JUDGMENT V. P. Bhatnagar, J.—Madho Ram plaintiff-appellant instituted a civil suit in the Court of learned Subordinate Judge, 1st Class, Palampur, against defendant-respondent Lakha Ram alleging that Lakha Ram executed an agreement to sell his land comprised in Khata No. 1, Khatauni No. 1, Khasra No. 27i3, measuring 0-17-83 hectares, situate in Mohal Tikkar, Mauza Alampur, Tehsil Jaisinghpur, on 17-7-1983, and it had been agreed that the total consideration would be Rs, 6,500 which was paid in lump sum to Lakha Ram on that very day. Lakha Ram had further agreed to execute the sale-deed within a period of three years and in case of default the land was to be deemed to have been sold. It was further alleged that the possession of the suit land was delivered to Madho Ram on the day of execution of the agreement to sell Based on the above allegations Madho Ram prayed for a declaration that he was the owner in possession of the suit land and also for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering in his possession. Madho Ram moved an application under the provisions of Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure for amending the plaint. This application was allowed by the learned trial Court whereby Madho Ram was allowed to add to the prayer clause that he be granted a decree for specific performance of agreement to sell, in the alternative. 2. The suit was contested by Lakha Ram defendant who raised several preliminary objections. He averred, as far as merits of the case were concerned, that he had never borrowed any money from the plaintiff nor executed any deed in his favour. The alleged agreement was stated to be a result of fabrication. It was also pleaded that he did not deliver the possession of the suit land to the plaintiff and that he himself continued to be in possession as an owner. 3. The parties were taken to trial on the following issues ?— 1. Whether the defendant entered into an agreement to sell dated 17-7-1983 with the plaintiff as alleged ? If so, its effect. OPP 2. If issue No. 1 is proved, whether the plaintiff become owner in possession of the suit land in view of the terms of agreement to sell dated 17-7-1983 as alleged ? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to sue? OPD 4. If so, its effect. OPP 2. If issue No. 1 is proved, whether the plaintiff become owner in possession of the suit land in view of the terms of agreement to sell dated 17-7-1983 as alleged ? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to sue? OPD 4. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action ? OPD 5. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of Court-fee and jurisdiction ? OPD 6. Whether the suit is not within limitation ? OPD 7. Whether the suit is not maintainable as alleged ? OPD 8. Relief. Issues No. 1 and 2 were decided by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff. Thus, on merits, it was held, that agreement to sell dated 17-7-1983 at Ex. PW 2/A was duly executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff and that plaintiff had become the owner in possession of the suit land in view of the terms of the said agreement, 4. The judgment and decree, dated 20-l-1989 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, 1st Class Palampur, was challenged by way of first appeal in the Court of the learned Additional District Judge (II), Kangra at Dharamsala, which Court by its judgment and decree, dated 20-1-1990, accepted the appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned trial Court. 5. The present Regular Second Appeal was admitted on the following questions of law within the ambit of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure :— (i) Whether the plaintiff was entitled to a decree of specific performance pursuant to the alleged agreement to sell ? (ii) Whether the document could be construed as sale-deed as distinguished from agreement to sell ? (iii) If the execution of the document in dispute is held to be proved, what are the defendants rights in the property in dispute which still subsist ? 6. (ii) Whether the document could be construed as sale-deed as distinguished from agreement to sell ? (iii) If the execution of the document in dispute is held to be proved, what are the defendants rights in the property in dispute which still subsist ? 6. A perusal of the judgment, dated 20-1-1989, the learned Subordinate Judge, 1st Class Palampur, shows that the factum of the plaint having been amended and additional relief of specific performance of contract of sale, dated 17-7-1983, was lost sight of By the said judgment, after holding that the agreement to sell had been duly executed by the defendant, the plaintiff was declared as owner in possession of the suit land due to the stipulation in the agreement that in case the defendant failed to execute the same within a period of three years the plaintiff would be deemed to have become its full owner. To me an agreement to sell per se does not create any interest in or charge on the property which is the subject-matter of the agreement. This stands clearly provided in section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and the learned Subordinate Judge obviously misdirected himself in ignoring the provisions of the said section as also those of section 17 of the Registration Act which lead to the same conclusion. What was open to the plaintiff was to pray for specific performance of the agreement to sell which he did by way of an amendment to the plaint. 7. The reasons which weighed with the learned first appellate Court for holding that the defendant had not entered into any agreement to sell are as follows :— (a) Much emphasis was laid on the fact that all formalities required for getting a sale-deed executed and registered had been completed on 17-7-1983 itself. Therefore, there was no conceivable reason not to have executed the sale-deed ; (b) the defendant from the very beginning had denied his signatures on the alleged agreement to sell It was, therefore, incumbent upon the plaintiff to have adduced Expert opinion for proving his signatures ; and (c) the entries in the revenue record favoured the defendant on the point of ownership and possession. 8. 8. I have perused the entire record and have heard the learned Counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that the learned first appellate Court committed a patent error inasmuch as there was no evidence whatsoever to arrive at the conclusion that the agreement to sell Ex. PW 2/A had not been executed by the defendant. There could be a number of reasons for not executing the sale-deed on 17-7-1983 itself. Manifestly, it could be got clarified from the plaintiff during his cross-examination but not a single question was asked from him in this behalf. In the absence of any evidence on this point, it Is not legally permissible to draw inference that the agreement to sell could not have been executed on 17-7-1983 merely because the entire sale consideration had been paid and all other conditions fulfilled for the execution of a sale-deed. As regards the failure of the plaintiff to adduce expert opinion, once again its appreciation by the learned first appellate court is legally erroneous because it is settled law by now that Expert opinion in the matter of hand-writing per se is not dependable and that the attendant circumstances have to be kept in view while evaluating such an opinion On the facts and circumstances of this case I do not think examining an Expert to prove the signatures of Lakha Ram was so necessary as to permit a conclusion against the plaintiff on this point. It may be stated here that the evidence in a civil suit is evaluated on the principle of preponderance of evidence. In fact the plaintiff did move an application for referring the signatures of Lakha Ram to an Expert but this application did not fin favour with the learned trial Court as revealed by his order dated 7-1-1989 The application was dismissed primarily on the ground that evidence led by the parties regarding the agreement in question was sufficient to appreciate the question of execution of the agreement and that it was not necessary to have the opinion of the Hand-writing Expert. 9. It is here that another legal infirmity in the impugned judgment must be noticed. Agreement to sell Ex. 9. It is here that another legal infirmity in the impugned judgment must be noticed. Agreement to sell Ex. PW 2/A was proved by the plaintiff by examining its scribe Shri N. K Sharma, Advocate (PW 5) and its attesting witness Shri Prakash Chand (PW 2) Another attesting witness, namely, in Shri Tula Ram was not examined since he had died by that time. The learned Additional District Judge who was the final Court as far as the finding of fact is concerned did not breathe a single word in relation to the statements of the above-mentioned witnesses. In fact, there was no reason to disbelieve their testimony It may also be observed here that it has come in evidence that the parties as also the attesting witnesses are related to each other and belong to the same family The defendant hat himself admitted in the witness box that both the marginal witnesses were respectable persons The statement of Hirdey (PW 3) is also quite material on the point since the suit land was under mortgage with him prior to the transaction in dispute and be has fully supported the plaintiff with respect to the execution of the document. In rebuttal the defendant in addition to stepping himself into the witness box has examined Shri Ami Prakash (DW 2). Now the testimony of DW 2 is absolutely useless as it is not clear as to with respect to which land he is deposing. It is totally vague and unreliable. Cumulatively, therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff to prove the agreement to sell is much more weighty than that of the defendant and further that the learned first appellate Court fell into a serious legal error in altogether ignoring the evidence referred to above. 10. With respect to there being no revenue entry in favour of the plaintiff, I think he has given a valid explanation in his cross-examination and it is that the revenue authorities, when approached, declined to make entry in his favour unless there was a registered sale-deed in existence. No doubt the plaintiff could have taken further steps in this regard for the correction of certain entries in the revenue record in his favour but merely because he did not do so would not negative his case altogether. 11. No doubt the plaintiff could have taken further steps in this regard for the correction of certain entries in the revenue record in his favour but merely because he did not do so would not negative his case altogether. 11. To summarise, my findings on the questions of law framed In this case are that the document v/z., agreement to sell cannot be construed as sale-deed. However, its execution having been duly proved the plaintiff is legally entitled to pray for a decree of specific performance. 12. In view of the above findings, this appeal is accepted and the impugned decree set aside. Instead, the plaintiffs suit for specific performance pertaining to the agreement to sell is hereby decreed and it is ordered that the defendant, on being given a registered notice, would execute the sale deed within a period of two months from to-day. In case of default the plaintiff appellant would be entitled to take recourse to the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 34, C. P. C, in order to have the sale-deed executed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.