated 23.7.1984 confirmed the said order of attachment or the said properties and this order of attachment was affirmed by the Supreme Court also. 14. After taking cognizance on 12.7.1984 again Nanonath Jha filed another Cr. Misc. petition being Cr. Misc. 13. After submission of the chargesheet the learned Additional District Judge, Alipore by order dated 23.7.1984 confirmed the said order of attachment or the said properties and this order of attachment was affirmed by the Supreme Court also. 14. After taking cognizance on 12.7.1984 again Nanonath Jha filed another Cr. Misc. petition being Cr. Misc. No. 9536 of 1984 against the order taking cognizance but the same was also dismissed on 12.12.1984 with the observation to the learned Special Judge for the expedition trial of the case. The learned single Judge was pleased to observe in respect of investigation that earlier Cr. Misc. 1238 of 1982 (R) had been filed during the pendency of the investigation which has already been disposed of on 12.1.1983 and the Court has refused to quash investigation, as such this second application for quashing of the cognizance could not be allowed. Then K.N. Banerjee and P.D. Goswami (since deceased) filed a petition before the learned Special Judge, Patna for the discharge which was, however, allowed by the learned Special Judge on 2.5.1985 and they were discharged. Against this order dated 2.5.1985 the Criminal Revision No. 360/1985 was filed in the Patna High Court which ultimately allowed on 23.8.1985 and the order dated 2.5.1985 of the court below was set aside. 15. Some of the accused filed application for discharge which was considered by the learned Special Judge on 27.2.1986 by which he has discharged accused Laxman Jha, B.P. Yadav and Saten Choudhary but did not discharge K.N. Banerjee and P.D. Goswami. Against this order the present Cr. Misc. 4073 of 1986 has been filed here. Against the discharge of the other accused the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, the Additional Collector/Compensation officer and the Collect Dhanbad Cr. Misc. 8113/1986 was filed Both the Cr. Misc. Nos. 4073 and 8113 of 1986 were taken together on 14.4.1987 by a Division Bench of this Court which referred to the case to a full Bench on the point as to whether the compensation officer is a court. The full Bench of this Court by its judgment dated 15.1.1990 has held that the compensation officer is not a court within the meaning of section 195 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. When the petitioners went to Supreme Court, being petition for Special Leave to Appeal Criminal 885/1990 (in Cr. Misc. The full Bench of this Court by its judgment dated 15.1.1990 has held that the compensation officer is not a court within the meaning of section 195 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. When the petitioners went to Supreme Court, being petition for Special Leave to Appeal Criminal 885/1990 (in Cr. Misc. 4073/1986) it was ordered that since the main Cr. Misc. petition is still pending before the Division Bench of Patna High Court the appropriate course would be to adjourn this matter till the matter is disposed of so that if the petitioners wish to seek any remedy there against that may also be available to them and the matter was adjourned to 1st week of March, 1991. Hence Cr. Misc. No. 4073/1986 is being disposed of by this judgment. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioners contented that all these questions raised are questions of fact but on the disputed documents, if it is shown that K.N. Banerjee was in fact, entitled to compensation then the main charge falls down and if it is so established that he was entitled to the amount and forgetting the lame even if he created some false document but not forged then no offence is made out. Learned counsel for the opposite party raised the preliminary objection that the order framing charge is a procedural order and so interlocutory and so bar of revision under section 379 (2) Cr. P.C. is there load this application under section 482 Cr. P.C. has been filed to circumvent the bar. Further questions of facts are also involved in this Clue which cannot be decided in an application under section 482 Cr. P.C. and for that the trial court should give its finding after examining the witnesses and the evidence produced by the parties. Learned council for the opposite party has relied upon the decisions reported in 1975 B.B.C.J. 300, Suresh Pd. Sinha & Surendra Pd. Sinha vs. Nageshwar Pathak, 1976 Cr. L.J. 1901, Bishwanath Agrawala vs. State, 1977 Cr. L.J. 1995 Bhikuram Jain & another vs. Principal Corporation Delhi and others and 1988 B.B.C.J. 607, Rajendra Kumar Singh @ Raju vs. State of Bihar in support of his contentions. 16-A In the case of Bishwanath Agrawala and others vs. State, 1976 Cr. Sinha vs. Nageshwar Pathak, 1976 Cr. L.J. 1901, Bishwanath Agrawala vs. State, 1977 Cr. L.J. 1995 Bhikuram Jain & another vs. Principal Corporation Delhi and others and 1988 B.B.C.J. 607, Rajendra Kumar Singh @ Raju vs. State of Bihar in support of his contentions. 16-A In the case of Bishwanath Agrawala and others vs. State, 1976 Cr. L.J. 1901, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has referred to the Dictionaries giving out the meaning of the word interlocutory order page 1904 (para). "Conerally speaking as Osborne puts it in Concise Law Dictionary 5th Edition page 172 while an order determines the rights of the parties the interlocutory order leaves something further to be done to determine those rights. Wharton's law Dictionary (14th Edition) state that an interlocutory order or judgment is one made or given during the progress or an action but which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties." The Division Bench further said at the same page in paragraph 8:– "An interlocutory order has not been defined. No single general test for finality can be laid down as final or interlocutory nature or order has to be considered in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. The criterion for determination of whether an order in criminal proceedings is final is not different from that in a civil proceeding. That was settled long a go in the case of Ruppuswami vs. The King reported in AIR 1949 FC 1: (49 Cri. L.J. 625) and reiterated in Mohan Lal vs. The State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1968 SC 733 : (1968 Cri. L.J. 876). In the latter case it was recognised that a judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another or final as to part and interlocutory as to part. However, generally speaking a judgment or order which determine the principal matter in question is termed final. Shelat, J. noted some English decisions where four tests were applied to determine the question; (1) Was the order made upon an application such that a decision in favour of either party would determine the main dispute? (2) Was it made upon an application upon which the main dispute could have been decided? (3) Does the order as made determine the dispute? (4) Is the order in question is reversed would the action have to go on? (2) Was it made upon an application upon which the main dispute could have been decided? (3) Does the order as made determine the dispute? (4) Is the order in question is reversed would the action have to go on? Justice Bacbawat, while delivering a separate judgment noted that in a civil proceedings the order it final if it finally decides the rights of the parties. It does net decide the rights of the parties the order is interlocutor though it conclusively determines some subordinate matter and dispose of the proceedings in which the subordinate matter is in controversy. He relied on AIR 1920 P.C. 86 (Firm Ramchand Manjimal vs. Firm C.V. Ratanchand)." In the case of Central Bank of India vs. Gokal Chand, AIR 1967 S.C. 799 , the Supreme Court while dealing with the case under section 38 of the Delhi Rent – Control Act observed at page 800 para 3:– "In the context of S. 38 (1) the words 'every' order of the Controller made under this Act though very wide, do not include interlocutory orders, which are merely procedural and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. In a pending proceeding, the Controller may pass many interlocutory orders under Ss. 36 & 37, such as orders regarding the summoning of witnesses discovery, production and inspection of documents issue of a commission for examination of witnesses, inspection of premises, fixing a date of hearing and the admissibility of a document of the relevancy of a question. All these interlocutory orders are steps taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceed in they regulate the procedure only and do not affect any right or liability of the parties. The Legislature could not have intended the parties would be learned with endless expense and delay by appeals from such procedural orders. The Legislature could not have intended the parties would be learned with endless expense and delay by appeals from such procedural orders. It is open to any party to set forth the error defect or irregularly if any in such an order as a ground of objection in his appeal from the final order in the main proceeding." In the case of Mohanlal Manganlal Thakkar vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 S.C. 733 , the Supreme Court observed at page 736 para 7 and 737 para 9:– "It is clear that though the proceeding in which the High Court passed the impugned order may be said to be an independent proceeding, one of the tests applied was that it did not determine the rights of the parties as the controversy as to the liability of the assessee still remained to be determined by the Board." "That the finality of an order passed in such an independent proceeding is not to be judged from the fact that original proceedings are not disposed of by it but are still pending determination that the tests as to whether the impugned order determines the rights of the parties in controversy in the original proceedings instituted by one of the would not apply to proceeding independent of such original proceedings and that if the order finally determines the controversy in such a proceeding and that proceeding is disposed of the order is final in so far as that controversy is concerned. Even an order exfactie interlocutory in character has been held to be final if it finally disposed of the proceeding though the main controversy between the parties remained undisposed of. An illustration of such case is to be found in the State of Orissa vs. Madan Gopal, 1952 S.C.R. 28, AIR 1952 SC 12 . In an appeal against that order the State contended that the order was not final as it was for an interim relief and the dispute between the parties remain to be determined in the proposed suits. In an appeal against that order the State contended that the order was not final as it was for an interim relief and the dispute between the parties remain to be determined in the proposed suits. Thought order had not determined the rights or the parties, this Court negatived the contention and held that the order was final "in view of the fact that with these orders the petitions were disposed of finally and nothing further remained to be done in respect of the petitions." In the case of Amar Nath vs. State of Harayana, AIR 1977 S.C. 2185 , the Supreme Court while dealing with interlocutory order in connection with power of revision under section 397 Cr. P.C. 1973 observed at page 2189 para 6:– "The term interlocutory is a term of well known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Vebster's NEW WORLD Dictionary interlocutory, has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have said down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the terms interlocutory order in S. 397 (2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes order of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the interlocutory rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain rights or the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in S. 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus for instance orders summoning witnesses adjourning cases passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under section 397 (2) of 1973 Code. Thus for instance orders summoning witnesses adjourning cases passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under section 397 (2) of 1973 Code. But orders which arc matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court." In the case of Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 S.C. 47 , the Supreme Court observed at page 52 in para 12:– Ordinarily and generally the expression interlocutory order has been under stood and taken to mean as a converse of the term 'final order'. In Volume 22 of the 3rd Edition of Halsburs laws of England at page 742, however, it has been stated in paragraph 1606:– "A judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another or final as to part and interlocutory as to part. The meaning of the two words must therefore be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required". In para 1607 it is said:– "In general a judgment of order which determines the principal matter in question is termed final". In para 1608 at page 744 and 745 we find the words:– "An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (i) is made before judgment and gives no final decision on the matter in dispute but is merely on a matter of procedure or 2, is made after judgment and merely directs how the declarations of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out is termed interlocutory. An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals." "In S. Kuppuswanmi Rao vs. The King, 1947 FCR 180, AIR 1947: FC 1, Kania C.J. delivering the judgment of the Court has referred to some English decisions at pages 185 and 186 (of FCR): (at P. 3 of AIR). Lord Esher M.R. said in Saleman vs. Warner (1891) 1 QB 734 "If their decision which ever way it is given, will, it stands finally dispose of the matter in dispute, I think that for the purpose of these rules it is final. On the other hand, their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but, it given in the other will allow the action to go on then think it is not final, but Interlocutory. To the same effect are the observations quoted from the judgments of Pry L.J. and Lopes L.J. Applying the said test, almost on facts similar to the ones in the instant case, it was held that the order in revision passed by the High Court (at that time there was no bar like S. 397 (2), wall not a 'final order' within the meaning of section 205(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935. But in our Judgment such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. On the one hand, the legislature kept intact the revisional power of the High Court, on the other it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation h appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression inter locutory order as invariable being converse of the words 'final order'. There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami's case, AIR 1947 FCJ 1, (supra) but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order that pare or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction we think that the bar in sub section (2) of section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be finally orders for the purpose of Article 134 of the Constitution yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2). They may not be finally orders for the purpose of Article 134 of the Constitution yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2). It is neither advisable, nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final and then to prepare and exhaustive lists of those types of orders which will fall in between the two. The first two kinds are well known and can be called out from many decided cases. We may however indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this cases even though if may not be final in one sense, is sorely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of sub section (2) of section 397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course." In the case of V.C. Shukla vs. State through C.B.I., AIR 1980 S.C. 962 it was held that in order to cons true the term interlocutory order it has to be construed in tradition to or in contract with a 'final order'. In other words the words not a 'final order' order must necessary mean an interlocutory order or an intermediate order. Thus the expression interlocutory order is to be understood and taken to mean converse of the term final. An interlocutory order merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought but not a final decision or a judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the Judgment. 17. Framining of charge has been explained in many decisions. In the case of Bhupindar Kumar Bhatnagar vs. State, 1975 Cri L.J. 1185, a learned single Judge of Delhi High Courts at page 1187 in para 10 has said:– "A charge merery puts the petitioner on notice as to the offense for which he is being tried." A Division Bench or the Calcutta High Court in Biswanath Agarwala vs. State, 1976 Cri. L.J., 1901 (supra) observed at page 1904 in para. L.J., 1901 (supra) observed at page 1904 in para. "Framing or charge after all is nothing but written formula of specific accusation made with certainty and communicate to the accused so that he may defend himself." The Supreme Court in the case of V.C Shukla vs. State through C.B.I., AIR 1980 S.C. 962 , observed about framing of charge at page 1005 in para 109:– "It is thus an intimation to notice to the affused of what precise offence or what allegation of facts he is called upon to meet. The object or a charge is to warren an accused person or the case he is to answer. It cannot be treated as if it was a part of acceremonial. (See B.N. Srikantiah & others vs. The State of Mysore, 1959, SCR 496 at page 503." 18. Then the question as to whether the order framing charge is an interlocutory order or a final order has been set at rest by a catena of decisions of the Courts in India. In the case of Bhupindar Kumar Bhatnagar (supra) it has been said at page 1187:– ''It is obvious that an order framing tire charge does not decide the question of the guilt of the innocence of the petitioner. A charge merely puts the petitioner on notice as to the offences for which he it being tried. The order merely keeps the proceeding alive. Even if the order framing charge is treated as an order declining to discharge the petitioner even then if does not amount to a final order." In the case of Biswanath Agarwala (supra) the Division Bench observed at page 1904 in para 8 that formulation of the charge, therefore, cannot in any view of the matter be said to finally determine the matter in issue. The controversy between the parties is hardly set at rest. In that view of the matter be have no doubt that framing of charge is an interlocutory order. In the case of Bhiku Ram Jain others vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & others, 1977 Cri. The controversy between the parties is hardly set at rest. In that view of the matter be have no doubt that framing of charge is an interlocutory order. In the case of Bhiku Ram Jain others vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & others, 1977 Cri. L.J. 1993, the Supreme Court has observed at page 2002 in paragraph 27:– "In view of our discussion above we hold that an order framing a charge or issuing against a process against & accused is an interlocutory order being a Procedural step and does not determine the principal matter in dispute." In the case of Rajendra Kumar Singh @ Raju vs. State of Bihar, 1988 B.B.C.J. 607, it has been said at page 611 para 12: – "An order framing a charge or issuing a process against an accused is an interlocutory order being a procedural step and which has not decided the question of guilt or innocence of the accused." But in the case of Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra (Supra) while dealing with a case in which charge had been framed against the appellant u/s 500 I.P.C. their Lordships observed at page 53 in para 13:– "We may, however, indicate that the type of the order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of sub–section (2) of S. 397. In our opinion it muss be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course." However, in the case of V.C. Shukla (supra) their Lordships referring to the decision in the case of Madhu Limaye observed at pages 968 & 969 in para 6, 970 para 7, 983 para 34 and para 110 page 1005:– Para 6 "A Division Bench consisting of three Judges held that an order framing a charge was not an interlocutory order and therefore a revision against such an order was competent before the Sessions Judge or the High Court. In dwelling on the various sheds and aspects of an interlocutory order, Utwalia, J. who spoke for the Court, referred to previous decisions of the Court regarding the scope and ambit of a final order in order to highlight the nature and signification of the term interlocutory order." Even so, the ratio decidendi in the aforesaid case was in our opinion, absolutely correct and we are entirely in agreement with the learned Judges constituting the Bench that the order of the Sessions Judge framing charges, in the circumstances of the case, was not merely an interlocutory order but partook of the nature of a final order or at any rate, an intermediate order so as to be taken out or the bar contained in S. 397 (2) of the Code." "7. This Court took care to explain that in a situation with the Judges were dealing in that particular case it would not be proper to treat the order framing charges as an interlocutory order pure and simple. Even though the order may be intermediate it could not be said to be final so as to bar the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court order section 397 (3) of the Code. We find ourselves in complete agreement with by the learned Judge who decided the said case." 34. "Applying these tests to the order impugned we find that the order framing of the charges is purely an interlocutory order as it does not terminate the proceeding but the trial goes on until it outminates in acquittal or conviction. It is true that if the Special Judge would have refused to form chaises and discharge the accused, the proceeding would have terminated but that is only one life of the picture. The other side of the picture is that if the Special Court refused to discharge the accused does frame charges against him then the order would be an interlocutory because the trial would still be alive." 110. "Merely because emphasis is add on the Court seriously applying its judicial mind at the stale of framing charge and therefore it can be said to be an important stage, the order framing the charge even after applying the ratio of the latter decision would not be an order other than an interlocutory order." 19. "Merely because emphasis is add on the Court seriously applying its judicial mind at the stale of framing charge and therefore it can be said to be an important stage, the order framing the charge even after applying the ratio of the latter decision would not be an order other than an interlocutory order." 19. A revision against an interlocutory order under the present Code is not permissible though under the Old Code of 1898 it was so. Under the Old Code Sections 435 and 439 Code permitted the revision. In the case of Amarnath vs. State of Harayana, AIR 1977 S.C. 2185 , the Supreme Court has observed at page 2189 in para 6:– "It seems to us that the term 'interlocutory order' in S. 397 (2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It mere denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain right of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very objects which formed the basis for insertion of this particular prevision in S. 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for a report and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding may not doubt amount to interlocutory order against which no revision would lie under Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be out said the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court." In the case of Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) the Supreme Court observed at page 5 in para 10:– "The Legislature in its wisdom decided to check this delay by introducing sub–section on (2) in Section 397. On the one hand, a bar has been put in the way of the High Court (as also the Sessions Judge) or exercise of the revisional power in relation to any interlocutory order, on the other, the power has been conferred in almost the same terms as it was in the 1898 Code. In our opinion a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in sub–section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning there by that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutor order." Against page 53 in para 13 their Lordships observed:– "But in our judgment such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. If it were so, it will render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court concerned on it by section 397 (1). On such a strict inter pretation only those orders would be revisable which are orders passed on the final determination of the action but arc not appelable under Chapter XXIX of the Code. This does not seem to be the intention of the Legislature when it retained the revisional power of the High Court in terms identical to the one in the 1898 Code. On the one hand, the Legislature kept intact the revisional power of the High Court and on other it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the Legislature was not to equate the expression interlocutory order as invariably being converse of the words "final order." There may be an order passed during the course of proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami's case (supra), but, yet it may notice an interlocutory order–pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub–section (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate order. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub–section (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate order. They may not be final orders for the purpose of Article 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutor, orders within the meaning of Section 397 (2)." In the case of V.C. Sukla (supra) Fazal Ali for himself and behalf of A.P. Sen. J, while considering the decisions in the case of Amarnath and Madhu Limaye (supra) observed at page 971 in para 7:– "It follows therefore that an order framing a charge was clearly revisable by the High Court under Ss. 435 & 439 of the Code of 1898. We may, however point out that we were in complete agreement with the principle, involved in the cases discussed above, that an order framing charges against an accused undoubtedly decides an important aspect of the trial and it is the duty of the Court to apply its judicial mind to the material and come to a clear conclusion that a prima facie case has been made out on the basis of which it would be justified in forming charges. The question, however, with which we are concerned in the present appeal is essentially different. The order of the Special Judge framing the charge is a reasoned order and not a mechanical or a casual order so as to vitiate the order of the Special Judge. In the instant case, we are concerned with a much larger question, viz., whether or not the term interlocutory order used in S. 11 (1) of the Act should be given the same meaning as this very term appearing in S. 397 (2) of the Code. In the instant case, we are concerned with a much larger question, viz., whether or not the term interlocutory order used in S. 11 (1) of the Act should be given the same meaning as this very term appearing in S. 397 (2) of the Code. In other words, the question is whether S. 11 (1) of the Act tightens or widens the scope of the term interlocutory order as contained in S. 397 (2) of the Code and as interpreted by this Court in the decisions, referred to above." Again further observed at page 988 para 44:– "On a true construction or S. 11 (1) of the Act and taking into consideration the natural meaning of the expression (interlocutory order) there can be no doubt that the order framing charges against the appellant under the Act was merely an interlocutory order which neither terminate the proceedings nor finally decided the rights of the parties. According to the tests laid down in Kuppuswami's case (supra) the order impugned was undoubtedly an interlocutory order. Taking into consideration, therefore, the natural meaning of interlocutory order and applying the non–obstante clause the position is that the provisions of the Code of Criminal procedure are expressly excluded by the non– obstante clause and therefore S. 397 (2) of the Code cannot be called into aid in order to hold that the order impugned is not an interlocutor, order. As the decisions of this Court in the cases of Madhu Limaye and Amarnath vs. State of Haryana were given with respect to the provisions of the Code, particularly S. 397 (2) they were correctly decided and would have no application to the interpretation of S. 11 (1) of the Act which expressly excludes the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure by virtue of the non–obstante clause." However, D.A. Desai, J. while concurring with Fazal Ali, J. observed at Page 1004 para 105:– "But undoubtedly in the Context of S. 397 (2) read with S. 482 of the Code, this Court with view to providing a judicial umbrella of active supervision for reaching possible correctable injustice by activist attitude and pragmatic interpretation found the third class of orders neither interlocutory nor final but intermediate and therefore outside the bar of S. 397 (2) of the Code of Criminal procedure. But the tests remains unaltered the every interlocutory order merely because it disposes of an aspect any a vital aspect in the course of a pending proceeding even adversely affecting a party for the time being would not be something other than interlocutory. To be specific the earlier test is not departed from but the power of supervision sought to be constricted was widened by ascertaining a third class of orders, namely, intermediate orders which are neither interlocutory nor final." Further at page 1005 in para 110 their Lordships observed:– Therefore, emphasis was laid on the Code expecting it to seriously apply its mind at the stage of framing the charge. It does not make the order framing the charge anything other than an interlocutory order. There is no decision since the Code of 1974 is in operation, which introduced a concept of commencement of trial at the stage anterior to framing of charge eliminating an enquiry before the charge as was the requirement prior to the amendment of 1891 Code in 1955 which would show that Court has treated order framing the charge other than interlocutory. Merely because emphasis is made on the Code seriously applying its judicial mind at the stage of framing charge and therefore, it can be said to be an important stage, the order framing the charge even after applying the ratio of the latter decisions would not be an order other than an interlocutory order. It would be unquestionably an interlocutory order." A learned single Judge in the case of Jaiprakash vs. State, 1981 Cri. L.J. 460, observed at page 461 in para 5:– "Even assuming that the Court has gone wrong in framing the charge without giving reasons there to the order framing the charge is an interlocutory proceeding and a such no revision will lie in view of Section 397 (2) of the Code of Criminal procedure. The framing of the charge does not put an end to the proceedings the trial goes on until it culminates in acquittal or conviction. It is no doubt true, that if the Court had passed an order the accused that would have been a final order. This is so because the order of discharge finally gives an and to the prosecution and therefore there is a termination of the entire proceeding that is not so in the case of a proceeding framing the charge. It is no doubt true, that if the Court had passed an order the accused that would have been a final order. This is so because the order of discharge finally gives an and to the prosecution and therefore there is a termination of the entire proceeding that is not so in the case of a proceeding framing the charge. Therefore even assuming that the Court committed an irregularity in omitting to pails a formal order leading to the framing of a charges the said proceeding is not open to revision in view of S. 397 (2) of the Code. The position is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in V.C. Sukla vs. State, AIR 1980 S.C. 962 : 1980 Cri. L.J. 690. In the case of Sarojini Amma vs. Sarojini & another, 1988 Cri. L.J. 1362, a learned single Judge observed at page 1363 in para 4:– "The framing of the charge does not in any way terminate the proceedings. It is after framing the charge that the trial is proceeded with till its culmination in acquittal or conviction. In a case where the Court has passed an order discharging the accused, it would be a final order as no further proceedings remain to be continued. By the order of discharge there is termination of the entire proceedings and so it cannot but be final. That is the reason why an order of discharging is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction. Position is entirely different in the case of framing of a charge. In V.C. Sukla vs. State AIR 1980 SC 962 (1980 Cri L.J. 690) it has been held that framing of charge is unquestionably an interlocutory order under Article 141 of the Constitution of India the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts with in the territory of India. Article 141 empowers the Supreme Court to declare the law and it also states that it shall be binding on all the Courts in India. In view of the authoritative pronouncement in V.C. Sukla vs. State, AIR 1980 S.C. 962 : (1980 Cri. L.J. 690) that framing of charge is an interlocutor, order indubitable position is that such an order is not revisable as postulated under S. 397 (2) of the Cr. P.C." 20. In view of the authoritative pronouncement in V.C. Sukla vs. State, AIR 1980 S.C. 962 : (1980 Cri. L.J. 690) that framing of charge is an interlocutor, order indubitable position is that such an order is not revisable as postulated under S. 397 (2) of the Cr. P.C." 20. Even if against an order framing charge no revision is maintainable under section 397 (2), yet the Coort is not powerless to grant relief in suitable cases if there, is abuse of the process of the Court or patent illegality staring in the face of the court. In the case of R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 S.C. 866 , the Supreme Court observed at page 896 Para 6:– "It is well established that tile inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceeding at an inter locutory stage. It is not possible desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases that the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be case where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount of the abused of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceeding would secure the ends of justice. A third category of case in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with these class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases whore there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or many not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under section 561–A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate and ordinarily it would not open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence that accusation made against the accused would not be sustained Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 561–A in the matter of quashing criminal proceeding and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point." In the case of Amarnath (supra) their Lordships observed at page 2187 in para 3:– "While we fully agree the view taken by the learned Judge that where a revision to the High Court against the order of the Subordinate Judge is expressly barred under sub–section (2) of section 397 of the 1973 Code the inherent contained in Section 482 would not be available to defeat the bar contained in S. 397(2) Section 382 of the 1973 Code contains the inherent powers of the Court and does not confer any new powers but preserve the powers which the High Court already possessed. A harmonious construction of Section 397 and 482 would lead to the irresistible conclusion that where a particular order is expressly barred under S. 397(2) and cannot be the subject of revision by the High Court, then to such a case the provisions of S. 482 would not apply. A harmonious construction of Section 397 and 482 would lead to the irresistible conclusion that where a particular order is expressly barred under S. 397(2) and cannot be the subject of revision by the High Court, then to such a case the provisions of S. 482 would not apply. It is well settled that the inherent powers of the Code can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision on the subject matter where there is an express provision, barring a particular remedy, the Court cannot resort to the exercise of inherent power." In the case of Madhu Limaye (supra) the Supreme Court observed at page 50 in para 8:– "Apart from the revisional power, the High Court possessed and possesses the inherent powers to be exercised exdebitio justified to do the real and the substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. In express language this power was recognised and saved in section 561–A of the old Code. At the outset the following principles may be noticed in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court, which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions: (1) That the Power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party: (2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice: (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code." Further it was observed in para 9:– "In most of the cases decided during several decades the inherent power of the High Court has been invoked for quashing of a criminal proceeding on one ground or the other Sometime the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court has also been resorted to for the same kind of relief while challenging the order taking cognizance for issuing processes of framing charge on the grounds that the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance and proceed with the trial, that the issuance of process was wholly illegal or void or that no charge could be framed as no offence was made out on the allegations made or the evidence adduced in Court. In the background aforesaid we proceed to examine as to what is the correct position of law after the introduction of a provision like sub–section (2) of Section 397 in the 1973 Code." Again the Supreme Court in para 10 observed:– "In our opinion a happy solution of the problem would be to say that the bar provided in sub–section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning there by that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other prince enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play there being no other provision in the Code or the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then it the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise it inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly bring about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then no thing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding in initiated illegally vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. Take for example a case where a prosecution is lunched under the Prevention of Corruption Act without sanction, then the trial of the accused will be without jurisdiction and after his acquittal a second trial after proper sanction will not be barred on the doctrine of Autifois Accuit. Even assuming, although we shall presently show that it is not so that in such a case an order of Court taking cognisence or issuing processes is an interlocutory order, does it stand to reason to say that inherent, power of the High Court cannot be exercised for stopping the criminal proceeding al early as possible, instead of harassing the accused upto the end? The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of Justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers. The present calc undoubtedly, falls for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming although not accepting that invoking the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible." In the case of Raj Kapoor & other vs. The State, Delhi Administration & others ( AIR 1980 S.C. 258 ) the Supreme Court observed at page 260:– "The first question is as to whether the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 stands repelled when the revisional power under Section 397 overlaps. The opening words of Section 482 contradict this contention because nothing in the Code, not even Section 397 can affect the amplitude of the inherent power reserved in so many terms by the language of S. 482. Even so a general principal pervades this branch of law when a specific provision is made easy resort to inherent power is not right except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade areas set apart specific power under the same Code. In abort there is no total ban on the exercise of inherent power where abuse of the process of the Court or other extraordinary Situation excites the Court's jurisdiction. The limitation is self–restraint, nothing more. The policy of the law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be taken upto the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final orders arc clearly capable of being considered in exercise of inherent power, if glaring in justice stares the Court in the face. The limitation is self–restraint, nothing more. The policy of the law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be taken upto the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final orders arc clearly capable of being considered in exercise of inherent power, if glaring in justice stares the Court in the face. In between is a tertium quid, as Utwalia, J. has pointed out as for example, where it is more this purely interlocutory order and less than a final disposal." In the case of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ram Kishan Rahotagi & others, AIR 1983 S.C. 67 , the Supreme Court observed at page 69 para 6:– "It may be noticed that Section 462 of the present Code is the adverbatim copy of Section 561–A of the old Code. This provision confers a separate independent power on the High Court alone to pass orders ex debito justitiae in case where grave and substantial injustice has been done or where the process of the Court has been seriously abused. It is not merely a revisional power meant to be exercised against the order passed by the Subordinate Courts. It was under this section that in the old Code the High Courts used to quash the proceedings or expunge uncalled for remarks against witnesses other persons or subordinate Court. Thus the scope, ambit and range of Section 561–A which is not Section 482 is quite different from the powers conferred by the present Code under the provisions of Section 397. It may be that in some cases there may b overlapping but such cases would be few and far between. It is well settled that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the present Code can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant and not where a specific remedy is provided by the Statute. Further, the power being an extraordinary one, it has to be exercised sparingly. It is well settled that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the present Code can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant and not where a specific remedy is provided by the Statute. Further, the power being an extraordinary one, it has to be exercised sparingly. If these considerations and kept in mind there will be no inconsistency between Section 482 and 397(2) of the present Code." In the case of V.C. Sukla (Supra) the Supreme Court at page 967 para 6 observed:– "One of the questions that arose was as to whether an interlocutory order which could be revised by the Sessions Judge, can be further revised under Section 482 of the Code of the High Court because S. 397(3) permitted the power of revision to be exercised only by the High Court or the Session Judge, but not by both of them. Sub–Section (3) does not limit at all inherent power of the High Court containing in S. 482, as mentioned above. It merely curves the revisional power given to the High Court or the Sessions Judge under S. 397(1) of the Code." In the case of Rajan Kumar Manchanda vs. State of Karnataka T. 1987 (4) S.C. 637: 1990 S.C.C. (Cr.) 537: 1990 Supra S.C.C. 132, the Supreme Court observed page 539 of S.C.C. (Cr.) para: 1 "The question for consideration is also whether the law u/s 397(3) Cr. P.C. should have been taken note of to reject the revision at the instance of the State Government or action taken by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power has to be sustained. It is not disputed by the counsel appealing for the State that the move before the High Court was really an application for revision of the order of the Magistrate releasing the truck that is exactly what is prohibited u/s 397(3) Cr. P.C. Merely by saying that the jurisdiction of the High Court for exercise of its inherent power was being invoked, the statutory bar could not ban been overcome. P.C. Merely by saying that the jurisdiction of the High Court for exercise of its inherent power was being invoked, the statutory bar could not ban been overcome. If that all to be permitted any revision application facing the bar of section 397(3) of the Code could be labelled at one under Section 482." In the case of Suresh Prasad Sinha vs. Nageshwar Pathak, 1975 B.B.C.J. 300, where the question of non payment under the cheque due to absence of sufficient money in the account of the accused was accidental or intentional was a question of fact whose determination was to be made in the trial on the evidence brought on the record though on the strength of prima facie evidence, charge had been framed, a learned single Judge of this Court on the objection that this application had been given the garb of application u/s 482 Cr. P.C. though. It was actually a reason, observed at page 304 (para 11) as follows:– "Mr. Prasad has also suggested the dismissal of this application on the ground that though it his been given a garb of a petition under section 482 of the Code, it is actually a revisional petition which it is open to him to file in this Court under section 397 of the Code. According to him since under sub–section (2) of this sect ion 397 the filing of such a revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in a trial is bar the petition has purposely labelled it under section 482 of the Code to circumvent this bar in its maintainability. There seems substance in this contention." A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Bishwanath Agarwala (supra) referred to the decisions in Krisnamurity Iyer vs. State of Madras, AIR 1954 S.C. 406 (supra) R.P. Kapoor vs. State of Punjab, 1960 S.C. 866 (supra), Delhi Development Authority vs. Lila Bhagat, AIR 1975 S.C. 849, holding that in an appropriate case inherent or revisional powers should be exercised to protect from illegal and various prosecution and Superintendent and Legal Remembrance West Bengal vs. Mohan Singh, AIR 1915 S.C. 1002, inherent powers of the Court can be exercised to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice. After referring to these decisions the Division Bench said (at page 1905, para 9). After referring to these decisions the Division Bench said (at page 1905, para 9). The aforesaid cases, no doubt, showed that in appropriate cases the High Court can interfere with the matters like the framing of the charge under its revisional or inherent powers but those cases were under the old Code of 1898. In the old Code there was no bar to the exercise of the powers in case of interlocutory order. The position of the bar cannot the context of the use of the inherent power of the Court in this respect. It is the inherent in the Code which fails to provide for all contingencies which has called for the creation of and saving the inherent power of the Court to act exdebito justitiae. The same also explains only this inherent power is not to be exercised in matters, specially covered by the other provisions of the Code. In such is the nature of the power should it be exercised in full such as interlocutory order which have been forbidden for the use of the revisional power by the court. Section 397(2) is a bar which apparently fetters the revisional power of the Courts only. There is nothing in section 482 Cr. P.C. that it is to be read with Section 397(2). But even then Ihou1d the Court, when it is unable to exercise its revision powers in case of interlocutory orders, take recourse to its inherent powers in that field? Indiscriminate of frequent use of inherent powers in that fashion would obviously render nugatory the bar put by Section 397(2), it would be doing indirectly that the Court is directly for bidden to do under section 397(2). While we would not like to fetter or circumscribe the bit of inherent powers of this Court which is a mighty reservoir to be drawn upon by the litigants in easel where the channels of other legal remedies under the Code arc dried up at the same time it would be inadmissible to expand its ambi possibly except in rare cases to spheres specifically sought to be excluded by the Code. It would be risky to attempt formulations of principles to be followed in this regard. Circumstance may arise where failure to exercise the inherent power in cases of interlocutor, orders may occasion great hardship. It would be risky to attempt formulations of principles to be followed in this regard. Circumstance may arise where failure to exercise the inherent power in cases of interlocutor, orders may occasion great hardship. To inhibit or carve or deny the courts power to provide remedies on such occasion may cause injustice for the removal of which alone the Court exist. Supposing an order it purported to be passed, for the example, by a Sessions Courts erroneously in exercise of its revisional powers in an interlocutor order which court be a nullity, should this court refrain from quashing that illegality? A Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Bhiku Das vs. Delhi Municipality, 1977 Cri. L.J. 1995–(supra) has said at page 2004–para 41 & 42–page 2005 para 45 as follows:– "41. There is a chain of authorities in support of the proposition that the High Court will exercise its inherent power where an order is necessary to secure the end of justice or to prevent the abuse of the powers of any Court. This Jurisdiction springs from the ever riding powers of the High Court because of its position qua the Subordinate Courts and is be Invoked in exceptional cases only on satisfaction of the High Court that ends of justice will be defeated in the injustice done to a party by an order of the Subordinate Court is not remedied. The inherent power recognised by law is however designed to meet those cases for which there is no provision in the Code and is Code exercise in the interest of justice and to afforc redress to a party who has been wrongly injured by an order of Court. Section 56–A thus safegurded and preserved existing inherent power possessed by a High Court necessary among other purpose to secure the ends of justice." "42. It is however to be borne in mind that inherent power is to be used sparingly only when it is necessary in the interest of justice to exercise the power. The injustice sought to be remediced should be of a grave character, clear and not of a doubtful character and if there exists no provision in the Code by which the aggrieved party would seek the relief." "43. The injustice sought to be remediced should be of a grave character, clear and not of a doubtful character and if there exists no provision in the Code by which the aggrieved party would seek the relief." "43. The provision of Section 482 of the Code being pari material with the provisions of Section 561–A, the same interpretation has to be placed on Section 482, as has been done while interpreting the scope and ambit of the inherent power of the Code preserved in Section 561–A of the old Code. The question, however, is whether Section 397(2) of the Code has any dent in the provision of Section 482 of the Code circumscribing the inherent power of the High Court disabling it to grant relief in certain types of cases. We do not think so. There can be no dispute that inherent power of the High Court is different and stands apart from its power to revise orders of the Subordinate Courts as envisaged in Section 397(2) in terms either expressly or by necessary implication the exercise of inherent power by the High Court in Suitable cases to make such orders as are necessary to prevent process of any Court or as are necessary to secure the ends of justice? It would require clear language to oust the exercise of such a power. So read Section 397(2) cannot be said to be a bar on the High Court exercising its inherent power to interfere when serious exceptional and unusual features in the case brought before it warrant such an interfere. It is however to be borne in mind that the inherent power is not to be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily but is to be exercised exist debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for which the Courts exist. We have carefully considered the provisions of Section 397(2) and are of the opinion that whatever limitations are imposed on the right of an accused to file revision petition challenging an interlocutory order the Section does not expressly or by implication control the undoubted power to make a suitable orders to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. The High Court is not only a Court of law but a Court of Justice, as well and in the interest of justice the High Court can interfere to rectify a grave wrong. The High Court is not only a Court of law but a Court of Justice, as well and in the interest of justice the High Court can interfere to rectify a grave wrong. That is the reason that the exercise of power which inherent in the High Court are not deliberately defined by Section 482 all it is not possible to attempt to define the veracity of circumstances which may call for their exercise." 21. Thus it is clear that no revision lies against an interlocutory order. There is a bar to the exercise of the revision powers of the High Court not only order section 397(2) but also under section 397(3) of the Code. But there is no bar to the exercise or the High Court qua the Subordinates when in exceptional circumstances the Court is satisfied that the ends of Justice will be defeated in case of not–exercise of inherent power or where the Court finds that there is no provision in the Code for the redresal or the wrong. The injustice sought to be remedied should be clear and categorical and staring in face of the Court. The High Court shall exercise its power ex debito justitiae and not only as a Court of Law but as a Court of justice. The exercise of power should not be sought to circumvent the provisions of law. The provision of bar to a revision cannot be resorted in exercise of such power as the provisions of section 482 are not subject to or under the control of revisional powers u/s 397 Cr. P.C. which are quite district independent and poles apart. The inherent powers cannot be eclipsed by revisional powers. The areas and domainsor both though appear to be over lapping are separate and different and so cannot be intermingled. 22. As regards the exercise of power in respect of framing of charges the Courts have holding that the Court can exercise its inherent power. When the charges ale vague, when there is no evidence in support of charge end trial will be muck trial when prima facie case is not made out from the material Produced at the initial stage when there is no evidence it. When the charges ale vague, when there is no evidence in support of charge end trial will be muck trial when prima facie case is not made out from the material Produced at the initial stage when there is no evidence it. Support of the charges and the trial in the end will be a mockery of justice and will result in acquittal of the great harassment to the accused and wastage of time of all and strain on the exchequer with no purpose and no good to the society. In the case of Krishna Murty Iyer (supra) the Supreme Court observed at Page 408 in para 8:– "It was quite clear that not only where the charges vague unintelligible but it was impracticable to try them without conclusion at one trial and in these peculiar circumstances the High Court was justification quashing them in exercise of its inherent powers even before the conclusion of the trial." In the case of Bishwanath Agarwala (supra), where the question was whether the deliver, of goods on credit and further on the basis of post dated cheques failure to provide funds for the cheque, amounted to a breach of promise giving rise to a civil liability of constituted an offence under section 420 was said to be a question of fact. The Division Bench held that the order framing charge is an interlocutory order and the exercise of power u/s 97(2) by the revisional Court is barred, yet in appropriates cases the Court Could exercise its inherent power. In that case not only on merit no case for interference wail made out but also because was an application which sought to invoke the Courts revisional powers on all interlocutory order and so the Court refused to exercise the inherent powers. In another case of Bhiku Ram Jain (Supra) the Court while holding that section 392(2) is no bar to the exercise of the inherent power said at page 2005 para 54. Let us take a case where charge has been framed or process issued against an accused person by a magistrate where no charge should have been framed or process issued. To allow the trial proceed in such a case would amount to allowing a mock trial to proceed with the inevitable result that the trial would and in an acquittal. Let us take a case where charge has been framed or process issued against an accused person by a magistrate where no charge should have been framed or process issued. To allow the trial proceed in such a case would amount to allowing a mock trial to proceed with the inevitable result that the trial would and in an acquittal. If that be the cases there can be no matter or doubt that the High Court would act ex debitio justitiae to grant relief to such a party the power of the High Court to secures the ends of justice in the exercises of its inherent power embraces the power to quash a charge or a process issued against an accused person when the High Court is satisfied that an accused is being prosecuted without those being any material before the subordinate court for his prosecution it will be falling in its duty rather abdicating its function if it did not interfere redress stop patent injustice calling for instant redress. In such a case High Court in under an imperative obligation to interfere to prevent the harassment to which an accused would be subjected if prompt redress is not afforded to him. It is, however, to be borne in mind that inherent power is not to be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily but is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for which the Court exists. 23. From all this it is clear that the High Court under section 482 has got power to interfere even at the stage of framing of the charge if circumstance make out and justice for the case demands to do so. The Court should consider tile evidence and the material there on the record for making out a case for interference. From all this it is clear that the High Court under section 482 has got power to interfere even at the stage of framing of the charge if circumstance make out and justice for the case demands to do so. The Court should consider tile evidence and the material there on the record for making out a case for interference. The Court will be justified in the exercise of its power not only as a Court of law but also as a Court of Justice if the Court finds that when there is no prima facie evidence in support of the charges or the charges are vague and the trial, if allowed to be continued, will be a mockery of justice and will end in acquittal to the great harassment of accused, causeless to the exchequer and public time and also do no good to society The application for quashing should not be for by passing or circumventing the provisions of section 397(2) of the Code. The Court shall not exercise its power in a routine manner on the mere asking by changing of label. The Court must see that there is no other remedy available to the aggrieved party for approaching the Court for redressel of the wrong and in such a situation non–exercise of power by the Court will be a denial of justice and failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. So the Court will have to accutinise as to whether suitable condition for the exercise of its power exist or not. 24. Then the question arises as to how the Court at the state of framing of the charge, has to consider the material on the record for coming to the conclusion that framing of the charge is made out or not. At the stage of framing the charge the Court is to apply its mind to see whether the commission of the offence is apparent or prima facie made out. It is not to decide the matter is if it was a case or stage of final hearing as the evidence is yet to come. In Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. At the stage of framing the charge the Court is to apply its mind to see whether the commission of the offence is apparent or prima facie made out. It is not to decide the matter is if it was a case or stage of final hearing as the evidence is yet to come. In Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. & another vs. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 545, the Supreme Court observed at page 552 in para 16:– "If on this material the Court cornel to the conclusion that there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it can appropriately consider the charge to be groundless and discharge the accused. The argument that the Court at the stage of framing the charge had not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused is not supportable either on the plain language of the section or on its judicial interpretation or on any other recognised principle of law. The order framing the charges does not substantially affect the person's liberty and it is not possible to countenance the view that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities, by relying on the documents referred to in section 173, consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. With out fully adverting to the material on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution." In the case of State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswami & others, All 1977 S.C. 1489, the Supreme Court after quoting section 227 of 1974 Code observed page 1492 para 7:– "This section is contained in Chapter XVIII called trial before a Court of Session. It is clear from the provision that the Sessions Court has the power to discharge an accused if after perusing the record and hearing the parties he comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be record at that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is clear from the provision that the Sessions Court has the power to discharge an accused if after perusing the record and hearing the parties he comes to the conclusion, for reasons to be record at that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The object of the provision which requires the Sessions Judge to record his reasons is to enable the superior court to examine the correctness of the reasons for which the Sessions Judge has held that there is or is not deficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The High Court therefore is entitled to go into the reasons given by the Sessions Judge in support of his order and to determine for itself whether the order is justified by the facts and circumstances of the case." Again in the case of State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 S.C. 2018 after referring to the sections 227 and 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1974 at page 2019 the Supreme Court observed in para 4:– "Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition as they have got to be would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth veracity and the effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the fact if proved would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of tea and Judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding recording the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under section 227 or section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see where there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. At that stage the Court is not to see where there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial state if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross–examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient around for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. It the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial , then, on the theory of the benefit or doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand it is so at the initial stage of making an order under section 227 or section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under section 228 and not under section 227." In the case of Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal & another, AIR 1979 S.C. 366 their Lordships at observed at page 369 para 10:– "Thus on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above the following principles emerge:– (1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie else against the accused has been made out. (2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which hall not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced be fore him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under section 227 of the Code the Judge who under the present Code is a senior and experienced Court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouth piece of prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court any basic infirmity appearing in the case and so on. This, however, does not mean that the Judge should make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weight the evidence as if he was conducting the trial." In the case of Superintendent & Remen brancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal vs. Anil Kumar Bhunja & other, AIR 1980 S.C. 52 , the Supreme Court observed at page 55, para 18: – "It may be remembered that the case was at the Stage of framing charge the prosecution evidence had not yet commenced. The magistrate had, therefore, to consider the above question on a general consideration of the materials placed before him by the investigating police officer. At this state as was pointed out by this Court in State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1917 S.C. 2018, the truth. Veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor standard of test proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise is not exactly to be applied at the stage of section 277 or 228 of the Code of Criminal procedure. 1973. Veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor standard of test proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise is not exactly to be applied at the stage of section 277 or 228 of the Code of Criminal procedure. 1973. At this stage even a very strong suspicion founded upon material before the magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of factual ingredient constituting the offence alleged may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence." In the case of Md. Akbar Dar & others vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1981 S.C. 1548 , the Supreme Court observed at page 1549 in Para 3:– "We have beard counsel for the appellants and have gone through the judgments of the Courts below. Both the trial and Case High Court have generally given a brief survey of the evidence sought to be adduced against the appellant. It is true that the High Court bat not gone into the details of the pros and cons of the matter. This was obviously because that is not the stage when the Court could enter into meticulous consideration of the evidence and material. The High Court has clearly observed that after perusing the statement of the witnesses recorded under S. 101. It was unable to find that the charges could be said to be groundless." In the case of R.S. Nayak vs. A.R. Antuly another A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 2045, the Supreme Court considered the discharge under the various provisions of the Cr. P.C. and held at page 2071 in para 44:– "The Code contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Session under S. 227 in case tribal by it easel institute upon a police report are covered by S. 239 and cases instituted otherwise than on police report are dealt with in S. 245. The three sections contain somewhat different provisions in regard to discharge of the accused. The three sections contain somewhat different provisions in regard to discharge of the accused. Under S. 227 the trial Judge is required to discharge the accused if the consider that there not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused Obligation, to discharge the accused under S. 239 arises when the magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless." In the case of State of U.P. vs. Man Mohan and other AIR S.C. 1652, while dealing with a case u/s 438 and 439 of the old Code of 1998, their Lordships observed at page 1653 para 4 as follows:– "We are of the firmed opinion that the High Court should not have quashed the charge framed by the learned Magistrate in exercise of its revisional and reference jurisdiction. Since the learned Magistrate had formed the opinion that there were grounds to presume that the accused had committed the offence and since it cannot be said that the prosecution was farse, frivolous or vexatious or one which was by way of abuse of the process of law the High Court should not have quashed the charge in exercise of the revisional and reference powers." In the case of Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad vs. Dilip Nathumal chordia and another, 1989 SCC (Cri) 285, after referring to two decisions in State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh (supra) and Union of India vs. Prafullo Kumar Samal, (supra) their Lordships observed at pages 291 (para 14) and 293 (para 20):– "(14) These two decisions do not lay down different principle Prafulla Kumar case has only teiterated what has been stated in Ramesh Singh case. In fact Section 227 itself contains enough, guidelines as to scope of enquiry for the purpose of discharge an accused. It provides that the Judge shall discharge when he considers that three is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The ground in the context is not a ground for conviction but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial the guile en the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The Court therefore need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sirting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delive into various aspects. It is in the trial the guile en the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The Court therefore need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sirting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delive into various aspects. All that the Court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record it generally accepted would reasonable connects the accused with the crime. No mere need be enquired into." "20. We wish to add a word regarding interference by the Bihar Court against the charge framed by the Sessions Court Section 227 which confers power to discharge an accused was designed to prevent harassment to an innocent person by the arouous trial or the ordeal or prosecution How Chat intention is to be achieved is reasonably clear in the section itself. The power has been entrusted to the Session. Judge who brings of brings his knowledge and experience in criminal trial. Besides, he has the assistance of counsel for the accused and public prosecutor. He is required to hen both sides before framing any charge against the accused or for discharging him. If the Session, Judge after hearing the parties frames a charge and also makes an order in support thereof, the law must be allowed to take its own course. Selfrestraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule unless there is glaring injustice which stares the Court in the face. The opinion on any matter may defter depending upon the person who views it. There may be as many opinions on a particular matter as there are Courts but it is no ground for the High Court to interdict the trial. It would be better for the High Court to allowed the trial to proceed." In the case of Radhey Shyam vs. Kunj Bihari, AIR 1990 S.C. 121 , the Supreme Court observed at page 123 (pars 8 & 9):– "(8) In so far as the High Courts view that in the interest of justice, it is the duty of the Court under S. 482, Cr. P.C. to go into the merits of the evidence and appreciate correctly the documents and the statements filed by the police. We may only refer to mond. Akbar Dar vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir, 1981 Sup. P.C. to go into the merits of the evidence and appreciate correctly the documents and the statements filed by the police. We may only refer to mond. Akbar Dar vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir, 1981 Sup. SCC 80; (AIR 1981 SCC 1548) where it has been pointed out that at the stage of framing of charges, meticulous consideration of evidence and materials by Court is not required." "The High Court has also deemed it necessary to quash the charge against respondents 1 to 3 because in its opioion the evidence proposed to be adduced by the prosecution, even if fully accepted, cannot show that respondent 1 to 3 committed any offence and referred in that behalf to the decision in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1978) 1 SCR 257 at page 259; ( AIR 1977 S.C. 2018 at page 2019). We find that the High Courtl conclusion about tbe inadequacy of the evidenee agaainst respondents 1 to 3, besides being a premature assessment of evidence, is also attributable of the wrong premises on which the High Court’s reasoning is based." In the case of Niranan Singh Karan Singh Punjabi Advocate v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja & others. ( AIR 1990 S.C. 1962 ) their Lordships after discussing the scope and ambit of the considention by the trial court at the stage of framing charge and after referring to the decision in State of Bihar v. Rameah Singh (supra), Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (supra) and Superintendent Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Wesl Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhuja (supra) observed at page 967 para 7:– "From the above discussion it seems well settled that at the Section 227 & 228 stage the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emeraing therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The Court may for this limited purpose sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the bread probabilities of the case." 25. Thus at the stage of framing charge the Court has to apply its mind to see if there is material to presume as to whether the accused has committed the alleged offence. Thus at the stage of framing charge the Court has to apply its mind to see if there is material to presume as to whether the accused has committed the alleged offence. Its duty is to see as to whether the facts and circumstances collected by the prosecution and brought to its notice at that stage justify to proceed and frame a charge against the accused. The truth or falsity, or merits or demerits of evidence collected is not to be judged at this stage. The evidence collected till that stage is to be judged and balanced to see as to whether charge levelled is compatible and commensurate to the evidence. Even a strong suspicion leading to presumption of guilt is sufficient at this stage. The Court at this stage is only to sift and balance as to a prima facie case is made out against the accused. Broad probabilities and possibilities are not to be gone into deeply for a conclusion for a charge. The infirmities and probabilities in the case are to be left for the final stage of the case on production of evidence by both sides. The probable evidence of the prosecution or defence of the probale defence the falsity, vexatiousness or frivolousness of the prosecution case should not be the consideration at this initial stage. Meticulous consideration of evidence and material and the examination from the point or view also whether the prosecution will lead to acquittal or conviction are not the standards for this stage, as evidence is yet to come. The judicial mind should be applied as to the extent as to whether there is reasonable, probable or suflicient ground to asked the accused to live evidence and defend himself. The judicial mind should be applied as to the extent as to whether there is reasonable, probable or suflicient ground to asked the accused to live evidence and defend himself. The Court after remaining to the material collected and brought on the record and hearing the counsel for the prosecution and the accused, it finds that there is no ground to proceed against the accused and further no grounds are made out, then the Court will be well within jurisdiction to discharge the accused and he should be allowed to face a mock trial with no reasonable, probable or legal evidence, but if the Court finds a prima facie case and reason to proceed, then the Court of law should not be interferred within its proceeding, and the person charged should be allowed to face the trial which may end in conviction or acquittal in the end after the evidence has been brought by both the sides to the full. No hard and fast rule can laid down for these considerations as the matter should be left to tbe expertise of tbe judicial mind for the disposal of the case as it may be. At this stage, without further evidence being produced by the parties, it is difficult to say with certent as to whether the prostcution is false, frivolous or vexatious or the evidence is inadequate or insufficient. The roving enquiring mind of the Court must not conduct the trial at this stage. The tests and proof the final stage are not to be applied at this stage. The Court is only to see this much that if it accepts for the moment the evidentiary material then whether or not it will connect the accused with the guilt charged. Brushing aside an evidence, which prima facie establishes a case against the accused is denial of justice and refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in the Court under law. The Court on the same time should not accept the case of prosecution as it is and should not do as a mouth piece of prosecution. The Court is to judge the material. Framing of the charge is rather a communication or information to the accused to come and defend himself against the evidence and material already produed and then allow the prosecution to produce the evidence further and also the accused should produce evidence if so desires in defence and rebuttal. The Court is to judge the material. Framing of the charge is rather a communication or information to the accused to come and defend himself against the evidence and material already produed and then allow the prosecution to produce the evidence further and also the accused should produce evidence if so desires in defence and rebuttal. Then the Court is to judge after the whole of the evidence comes, for or against, as to whether the man should be booked finally or not. But, at thit stage, quashing a chargesheet is the exercise of the power under section 482 by the High Court when the evidence is yet to come or the evidence collected is disputed and all questions of fact are involved, will amount to undue and unwanted interference in course or justice and will also amount to High Courts exercise of power which is to be done by the trial Court, be a Magistrate or Sessions judge. The sifting and balancing of disputed questions of facts is the duty of the trial Court where witnesses are examined and cross-examined or the appropriate stage. High Court cannot convert itself as a Court of Magistrate or Sessions judge sparingly and with circumspection when the justice and fair play demand so in the proceedings which are nothing but misuse or abuse of the process of law and Court and harassment to the citizen. The Supreme Court in the case of Raghubir Singh & others Vs. State of Bihar & other ( AIR 1987 SC 149 ) observed at page 157 para 14:– "We wish to emphasise that this Court cannot convert itself into the Court of a Magistrate or Special Judge to consider whether there is evidence or not justifying the framing of charge." 26. In the instant case some disputed questions of fact are there. (i) Accused say that Mukundlal Layak and Krishna Kishore Adhikari executed deed of relinquishment no. 662/1901. In favour of Jadav Lal relinquishing their rights in respect of 990 bighas of Bhagabond. The prosecution says that the attested copy filed by the K.N. Banerjee petitioner is forged as in this deed 990 bight is not included. (ii) Similarly mining interest of 990 bighas is said to have been transferred to Birbhum Colliery Company by Atul Shiv Banerjee, Nirmal Shiv Banerjee and Sashtinkar Banerjee. The prosecution says that the attested copy filed by the K.N. Banerjee petitioner is forged as in this deed 990 bight is not included. (ii) Similarly mining interest of 990 bighas is said to have been transferred to Birbhum Colliery Company by Atul Shiv Banerjee, Nirmal Shiv Banerjee and Sashtinkar Banerjee. The three sons of Jadav Lal vide registered deeds dated 17.1.1921, 209 dated 20.2.1921 and 1362 dated 1921 but the prosecution says that the deed nos. 208 and 209 are forged. (iii) Birbhum Company in turn transferred the said interest to Bisheshwar Trust Estate vide deed no. 2127 dated 29.8.1938. This contention of the defence is denied by saying that it is a forged document. (iv) Bisheshwar Trust Estate transferred the said trust to Kajor Pioneer Company Pvt. Ltd. vide registered deed no. 3263 of 1944. This also has been disputed by the prosecution as being a forged document. (v) Kajor Pioneer Company Pvt. Ltd. transferred the said interest to the Central Manbhum Company Pvt. Ltd. vide registered deed no. 1050 dated 14.10.1950. Thil document is also said to be forged one and the prosecution does not admit its correctneas. 27. The prosecution has also said that Atul Shiv son of Yadav Lal had filed Title Suit 395/1911 in the court of Sub Judge Manbhum for the partition of property which included the mining interest of 990 bighas. Although the suit was dismissed but the entire property was given under the management of receiver for receiving royalty and its distribution to co-shares and so the receiver alone could receive the royalty and not the accuasd who claims right to receive the same. This is also a disputed question of fact. Not only this, the question as to whether K.N. Banerjee was entitled to receive the compensation is disputed and not an admitted fact. 28. The Government appears to have prepared its own record after the vesting of the mining rights in the State for the purpose of collecting royalties from the assesses and that is the matter to be decided on the basis of the record as to how far the petitioner K.N. Banerjee could get any right in 990 bighas of Bagabond. The prosecution says that there is cheating and wrongful loss to the State and wronlful gain to the petitioner K.N. Banerjee which allegation also needs evidence to be produced for and against. 29. In case no. The prosecution says that there is cheating and wrongful loss to the State and wronlful gain to the petitioner K.N. Banerjee which allegation also needs evidence to be produced for and against. 29. In case no. 3/74-75 K.N. Banerjee-petitioner said about transfers and re-transfers of the rights and only attested copies have been filed farwhich the prosecution not said that the deeds forged and K.N. Banerjee was not entitled to any compensation. Even the income tax returns said to have been filed are not admitted to be genuine. The rate of royalty is said to be inflated. 30. From looking to the evidence collected and material brought on tbe record and contentions raised by the parties disputed questions of fact are there for which at this stage it cannot be laid with certainty that the prosecution case is false, frivolous, vexatious, without any basis or no prima facie case it made out and so in these circumstances in exercise of the inherent powers to quash order framing of the charge without evidence coming further will be a denial of justice and to nip in the bud the prosecution which is yet to bring the evidence if there would have been undisputed questions of facts, the Court could have come on a conclusion of its own, as to whether the accused is liable to be discharged. But in these circumstances, at this stage, on the basis of disputed document and evidence it is difficult for the Court to lay that no prima facie case is made out and charges should not be framed. 31. Therefore, the application for quashing the entire criminal proceedings in Special Case No. 172 of 1983 including the order dated 27.2.1986 of learned Special Judge refusing to discharge, has no force and is liable to be dismissed. The inter order dated 1.12.1986 for stay of proceedings is recalled the court below proceed with the case in accordance with. I agree. Application dismissed.