JUDGMENT Om Prakash 1. By the order dated 1st September, 1973, (Annexure to the writ petition) the petitioner was appointed as Assiststan Teacher in J. T. C. grade till 30th June 1974 Admittedly, he continued in service after that date till the date of termination without there being any fresh appointment letter. The petitioner admittedly, remained absent on 19th September, 1975, from the school. There upon a charge-sheet dated 24th November, 1975, (Annexure 5' to the writ petition) was caused to be served upon the petitioner by the Management stating : (1) that the petitioner remained absent from the School without any permission on 19th September, 1975. (2) that he refused to accept the suspension order dated 20th September, 1975, and again left the institution on that date without permission, (3) that he misrepresented to the higher authorities in the statement dated 29th September, 1975 that application for leave for one day, i.e. 19th September 1975, had been sent by him on the same day by post, which in fact was not received in the institution; and (4 that he irresponsibly manipulated the attendance register showing some students, who were absent between 15 to 24, as having remained present. 2. The petitioner furnished his reply dated 11th December, 1975 (Annexure 6' to the writ petition) to such charge-sheet. Having considered the reply and having observed that despite opportunity having been given, the petitioner failed to appear before the inquiring authority and produce any material in support of his defence, the respondents terminated the services of the petitioner by order dated 25th May, 1976 (Annexure 7' to the writ petition). There after, the petitioner had made representations to the respondent no. 4 that his services could not have been terminated, without prior approval from the Educational Authorities, which too were rejected by the respondent no. 4 with the observations that at the relevant time there was no rule for seeking prior approval. The petitioner, therefore, seeks quashing of the termination order (Annexure 7' to the writ petition) and the orders dated 21-3-1978 and 22-9-1979 (Annexures 10' and 15' to the writ petition) passed by the respondent no. 4. 4 with the observations that at the relevant time there was no rule for seeking prior approval. The petitioner, therefore, seeks quashing of the termination order (Annexure 7' to the writ petition) and the orders dated 21-3-1978 and 22-9-1979 (Annexures 10' and 15' to the writ petition) passed by the respondent no. 4. The petitioner has challenged the termination order mainly on the grounds : (i) that he was a primary teacher and was, therefore, governed by the U. P. Recognised Basic School (Recruitment and Condition of service of Teachers and other Conditions) Rules, 1975 (for short 'the Rules, 1975') rule 11 of which states that no primary teacher can be removed from service by Management, without taking prior. approval of the District Basic Shiksha Adhikari, and since no approval was obtained from the respondent no. 4 the termination order is liable to be quashed; (ii) that the respondent no. 1 is an aided institution and hence it cannot arbitrarily terminate the services of the petitioner indisregard to the directions issued by the Education Department time to time; and (iii) that as he continued in service after 30th June, 1974, without any appointment letter, he would be deemed to have been confirmed in the service and, therefore, his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily. 3. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Management, it is stated that the petitioner was appointed by the letter dated 1st September, 1973, (Annexure 1' to the writ petition) purely on temporary basis as a teacher of junior High School to teach classes VI to VIII and, therefore, the Rules of 1975, which are applicable to primary school teachers, are not applicable to the petitioner, who was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in junior high school. It is contended that the petitioner being a teacher in junior high school is governed by U. P. Basic Education Act. 1972 (briefly, 'the Act, 1972') where under Rules were framed for the first time in the year 1978. It is averred that prior to 1978 there were no Rules governing the service of the petitioner and there was pure and simple relationship of master and servant between the petitioner and the Management till then and, therefore, the petitioner's services were at the pleasure of the Management and could have been terminated at any time. It is averred that prior to 1978 there were no Rules governing the service of the petitioner and there was pure and simple relationship of master and servant between the petitioner and the Management till then and, therefore, the petitioner's services were at the pleasure of the Management and could have been terminated at any time. It is denied that the petitioner was ever confirmed in service and that the respondent is amenable to writ jurisdiction. 4. On these pleadings the questions for consideration are : (a) whether by the letter dated 1st September, 1973 (Annexure 1' to the writ petition) the petitioner was appointed as a primary teacher or as a teacher of junior high school to teach classes VI to VIII; (b) whether there were any statutory rules governing the services of the teachers in the aided school prior to 1978, if so, whether the respondent can be subjected to writ jurisdiction ; and (c) whether the petitioner was ever confirmed in service ? To answer the first question a bare perusal of the pleadings is sufficient. In paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit it is stated that the institution, respondent no. 1, in which the petitioner was appointed by the letter dated 1st September, 1973, is a junior high school and it has a primary section as well. However, it is categorically averred in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner was engaged as a junior high school teacher to take up classes VI to VIII. In paragraph 7 of the supplementary-rejoinder-affidavit the petitioner states : . .the president of the school used to get the signature of the petitioner on attendance register and also on the salary bill payable to the junior high school teachers but was paying the salary to the petitioner only of the scale payable to the primary school teachers." From this averment it is manifest that the petitioner has signed the attendance register and the pay bills relating the junior high school teachers and, therefore, the contention of the respondent that the petitioner was appointed as a junior high school teacher has to be accepted. 5. This being so, the petitioner cannot claim to be governed by the Rules, 1975, and, therefore, he cannot contend that pri6r approval by the respondent no. 4 was necessary before terminating his services. 5. This being so, the petitioner cannot claim to be governed by the Rules, 1975, and, therefore, he cannot contend that pri6r approval by the respondent no. 4 was necessary before terminating his services. The orders dated 21-3-1978 (Annexure 10 to the writ petition) and dated 22-9-1979 (Annexure 15' to the writ petition) passed by the respondent no. 4, therefore, cannot be impugned on the ground that the respondent no. 4 was vested with the power of granting prior approval. 6. Coming to the second question, the contention of Sri Sankatha Rai, learned Counsel for the respondent no. 1 is that Rules were framed in the year 1978 for the first time governing the services of the teachers of junior high schools under the Act, 1972, and there were no Rules governing the petitioner's services at the time when the impugned termination order was passed in May, 1976. This being so, he urged that the Management not being a statutory body and it not having discharged statutory functions and there being no service conditions either statutory or executive in nature prior to 1978, could not be subjected to writ jurisdiction for breach of any service condition. Sri Aditya Narain, learned Counsel for the petitioner, argued that service conditions could be created even by an executive order and there was no legal necessity of there being statutory Rules governing the service conditions of the teachers and the respondent no. 1 admittedly, being an aided institution could be subjected to writ jurisdiction for breach of service conditions executive in nature. There is no dispute about this legal proposition. It is undisputed that service conditions may be created by an executive order which will continue to operate till such time it is replaced by another executive order or till statutory rules come into force. But the question is whether there was any executive order governing the service conditions of the petitioner at the relevant time when the impugned termination order was passed. The petitioner heavily relied on a Circular dated 19-12-1977 issued by the respondent no. 4 to all the recognised junior high schools, situate within the district Varanasi (see Annexure 1' to the supplementary-rejoinder-affidavit) which alludes to the letter dated 13-5-1975 issued by the Education Director of Uttar Pradesh stating that the services of the teacher, who remained in service from the year 1971-72 without any break, cannot be terminated. 4 to all the recognised junior high schools, situate within the district Varanasi (see Annexure 1' to the supplementary-rejoinder-affidavit) which alludes to the letter dated 13-5-1975 issued by the Education Director of Uttar Pradesh stating that the services of the teacher, who remained in service from the year 1971-72 without any break, cannot be terminated. The question is as to whether the petitioner can take advantage of the letter dated 13-5-1975 issued by the Education Director of Uttar Pradesh, as referred to in the Circular dated 19-12-1977 (Annexure 1' to the supplementary-rejoinder-affidavit). This letter clearly prohibits termination of services of those teachers who continuously remained in service from the year 1971-72. Indisputably the order dated 13-5-1975 passed by the Education Director, Uttar Pradesh creates a service condition, but the petitioner cannot take the benefit of that, in as much, as he joined the service for the first time with effect from 1 September, 1973, and did not remain in continuous service from the year 1971-72. So, in any case, this service condition does not govern the petitioner. As the Act 1972, where under the Rules 1978 governing service conditions were framed came in force, the State Government thought it proper to protect the service of those who remained in continuous service from the year 1971-72 and that was why executive direction was issued. When the Management was not enjoined upon to follow any service condition or any other direction, either under a statute or by way of executive order, the State Government would not have exercised any control over the institution/Management and therefore, it cannot be subjected to writ jurisdiction. An educational institution cannot be subjected to writ jurisdiction simply on the ground of being an aided institution. In Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V. R. Rudani, AIR 1989 SC 1607 legal position as to the writ of mandamus is succinctly stated in paragraph 14 on page 1611 thus : 'If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions to Mandamus. Public money paid as Government aid plays a major role in the control, maintenance and working of educational institutions. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions to Mandamus. Public money paid as Government aid plays a major role in the control, maintenance and working of educational institutions. The aided institutions like Government institutions discharge public function by way of imparting education to students. They are subject to the rules and regulations of the affiliating University. Their activities are closely supervised by the Universities authorities. Employment in such institutions, therefore, is not devoid of any public character. 7. The quint essence of the above reproduced rule is that by giving aid to an institution, the Government or the instrumentality of the Government exercises tremendous control on the maintenance and working of educational institutions and therefore, the aided institutions become amenable to writ jurisdiction. 8. In Francis John v. Director of Education, (1990) 1 UP LB EC 420 SC the Supreme Court relying on the decision in Tika Ram v. Mandikota Shikshan Prasarak Mandal, AIR 1984 SC 1621 observed in paragraph 9 at page 425 as under. "In the instant case also we are concerned with Grant-in-aid Code. Any private school which receives aid from the Government under this Grant- in-aid Code, which it promulgated not merely for the benefit of the Management but also for the benefit of the employees in the school for whose salary and allowances the Government was contributing from the public funds under the Grant-in-aid Code cannot escape from the consequences flowing from the breach of the Code and particularly where the Director of Education who is an instrumentality of the State is participating in the decision of making process. Under these circumstances we find that the High Court was wrong in upholding that the orders of the Director of Education and of the Dispute Settlement Committee were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution....." From the above dictum also it is manifest that an aided institution is subjected to the Grant-in-aid Code, which may be executive in nature and therefore, for the breach of the same the aided institution becomes amenable to the writ jurisdiction. 9. 9. In the case on hand the Management was neither subjected to any statutory Rules, nor to any executive directions or the Grant-in-aid Code at the relevant time and there being no breach of any of them it cannot be subjected to writ jurisdiction in the instant case. 10. As the petitioner is not governed by any service conditions created under a statute or by an executive order, the impugned termination order dated 25-5-1976 (Annexure "7" to the writ petition) cannot be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution for breach of such conditions. The submission of the petitioner that he was confirmed in service has no force, in as much as no order confirming his services has been produced. The averment made in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner was appointed temporarily has, therefore, to be accepted. 11. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.