JUDGMENT : B.N. Srikrishna, J. - This petition, though purported to be under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, can substantially be entertained under Article 227, as the same reliefs can be granted thereunder. Consequently, I have entertained this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 2. By the present petition, the petitioner has impugned an order of the Industrial Court, dated 2nd September, 1985, made in Appeal (1C) No. 10 of 1984 under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). 3. The salient facts leading to the present petition are as under :- 4. The respondent is in the employment of the petitioner, which is a co-operative society manufacturing sugar, since 14th November, 1963. The respondent joined initially as a Slip Boy, was made a Clerk Grade IV from month May, 1972 and thereafter made permanent. During the crushing season of 1982-83, he was made Cane Yard Supervisor and called upon to perform the duties of the said post. By an order dated 28th December, 1982, he was transferred to the Cane Yard Section in the Agriculture Department and appointed as Cane Yard Supervisor on a permanent post. Though the respondent was appointed on the post of Cane Yard Supervisor in the Agriculture Department, he was neither made permanent on the said post, nor was he paid the emoluments attached to the said post. On the other hand, it appears that, while the respondent was working as Cane Yard Supervisor, the petitioner called for applications from suitable candidates for being appointed to the post of Cane Yard Supervisor. The respondent also applied for the same, and was interviewed along with other candidates. The respondent was, however, never told the results of the interview, nor was any other candidate appointed on the said post. Bering aggrieved by the failure of the petitioner to appoint him permanently on the post of Cane Yard Supervisor, the respondent gave a letter of approach u/s 42(4) of the Act demanding that he be appointed as permanent Cane Yard Supervisor and be paid the wages and other emoluments payable therefore, failing which agreement on the issue, the petitioner moved the Labour Court, Kolhapur, under the provisions of Section 78 of the Act for the aforesaid reliefs. The Labour Court after recording evidence, came to the conclusion that it would not be just and proper that the respondent be directed by the petitioner to work in the post of Cane Yard Supervisor, without being paid the emoluments attached to the said post. The Labour Court also upheld the validity of the grievance made by the respondent that the action of the petitioner in not making him permanent on the post of Cane Yard Supervisor was illegal and improper. The Labour Court directed the petitioner to continue the applicant and make him permanent on the post of Cane Yard Supervisor, and pay him wages of the said post for the period during which the respondent had worked as Cane Yard Supervisor. 5. Being aggrieved by the said order made by the Labour Court, the petitioner carried the matter in appeal to the Industrial Court u/s 84 of the Act. The Industrial Court concurred with the findings recorded by the Labour Court on all aspects of the matter, except as to the direction for payment of wages for the entire period. The Industrial Court took the view that the claim for wages could not be granted for a period prior to three months from the date on which the approach notice was made by the respondent, and, therefore, restricted the claim for wages to this period only. The appeal was allowed only to this extent and the rest of the directions of the Labour Court were confirmed. Being aggrieved by the said order of the Industrial Court, the petitioner has challenged the same before this Court. 6. Mr. Patil, learned advocate for the petitioner, has reiterated the same contentions which were raised before the Industrial Court. the first contention is that the application made by the respondent before the Labour Court was barred by limitation, as it was not within the period prescribed u/s 78(1)A(a)(i) of the Act. It was contended that the respondent had made an earlier application (BIR) No. 66 of 1983, which was not preceded by an approach letter, as required by the proviso to Section 44 of the Act, and upon an objection being taken as to the ten-ability of the said application, the Application (BIR) No. 66 of 1983 was withdrawn by the respondent. Subsequently, the respondent gave an approach notice and filed the present application before the Labour Court. Subsequently, the respondent gave an approach notice and filed the present application before the Labour Court. It is contended that the approach notice is time-barred, as the approach notice had to be issued long after the respondent started working as Cane Yard Supervisor. In any event, more than three months had passed between the date of the cause of action, if any, and the date of the approach notice. The Industrial Court has, in my view, very rightly, rejected this contention. Despite strenuous arguments by Mr. Patil to the contrary, I am not satisfied that the dispute sought to be raised by the respondent was not a change demanded with regard to industrial matter enumerated in Schedule III to the Act, particularly items (2) and (6) thereof. The respondent was not being appointed as a permanent Cane Yard Supervisor, and was not paid the emoluments attached to the said post. By the approach notice, the respondent demanded the said change. In my view the change demanded would be a change with regard to an industrial matter covered by item (2) of Schedule III, which is styled "Assignment of work and transfer of workers within the establishment". At any rate, Item (6) of Schedule III, which reads "Employment including - (i) reinstatement and recruitment; (ii) unemployment of persons previously employed in the industry concerned" is of sufficient amplitude so as to incorporate within itself a change such as the one demanded by the respondent. I am, therefore, of the view that there is no substance in the contention raised by the petitioner, and the Industrial Court has rightly rejected the same. 7. The next contention raised by the petitioner is that the dispute sought to be raised by the application was not covered u/s 78(1)D of the Act and, therefore, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application or grant any relief therein. This contention, in my view, is thoroughly misconceived. Section 78(1)D is not intended to apply to such a situation at all. It merely amplifies the ambit of jurisdiction of the Labour Court to grant reliefs in cases of orders of dismissal, discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination of service or suspension of an employee being found illegal. The dispute raised by the respondent fell appropriately within Section 78(1)A(a)(iii) read with Items (2) and (6) of Schedule III of the Act, as I have already indicated. The dispute raised by the respondent fell appropriately within Section 78(1)A(a)(iii) read with Items (2) and (6) of Schedule III of the Act, as I have already indicated. The contention raised on Section 78(1)D is, therefore, puerile and is rejected. 8. The last contention based on limitation is also without merit, in my view. As far as a change demanded with regard to any industrial matter falling within any of the items enumerated in Schedule III to the Act is concerned, the limitation is prescribed by Section 79(3)(b) of the Act. The said clause provides that, it is a dispute falling under Sub-clause (iii) of Section 78(1)A, then the application has to be made within three months of the employee concerned having "last approached" the employer under the proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 42 of the Act. The section, therefore, indicates that, as long as the cause of action continues, it is open to the employee to keep on making approaches, and, so long as he makes an application to the Labour Court within a period of three months of the last approach the application would be well within time. The Industrial Court, therefore, was fully justified in rejecting the argument on this aspect of the matter also, as enumerated. 9. Having exhausted all the contentions in his legal armoury, Mr. Patil turned to the merits of the case, and, when he did so, he had precious little to canvass. It is not disputed that the respondent had been, by a specific order, directed to work as Cane Yard Supervisor in the Agriculture Department. It is also not disputed that he has been carrying out his duties as such and that he has not been made permanent on the said post. It is also admitted that he has not been paid wages and other emoluments attached to the said post. In these circumstances, I see no defence to the claim in the application, on merits, at all. It is also admitted that he has not been paid wages and other emoluments attached to the said post. In these circumstances, I see no defence to the claim in the application, on merits, at all. Both the Courts below were, therefore, fully justified in directing that the respondent, who has been working on the post of Cane Yard Supervisor, Agriculture Department, for long, should be made permanent in the said vacant post, and that he should be paid the wages and other emoluments attached to the said post The Industrial Court was also right in restricting the monetary claim to a period of three months immediately preceding the date of the letter of approach. 10. In the circumstances, I see no infirmity in the judgments of the Courts below which appear to be perfectly consistent with the law on the subject. There is no merit in the petition, which is, therefore, dismissed. Rule discharged with costs.