A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THE Original Plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 9110 of 1983 decided on 1/10/1984 has preferred this Appeal against the judgment and the decree passed by the learned City Civil Judge of Court No. 6 at Ahmedabad. Thereby the learned Trial Judge dismissed the present appellants suit. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this Appeal may be summarised thus: The appellant entered into an Agreement on 1 4/05/1981 for dealing in petroleum products supplied by Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (the Corporation for convenience) at the retail outlet situated at Boriavi Taluka Nadiad District Kheda (the petrol pump for convenience ). The Agreement for Dealership executed between the parties on 14/05/1981 is at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. Thereunder the present appellant was given a licence to deal in petroleum products at the petrol pump supplied by the Corporation. Under Clause 10 (s) thereof he agreed not to change the constitution of the licensees firm nor to dissolve the partnership nor to admit new members as partners nor to allow any partner to withdraw from the partnership without obtaining the previous consent in writing of the Corporation. Clause 12 thereof empowered either party to put the licence to an end by giving not less than 90 days notice in writing to the other side. Clause 13 (a) (vii) empowered the Corporation to terminate the Agreement forthwith if the licensees were found guilty of a breach of any of the covenants and stipulations on their part contained in the Agreement. Pursuant to the Agreement the present appellant started running the petrol pump in the name and style of Kataria Petroleum. It appears that the present appellant executed one Partnership Deed on 4/10/1982 to carry on the business at the petrol pump in partnership with one Amritlal Gada. Under Clauses 5 and 12 thereof it was stipulated that the admission of said Amritlal Gada to partnership was subject to approval by the Corporation. A copy of the partnership deed executed between the present appellant and said Amritlal Gada on 4/10/1982 is at Exh. 24 on the record of the Trial Court. It appears that the present appellant some time on 23rd December 1982 requested the Corporation for a permission to change the name of his dealership business from Kataria Petroleum to Raja Petroleum Services. 24 on the record of the Trial Court. It appears that the present appellant some time on 23rd December 1982 requested the Corporation for a permission to change the name of his dealership business from Kataria Petroleum to Raja Petroleum Services. By its letter of 24/12/1982 no such permission to change the name of dealership business was given to the present appellant. This communication containing such rejection of permission is at Exh. 26 on the record of the case. It appears that the Corporation somehow came to know that the present appellant had entered into partnership with said Amritlal Gada. Thereupon one communication of 27/12/1982 came to be addressed in the name of Kataria Petroleum which is at Exh. 27 on the record of the Trial Court. Therein the present appellant was informed that it had come to the notice of the author of the said communication that the appellant had taken a partner by the name of Amritlal Premji Gada in the formers dealership business without the express permission from the Corporation. It was indicated that such action on his part would amount to a breach of the Clause 10 (s) of the Agreement at Exh. 25. He was asked to inform the Corporation whether or not he had taken any partner in his dealership business that is in his business of running the petrol pump. It appears that the present appellant caused his reply thereto on 4/01/1983. His reply is at Exh. 29 on the record of the Trial Court. Therein he mentioned that he had submitted a separate application on 28th December 1982 seeking permission from the Corporation for admitting a partner to his dealership business. The present appellant further indicated therein that he had not committed any breach of the Agreement till then as he had not taken any partner in the dealership business. He also requested the Corporation thereby to permit him to take a partner in his dealership business with a view to developing it. Prior thereto it appears that he caused reply on 2 8/12/1982 to the communication of 2 4/12/1982 at Exh. 26 rejecting the permission to change the name of his business from Kataria Petroleum to Raja Petroleum Services. The present appellants reply of 28/12/1982 is at Exh. 28 on the record of the case. Prior thereto it appears that he caused reply on 2 8/12/1982 to the communication of 2 4/12/1982 at Exh. 26 rejecting the permission to change the name of his business from Kataria Petroleum to Raja Petroleum Services. The present appellants reply of 28/12/1982 is at Exh. 28 on the record of the case. Thereunder he accepted the decision of the Corporation not to permit change in the name of the business as proposed by him and he reiterated that the name of the business would not be changed and the original name would he continued. It appears that the present appellants reply of 4/01/1983 at Exh. 29 on the record of the Trial Court evoked a further query from the Corporation by means of its communication of 6/01/1983. This communication of 6/01/1983 issued on behalf of the Corporation and addressed to the present appellant is at Exh. 30 on the record of Trial Court. It appears to have been sent by post under registered cover. It appears that it could not be served to the present appellant either at his petrol pump address or at his residential address as transpiring from another communication issued on behalf of the Corporation on 21/01/1983 at Exh. 31 on the record of the Trial Court. The communication at Exh. 31 was accompanied by the communication at Exh. 30. By the communication at Exh. 31 the present appellant in the name of his dealership business was called upon to explain within 8 days from the receipt of the said communication as to why action should not be taken against him in the light of the accompanying communication of 6/01/1983 at Exh. 30 on the record of the Trial Court. The present appellant submitted his reply on 24/01/1983 and denied the allegation that he had taken any partner in his dealership business in contravention of the relevant covenant in the Dealership Agreement. The present appellants reply of 2 4/01/1983 is at Exh. 32 on the record of the Trial Court. It appears that the said explanation contained in the present appellants reply of 24/01/1983 ai Exh. 38 on the record of the Trial Court was found not acceptable to the Corporation. By its communication of 8/02/1983 at Exh. 49 on the record of the Trial Court the present appellants Dealership Agreement was brought to an end. Its copy is at Exh. 38 on the record of the Trial Court was found not acceptable to the Corporation. By its communication of 8/02/1983 at Exh. 49 on the record of the Trial Court the present appellants Dealership Agreement was brought to an end. Its copy is at Exh. 49 on the record of the Trial Court. Thereunder the present appellant was informed of the fact of termination of the Dealership Agreement forthwith under Clause 13 (a) (vii) thereof and he was directed to hand over the charge of the Corporations properly to its Sales Officer who would call on the appellant with the said communication for the purpose. It appears that the communication at Exh. 40 on the record of the Trial Court was delivered in person to said Amritlal Gada at the petrol pump. He appears to have accepted its service as a partner of Kataria Petroleum. It appears that supply of petroleum products at the petrol pump was discontinued with effect from 8/02/1983. Thereupon the present appellant by his letter of 16/02/1983 requested the Corporation not to discontinue supply of petroleum products at the petrol pump. He also reiterated that he had not taken any partner in the dealership business and he wanted to take said Amritlal Gada as his partner subject to the Corporations approval. A copy of the appellants letter of 1 6/02/1983 is at Exh. 34 on the record of the Trial Court. It appears that his request was not acceded to on behalf of the Corporation. He thereupon approached the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad on 7/03/1983 and filed a suit inter alia for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the present respondents from discontinuing the supply of petroleum products at the petrol pump and to recover its possession from him. It was registered as Civil Suit No. 9110 of 1983. He inter alia averred therein that certain Officers of the Corporation went to the petrol pump on 5/03/1983 and threatened him to discontinue the supply of petroleum products thereat if certain illegal demands of theirs were not complied with. It appears that he also took out a Notice of Motion therein for the purpose of claiming an interim relief in the nature of the relief of permanent injunction as claimed by him in the suit. It appears that he also took out a Notice of Motion therein for the purpose of claiming an interim relief in the nature of the relief of permanent injunction as claimed by him in the suit. It appears that the present respondents filed their reply on 25/03/1983 to the Notice of Motion and resisted it on various grounds. The present respondents inter alia contended therein that the Dealership Agreement in favour of the present appellant was put an end to on 8th February 1983 and the necessary communication in that regard was in fact served to him. It appears that the learned Chamber Judge of Court No. 13 at Ahmedabad by his order passed on 5/05/1983 below the Notice of Motion in Civil Suit No. 9110 of 1983 rejected the interim relief of permanent injunction restraining the present respondents from discontinuing the supply of petroleum products at the petrol pump but granted the relief of permanent injunction restraining them from disturbing the present appellants possession of the petrol pump without recourse to the due process of law. It appears that the present appellant thereafter took out one Chamber Summons with the application for amendment of the plaint on 20/09/1983. By amendment he wanted to challenge the legality and validity of the communication of 8/02/1983 issued by the Corporation inter alia on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. He also prayed for the relief of mandatory injunction for supply of petroleum products at the petrol pump without causing any kind of hindrance or obstruction to his dealership business thereat. The present respondents appeared to have filed their reply at Exh. 12 and resisted the application for amendment on various grounds. By his order passed on 23/11/1983 below the Chamber Summons at Exh. 9 together with the application for amendment at Ex. 10 in Civil Suit No. 9110 of 1983 the learned Chamber Judge was pleased to grant leave to the present. appellant to amend the plaint in terms of the application for amendment at Exh. 10. Apropos the plaint was amended. It appears that by their purshis at Exh. 8 passed on 20/06/1983 the present appellant had adopted the reply to the Notice of Motion as their written statement in the suit. The learned Trial Judge framed the necessary issues at Exh. 20. 10. Apropos the plaint was amended. It appears that by their purshis at Exh. 8 passed on 20/06/1983 the present appellant had adopted the reply to the Notice of Motion as their written statement in the suit. The learned Trial Judge framed the necessary issues at Exh. 20. After recording evidence and hearing the parties the learned City Civil Judge of Court No. 6 by his judgment and order passed on 1st October 1984 was pleased to order dismissal of the suit. That aggrieved the present appellant. He has therefore preferred this First Appeal before the Court. ( 3 ) THE present appellant has also made Civil Application No. 2762 of 1991 with a prayer to introduce paragraphs A and B set out in paragraph 10 of the application in the plaint by way of amendment. The respondents have filed their affidavit-in-reply and have resisted this application for amendment to the plaint on several grounds. This application for amendment was therefore ordered to be heard with the hearing of this Appeal. Both the sides have thereupon addressed me on this application for amendment. Incidentally Shri Thakore for the respondents has also questioned the correctness of the order passed by the learned Chamber Judge on 23rd November 1983 below w the Chamber Summons at Exh. 9 with the application at Exh. 10 in Civil Suit No. 9110 of 1983 permitting the present appellant to amend the plaint in terms of his application for amendment. ( 4 ) BEFORE adverting to the rival contentions urged before me on the merits of the case I think it would be desirable to decide whether or not this application for amendment deserves to be granted and whether or not the learned Trial Judge was Justified in permeating the present Appellant to amend his plaint in terms of his application at Exh. 10 accompanying the Chamber Summons at Exh. 9 on the record of the Trial Court. ( 5 ) IT would be quite and proper to look at the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply Gurgaon reported in A. I. R. 1969 S. C. at page 1267. In that case the manager of one joint family carrying on its business under a business name brought a suit in that business name. In that case the manager of one joint family carrying on its business under a business name brought a suit in that business name. An objection was taken by the other side that the business firm was unregistered and was therefore incompetent to sue. The suitor thereupon applied for amendment of the plaint stating that he himself had intended to file and had in fact filed the action on behalf of the family in the business name. In that context it has been held"rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake negligence inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of procedure. The Court always gives leave to amend the pleading of a party unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide or that by his blunder he had caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensed for by an order of costs. However negligent or careless may have been the first omission and however late the proposed amendment the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side". Thereafter on a review of case law the Supreme Court has held:"these cases do no more than illustrate the well-settled rule that all amendments should be permitted as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties unless by permitting the amendment injustice may result to the other side". ( 6 ) IT will be necessary to consider the submissions urged before me by Shri Thakore for the respondents challenging the correctness of the decision of the learned Chamber Judge made on 23/11/1983 permitting the present appellant to amend the plaint in terms of his application at Exh. 10 accompanying his Chamber Summons at Exh. 9 on the record of the Trial Court. Shri Thakore for the respondents has submitted that there was no basis for the pleas ought to be raised by way of amendment in the plaint as originally filed. In a way Shri Thakore for the respondents is right that the plaint as originally filed did not contain any averment as to termination of the Dealership Agreement between the parties. Shri Thakore for the respondents has submitted that there was no basis for the pleas ought to be raised by way of amendment in the plaint as originally filed. In a way Shri Thakore for the respondents is right that the plaint as originally filed did not contain any averment as to termination of the Dealership Agreement between the parties. The plaint as originally filed contained an averment that the present respondents threatened to disconnect supply of petrolium products at the petrol pump as per the Dealership Agreement. Thereby the present appellant impliedly meant the Dealership Agreement was in force and no averment whatsoever either expressly or impliedly made indicating termination of the Dealership Agreement. However what the present appellant sought by way of his suit was protection of his supply of petroleum products at the petrol pump in terms of the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. By praying for the relief of permanent injunction he wanted to prevent the present respondents from discontinuance of supply thereof. By the amended relief of mandatory injunction he sought restoration of such supply. Ultimately the relief sought by him was protection of his supply of petroleum products at the petrol pump in terms of the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. In that view of the matter though the plaint as originally filed did give an impression that the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court was in force on the date of the suit the proposed amendment sought in the plaint was not in the nature of changing the subject-matter thereof. Even at the cost of repetition it may be reiterated that the subject-matter of the suit was supply of petroleum products art the petrol pump in terms of the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. The proposed amendment by means of the application at Exh. 10 on the record of the Trial Court was not designed to change the subject-matter of the suit. It was not designed to change the nature or the character of the suit. The suit as aforesaid was for continued supply of petroleum products under the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. The proposed amendment in terms of the application at Exh. It was not designed to change the nature or the character of the suit. The suit as aforesaid was for continued supply of petroleum products under the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. The proposed amendment in terms of the application at Exh. 10 on the record of the trial Court had not the effect of changing this nature of the suit. ( 7 ) THE ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of The Municipal Corporation of Grater Bombay v. Lala Pancham and Others reported in A. I. R. 1965 SC at page 1008 as relied on by Shri Thakore in support of his submission can be distinguished on its own facts. In that case the plea of fraud was sought to be introduced in the plaint by way of amendment. There was no basis in the plaint as originally filed about any kind of fraud practised by the other side. The Supreme Court has therefore held that such amendment could not be permitted. This was presumably in view of the relevant provisions contained in Order VI Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (the Code for brief) requiring inter alia to set out specifically the circumstances from which such fraud can be inferred. I am therefore of the opinion that the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in Lala Panchams case (supra) is not of much help to the respondents in the present case. ( 8 ) THE ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. and Another v. Ladha Ram and Co. reported in A. I. R. 1977 SC at page 680 relied on by Shri Thakore for the respondents in support of his aforesaid submission is also distinguishable on its facts. There the amendment was sought in the written statement by substituting certain paragraphs. It was found that the amendment introduced entirely a different and new case and sought to displace the plaintiff completely form admissions made by the defendants in their written statement. In those circumstances the Supreme Court held that the application for such amendment was liable to be rejected. This ruling of the Supreme Court in Modi Spinnings case (supra) will not apply on the present case. In those circumstances the Supreme Court held that the application for such amendment was liable to be rejected. This ruling of the Supreme Court in Modi Spinnings case (supra) will not apply on the present case. It is true that the plaint as originally filed gave an impression that the Dealership Agreement between the parties was subsisting and the present respondents were threatening to discontinue supply of petroleum products at the petrol pump despite subsistence of the Dealership Agreement between the parties. It is true that the proposed amendment was sought only after the present respondents came out with a case in their reply that the Dealership Agreement between the parties was put to an end way back on 8/02/1983 that is about a month before institution of the suit. No attempt on the part of the plaintiff was made to displace this admission of the present respondent in the reply by means of his proposed amendment in the plaint. What the plaintiff sought by way of amendment was to challenge the action of the present respondent terminating the Dealership Agreement unilaterally. In that view of the matter the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in Modi Spinnings case (supra) will not be of any assistance to the respondents in the instant case. ( 9 ) ONE of the considerations for deciding the facts of the application for amendment is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings between the parties. If the amendment sought by the present appellant in his plaint was required to be refused he would have been driven to file another suit seeking enforcement of the Dealership Agreement between the parties and for the relief of mandatory injunction for restoration of supply of petroleum products at the petrol pump together with the relief of permanent injunction restraining the present respondents from taking away possession of the petrol pump from him. The grant of amendment sought by the present appellant in his plaint become necessary to avoid the second round of litigation between the parties. In other words it was necessary to avoid multiplicity of proceedings between the same parties. Again it was necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. It is needless to repeat that the real controversy between the parties was justifiability of the action of the Corporation of terminating the Dealership Agreement. In other words it was necessary to avoid multiplicity of proceedings between the same parties. Again it was necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. It is needless to repeat that the real controversy between the parties was justifiability of the action of the Corporation of terminating the Dealership Agreement. This proposition of law flows from the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lals case (supra ). ( 10 ) I am therefore of the view that the order passed by the learned Chamber Judge on 23/11/1983 permitting the present appellant to amend his plaint. in terms of his application at Exh. 10 accompanying his Chamber Summons at Exh. 9 on the record of the Trial Court was quite legal just and right. It needs no interference by this Court at this stage. ( 11 ) THE grant of the Civil Application made in this Appeal for making further amendment in the plaint was objected to by Shri Thakore for the present respondents mainly on the ground that he was sailing (sic.) the aforesaid decision of the Trial Court permitting the present appellant to amend his plaint in terms of his application at Exh. 10 on the record of the Trial Court. Shri Thakore has submitted that the present appellant cannot be permitted to fill in lacuna in his case at this stage. The plaint as it stood after the amendment granted by the Trial Court runs Shri Thakores submission does not contain any pleading as to the alleged illegality or invalidity of the action of termination of the Dealership Agreement between the parties. According to Shri Thakore for the respondents no relief can be granted in absence of the necessary pleadings to that effect in support of the claim for such relief. This submission does not deserve any serious consideration for the simple reason that the Trial Court in its judgment came to the conclusion that no opportunity of hearing was given to the present appellant before terminating the Dealership Agreement. It would mean that the parties went to trial on the footing that the absence of necessary pleadings was not material for the purpose of deciding the legality and validity of the action of termination of the Dealers hip Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. It would mean that the parties went to trial on the footing that the absence of necessary pleadings was not material for the purpose of deciding the legality and validity of the action of termination of the Dealers hip Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. The parties brought on record the necessary evidence before the Court for deciding the legality and validity of such action on the part of the present respondents terminating the Dealership Agreement between the parties. In that view of the matter no serious objection deserves to be taken against grant of the Civil Application seeking amendment in the plaint and thereby supply the necessary averments for the purpose of the relief claimed by the present appellant in that regard in the plaint. The ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Shri H. D. Vashishta v. M/s. Glaxo Laboratories (I.) (P.) Ltd. reported in A. I. R. 1979 S. C. at page 134 can be distinguished on its own facts. In that case in the suit for setting aside dismissal of the concerned employee as illegal and contrary to the standing orders applicable to the industry the material facts necessary to constitute the cause of action about the illegality of such dismissal had not been averred in the plaint. It was found that there was no averment to the effect that past record of the worker had not been considered while making the order of dismissal. In that view of the matter the Apex Court held that the suit must fail. This ruling of the Supreme Court will not apply in the present case in view of its peculiar facts. In the present case the necessary evidence was brought on record to enable the Trial Court to decide the validity or otherwise of the action of termination of the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 though no specific averments in that regard were made in the plaint. The present respondents raised an objection at trial to the effect that the evidence brought on record in that regard need not be looked into for want of the necessary pleadings. The Trial Court recorded a finding to the effect that the action of termination of the Dealership Agreement was in contravention of the audi alteram partem rule. The present respondents raised an objection at trial to the effect that the evidence brought on record in that regard need not be looked into for want of the necessary pleadings. The Trial Court recorded a finding to the effect that the action of termination of the Dealership Agreement was in contravention of the audi alteram partem rule. In that view of the matter the present appellants attempt to raise the necessary pleadings in the plaint by means of amendment cannot be and need not be frustrated on technical considerations. The aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in Shri Vashishtas case (supra) will not come to the rescue of the present respondents in resisting the Civil Application made in this Appeal for seeking amendment in the plaint. ( 12 ) I am therefore of the view that the amendment sought by the present appellant in the plaint in terms of the Civil Application No. 2762 of 1991 deserves to be granted. The present appellant deserves to be directed to carry out the necessary amendment in the plaint in terms of the said Application. It is true that the present respondents will not have an opportunity to meet with the present appellants case as amended in the plaint by filing their additional written statement thereto. However as pointed out hereinabove the parties went to trial and brought on record the evidence in that regard despite absence of such pleadings in the plaint. The present respondents very well knew that their action of terminating the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 was under challenge though the necessary pleadings for the purpose were not incorporated in the plaint. I am therefore of the view that it would not therefore be necessary to give any opportunity to the present respondents to meet with the case of the present appellant as amended in terms of his Civil Application No. 2762 of 1991 The utmost the present respondents could have done was to deny that principles of natural justice have not been contravened while taking the action of terminating the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. That they can do even by pointing out the evidence on record. In fact Shri Thakore for the respondents has performed that exercise before me while making submission on merits of the matter. ( 13 ) THAT brings me to the merits of the case. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. That they can do even by pointing out the evidence on record. In fact Shri Thakore for the respondents has performed that exercise before me while making submission on merits of the matter. ( 13 ) THAT brings me to the merits of the case. Shri Jani for the appellant has submitted that the action of the respondents of terminating the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court was not taken on any justifiable ground inasmuch as the present appellant had in fact not taken any partner in his dealership business contrary to the covenants contained in the above referred Dealership Agreement. Shri Jani for the appellant has further submitted that in any case the action of the present respondents in terminating the aforesaid Dealership Agreement is in violation of the audi alteram partem rule which is one of the basic principles of natural justice. Shri Jani for the appellant has alternatively submitted that in any case the action taken against the present appellant for his alleged contravention of the covenant contained in the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court is too harsh to be supported keeping in mind the nature of such contravention. As against this Shri Thakore for the respondents has submitted that the power of terminating the aforesaid Dealership agreement was rightly exercised on behalf of the Corporation. He has further submitted that the exercise of such power does not contemplate observance of any principle of natural justice. Even otherwise runs his submission alternatively if at all any principle of natural justice is required to be observed it is a principle of fair play and not of natural justice stricto sensu. Shri Thakore for the respondents has submitted that the principles of fair play have been observed in the instant case before terminating the Dealership Agreement. at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. He has then further submitted in the alternative that the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court is determinable in nature and as such its specific performance cannot be granted. at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. He has then further submitted in the alternative that the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court is determinable in nature and as such its specific performance cannot be granted. What the present appellant has sought in the plaint as amended in the Trial Court is inter alia the relief of mandatory injunction for restoration of supply of petrol products at the petrol pump and such relief is nothing but the relief of the specific performance of the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. According to Shri Thakore for the respondents if at all the Corporation is found to have terminated the Dealership Agreement illegally the relief available to the present appellant in the suit would be in the nature of damages for the notice period only. ( 14 ) IT would be quite proper at this stage to look at certain facts some of which are not in dispute and some of which clearly emerge from the record. The Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 was executed on 14/05/1981. The appellant thereupon started the dealership business at the petrol pump in the name and style of Kataria Petroleum. At that time the present appellant was jobless. It is an admitted position on record that formerly he was an employee of the Railways and he was removed from service. According to the present appellant he was removed from service on account of having participated in the general strike some time in 1974 By one order passed by the competent authority in the Railways on 18/03/1982 his reinstatement in service was ordered and he was advised to resume duties as early as possible. The order of his reinstatement in service is at Exh. 58 on the record of the Trial Court. It transpires therefrom that his reinstatement in service was ordered pursuant to the judgment and the decree passed in Regular Civil Appeal No. 76 of 1980. It does not become clear from the evidence on record when the present appellant resumed his duties in the Railways pursuant to the order at Exh. 58 on the record of the Trial Court. It however transpires from his oral testimomy at Exh. 23 that he was in service in the Railways on the date of his deposition recorded on 5th July 1984. 58 on the record of the Trial Court. It however transpires from his oral testimomy at Exh. 23 that he was in service in the Railways on the date of his deposition recorded on 5th July 1984. It can safely be presumed that he resumed duties soon after the date of the order at Exh. 58 on the record of the Trial Court. He could not have obviously attended to his dealership business at the petrol pump. It is not on record as to where he came to be posted on resumption of his duties. Even if he was posted in the vicinity of the petrol pump it would not have been possible for him to devote his full time attention to the dealership business at the petrol pump. He might have therefore thought it fit to take someones assistance in his dealership business. Though there is nothing on record in that regard it will not unsafe to presume that the person he had in mind was agreeable to manage the affairs of the petrol pump only if he was taken as a partner in the dealership business. It is an admitted position on record that one Partnership Deed between the present appellant and one Amritlal Gada came to be executed on 4/10/1982. Its copy is at Ex. 24 on the record of the Trial Court. This Partnership Deed makes some interesting reading. Clause 2 thereof states that the partnership would commence on and from 26/10/1982 and its duration is fixed for 5 years. Clause 13 therefore recites that the partnership would be at will and would continue till the volition of partners. These two clauses are inconsistent and cannot stand together. Be what it may Clause 3 specifies that the present appellant would remain a silent partner in the partnership business and the other partner would look after the affairs of the partnership business. It would mean that the dealership business at the petrol pump would be looked after managed and conducted by the other partner. Clause 5 thereof inter alia recites that the other partner would be admitted to partnership business subject to approval from the Corporation. Clause 12 thereof also inter alia recites that the second partner would be admitted to the dealership business on grant of approval by the Corporation. Clause 5 thereof inter alia recites that the other partner would be admitted to partnership business subject to approval from the Corporation. Clause 12 thereof also inter alia recites that the second partner would be admitted to the dealership business on grant of approval by the Corporation. Clause 8 thereof recites that the accounting year of the partnership business would be according to the Vikram Calendar. It would mean that the accounting year would begin from Kartak Sud 1 and end on Asho Vad Amas. It appears that the present appellant transferred the entire dead-stock at the petrol pump to his partner on 7/11/1982 against the total consideration of Rs. 84 279. 5 ps. The receipt of the amount towards the price of the dead-stock in the petrol pump was acknowledged by the present appellant. It is at Exh. 46 on the record of the Trial Court. It appears that said Amritlal Gada started attending to the dealership business at the petrol pump from that date onwards. The present appellant by his letter of 23/12/1982 appears to have made request to the Corporation for permitting him to change the name of the dealership business from Kataria Petroleum to Raja Petroleum Service. The Corporation by its letter of 24/12/1982 did not accede to such request made by the present appellant. Its communication of 24/12/1982 is at Exh. 26 on the record of the Trial Court. The present appellant accepted this decision of the Corporation by means of his communication of 28/12/1982 addressed to the Corporation. His at Exh. 28 on the record of the Trial Court. It appears that during his visit to the petrol pump some responsible officer of the Corporation came to know that it was managed by said Amritlal Gada and not the present appellant. It appears that said Amritlal Gada represented himself as a partner in the business to the said officer of the Corporation during his visit thereto. Thereupon the Corporation by its communication of 22/12/1982 sought to know from the present appellant whether or not there was reconstitution of his dealership business. That communication of 27/12/1982 from the Corporation and addressed to the present appellant by of his business name is at Exh. 27 on the record of the Trial Court. The present appellant gave his reply on 4/01/1983 and said that he had not taken any partner in his dealership business. That communication of 27/12/1982 from the Corporation and addressed to the present appellant by of his business name is at Exh. 27 on the record of the Trial Court. The present appellant gave his reply on 4/01/1983 and said that he had not taken any partner in his dealership business. He however indicated that he wanted to take one partner in his dealership business with a view to developing it. According to him he had made a separate application seeking the approval of the Corporation on 2 8/12/1982. The present appellants reply of 4/01/1983 to Exh. 27 is at Exh. 29 on the record of the Trial Court. It appears that some responsible officer of the Corporation had during the course of his visit to the petrol pump gathered information from said Amritlal Gada that he was already taken as a partner in the dealership business by the appellant. The Corporation thereupon addressed one communication on 6/01/1983 seeking to know from the present appellant whether or not any partner was taken by him in his dealership business. It was indicated therein that admitting a partner in the dealership business without the consent of the Corporation would amount to a breach of the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. A copy of the said communication of 6th January 1983 by the Corporation to the present appellant is at Exh. 30 on the record of the Trial Court. It transpires from the record that it was sent by post under registered cover. It has come on record that the envelope containing the said communication was accepted neither at the petrol pump nor at the residence of the present appellant and it came back to the Corporation as undelivered. The Corporation thereupon sent one more communication on 2 1/01/1983 by hand delivery together with its communication of 6/01/1983. Its delivery was accepted at the petrol pump by said Amritlal Gada styling himself as a partner of Kataria Petroleum. The office copy of the said communication of 21/01/1983 is at Exh. 39 on the record of the Trial Court. The signature of said Amritlal Gada in token of having received it at the petrol pump is separately taken on record at Exh. 47 from the communication at Exh. 39 on the record of the Trial Court. The office copy of the said communication of 21/01/1983 is at Exh. 39 on the record of the Trial Court. The signature of said Amritlal Gada in token of having received it at the petrol pump is separately taken on record at Exh. 47 from the communication at Exh. 39 on the record of the Trial Court. The acknowledgement of the receipt of the communication of 6/01/1983 was also given by said Amritlal Gada in his capacity as a partner of the dealership business. The office copy of the said communication at Exh. 37 on the record of the Trial Court and the acknowledgement together with the signature of said Amritlal Gada is separately taken on record at Exh. 48 from the communication at Exh. 37. The present appellant caused his reply on 24/01/1983 to the communication at Exh. 31 (equivalent to Exh. 39) reiterating therein that he had not taken any partner in his dealership business and requesting for according approval to his proposal to admit said Amritlal Gada as a partner in his dealership business. A copy of the present appellants reply of 24/01/1983 is at Exh. 38 on the record of the Trial Court. It appears that his explanation contained in his reply at Exh. 38 was not found acceptable. The Corporation therefore by its communication of 8/02/1983 terminated the Dealership Agreement for breach of the covenant on the part of the present appellant contained in the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. A copy of this communication of 8/02/1983 is at Exh. 49 on the record of the case. It appears to have been served to the appellant at his petrol pump by hand delivery. Its delivery appears to have been accepted by said Amritlal Gada in his capacity as a partner of the dealership business. The present appellant thereupon by his communication of 16/02/1983 requested the Corporation to restore supply of petroleum products at the petrol pump. He reiterated therein that he had not taken said Amritlal Gada as his partner in his dealership business till approval to his proposal in that regard was accorded by the Corporation. It appears that his request was not acceded to and the present appellant thereupon filed his suit for protection of his supply of petroleum products at the petrol pump. He reiterated therein that he had not taken said Amritlal Gada as his partner in his dealership business till approval to his proposal in that regard was accorded by the Corporation. It appears that his request was not acceded to and the present appellant thereupon filed his suit for protection of his supply of petroleum products at the petrol pump. ( 15 ) IT becomes clear from terms of the Partnership Deed at Exh. 24 that the appellant did take said Amritlal Gada as a partner in his business. Clauses 5 and 12 thereof indicating that his admission to partnership was subject to approval by the Corporation were sham and nominal. If that was so there was no earthly reason for the present appellant not to have informed the Corporation within a reasonable time of his having executed the Partnership Deed on 4/10/1982. For the first time in his reply of 4/01/1983 at Exh. 29 on the record of the Trial Court the present appellant has mentioned that he applied for permission for admitting a partner in his dealership business. According to him he made that application on 2 8/12/1982. That application of his has not come on record. Even if one goes by his statement that he made application seeking approval of the Corporation for admission of a partner to his business he made such application on 28/12/1982 that is more than 2/2 months after execution of the Partnership Deed and more than 2 months after coming into force of the Partnership Deed between them on and from 26/10/1982. Again there is another piece of evidence on record in the form of one power of attorney executed by the present appellant in favour of said Amritlal Gada on 24/01/1983. Its copy is at Exh. 33 on the record of the Trial Court. In that document also said Amritlal Gada has been styled as a partner in the dealership business. It has inter alia been stated therein that the power of attorney was given to said Shri Amritlal Gada in his capacity as a partner in the dealership business. No attempt whatsoever has been made by the present appellant in his oral testimony at Exh. 23 to explain how and why said Shri Amritlal Gada was described as a partner in the power of attorney in the document at Exh. 33 on the record of the Trial Court. No attempt whatsoever has been made by the present appellant in his oral testimony at Exh. 23 to explain how and why said Shri Amritlal Gada was described as a partner in the power of attorney in the document at Exh. 33 on the record of the Trial Court. As pointed out hereinabove the communication at Exh. 31 (equivalent to Exh. 39) together with the communication at Exh. 30 (equivalent to Exh. 39) was served to the present appellant in his business name at the petrol pump by hand delivery. Its hand delivery was accepted by said Amritlal Gada in his capacity as a partner in the dealership business. This becomes clear from the rubber stamp impression used by him for the purpose of making endorsement acknowledging receipt of the said two communications by hand delivery. Similarly the communication at Exh. 49 was also accepted by said Shri Amritlal Gada as a partner of the dealership business when served by hand delivery. No attempt whatsoever has been made by the present appellant in his oral testimony at Exh. 23 how and why the rubber stamp of denoting a partner in the dealership business was required to be prepared and under what authority said Amritlal Gada used that rubber stamp styling himself as a partner therein. These circumstances are eloquent enough to suggest that said Amritlal Gada in fact acted as a partner in the dealership business with the consent and to the knowledge of the present appellant. If it was not so he would not have used the rubber stamp denoting himself as a partner in business transactions. The present appellant in his oral testimony at Exh. 23 has clearly admitted that he had no strained relations with said Amritlal Gada at any point of time not even on the date of his deposition before the Trial Court. In that view of the matter there is no escape from the conclusion that the present appellant did take said Amritlal Gada as a partner in his business. ( 16 ) IT transpires from the oral testimony of the present appellant at Exh. 23 and his witness named Shantilal Ambalal Patel at Exh. 40 on the record of the Trial Court that accounts of the dealership business were maintained. It transpires therefrom that the dealership business had also bank accounts. ( 16 ) IT transpires from the oral testimony of the present appellant at Exh. 23 and his witness named Shantilal Ambalal Patel at Exh. 40 on the record of the Trial Court that accounts of the dealership business were maintained. It transpires therefrom that the dealership business had also bank accounts. The present appellant could have brought on record his accounts showing what was the status of said Amritlal Gada vis-a-vis the dealership business. In his oral testimony at Exh. 23 the present appellant has chosen to style said Shri Amritlal Gada as his Manager in the dealership business. The Books of Accounts of the dealership business if brought on record would have certainly shown whether or not said Amritlal Gada was a manager in the dealership business or a partner therein. Again the present appellant could have brought on record the necessary documents from the bank in which he had dealership business bank account to show that the dealership business bank accounts were operated by the present appellant or also by said Amritlal Gada in his capacity as a manager in the dealership business and not as a partner therein. The appellant was in possession of the best evidence. He has not chosen to bring it on record and to disclose it to the Court. It may be that the onus of proof did not lay on him. But then he was in possession of the best evidence that could have thrown light on the real controversy between the parties in the suit. He has not chosen to bring it on records and as such adverse inference therefore deserves to be drawn against him in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Gopal Krishnaji v. Mohamed Haji Latif and Others reported in A. I. R. 1968 S. C. at page 1413. ( 17 ) THE same result would ensue if the question is examined from a different angle. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 casts the burden to prove a fact within the special knowledge of a party on that party. What was the status of said Amritlal Gada in the dealership business was a fact within the special knowledge of the present appellant. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 casts the burden to prove a fact within the special knowledge of a party on that party. What was the status of said Amritlal Gada in the dealership business was a fact within the special knowledge of the present appellant. The burden to prove that he was not a partner but a manager was therefore on the present appellant in view of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 He has not chosen to discharge that burden at trial by bringing on record the evidence which could have thrown light on it or by examining said Amritlal Gada as his witness at trial. ( 18 ) I think with respect the learned Trial Judge was not justified in blaming the present respondents for not examining said Amritlal Gada at trial. With respect the learned Trial Judge was not right in assuming that it was for the present respondents to establish that said Amritlal Gada was a partner in the dealership business with the present appellant. It appears that the learned Trial Judge lost sight of the relevant provisions contained in Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 Such erroneous assumption on the part of the learned Trial Judge has vitiated his findings to the effect that the appellant did not take said Amritlal Gada as his partner in his dealership business. With respect such finding has to be branded as contrary to the evidence on record. ( 19 ) THE learned Trial Judge also appears not to have noticed and taken a serious note of the conduct of the present appellant in not identifying the signature and handwritings of said Amritlal Gada in the office copies of the comunications at Exhs. 37 and 39 on the record of the Trial Court. The present appellant wanted to take said Amritlal Gada as his partner in the dealership business. The present appellant had also executed his power of attorney in favour of said Amritlal Gada on 24/01/1983 at Exh. 33 on the record of the Trial Court. He was expected to be familiar with the signature and the handwritings of said Amritlal Gada. The present appellant however in his oral testimony at Exh. 23 has chosen to express his doubts when confronted with the identification of said Amritlal Gadas handwritings and signature on the office copies of the communications at Exhs. He was expected to be familiar with the signature and the handwritings of said Amritlal Gada. The present appellant however in his oral testimony at Exh. 23 has chosen to express his doubts when confronted with the identification of said Amritlal Gadas handwritings and signature on the office copies of the communications at Exhs. 37 and 39 on the record of the Trial Court. The present respondents had to examine their witness named Arvindkumar Vidyasagar at Exh. 45 inter alia to identify the signature and handwritings of said Amritlal Gada on the office copies of the communications at Exh. 45 inter alia to identify the signature and handwritings of said Amritlal Gada on the office copies of the communications at Exhs. 37 and 39 on the record of the Trial Court. Such conduct on the part of the present appellant at the time of his deposition at Exh. 23 before the Trial Court ought to have been considered eloquent enough to suggest that the present appellant did not choose to make clean breast of the affairs of the dealership business. ( 20 ) I am therefore of the view that the learned Trial Judge was not right in coming to. the conclusion that the present appellant did not take any partner in his dealership business. On the contrary on careful scrutiny of the evidence on record I am of the view that the present appellant did take said Amritlal Gada as his partner in the dealership business in terms of the Partnership Deed at Exh. 24 on the record of the case. I think the present respondents were Justified in terminating the Dealership Agreement for breach of such covenant in exercise of their powers under Clause 13 (a) (vii) of the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. . ( 21 ) SHRI Jani for the present appellant has then submitted that the action of the present respondents of terminating the Dealership Agreement cannot be sustained in law on the ground that no opportunity of hearing was given to the present appellant before taking such action. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. . ( 21 ) SHRI Jani for the present appellant has then submitted that the action of the present respondents of terminating the Dealership Agreement cannot be sustained in law on the ground that no opportunity of hearing was given to the present appellant before taking such action. As against this Shri Thakore for the respondents has submitted that no such opportunity was to be given in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Radhakrishna Agarwal and Others v. State of Bihar and Others reported in A. I. R. 1977 Supreme Court 1496. It has been held therein:"a question of the distinction between an administrative and quasi-judicial decision can only arise in the exercise of powers under statutory provisions. Rules of natural justice are attached to the performance of certain functions regulated by statutes or rules made thereunder involving decisions affecting rights of parties. When a contract is sought to be terminated by the Officers of the State purporting to act under the terms of an agreement between parties such action is not taken in purported exercise of a statutory power at all". xxx xxx xxx"the limitations imposed by rules of natural justice cannot operate upon powers which are governed by the terms of an agreement exclusively. The only question which normally arises in such cases is whether the action complained of is or is not in consonance with the terms of the agreement". I think Shri Thakore is right in his submission in view of the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court in Radhakrishna Agarwals case (supra ). This ruling of the Supreme Court in Radhakrishna Agarwals case has not come to be overruled either expressly or by necessary implications. ( 22 ) THE ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahabir Auto Stores and Others v. Indian Oil Corporation and Others reported in A. I. R. 1990 Supreme Court 1031 is distinguishable on its own facts. In that case the supply of lubricants to the firm of the appellant before the Supreme Court was abruptly stopped after 18 years without giving intimation to the firm on the ground that the Indian Oil Corporation could not have entered into contract with any firm in absence of appointment of such firm as its lube distributor. In that case the supply of lubricants to the firm of the appellant before the Supreme Court was abruptly stopped after 18 years without giving intimation to the firm on the ground that the Indian Oil Corporation could not have entered into contract with any firm in absence of appointment of such firm as its lube distributor. The controversy centred round whether or not the Indian Oil Corporation could refuse to enter into contract with a distributor on the ground that there was no letter of appointment of that firm as lube distributor though it acted as such for 18 years. As pointed out hereinabove stoppage of supply of lubricants was not discontinued by the Indian Oil Corporation on the ground that. there was breach of some covenant in the Dealership Agreement in the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in Mahabir Auto Stores case (supra ). In that view of the matter it will not govern on the facts of the present case. ( 23 ) ON the same ground is distinguishable the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay reported in A. I. R. 1989 Supreme Court at page 1642. In that case one tenant was sought to be evicted by the Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay with a view to developing properties of the Bombay Port Trust in compliance with the town planning scheme. In that case what is emphasised by the Supreme Court is that every public authority enjoying immunity from some legislation for benefits of the other party should act fairly and reasonably and in public interest. Even in that case it is not laid down as an invariable rule of law that an opportunity of hearing has to be given to the other side before taking such action. In that view of the matter I am of the opinion that the ruling of the Supreme Court in Dwarkadas Marfatias case (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. On the same reasoning the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi etc. etc. v. State of U. P. and Others reported in A. I. R. 1991 Supreme Court at page 537 can be distinguished. On the same reasoning the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi etc. etc. v. State of U. P. and Others reported in A. I. R. 1991 Supreme Court at page 537 can be distinguished. In that case removal en bloc of all District Government Counsels by the State of U. P. was under challenge. It was held that appointment of a District Government Counsel was to a post or office and as such he cannot be removed arbitrarily and without observing principles of natural justice. In the course of the judgment the Supreme Court has however examined the question on the touch-stone of contractual relations between the State Government and a District Government Counsel. It has been held:" Even apart from the premise that the office or post of D. G. C. S. has a public element which alone is sufficient to attract the power of judicial review for testing validity of the impugned circular on the anvil of Art. 14 this power is available even without that element on the premise that after the initial appointment the matter is purely contractual. The personality of the State requiring regulation of its conduct in all spheres by requirements of Art. 14 does not undergo such a radical change after the making of a contract merely because some contractual rights accrue to the other party in addition. It is not as if the requirements of Art. 14 and contractual obligations are alien concepts which. cannot co-exist. The Constitution does not envisages or permit unfairness or unreasonableness in State actions in any sphere of its activity contrary to the professed ideals in the Preamble. Exclusion of Art. 14 in contractual matters is not permissible in constitutional scheme. The scope and permissible grounds of judicial review in such matters and the relief which may be available are different matters but that does not justify the view of its total exclusion. Even assuming that it is necessary to import the concept of presence of some public element in a State action to attract Art. 14 and permit judicial review it can be said that the ultimate impact of all actions of the State or a public body being undoubtedly on public interest the requisite public element for this purpose is present also in contractual matters. Therefore it would be difficult and unrealistic to exclude the State actions in contractual matters after the contract has been made from the purview of judicial review to test its validity on the anvil of Art. 14. Thus the wide sweep of Art. 14 undoubtedly takes within its fold the impugned circular issued by the State of U. P. in exercise of its executive power irrespective of the precise nature of appointment of the Government Counsel in the districts and the other rights contractual or statutory which the appointments may have". The aforesaid observations though in the nature of obiter dicta of the Supreme Court are indeed binding to this Court. They do support the submission urged before me by Shri Jani to a certain extent. However it is a judgment by two Honble Judges of the Supreme Court. It has made no reference of the earlier ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Radhakrishna Agarwal (supra) delivered by three Honble Judges of the Supreme Court. The earlier ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Radhakrishna Agarwal (supra) is not and could not have been overruled by the ruling of the Division Bench of the Supreme Court comprising of two Honble Judges. In that view of the matter the earlier ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Radhakrishna Agarwal (supra) can be said to be holding the field. ( 24 ) EVEN otherwise what is emphasised in the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra) is that the action of the State or the State authority even in contractual matters should pass the test of reasonableness. Such State action even in contractual fields should not be taken with arbitrariness. The dictum of law pronounced by the Supreme Court in its aforesaid ruling in the case of Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra) would be that the principles of fair play should be observed by the State or the authorities in the nature of the State even in the realm of contracts. I propose to examine hereinafter whether or not principles of fair play have been observed by the Corporation in the present case. I propose to examine hereinafter whether or not principles of fair play have been observed by the Corporation in the present case. ( 25 ) THE ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Transport Corporation v. D. T. C. Mazdoor Congress and Others reported in A. I. R. 1991 Supreme Court at page 101 is also distinguishable on the short ground that it was a service matter. The Court was required to consider whether or not a statutory corporation could exercise its blanket power to put to an end services of its employee or employees without any rhyme or reasons. I do not think the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in Delhi Trasport Corporations case (supra) would govern the facts of the present case. ( 26 ) THE ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and Others reported in A. I. R. 1981 Supreme Court at page 136 is also distinguishable on its own facts. In that case the statute provided for giving of an opportunity of hearing to the elected Municipal Councillors before supersession of the Municipal Committee. It cannot be gainsaid that an elected Municipal Councillor enjoy some status. A licence under the contract cannot be said to be enjoying any such status. ( 27 ) THE ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Swadeshi Cotton Mills etc. v. Union of India etc. etc. reported in A. I. R. 1981 Supreme Court at page 818 also cannot have application in the present case. That ruling of the Supreme Court was in the light of the relevant provisions contained in the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 1951 (as amended by Act 72 of 1971 ). ( 28 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion I am of the view that the present respondents were not bound to follow the principles of natural justice stricto sensu while exercising their powers under the Dealership Agreement in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Radhakrishna Agarwal (supra ). ( 28 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion I am of the view that the present respondents were not bound to follow the principles of natural justice stricto sensu while exercising their powers under the Dealership Agreement in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Radhakrishna Agarwal (supra ). ( 29 ) EVEN assuming in favour of the present appellant for the sake of argument that the respondents were required to follow principles of fair play in their action as pronounced by the Supreme Court in its ruling in the case Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra) I am of the opinion that the respondents have observed the principles of fair play before taking action of terminating the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court on the ground of breach of the covenant contained in Clause 10 (s) thereof. By its communication at Exh. 30 on the record of the Trial Court together with its communication of 21/01/1983 at Exh. 31 on the record of the Trial Court the present appellant was called upon to state whether or not he had admitted said Amritlal Gada as a partner in the dealership business. It was also pointed out to the present appellant thereunder that admission of a partner in the dealership business without the express permission from the Corporation would amount to breach of the aforesaid covenant contained in the Dealership Agreement. It has come on record that the communication at Exh. 30 and at Exh. 31 on the record of the Trial Court were served together. The communication at Exh. 31 on the record of the Trial Court does contain a direction to show caus e against the alleged breach of the covenant made by the present appellant. It is not possible to agree with Shri Jani in his submission to the effect that the present appellant was not specifically informed that the proposed action for breach of the aforesaid covenant in the Dealership Agreement would be terminating thereof. Again according to Shri Jani the present appellant was not specifically told thereunder how the breach of the aforesaid covenant was made by him. As aforesaid the communications at Exhs. 30 and 31 on the record of the Trial Court were served to the appellant together. The communication at Exh. Again according to Shri Jani the present appellant was not specifically told thereunder how the breach of the aforesaid covenant was made by him. As aforesaid the communications at Exhs. 30 and 31 on the record of the Trial Court were served to the appellant together. The communication at Exh. 31 on the record of the Trial Court does refer to the communication at Exh. 30 on the record of the Trial Court. A combined reading thereof would leave no room for doubt for the present appellant who is specifically told what breach of the covenant was made by him and in what manner. I think an opportunity of hearing was certainly given to the present appellant before taking the action of terminating the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. ( 30 ) IT appears that the learned Trial Judge with respect has lost sight of these communications at Exhs. 30 and 31 on the record of the Trial Court before coming to the conclusion that principles of natural justice were not observed before terminating the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record. ( 31 ) THAT brings me to the last submission urged before me by Shri Jani for the appellant to the effect that the action of termination of the Dealership Agreement by the respondents on behalf of the Corporation is too harsh to be said justifiable looking to the nature of the breach of the covenant made by the appellant. Shri Jani for the appellant wants me to hold the action of termination of the Dealership Agreement to be illegal and invalid on that ground. ( 32 ) I think it is not possible for me to declare the action of termination of the Dealership Agreement to be illegal and invalid simply on the ground that such action is quite harsh keeping in mind the nature of the breach of the concerned covenant of the Dealership Agreement made by the present appellant. It is not shown as to what less harsh action was available to the respondents under the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court for breach of the concerned covenant made by the appellant. It is not shown as to what less harsh action was available to the respondents under the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court for breach of the concerned covenant made by the appellant. It is not possible for me to rely on the reference made to some guidelines issued by the Petroleum Ministry in the Central Government to all Corporations engaged in dealing in petroleum products in the Division Bench ruling of this Court in the case of M. S. Desai and Co. v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. reported in 1987 (1) 28 (1) GLR at page 375. Such guidelines are not on the record of the present case. No attempt is made to bring such guidelines referred to in the aforesaid Division Bench ruling of this Court in the case of M. S. Desai and Co. (supra) pertain to the action to be taken by the Corporation when its dealer is found to be indulging into some malpractices in conducting his dealership business. In that view of the matter it is not possible for this Court to declare as illegal and invalid the action of termination of the Dealership Agreement taken by the Corporation as communicated to the present appellant under the letter at Exh. 49 on the Trial Court. ( 33 ) BESIDES the question of proportionality of the punishment for the guilt established will have to be considered in the light of the service jurisdiction. That question would be more appropriate for consideration when an employee is sought to be dismissed from service for some minor lapse on his part. There also perhaps the Courts are left with little choice in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Parma Nanda reported in A. I. R. 1989 Supreme Court at page 1185. ( 34 ) I find considerable force in the submission made before me by Shri Jani for the appellant to the effect that the action of termination of the Dealership Agreement is quite harsh. At Exh. 52 on the record of the Trial Court is issue No. 4 of volume 3 of Bharat Petroleum News Letter for October-November 1981. On page 3 thereof is found published the photograph of the present appellant styling him as a resourceful dealer. At Exh. 52 on the record of the Trial Court is issue No. 4 of volume 3 of Bharat Petroleum News Letter for October-November 1981. On page 3 thereof is found published the photograph of the present appellant styling him as a resourceful dealer. In the write-up which is above and before the photograph are showered praises for his good work as a dealer conducting the dealership business at the petrol pump. The fact that the present appellant is a member of the scheduled caste is also taken note of in the write-up. It thus becomes clear that he has been able to earn laurels and win acclaim from the authority of the Corporation for his good performance in conducting the affairs of the dealership business at the petrol pump. It transpires from the oral testimony of the witness at Exh. 45 examined on behalf of the Corporation at trial that the dealership for the petrol pump in question was reserved for a member of the scheduled caste. It is true that the Corporation has to see that the dealership business at the petrol pump in question is not assigned to any other person in breach of the relevant covenant contained in Clause 10 of the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25. The idea may be that the dealership business is not assigned to a person without the consent of the Corporation to whom it might not have chosen to assign that business in the first instance. It is possible that the dealership business at the petrol pump might come to be assigned under the guise of partnership to a person who may not be belonging to the scheduled caste. I am told at the bar that said Amritlal Gada does not belong to the scheduled caste. It is possible that under the guise of partnership the other partner might take possession of the petrol pump and remain in charge of the dealership business thereat. The Corporation has to be vigilant against any such assignment. However keeping in mind the outstanding performance of the present appellant at the petrol pump a note of which is taken in the publication of the Corporation at Exh. 52 on the record of the Trial Court it would be desirable if the Corporation reconsiders its decision of terminating the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. 52 on the record of the Trial Court it would be desirable if the Corporation reconsiders its decision of terminating the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court. The breach of the concerned covenant cannot be said to be so serious as indulgence in some malpractices in conducting the business thereat. It is not the case of the Corporation that the present appellant was found guilty of indulging in malpractices at the petrol pump in conducting his dealership business thereat. The guidelines referred to by this Court in its aforesaid Division Bench ruling in M. S. Desai and Co. s case (supra) would go to show that the Corporation has to give one more opportunity to a dealer found guilty of malpractices in conducting his dealership business at some petrol pump. In that view of the matter when the present appellant is not found guilty of any such malpractice he ought to be given an opportunity to continue his dealership business at the petrol pump which practically was snatched away from him by a stroke of pen on account of his having inducted a partner in his dealership business without the express permission from the Corporation. I think the present appellants case requires a sympathetic consideration if any by the Corporation. It may reconsider its decision of terminating his Dealership Agreement suo motu or on the representation if any made by or on behalf of him. His such representation may be considered sympathetically keeping in mind his outstanding performance at the petrol pump the note of which is found taken in its News Letter at Exh. 52 and keeping in mind the fact he is a member of the scheduled caste. ( 35 ) THERE is one more ground for reconsideration of the present appellants case by the Corporation. I am told at the Bar that the petrol pump is still in possession of the present appellant. He is unable to carry on his dealership business thereat in view of the termination of the Dealership Agreement caused on behalf of the Corporation. It means that the petrol pump does not function and it has remained idle for last about 8 years. He is unable to carry on his dealership business thereat in view of the termination of the Dealership Agreement caused on behalf of the Corporation. It means that the petrol pump does not function and it has remained idle for last about 8 years. It is not certain whether this judgment of mine brings an end to the long-drawn litigation between the parties or is carried further in appeal before a bench of this Court under the Letters Patent and later on to the Apex Court. In the context it would be desirable on the part of the Corporation sympathetically to reconsider its decision. ( 36 ) IN view of my aforesaid finding I do not think it necessary to examine whether or not the present appellant was justified in seeking specific performance of the Dealership Agreement at Exh. 25 on the record of the Trial Court by seeking the relief of mandatory injunction for restoration of supply of petroleum products at the petrol pump. That question does not arise for consideration in this Appeal in view of my aforesaid discussion. ( 37 ) IN the result the Civil Application for amendment is accepted. The appellant is directed to cause to carry out the necessary amendment in the plaint on or before 27/12/1991. Rule issued therein is accordingly made absolute however with no order as to costs. In the Appeal the appellant fails. His Appeal is dismissed however with no order as to costs. (RPV ) Order accordingly. .