Judgment 1. WE would like to place on record that we have very much appreciated the endeavour made by the learned counsel for the parties to assist us as best at they could. But after giving our anxious advertence to their arguments and to the materials on record as at present, we are satisfied that only two questions realy survive for our consideration in this appeal and no other question need obtain us for the present. 2. THE first question is whether the notice Of requisition under section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 is valid and was validly served. And the Second question is that since the public purpose for which the land has been requisitioned relates to the Calcutta Improvement trust whether the authorities concerned could resort to this West Bengal Act of 1948 at all when the Calcutta Improvement Act 1911 itself provides for acquisition of land for such purpose. As the first question, we are satisfied that the challenge to the service of notice a behalf of the appellant was rather half-hearted. The respondents is paragraph 6 (c) and paragraph 9 of their affidavit have categorically stated about the mode in which the process-server of the office of the First Land acquisition Collector served the notice and it has been stated that the same was done by affixing the notice on the front door of the residential house of the appellant. To this, the reply of the appellant is that there is no front door in this residence and as such no notice could be affixed on the front door. If a notice was served on the premises, as required under the relevant Act and the Rules made thereunder, the mere fact that it was not affixed on the front door but was affixed at some other conspicuous place cannot invalidate the notice. As has been repeatedly ruled by the Supreme Court, the tendency of the courts to technicalities must be deprecated and it is the substance that must count and must be allowed to take precedence over mere form and formalities. The learned trial Judge has also dealt with this aspect in appreciable details and after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties on going through the records we find no reason to come to any different conclusion. The learned trial Judge has also dealt with this aspect in appreciable details and after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties on going through the records we find no reason to come to any different conclusion. We, accordingly, hold that the notice of requisition under Section 3 of the Act of 1948 was legally served as required by law. 3. AS to the legality of the notice, Mr. Mukherjee appearing for the appellant has also signed that the public purpose for which the land was sought to be requisitioned was not properly specified in the notice. It is by now almost settled by the appex court that the purpose of the acquisition need not be articulated in the notice in details. . We have looked at the copy of the notice and are satisfied that the purpose of the requisition was substantially notified therein. 4. MR. Mitra appearing for the respondents has drawn, our attention to the decisions of the Supreme Court tin M. D. Vara vs. State of Maharashtra (A. I. R 1984 SC 866) and also in Jawani Kumar vs. First Land Acquisition Collector, calcutta ( AIR 1984 SC 1707 ) in support of the contention that the purpose of the acquisition need not be mentioned in details in the notice of requisition. Be that as it may, we are satisfied that the notice substantially specified the purpose of the acquisition, this question also need not detain us in future. Mr. Mukherjee has very seriously urged that since the land was sought to be requisitioned for the purpose of Calcutta Improvement Trust and to be acquired thereafter, each and every step or such acquisition was to be made under the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 alone and the requisition under Act of 1948 was illegal. Mr. Mukherjee has also argued that if the land is eventually acquired under the provisions of the Act of 1948, the appellant will be deprived of a seizable amount of compensation which she would have been entitled if the lands were acquired under the Calcutta Improvement Act, to which the provisions of the Central Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would have applied. Mukherjee has also argued that if the land is eventually acquired under the provisions of the Act of 1948, the appellant will be deprived of a seizable amount of compensation which she would have been entitled if the lands were acquired under the Calcutta Improvement Act, to which the provisions of the Central Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would have applied. It is true that there was a catena of decisions of Supreme Court where it was held that if there were two sets of laws providing for requisition/acquisition of land and also for different quantum of compensation and there was no guide line as to when and under what circumstances which of the Laws was to be resorted to, any such law providing unequal and lesser relief may be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. A large number of decisions have been cited both by Mr. Mukherjee and also by Mr. Mitra, but we are inclined to hold that we need not decide the question at this stage: in the interest of the parties themselves. If and when the land would be acquired, it will be for the appellant to challenge the acquisition on any of the grounds on which he has sought to do so before us. But as the acquisition stage is yet to come, we should not go into the question of the legality of the acquisition under the 1948 Act on the basis of any conjecture. We need only decide as to whether the requisition under the Act suffers from any illegality or infirmity. 5. NOW it is absolutely clear that the Calcutta Improvement Act 1911 for the central Land Acquisition Act, 1894, does not provides for requisition of any land. It will be too bold an argument to contend that since the Calcutta improvement Act does not provide for requisition, there cannot be requisition of land for any purpose connected with the Improvement Trust. Request on is very often a preliminary step to acquisition and goes to enable the out no. ties concerned to finally decide as to whether they would finally proceed to acquire the land. Such a power cannot be denied to the State Government and the same has been expressly conferred on the State Government by the 1948 Act. Request on is very often a preliminary step to acquisition and goes to enable the out no. ties concerned to finally decide as to whether they would finally proceed to acquire the land. Such a power cannot be denied to the State Government and the same has been expressly conferred on the State Government by the 1948 Act. Under the 1948 Act, such requisition by the State Government can be for any- of the public purposes mentioned in Section 3 which may relate to the improvement Trust also. That being so, the fact that the land has been requisitioned under the 1948 Act for the purpose connected with the improvement Trust cannot be assailed on the ground that the Calcutta improvement Act of 1911, of which the Improvement Trust is the nature, does not expressly provide for requisition. We have, therefore, no done that a requisition, even if it is for the purpose of acquisition in future for the Calcutta improvement Trust, can be validly and legally made under the Act of 1948. 6. WE would also like to point out that we find from the paper book that an affidavit affirmed on June 2, 1987, purporting to be 'in support of written submission, sworn by Bibekananda Roy Chowdhury' has found place in the paper book. The same was filed after the hearing of the case in the court was concluded and it is doubtful whether it could have any legitimate entry. We have accordingly, excluded the same entirely from our consideration. Another argument which was sought to be made by Mr. Mukherjee was that the Supreme Court in the case of H. D. Vora (supra) has condemned requisition for any perennial or permanent purpose. It may, however, be noted that, as explained by the Supreme Court in the larger Bench decision Jewani kumar (supra), the requisition is not to be struck down on that ground alone, be that as it may, here the appellant having challenged the requisition and having dragged the matter up to this stage and into this day cannot surely complain that the requisition has continued for an unreasonable period. As urged by the Respondents, because of the writ proceeding and the interlocutory interdiction, the respondents could not proceed with the matter of acquisition any further. This question also therefore fails as without substance. 7. As urged by the Respondents, because of the writ proceeding and the interlocutory interdiction, the respondents could not proceed with the matter of acquisition any further. This question also therefore fails as without substance. 7. THIS appeal, accordingly, fails, the judgment of the learned trial Judge is hereby affirmed. As a result, this appeal is dismissed with costs, hearing fee being assessed at 100 gold mohars.