JUDGMENT S.B. SINHA, J. 1. This application is directed against an order dated 26.7.1989 passed by the respondent no. 3 as contained in Annexure 4 to the writ application as also an order dated 27.2.1991 passed by the respondent no. 2 as contained in Annexure 5 to the writ application. 2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. 3. The respondent no. 4 filed an application for restoration of the lands purported to be in terms of the provisions of Section 71A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 alleging therein that he transferred the lands in question which have been described in paragraph 4 of the writ application in favour of one Dhanpat Baraik who in turn sold the said lands in favour of one Ganesh Sahu by virtue of a registered deed of sale dated 3.9.1957. A copy of the said deed of sale is contained in Annexure 2 to the writ application. 4. It is further the admitted case of the parties that the aforementioned Ganesh Sahu transferred the lands in question in favour of one Ramu Sahu, brother of the petitioner on 24.1.1961 by reason of a registered deed of sale as contained in Annexure 3 to the writ application. The said application for restoration filed by the respondent no. 4 was registered as SAR Case No. 37 of 1979-80. 5. It appears that by reason of the impugned order dated 26.7.1989 as contained in Annexure 4 to the writ application, the respondent no. 3 relied upon a caste certificate granted by the Block Development Officer, although, the Block Development Officer himself was not examined as a witness. 6. It further appears that before the respondent no. 3 although, the parties had adduced evidences but the said respondent did not analyse the evidences at all the respondent no. 2 being the appellate authority while passing the impugned order as contained in Annexure 5 to the writ application, had also failed to analyse the evidences brought on records. 7. Mr. P.N. Sahu, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised a short question in support of this application. 2 being the appellate authority while passing the impugned order as contained in Annexure 5 to the writ application, had also failed to analyse the evidences brought on records. 7. Mr. P.N. Sahu, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised a short question in support of this application. The learned counsel submitted that in view of the entries made in the record of rights which is contained in Annexure 1 to the writ application, it would appear that the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner was recorded as being belonging to Baraik community and not Chik Baraik community. The learned counsel, in this connection, has also submitted that from a perusal of the deed of sale as contained in Annexure 2 to the writ application, it would appear that the vendor thereof viz. Dhanpat Baraik described himself as Baraik i.e. belonging to Baraik community. It was further submitted that even in the voters' list which is contained in Annexure 6 to the writ application, Birbal Baraik has been described as Baraik only and not as Chik Baraik. 8. According to the learned counsel, therefore, as a presumption of correctness arises with regard to the entry made in the finally published record of rights in terms of Section 84(3) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act and further a presumption may be drawn with regard to the fact that official acts have been done in due course of business in terms of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act; the respondent nos. 2 and 3 misdirected themselves in so far as they failed to take into consideration that such statutory presumption could be rebutted by the respondent no. 4 only upon adducing cogent evidence. 9. The learned counsel further submitted that in view of a decision of this Court in Liloo Sahu vs. State of Bihar, reported in 1988 B.L.T. 4, unless the Block Development Officer himself was examined as a witness, the respondent no. 3 could not have taken into consideration the caste certificate. The learned counsel appears to be correct. 10. It is not in dispute that Baraiks are not members of the scheduled tribes whereas Chik Baraiks are the members of the scheduled tribes. 3 could not have taken into consideration the caste certificate. The learned counsel appears to be correct. 10. It is not in dispute that Baraiks are not members of the scheduled tribes whereas Chik Baraiks are the members of the scheduled tribes. It as also a settled law that only because in the record of rights, person's caste has been recorded as Baraik, the same would not be conclusive and thus, it would be open to the parties concerned to rebut the presumption arising under Section 84(3) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act. So far as an admission made of a member of a scheduled tribe is concerned, the court in view of Regulation 2 of the Bihar Scheduled Area Regulations is required to direct the parties to prove the fact otherwise than by such admission made by a member of a scheduled tribe and in such a case the Deputy Commissioner may also adduce evidence in rebuttal and in that view of the matter, the admission made in Annexure 2 may not be binding upon the maker thereof, if he otherwise can prove that he is a member of scheduled tribe. 11. It is, therefore, evident that it would be open to the respondent no. 4 to rebut the presumption arising out of correctness of the entries made in the record of rights (Annexure 1) as also the correctness of the entries made in the voters' list (Annexure 6). 12. Unfortunately, the respondent nos. 2 and 3 did not consider this aspect of the matter at all. Both the aforementioned respondents merely observed that witnesses have been examined. They further enumerated the documents filed by the parties. The respondent no. 3 could not have come to a finding that the respondent no. 4 was a Chick Baraik by caste and thus a member of scheduled tribes on the basis of materials brought on records and for that purpose he was required to discuss and analyse the evidences adduced by the parties. The respondent no. 3 further misdirected himself in relying upon the caste certificate granted by the Block Development Officer although, he was not examined. 13. In Liloo Sabu's case (supra), this Court has clearly held that by reason of such a certificate which was not admissible in evidence, the presumption arising out under Section 84(3) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act cannot be said to have been rebutted. 14. 13. In Liloo Sabu's case (supra), this Court has clearly held that by reason of such a certificate which was not admissible in evidence, the presumption arising out under Section 84(3) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act cannot be said to have been rebutted. 14. Yet in another decision in Kashi Nath Ram Ganjhua vs. State of Bihar, reported in 1988 BLT 13, this Court has held as follows:– "It is an admitted position that in the cadestral survey as well as in the revisional survey, Durga Baraik has been described as only Baraik and not as Chick Baraik. In the registered documents, which were executed as early as in the year 1925 and 1939, Durga Baraik was described as Baraik only. In this background, in my view Shri B.N. Tiwary was not justified in coming to the conclusion that although Durga Baraik belonged to Chik Baraik caste but, as Chik Baraik were considered lower than the Baraik he wrongly described himself as Baraik in different registered documents. However, Shri Tiwary has not mentioned as to why even in the two survey records he was described only as Baraik and not as Chik Baraik. In this situation I have no option but to accept the submission raised on behalf of the petitioners that the finding recorded by the Courts below that Durga Baraik was Chik Baraik by caste and as such belonged to scheduled tribe is based on no evidence. There is no dispute that once Durga Baraik is held to be only Baraik by caste, then he shall not be a member of the scheduled tribe so as Respondent could have availed the benefit of the provisions of Section 71A of the Act." 15. However, in this case as noticed hereinbefore, some oral evidences have been adduced on behalf of the respondent no. 4 in order to rebut the presumption arising out under Section 84(3) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act as also under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. 16. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the matter requires reconsideration at the hands of the respondent no. 3. 17. In this view of the master, this application is allowed the impugned orders as contained in Annexure 4 and 5 to the writ application are quashed and the matter is remitted back to the respondent no. 3 who shall pass a fresh order in accordance with law. 3. 17. In this view of the master, this application is allowed the impugned orders as contained in Annexure 4 and 5 to the writ application are quashed and the matter is remitted back to the respondent no. 3 who shall pass a fresh order in accordance with law. 18. In the event, the respondent no. 4 files an application for adduction of additional evidence the respondent no. 3 shall allow the same. It goes without saying that in such an event the petitioner shall also be entitled to adduce evidence contrary. 19. This application is disposed of with the aforementioned observations and directions. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.