DAVE, J. ( 1 ) THIS Civil Revision Application arising under Sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947, has been directed against the appellate judgment pronounced by the learned District Judge, Valsad at Navsari in Reg. Civil appeal No. 87 of 1978 dated 16/04/1979 dismissing the appeal and confirming the judgment and the decree pronounced by the learned Civil Judge (J. D.), Gandevi, in Reg. Civil Suit No. 252 of 1974 dated 30/09/1978, decreeing the suit of the plaintiff for a decree of eviction. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff-landlord Mohanlal Tailor had approached the trial Court for a decree of eviction against the defendant Jagmohandas Kansara on the ground that the defendant was a tenant in arrears of rent for a period of more than six months and that, he was not ready and willing to pay the dues and that the suit premises were reasonably and bona fide required by the plaintiff landlord for his use and occupation. It was also the case of the plaintiff landlord that after coming into operation of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947, the defendant tenant had acquired vacant possession of a suitable residence. The above said case of the plaintiff landlord came to be challenged by the defendant tenant by W. S. at Exh. 8 in which it is inter alia contended by the defendant tenant that he was always ready and willing to pay the rent which was due. The defendant tenant has also complained that the suit premises were not reasonably and bona fide required by the plaintiff landlord for his own use and occupation. It was a further contention raised by the defendant tenant in the W. S, that the house property in Anand Baug Co-operative Society was not sufficient to accommodate the defendant and the members of the family and that the above said house was in a bad and worn out condition and was not fit for habitation of the defendant and the members of his family. Upon the above said pleadings of the parties the learned trial Judge has reached the conclusion that the defendant was not in arrears of rent as urged by the plaintiff and that, it cannot be said that he was not ready and willing to pay the rent. Upon the above said pleadings of the parties the learned trial Judge has reached the conclusion that the defendant was not in arrears of rent as urged by the plaintiff and that, it cannot be said that he was not ready and willing to pay the rent. The learned trial judge had also reached a conclusion that the evidence adduced before him showed and established that the suit premises were reasonably and bona fide required by the plaintiff landlord for his own use and occupation. Lastly the learned trial Judge had also taken the view that the defendant tenant had acquired vacant possession of a suitable residence because he has a bungalow at Anand Baug Co-op. Society in the same city. Reaching the above said conclusion the learned trial Judge has awarded the decree of eviction as prayed for by the plaintiff landlord. The above said judgment rendered by the learned trial Judge dated 30th Sept. 1978 and the consequent decree came to be challenged by the defendant tenant before the District Court, Valsad at Navsari by filing Reg. Civil Appeal No. 87 of 1978. The learned appellate Judge came to the conclusion that the decree as pronounced by the learned trial Judge, was required to be confirmed because the evidence on record established both the grounds on which the decree was prayed for. In view of this matter the learned appellate Judge has dismissed the appeal and has confirmed the judgment and decree pronounced by the trial Court. The above said judgment of the appellate Court dated 16-4-1979 and the consequent appellate decree are being assailed in present Civil Revision Application which has been filed by the petitioners, who are the original defendants. ( 3 ) THE suit came to be filed by the plaintiff landlord against the defendant tenant Jagmohandas Kansara but it appears that after the pronouncement of the appellate judgment and the decree, the said tenant has expired and therefore, his heirs and legal representatives have been brought on record who figure as the petitioners in this Civil Revision Application before this Court. ( 4 ) MR. S. H. Sanjanwala the learned Advocate appears on behalf of the petitioners, while Mr. H. M. Parikh the learned Advocate appears on behalf of the opponent. ( 5 ) MR. ( 4 ) MR. S. H. Sanjanwala the learned Advocate appears on behalf of the petitioners, while Mr. H. M. Parikh the learned Advocate appears on behalf of the opponent. ( 5 ) MR. Sanjanwala the learned Advocate who appears on behalf of the petitioners has firstly contended that both the Courts below have committed a serious error in not considering the provisions contained under sec. 13 (2) (ii), which mandate that the Court has to take into consideration the question regarding passing of a decree in respect of the part of the premises only. Mr. Sanjanwala has urged that as the mandatory requirement laid down in the above said provision has not been complied with by the courts below, no decree could have been granted to the plaintiff landlord under Sec. 13 (l) (g) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947. So far as the second ground on which the decree has been granted by the trial Court has been confirmed by the appellate Court, the contention of Mr. Sanjanwala is that, both the Courts below have erred in not examining the question as to whether the new premises acquired by the defendant tenant, namely the bunglow in the Co-operative Society aforesaid is a suitable accommodation. It is on the basis of the said two arguments/contentions that Mr. Sanjanwala has urged for setting aside the decrees under challenge and to remand the matter to the trial Court with a view to decide the matter afresh according to law and on merits. However, Mr. Parikh the learned Advocate who appears on behalf of the opponent landlord has urged that in all cases it would not be necessary for the trial Court or the appellate Court to consider the question of passing the decree of eviction in respect of part of the premises only, and therefore, when the above said question has not been dealt with and decided by the Courts below it cannot be said that there is an error of law committed by the Courts below. In view of Mr. Parikh, therefore, the first contention raised by Mr. Sanjanwala should necessarily fail. Taking up the second contention raised by Mr. Sanjanwala, Mr. Parikh has urged that the evidence on record goes to show very clearly that the defendant tenant has acquired a suitable residential accommodation and that, therefore, the decree on that count also deserves to be confirmed and upheld. Parikh, therefore, the first contention raised by Mr. Sanjanwala should necessarily fail. Taking up the second contention raised by Mr. Sanjanwala, Mr. Parikh has urged that the evidence on record goes to show very clearly that the defendant tenant has acquired a suitable residential accommodation and that, therefore, the decree on that count also deserves to be confirmed and upheld. ( 6 ) IT is an admitted position not disputed by Mr. Parikh before this Court that factually the provisions contained under Sec. 13 (2) para 2 have not been considered by the Courts below. Firstly, taking up the provisions contained under sec. 13 (l) (g) of the Rents Act, 1947, it becomes clear that the decree can be granted in favour of the plaintiff landlord, if it is established by him that the suit premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for his or his family members occupation. But the above said provisions are subjected to a further rider provided in Sec. 13 (2) of the Act of 1947. This provision enjoins upon the Courts to examine the question of relative hardship and the decree in favour of the plaintiff landlord can be awarded only if the Court comes to the conclusion that greater hardship would be on the shoulders of the plaintiff landlord by the refusal of decree. The second part of clause (2) of Sec. 13 of the act would go to show further that, when the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of part of the premises, the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. As pointed out earlier, the above said provisions admitedly have not been considered by the Courts below, and therefore, the contention raised by Mr. Sanjanwala is that, when the mandatory provisions have not been complied with the decree of the trial Court confirmed by the appellate Court, cannot be sustained. As pointed out earlier, the above said provisions admitedly have not been considered by the Courts below, and therefore, the contention raised by Mr. Sanjanwala is that, when the mandatory provisions have not been complied with the decree of the trial Court confirmed by the appellate Court, cannot be sustained. ( 7 ) UPON a plain reading of the provisions contained under Sec. 13 (2) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947, it might appear at a first glance that if the Court comes to the conclusion that the greater hardship is likely to be caused by the refusal of the decree to the plaintiff landlord then the Court is required to pass a decree of eviction in his favour. But reading the entire provisions contained in Sec. 13 (2) of the Act of 1947 and especially the second part thereof it becomes clear that the Court is also required to examine the question of passing a decree in favour of the plaintiff landlord in respect of the part of the premises. It cannot be urged that the above said provision in second part of Sec. 13 (2) of the Act would come into play only when the Court is not prepared to pass a decree as a whole in favour of the plaintiff landlord. On the contrary, reading the entire provisions under Sec. 13 (2) of the Act it becomes clear that before awarding a decree of eviction on the ground that the suit premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the plaintiff landlord, the Court is also required to examine simultaneously the question as to whether the passing of a decree in respect of the part premises only would serve a useful purpose. This is the only interpretation which arises out of the above said provisions. It requires to be pertinently noticed that Sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Act firstly says that the landlord shall be entitled to the decree of eviction against the defendant tenant provided he is able to establish that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by him for his use and occupation which would also include the use and occupation by any person for whose benefit the premises are held. If no other consideration were to be necessary there could have been no need of inserting Sec. 13 (2) in the Act. The above said provision, namely. If no other consideration were to be necessary there could have been no need of inserting Sec. 13 (2) in the Act. The above said provision, namely. Sec. 13 (2) of the Act places an additional embargo or an additional hurdle or a qualifying rider in the way of the plaintiff landlord. Even if the Court comes to the conclusion that the suit premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the plaintiff landlord then in that case alone the Court cannot pass a decree of eviction in favour of the plaintiff landlord. The question regarding the relevant or comparative hardship is also required to be decided as it becomes clear from the provisions as stated above. It is a mandatory requirement or exercise which the Courts shall have to undergo before the suit of the plaintiff landlord can be decreed on the ground of bona fide reasonable personal requirement. The matter does not rest here because the second part of Sec. 13 (2) of the act lays down that the Court is also entitled to pass a decree in part only in respect of the rented premises. In view of this position it becomes clear that the rights which have been given to the plaintiff landlord under Sec. 13 (l) (g) are circumscribed by the provisions contained in Sec. 13 (2) of the act. As made clear earlier the rider is a two-fold one and it appears very clearly that merely because the greater hardship would be on the shoulders of the plaintiff landlord by the refusal of a decree, a decree of eviction could not and should not be passed. The Court is also required to take into consideration as to whether the passing of eviction of decree in respect of the part premises only would serve the purpose, ( 8 ) THE view which this Court is taking while deciding the contention raised by Mr. Sanjanwala is duly supported by a decision rendered by the learned single Judge in Maneklal Narandas v. Gajaraben Wd/o. Chunilal maneklal, (1975) XVI GLR 11. In this decision also, though in a different context a similar question had arisen before the learned single Judge of this court. Sanjanwala is duly supported by a decision rendered by the learned single Judge in Maneklal Narandas v. Gajaraben Wd/o. Chunilal maneklal, (1975) XVI GLR 11. In this decision also, though in a different context a similar question had arisen before the learned single Judge of this court. In that case in two suits the tenants had disputed the landlords claim by filing the written statement but later on before the evidence could be recorded the parties had filed the compromise purshish in both the suits in identical terms, under which the defendants had accepted the case of the plaintiff landlords regarding the bona fide and reasonable requirements of the plaintiff landlord. It is in the context of these facts that the learned single Judge of this Court was required to examine the question regarding the legal requirements enjoined upon the Court before passing a decree of eviction on the ground that the suit premises reasonably and bona fide required by the plaintiff landlord. The learned single Judge has pointed out 3 contingencies at paragraph 4. It would be beneficial to reproduce what the learned single Judge had to say in this respect. The 3 contingencies have been pointed out by the learned single Judge in the following manner :"thus, three contingencies were pointed out. If the balance tilts on the side of the landlord so that there was greater hardship left to the landlord as a result of the statutory balance-sheet of hardship, the landlord must get the entire decree. If, however, resultant balance of hardship in the balance-sheet was nil in the sense that there is a just balance and the scale swings on neither side, then the case is one of a partial decree. It is only when greater hardship is on the side of the tenant and balance on the side tilts in his favour that the decree would be refused. I also pointed out the settled legal position as per the earlier decision of this Court that when a partial decree solution was offered, the parties should be given an opportunity to lead evidence as they could not have anticipated such solution being offered by the court. I also pointed out the settled legal position as per the earlier decision of this Court that when a partial decree solution was offered, the parties should be given an opportunity to lead evidence as they could not have anticipated such solution being offered by the court. It was also pointed out that at first the Court must answer the question that there was some resultant hardship either on the side of the tenant or of the landlord and thereafter the second question could arise as to the solution of a partial decree which resulted into no resultant hardship to either parties by achieving just balance. " ( 9 ) AFTER reading and re-reading the abovesaid portion of the judgment mr. Parikh has Urged that the question of passing a decree in respect of the part of the premises would arise only when the third contingency arises and not otherwise. But the conclusion of the learned single Judge at page 21 cannot be overlooked. The abovesaid portion runs thus :"therefore, merely because the tenant admits that the landlords requirement is reasonable and bona fide personal requirement for his own occupation, that does not entitle the Rent Court to pass eviction decree so far as the Bombay kent Act is concerned. There would be an additional requirement to be satisfied on the ground of comparative hardship and it is only when this question is duly considered by the Court as required by Sec. 13 (2) after giving proper opportunity to both the parties to lead necessary evidence thereon that an eviction decree can be passed against the tenant, if the resultant hardship was greater to the landlord and partial decree was not satisfactory solution so as to achieve a just balance. " (Emphasis supplied by this Court) ( 10 ) THEREFORE the above said conclusion to which the learned single Judge has arrived at, after consider 3 contingencies is very clear when it is said that the decree under Sec. 13 (l) (g) of the Act can be passed only after coming to the conclusion that the resultant hardship was greater to the landlord and partial decree was not a satisfactory solution so as to achieve a just balance. This conclusion therefore rendered by the learned single Judge goes to show very clearly that both the parts of Sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Act are to be read conjointly and not in isolation of each other as suggested by the learned Advocate Mr. Parikh. The word "and" used in the abovesaid concluding portion would go to show that while considering the question of awarding the decree under Sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Act would require a requisite exercise of the consideration of both the parts contained under Sec. 13 (2) of the Act. In other words a decree under Sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Act cannot be passed unless the Court comes to the conclusion that the greater hardship would ensue to the landlord by the refusal of a decree and that a partial decree would not be a satisfactory solution so as to achieve the just balance. ( 11 ) SIMILAR views have been taken in two other decisions, one rendered by Patna High Court and the other one rendered by Rajasthan High Court. In arun Kumar Sah v. Md. Basir Ahmad and Am. ,, AIR 1981 Pat 230 , also while examining the similar provisions contained in the Bihar Rent Act, 1947, the learned single Judge has taken the view that if the case of the plaintiff landlord regarding his requirement of the demised premise being reasonably and in good faith is accepted, the Court must consider the situation contemplated by the proviso to Sec. 11 (l) (c) of the Bihar Act and to decide as to whether the requirement of the landlord may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from the part only of the premises and allowing the tenant to continue in occupation of the rest of the premises on the tenant agreeing to the same. In Seema Sandesh and Ors. v. Smt. Gian Kaur, AIRCJ 1982 (2) 36 the learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court has taken a similar view. It has been pointed out that the Court below having failed to consider the provisions of para second of Sec. 14 (2) of the Rajasthan Rents act, 1950 which requires the Court to consider the question as to whether the need of the landlord would be met if the tenant is ordered to vacate only a part of the demised premise. It therefore becomes clear that while considering the same question although in respect of the provisions of the bihar and Rajasthan Rent Acts, both the Courts have taken the view that such a question was required to be examined and decided before granting a decree of eviction. Any how the matter has been made absolutely clear by the Bombay High Court decision in Bhaskar Digambar Chudhari v. Bhagwan vishwanath Fadnis, (1976) 78 BLR 454. In this decision while considering the same question Honble Mr. Justice Sawant (as he then was) has reached the conclusion that the provisions of the second part of Sec. 13 (2) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947 cast a duty on the Court before passing a decree of eviction in respect of the entire premises, to satisfy that no hardship will be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing a decree in respect of the part of the premises. It was also pointed out that this being a statutory enjoinment upon the Court it was necessary for the trial Court in each case to raise an issue in terms of the said provisions even if the parties to the proceedings have not raised the said issue. This decision rendered by the Bombay High Court considers the very same provisions, namely Sec. 13 (2) of the Act, and clearly lays down that before passing a decree of eviction in respect of the entire premises the Court is required to satisfy itself that no hardship will be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing a decree in respect of the part of the premises only. Mr. Sanjanwala the learned Advocate who appears on behalf of the petitioners has also placed reliance upon the Supreme Court decision in Rehman jeo Wangoo v. Ram Chand and Ors. , AIR 1978 SC 413 . In this decision while considering the proviso to the explanation in Sec. 11 (h) of the J and K Rent control Act, 1966, the 3 Judges Bench of the Supreme Court has stated that the above proviso mandates the Court to consider whether partial eviction as contemplated therein should be ordered or the entire holding should be directed to be vacated. It has also been pointed out that this aspect requires a judicial exploration after giving opportunity to both the sides to lead evidence in this behalf. It has also been pointed out that this aspect requires a judicial exploration after giving opportunity to both the sides to lead evidence in this behalf. ( 12 ) THE above said observations of the Supreme Court proceed on the basis of the interpretation of the provisions of J and K Rent Control Act, 1966, and therefore Mr. Parikh has tried to urge that the provisions in the bombay Act and the provisions under the above said Act not being pari materia the above said decision of the Supreme Court would not be able to render any assistance to Mr. Sanjanwala in his submissions before this court. This contention raised by Mr. Parikh had necessitated a reference to sec. 11 of the J and K Rent Central Act (34 of 1966 ). Firstly, Sec. 11 of the above Act says that no order or decree for recovery of possession of any house or shop shall be made by any Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant. But the proviso says that the above said embargo would not be applicable in certain cases enumerated in Sec. 11 (1) (a) to (h ). Section 11 (l) (h) says that the decree can be passed when the house or shop is reasonably required by the landlord either for the purpose of building or re-building or for his own occupation. The explanation to the proviso to sub-clause (h) shows that the Court has to take into consideration the comparative advantage or disadvantage of the landlord or the person for whose benefit the house or shop is held and of the tenant. This explanation, therefore, though is couched in entirely different language, the spirit underlying the same is not different. The explanation says that the question of comparative advantage or disadvantage shall have to be examined by the Court. The proviso to this explanation further says that provided the Court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the premises and allowing the tenant to continue his occupation of the rest and if the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass a degree accordingly. Therefore, though the above said explanation and proviso in Sec. 11 of J and K Rents Act, 1966 are couched in different language the underlying principle is the same. Therefore, though the above said explanation and proviso in Sec. 11 of J and K Rents Act, 1966 are couched in different language the underlying principle is the same. In view of this position, it becomes clear that the above said Supreme Court decision would definitely assist Mr. Sanjanwala in his submission before this Court that in the Bombay rents Act, 1947 also the second paragraph of Sec. 13 (2) of the Act is a mandatory requirement and it mandates the Court to examine the question as to whether the decree in respect of the part of the premises only could have served the purpose. ( 13 ) IN view of all what has been stated above it becomes clear that in the instant case also both the Courts below have erred in not examining the above said mandatory question arising out of the provisions contained under sec. 13 (2), second paragraph. The contention in this respect therefore raised by Mr. Sanjanwala requires to be accepted and the matter is required to be remanded to the trial Court with a direction to examine the above said statutory question. ( 14 ) BUT Mr. Parikh the learned Advocate who appears on behalf of the opponent landlord has urged that no useful purpose is going to be served by remanding the matter because both the Courts below have granted and confirmed a decree of eviction on the other ground also that the tenant has acquired a suitable alternative residential accommodation. While challenging the case of the plaintiff landlord the defendant tenant by filing W. S. at Exh. 8 has contended that it would not be possible for the defendant tenant to accommodate his own self and the members of the family comprising of his two sons, two daughters-in-law and the grand-children. It is also contended that the above said house acquired by the defendant tenant is not fit for the residence or habitation and that therefore it cannot be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation. When the reference is made to the provisions contained under sec. 13 (1) (1) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947, it becomes clear that the plaintiff landlord would be entitled to a decree of eviction only if it is established that the defendant tenant has acquired vacant possession or built a house which can be said to a suitable residence. When the reference is made to the provisions contained under sec. 13 (1) (1) of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947, it becomes clear that the plaintiff landlord would be entitled to a decree of eviction only if it is established that the defendant tenant has acquired vacant possession or built a house which can be said to a suitable residence. Therefore in the instant case also before passing a decree of eviction on the above said ground the Courts below were required to examine the question as to whether the Anand Baug Society house which is built or acquired by the defendant tenant is a suitable residence or not. The question of the suitability or otherwise of the residence shall have to be examined vis-a-vis the requirement of the defendant tenant. The evidence on record goes to show very clearly that the rented premises have got two rooms, kitchen, a bathroom and chokadi on the ground floor and 3 rooms on the first floor and a small loft or kataria on the third floor. The evidence also goes to show very clearly that the Anand Baug Society house has got a drawing room and a living room on the ground floor with a kitchen. This is a small store room and an otia in the front of the house. The family of the defendant tenant consists of himself, his father, mother, son, sons wife etc. which would number 8 people. When the reference is made to the judgment rendered by both the Courts below it becomes clear that both the Courts have taken into consideration only one question and that too regarding the fitness or otherwise of the above said house. The trial Judge has taken the view that the case of the defendant that the ceiling is leaking and that the electric connection is not in order, cannot be accepted and, even if it is accepted, it cannot be said that the above said premises, would not be fit for the residence or habitation of the defendant tenant and the members of his family. But it appears that both the Courts below have not elaborately examined the question as to whether looking to the area available in the rented premises and the area in the new premises, namely anand Baug Society bunglow and further looking to the number of the members of the family of the defendant, the above said accommodation can be said to be a suitable accommodation. In view of this position it appears that the exercise made by the Courts below in respect of this question also is not complete and therefore, the matter requires to be remanded to the trial Court with a view to examine the question as to whether the plaintiff landlord is entitled to a decree of eviction of the ground that the defendant tenant has acquired a suitable residential accommodation after coming into operation of the Bombay Rents Act, 1947. ( 15 ) BEFORE pronouncing the final orders it requires to be clarified that this Court has referred to the evidence on record only with a limited purpose to show that the question which were really required to be examined by the Courts below have not been exmined and it therefore would warrant a re-trial of the case by the trial Court. It should be made clear that this Court does not express any opinion regarding the merits or otherwise of the case of the plaintiff landlord. While taking up the matter for fresh decision it would be open for the learned trial Judge to examine the above said question on the basis of the evidence which is made available to him. ( 16 ) THUS the present Civil Revision Application succeeds and the same requires to be partly allowed and the same is hereby accordingly partly allowed with no order as to cost. The matter is remanded to the trial court with the directions to decide it afresh according to law and on merits in light of the above said observations, as early as possible and at any rate within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the R and P. Rule made absolute accordingly. .