K. RAMACHANDRIAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a tenants' Revision Petition filed under Section 115, C. P. C. against the concurrent orders of the Principal Munsiff, Chitradurga (for short 'the trial Court' or 'the trial Judge') dated 10-7-1990 in H. R. C. No. 5/1987 allowing the eviction petition filed by the respondents under clauses (h), (c), (f) and (p) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the act') seeking their eviction from a certain non-residential premises consisting of the ground floor and the first floor in which they are running a hotel at Chitradurga (for short 'the premises') and confirmed by the District Judge, Chitradurga by dismissing their Revision Petition (R) No. 25/1990 by order dated 28-2-1991. ( 2 ) FOR the sake of convenience, reference will hereinafter be made to the parties to this Revision Petition with reference to the positions they respectively occupied in the eviction petition in the trial Court. ( 3 ) THERE is no dispute that the petitioners-tenants are running a hotel in abuilding consisting of the first floor and the ground floor of the respondents-landlords in Chitradurga Town as their tenants on payment of rent of rs. 250/- per month from 1-3-1966 and enhanced rent of Rs. 650/-per month from 1-4-1978. The said building measures 26' x 60'. The landlords Filed an eviction petition against the tenants in the trial Court in H. R. C. No. 5/1987 seeking their eviction from the premises on as many as four grounds covered by clauses (h), (c), (f) and (p) of Section 21 (1) of the Act. ( 4 ) IT was resisted by the tenants by contending in their objection statement that the landlords were not entitled to seek their eviction on any of the four grounds. Both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence in proof of their respective contentions. ' On a consideration of the said evidence, the learned trial Judge by his order dated 10-7-1990 allowed the eviction petition on all the four grounds. ( 5 ) FEELING aggrieved by the said order, the tenants filed a Revision Petition (R) No. 25/1990 in the District Court, Chitradarga. ' On a consideration of the said evidence, the learned trial Judge by his order dated 10-7-1990 allowed the eviction petition on all the four grounds. ( 5 ) FEELING aggrieved by the said order, the tenants filed a Revision Petition (R) No. 25/1990 in the District Court, Chitradarga. By order dated 28-2-1991, the learned District Judge dismissed the Revision Petition and confirmed the eviction order of the trial Court giving 30 days time from the date of his order to the tenants to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises to the landlords. It is against the said concurrent orders of the two Courts below that the tenants have filed this second Revision Petition under Section 115, C. P. C. ( 6 ) ALTHOUGH as many as nine grounds are urged in the Revision Petition, Sri H. K. Vasudeva Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants confined his argument to only one ground, namely, partial eviction aspect not considered by the trial Court as per the mandate of sub-para (2) of sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the act which reads thus:"if the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only". He also placed reliance in support of his contention on a decision of the Supreme court in Rehaman Jeo Mangroo v Ram Chand and Others, AIR 1978 SC 413 in which the Supreme Court while considering the corresponding provision, in Section ll (h) of J. and K. Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966 has held that the proviso to Section ll (h) of the said Act mandates the Court to consider whether partial eviction as contemplated therein should be ordered or the entire holding should be directed to be evicted and, therefore, lhal aspect requires judicial exploration after giving opportunity to both sides to lead evidence in that behalf. With the said observations, the Supreme Court has directed the first appellate Court to go into the question as to whether the reasonable requirement of the landlord may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the premises as contemplated in the proviso and if, after taking evidence, the Court is satisfied that the entire house or premises must be vacated to fulfil the reasonable requirement of the landlord, the present order will stand and if, on the other hand, the Court finds, as a fact, that partial eviction will meet the ends of justice as visualised in the proviso, an appropriate order will be passed on that fooling. He also placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Radhakrishna v Thayappa Setty, ILR 1985 (2) Karnataka 3182, in which his Lordship K. Jagannatha Shelly, J. (as his Lordship then was) has observed in paragraph 7 at page 3187 as under: "under Section 21 (4) of the Act, the Court is required to consider all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant. Under this sub-section, the Court not only is required lo consider all the evidence on record, but also to bear in mind the problem of accommodation prevalent in the area. The Court must also bear in mind the respective means of the parties. The court must also consider the nature of their occupations, the living conditions and the like with the possibility of rehabilitation of the tenant without much difficulty. The Court must use its hindsight on all these facts and surrounding circumstances of the case and cases perhaps not so uncommon around it". Placing reliance on the said observations, Sri H. K. Vasudeva Reddy argued that although the District Judge has made a cursory reference to the partial eviction aspect in his order, he had no requisite material before him in support of his observations inasmuch as the trial Court had not at all advertised to that aspect in its order and both parties had also not adduced evidence on the question of partial eviclion. He further submitted thai he would accept the requirement of the landlords in respect of the first floor of the building in the occupation of the tenants but not of the ground floor in which they are doing the family business of running a hotel and, therefore, the petitioners are agreeable to give up the fvrst floor as it would meet the requirements of the landlords and also safeguard the interests of the tenants as well. ( 7 ) BUT, Smt. Kumud C. Rao, learned counsel for the respondents-landlords, was not agreeable to the said suggestion of the learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants by contending that the material on record was sufficient to enable the District Judge to hold that partial eviction of tenants was not feasible and, therefore, there is no reason to interfere with the impugned order of the learned District Judge. ( 8 ) BY way of reply, Sri H. K. Vasudeva Reddy submitted that the evidence onrecord is in sufficient to decide the question of partial eviction in one way or the other and, therefore, the matter may be remanded back to the trial Court for recording its finding on the question of partial eviction, after recording further evidence on that point. ( 9 ) IN my opinion, there is no need to accede to the said request of Sri H. K. Vasudeva Reddy for more reasons than one. Firstly, the learned District Judge has considered partial eviction aspect in considerable detail in paragraph 19 of his order on the basis of the materials available in the records with reference to the law laid down by this Court in the decisions referred to by him. In particular, he has referred to the decision of this Court in Chokadi Venkataraman v Kashim Saheb, ilr 1985 Karnataka 1972 that the jurisdiction to make an order of eviction in respect of part of the premises does not entitle the Court to divide the premises whimsically in a manner which may not be useful for either of the two parties, that the division of the property must be workable and the Court has to strike a just balance between the landlord and the tenant so that no injustice is done to either of them. Dimensions of the premises as mentioned in the eviction schedule are 26' x 60'. Dimensions of the premises as mentioned in the eviction schedule are 26' x 60'. Second respondent is admittedly running a hotel-cum-restaurant in the ground floor and is using the first floor for lodging purposes. The case of the petitioners is that the first petitioner who had no chance of securing any Government employment as he was already 40 years old. He has stated in the eviction petition and also in his evidence that he is in reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises for the purpose of opening a Stationery shop in the ground floor and he also intends to lake up the agency of consumer goods like T. V. sets etc. , and also to use the first floor for lodging purposes. Except making some suggestions that the first petitioner was having sufficient liquid cash out of the earnings of his Doctor father who had lucrative practice till he suddenly died of heart-attack, respondents have not been successful in establishing by any acceptable evidence that petitioners were in affluent circumstances by possessing sufficient liquid cash and other properties besides the building in question. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion reached by the learned District Judge that partial eviction of the premises is not feasible does not call for a second look in this Revision Petition filed under Section 115, C. P. C. Secondly, partial eviction aspect would have assumed much importance if the eviction order has been made under clause (h) only. But, in the instant case, eviction order is made against the petitioners under clauses (c), (f), (h) and (p) of section 21 (1) of the Act. It is manifest from the language of Section 21 (1) proviso that an eviction order can be sought and granted by the Court on one or more of the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to (p ). Therefore, I am not impressed by the argument of Sri H. K. Vasudeva Reddy that the impugned orders of the Courts below and, in any event, the order of the learned District Judge suffers from the vice of non-consideration of the partial eviction aspect as per the mandate of Section 2 (4) of the Act. Therefore, I am not impressed by the argument of Sri H. K. Vasudeva Reddy that the impugned orders of the Courts below and, in any event, the order of the learned District Judge suffers from the vice of non-consideration of the partial eviction aspect as per the mandate of Section 2 (4) of the Act. ( 10 ) EVENOTHERWISE, the impugned concurrent orders of the Courts below ordering eviction of the petitioners on the above mentioned four grounds do not call for interference in this Second Revision Petition filed under Section 115, C. P. C. Before adverting to the decisions cited by Smt. Kumud C. Rao on the scope of section 115, C. P. C. , I consider it appropriate to make brief reference to the evidence on record in support of the above mentioned four grounds. The rent agreement-Ex. R-1 is executed in favour of late Dr. B. K. Nagaraj by first respondent h. Padmanabha Rao only and not by the second respondent also. The purpose for which the premises is taken on lease by the first respondent is for the purpose of running a reslaurant-cum-lodging. Respondents-1 and 2, who are brothers, have unequivocally admitted in their evidence that they were not members of a joint family and they had no ancestral properties. They have been residing separately in their own houses since several years prior to the execution of the rent agreement Ex. P-1 by the first respondent in favour of Dr. B. K. Nagaraj on 1-3-1966. Subsequent correspondence in respect of the premises is made by the first respondent only. Second respondent has not paid rent of the premises at any time. It is only on 12-4-1975 a deed of dissolution of partnership has come into existence between the first respondent and the second respondent as per Ex. R, 22 under which second respondent is conferred absolute right of running the hotel-cum-lodging in the premises and he has been in exclusive possession of the premises since then. Therefore, the view taken by the trial Court and affirmed by the District Court that this is a clear case of subletting of the premises by the first respondent to the second respondent is perfectly justified. Therefore, the view taken by the trial Court and affirmed by the District Court that this is a clear case of subletting of the premises by the first respondent to the second respondent is perfectly justified. ( 11 ) SECOND respondent (R. W. 1) has staled in his evidence in chief-examination itself that his elder brother (first respondent) was having a hotel in his own building and he had also constructed a new house. He has also admitted that he was still in possession of a building of one G. Maheshwarappa situate just opposite to the premises in question ; that he was running a hotel in that building and he is now using it for storing hotel articles and has permitted his hotel workers to sleep in it. He has also admitted that his elder brother is having Laxmi Tiffin Rooms in chickpet and he has purchased that building in 1972-73. This aspect is admitted by the first respondent also (P. W. I) in his evidence by stating that he has been running a restaurant by name Laxmi Bhavan Tiffin Rooms in Chickpet from 1954 by taking the building of that Tiffin Rooms on lease in 1954 and he has subsequently purchased that building in 1969 and he continues to run Laxmi Bhavan Tiffin Room in that building in and it has become a famous hotel in Chitradurga as popular eatables like 'dosai, 'vadai' and 'idlies' etc. , are deliciously prepared in that hotel and quite a good number of customers visit that hotel as it is situate on bangalore-Davangerc Highway. Therefore, the view taken by the trial Court that the petitioner has made out a ground for evicting the respondent under clause (p) also is well founded. ( 12 ) UNDER clause (c) the tenant cannot erect on the premises any permanent structure without the landlord's consent given in writing. Both respondents have stated in their evidence that the building at the time it was taken on lease from Dr. ( 12 ) UNDER clause (c) the tenant cannot erect on the premises any permanent structure without the landlord's consent given in writing. Both respondents have stated in their evidence that the building at the time it was taken on lease from Dr. Nagaraj consisted of four portions in the first floor and four portions in the ground floor and after taking the same on lease they have converted the first floor into eight rooms, bath-room, water tank, kitchen and chimney for letting off the smoke and a store room, dining hall, another room for grinding the food articles by erecting brick walls both in the first floor and the ground floor. They have admitted that they have spent about Rs. 10,000/- for that purpose and there was no written consent of Dr. Nagaraj for doing so before eommeneing the reslauranl-cum-lodging. Even their witness U. K. Padmanabha Rao (R. W. 3) who has been functioning as President of hotel Owners' Association in Chitradurga since 25 years and was said to be present at the time the premises was taken on lease from Dr. Nagaraj has admitted in his evidence, that there is no recital in the lease agreement - Ex. R. 1 which he has attested that it was taken by the first respondent for the purpose of running a restaurant-cum-lodging in it along with his younger brother Puttanna, second respondent and it is also not written in Ex. R. 1 that material alterations could be made in that building for the purpose of running a restaurant and lodging except writing that the necessary amenities may be got done by the lessee. He has also made a categorical admission that there was no talk at the time of lease that suitable alterations in the structural design of the building can be got done by the lessee. This Court has taken the view in Panduranga Mallya v Alphonso A. Rodrigues, 1976 (2) Kar. LJ. 428 that replacement of tin sheets over an open space by zinc sheets cannot be a permanent construction as the expression 'permanent structure' necessarily refers to some material alteration made in the building such addition or subtraction in the building leading to alteration in the character of enjoyment. So tested, the above mentioned alterations made by the tenants clearly amounts to material alteration of the building. So tested, the above mentioned alterations made by the tenants clearly amounts to material alteration of the building. Therefore, the view taken by the Courts below that the landlords were entitled to an order of eviction under clause (c) also is based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record and also the law on the point. ( 13 ) THE next aspect to be considered is whether the said findings can be interfered with by this Court in exercise of the revisional powers under Section 115, c. P. C. even if it is possible to take the view that the above findings recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the District Court are not warranted by the evidence on record. On this point, Smt. Kumud C. Rao placed reliance on three decisions of the supreme Court in Vora Abbasbhai Alimohamed v Haji Gulamnabi amnaji Safibhai, air 1964 SC 1341 in which it is held with reference to the provisions of the Bombay rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 that the High Court cannot interfere under Section 115, C. P. C, even if the District Court had erroneously held that Section 13 (3) (b) of the said Act was complied with and readiness and willingness as contemplated by clause (1) of Section 13 (3) (b) were other wise established. While considering the scope of revisional jurisdiction of the high Court under Section 64-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as amended by the state of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court has observed in K. Balasubramania Chetty v N. M. Sambandamoorthy Chetty, AIR 1975 SC 818 in paragraph 8 that the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 64-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as amended by the State of Tamil Nadu, is as severely restricted as that under Section 115, C. P. C. and it is only where there is a jurisdictional error or illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction that the High Court can interfere under section 64-B with an order made by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and in that case, the High Court had overstepped the limits of revisional jurisdiction when it interfered with the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal by treating the revision against his order as if it were an appeal which was not permissible. In Johri singh v Sukh Pat Singh and Others, AIR 1989 SC 2073 the Supreme Court has held that the first condition precedent to enable the High Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, C. P. C. was lacking for revising an order made by the trial Court extending time under Section 148, C. P. C. as the trial Court had jurisdiction to grant extension of time on sufficient cause being made out and there was nothing on record to hold that the said discretion was exercised by the trial court in breach of any provision of law or that the trial Court committed any error of procedure which was material and may have affected the ultimate decision and that being so, the High Court had no power to interfere with the order of the trial court, however profoundly it may have differed from the conclusions of the trial judge on the questions of fact or law. On this point, I may usefully refer to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Chandmal v Finn Ramachandra and Vishwanath, 1991 (3) SCC 130 decided on May 7,1991. In the said decision, their Lordships were considering the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 26 of the hyderabad House (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954. In that context, the Supreme Court has observed that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 26 of the Hyderabad Rent Act which is almost in pan materia with section 115, C. P. C. is a limited one and is confined strictly to the jurisdictional error or illegal exercise of jurisdiction and, therefore, the finding of the High Court to the effect that it was the duty of the Court in the interest of justice to interfere even with th concurrent finding of fact because on the record, High Court found that there was not a single factor to come to the conclusion that the claim was mala fide or was not bonafide as required by the statute, is entirely baseless and not in accordance with Section 26 of the Hyderabad Rent Act which confers revisional jurisdiction on the High Court. With the said observations, the Supreme Court has set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and has affirmed the orders of the Courts below. With the said observations, the Supreme Court has set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and has affirmed the orders of the Courts below. ( 14 ) IN the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above mentioned decisions regarding the scope of revisional powers under Section 115, c. P. C, I hold that the impugned concurrent orders of the Courts below do not call for interference in this revision filed under Section 115, C. P. C. even if it is possible to take the view that the concurrent conclusions reached by the two Courts below are not based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record. ( 15 ) VIEWED from any angle, therefore, this Revision Petition is devoid of any merits. ( 16 ) IN the result, the Revision Petition is dismissed with costs. As this case reveals that the petitioners have successfully prevented the respondents from getting possession of the premises from 1983, they arc not entitled to the grant of sufficiently longer time for vacating the premises as alternatively pleaded by Sri h. K. Vasudeva Reddy on the ground that a reslaurant-cum-lodging is run in the premises. It is not as if the petitioners have to alternative accommodation for running their hotel business. However, taking into consideration that it requires some time for the petitioners to shift their hotel business from the premises in question, I consider it necessary in the ends of justice to grant them time till 31-10-1991 (Thirty-first October, Nineteen ninety-one) to voluntarily vacate and deliver vacant possession of the eviction petition schedule premises to the respondents without putting them to the ordeal of filing an execution petition and also subject to payment of rent regularly every month till then. --- *** --- .