Judgment :- Thiru N. Meenakshisundaram, the arbitrator/petitioner filed Original Petition of 1991 - under Sec.14, Sub-clause (2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, hereinafter referred as the Act to receive the award passed by him dated 15.3.1991 and order notice claimant and the opposite party. Original Petition No.197 of 1991 was filed by the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Madras against the claimants, South India Corporation Private Limited, Cochin arbitrator under Sec.30 of the Act to set aside the award dated 15.3.1991 filed in Petition No.179 of 1991. Application No.2365 of 1991 in Original Petition No.179 of 1991 was filed by the South India Corporation Private Limited, represented by its Manager, S.Palaniappa to pass a decree in terms of the award dated 15.3.1991 of the arbitrator. 2. Brief facts that are relevant for the disposal of the above three matters are as follows: Civil Suit No.144 of 1979 was filed by the claimant, South India Corporation Private Cochin under Sec.20 of the Act for an order directing the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board the Arbitration Agreement dated 27.10.1967 entered into between the South Corporation Private Limited (hereinafter called as the Corporation) and the Chairman, Nadu Electricity Board (hereinafter called as the Board) into Court and refer the matter arbitration. 3. The suit was resisted by the Board. Singaravelu, J. by his order dated 21st July, appointed Thiru N.Meenakshisundaram, retired District and Sessions Judge and Additional Registrar of this Court to decide the disputes between the parties in accordance with the terms of the Arbitration Agreement, dated 27.10.1967. Learned single specifically directed that the arbitrator appointed by him shall decide the question limitation along with the other points of disputes. 4. The sole arbitrator who was appointed by this Court to decide the disputes between parties in accordance with the terms of the agreement, dated 27.10.1967 entered upon reference and issued notice to both parties, requiring them to file their statements to the disputes. The disputes between the parties relate to the contract or agreement, 27.10.1967 for the supply and erection of Power House Structural Steel between columns to 10 (both inclusive) excluding Coal Bunker for the Ennore Thermal Scheme, Madras-57, according to specification No.C.990. The claimant/Corporation filed statement setting forth the various points of disputes and differences on the claim the Board. The Board filed its counter to the said claim statement, denying and disputing claims raised. The claimant/Corporation filed statement setting forth the various points of disputes and differences on the claim the Board. The Board filed its counter to the said claim statement, denying and disputing claims raised. A rejoinder was also filed by the Corporation by way of meeting out points raised in the counter filed by the Board. The claim statement filed by the Corporation consists of five claims. According to the claimant, a total sum of Rs.6,35,999.57 p. from the Board together with interest at 18 percent per annum from the date of payment and costs of Arbitration. The Board contested the claims. Several points consideration were framed. Point No.7 relates to the claim of interest on the amount due and if so at what rate. No evidence had been adduced on either side. The claimants’ documents have been marked Exs.C-1 to C-41 by consent and admitted in evidence. On the side of the Board, document had been produced and marked in evidence. On Point No.1, the arbitrator held that the claim made by the Corporation is not barred limitation and is well within time. On Point No.2, the arbitrator held that the excess quantity of work fabricated by claimant was 1563 tonnes. On Point No.3, the arbitrator held that the claimant was not entitled to claim additional of ‘Rs.292 per tonne for 1383 tonnes i.e., to say Rs.4,03,836. On Point No.4, the arbitrator held that the claimant was entitled to recover from the Board sum of Rs.54,096.30 p.m. towards the difference in cost of various articles purchased Ex.C-33 invoices in open market. On Point No.5, the arbitrator has found that the claimant was entitled to the refund Rs.1,12,814.80 p. from the Board with regard to the excess percentage charges levied and collected. On Point No.6, which relates to the claim regarding the final bill, the arbitrator held that it cannot be construed as a dispute arising under Arbitration Agreement. On Point No.7, with which we are presently concerned in all the three matters and relates to the claim of interest by the claimant/Corporation on the amount due at cent per annum from the date of claim till date of payment, the arbitrator observed under: Point No.7: The petitioner claimed interest on the amount due at 18 per cent per from the date of claim till the date of payment. Sec.29 of the Arbitration Act deals with question of awarding interest and it runs as follows: Where and in so far as an award is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the order interest from the date of the decree at such rate as the Court deems reasonable paid on the principal amount as adjudged by the award confirmed by the decree. “This provision available in the Arbitration Act does not empower the Arbitrator to interest. It is for the Court while passing the decree confirming the award to award as it may deem fit. Hence, it is for the petitioner to move the Honourable High Court regard to interest to be awarded on the amount found due from the respondent.” arbitrator passed an award in a sum of Rs.5,70,747.10 p. on various claims. However, declined to grant interest as prayed for on the ground that he is not empowered to do. 5. Two original petitions were filed, one by the arbitrator and the other by the claimant Original Petition Nos.206 of 1987 and 562 of 1987 respectively. In the Original No.206 of 1987 filed by the arbitrator, the award filed by the arbitrator was ordered received on 29th April, 1987. This Court after receipt of the award ordered notice parties under Sec. 14, Subclause (2) of the Act. The Corporation aggrieved by that portion the award declined to grant interest and came forward with Original Petition No.562 of to set aside the same. Janarthanam, J., by his order dated 11.6.1990, after hearing both counsel passed a decree in terms of the award of the arbitrator, allowing the claim Corporation/claimant to the extent of Rs.5,70,747.10 p. with interest at 18 per cent annum from the date of his order (11.6.1990) till date of payment of the amount awarded by the arbitrator. 6. On the question regarding the power of the arbitrator to award interest from the claim to the date of passing of the award, the matter was seriously argued by both Janarthanam, J, passed a decree in terms of the award for Rs.5,70,747.10 p. with interest 18 per cent per annum from 11.6.1990 till date of payment and set aside the finding arbitrator, rejecting the claim of the Corporation regarding payment of interest and remitted the matter to the arbitrator for fresh consideration of that claim within six months from date of receipt of the order. Accordingly, the learned single Judge allowed Original No.562 of 1987. 7. It is pertinent to note that the order of the learned single Judge was not appealed by any of the parties to the proceedings and has become final and conclusive. In fact, Board had already paid Rs.6,48,083.20 p. being the principal sum of Rs.5,70,747 interest of Rs.77,336.20 p. on 12.3.1991 in accordance with the directions given Court in the common Judgment, dated 11.6.1990 in Original Petition Nos.206 and 562 1987. 8. After remand, the arbitrator issued notice to the counsel appearing for both parties fresh consideration of the claim regarding interest. No fresh evidence either oral documentary has been adduced by any party. Learned counsel appearing for the respective parties advanced arguments referring to certain documents already marked during enquiry of the earlier award proceedings. The arbitrator has decided the only point that arose consideration with regard to interest. 9. Learned arbitrator on a careful consideration of the entire materials placed before him on record and also taking into account the counter statement filed by the Board not denying the claim for interest held that the claimant is entitled to claim interest on the amount Rs.5,70,747.10 p. which was found due from the date 1.8.1970 upto 11.6.1990 with interest at 18 per cent per annum on the said sum till the date of payment. In considering the rate of interest to be awarded Rs.5,70,747.10 p. the arbitrator held that the award of interest at 18 per cent per annum just and reasonable and accordingly awarded 18 per cent per annum of the amount Rs.5,77,747.10 p. from 1.8.1970 to 10.6.1990. Learned Arbitrator in awarding interest per cent per annum from 1.8.1970 to 10.6.1990 has considered all the relevant materials, the submissions made by both parties, the records p laced before him and also judgments of the Supreme Court in Firm Madanlal Roshanlal Mahajan v. Hukumchand Ltd.,Indore, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1030: (1967)1 S.C.J. 472: (1967)1 S.C.R. 105 , State of v.S&SLtd., A.I.R.1972 S.C. 1507, Union of India v. Unit Construction Company (P.) A.I.R.1987 Cal. 175, Executive Engineer v. Abnadita Jena, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1520, Builders v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1340, and found that the claim of interest also not been specifically denied by the Board in its counter statement. 175, Executive Engineer v. Abnadita Jena, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1520, Builders v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1340, and found that the claim of interest also not been specifically denied by the Board in its counter statement. The arbitrator that the work was completed in March, 1970 and even though the claimant had put the claim before the Board for an additional rate of Rs.300 per tonne for the excess 1,500 tonnes over and above the agreed rate of Rs.1,525 per tonne under a letter 1.8.1970 (Ex.C-6) which was followed by another letter dated 23.1971 (Ex.C-7), claim has not been considered by the Board. The arbitrator held that on the basis letters, the claim for the additional rate of Rs.300 per tonne for the extra work done 1.8.1970 and for carrying out such a work claimant/Corporation had to purchase like Girders, Angles, Plates, Joists, Channels, Structu-rals, Gas, Welding Electrodes, etc., in open market at considerable cost and even after the completion of the contract and inspite of the claim made, the accounts, were not settled and that the amount due even as early as 1970. Thus, the arbitrator has also clearly held that the claimant entitled to interest from 1.8.1970 and that the delay in settling the account attributable to the Board. 10. This award was challenged by the Board in O.P.No.197 of 1991 under Sec.30 of This award was supported by the claimant/Corporation by filing Application No.2365 in O.P.No.179 of 1991 to pass a decree in terms of the award dated 15.3.1991. As supra, the sole arbitrator himself has filed Original Petition No.179 of 1991 under Sub-clause (2) of the Act to receive the award and order notice to the respective parties. 11. I have heard the arguments of Mr.K.V.Venkatapathi, learned counsel appearing Board and Mr.G.Rajagopalan, learned counsel appearing for the claimant/Corporation. 12. According to Mr.K.V.Venkatapathi, the award in question is not just and legal the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award interest for the reason that was not under Chapter IV. According to him, since the arbitrator was appointed under Chapter III, pursuant to an application in the form of a suit, requesting the Court to matter for arbitration, pursuant to an agreement entered into between the parties, arbitrator has no jurisdiction to award interest as a Court. According to him, since the arbitrator was appointed under Chapter III, pursuant to an application in the form of a suit, requesting the Court to matter for arbitration, pursuant to an agreement entered into between the parties, arbitrator has no jurisdiction to award interest as a Court. The arbitrator appointed Sec.20 of the Act has to be construed and treated as an appointment without intervention of the Court and that the aid of the Court was sought only to enforce agreement. A few important remarks passed by the counsel appearing for the Board follows: (a) The order appointing the arbitrator was passed under Sec.20 of the Arbitration Act, which will not amount to mean that the Arbitrator has been appointed through intervention of the Court; (b) The learned Arbitrator should have seen that only when arbitrators are appointed Chapter IV of the Indian Arbitration Act 10 of 1940, the Arbitrator should be deemed been appointed through the intervention of the Court; (c) The learned Arbitrator should have seen that in the present case, he was appointed arbitrator under Chapter III on the basis of a signed Agreement and hence he is Arbitrator appointed through the intervention of the Court; (d) The learned arbitrator has no power to award interest, when he is not appointed the intervention of the Court; (e) When the arbitrator has not been appointed through the intervention of Court, learned Arbitrator has no power to order interest under Sec.34, C.P.C. (f) The learned arbitrator had no jurisdiction to apply the provisions of the Interest Act, for awarding interest; and (g) In any event, the learned arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award interest on the Interest Act as the dispute had arisen on the basis of a contract, dated 21.7.1967 which long before the coming into force of the Interest Act. 13. Per contra, Mr. 13. Per contra, Mr. G. Rajagopalan, learned counsel appearing for the claimant/Corporation has contended that the order of the learned single Judge has become final and conclusive view of the fact that the Board did not file any appeal against the said Order and paid the amount decreed with interest upto the date and after remand, the arbitrator an award on 15.3.1991 holding that the applicant is entitled to interest at 18 per annum from 1.8.1970 and hence, the applicant became entitled to interest at the rate per cent per annum on the amount awarded from 1.8.1970 to 10.6.1990. According the Corporation has never disputed the grant of interest in its counter statement arbitrator only after taking into consideration of the entire materials on record taking note of the fact that the Corporation never disputed the grant of interest as interest for the period mentioned above. 14. In support of his contention, Mr.K.V.Venkatapathi, learned counsel appearing Board placed strong reliance on the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Builders v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C.1340. That case arose out of a reference the arbitrator by the High Court of Calcutta under Sec.20 of the Act. While dealing contention raised by the Union of India, the Supreme Court laid down that the pendente lite interest would be justified only when the reference to arbitration is made course of a suit. In support of the above view, the Supreme Court referred to its pronouncement made in Executive Engineer, Irrigation, Galimala v.AbnadutaJena,A.I.R. S.C. 1520. 15. It is significant to notice that the decision in Executive Engineer, Irrigation, Gatimala case, A.I.R 1988 S.C. 1520. clearly lays down the ratio that in cases arising after the into force of the Interest Act (14 of 1978), which came into force on 19.8.1981, the is that the award of pendente lite interest is still governed by the same principle laid Firm Madanlal Roshanlal v. Hukumch and Mills Ltd., Indore, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1 Honourable Judges), Union of India v. Bungo Steel Furniture, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1032(three Honourable Judges) and State of M.P. v. S. & S. Ltd., A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1507 Honourable Judges) and the award of interest prior to the suit is governed by the Interest (14 of 1978). 16. Firm Madanlal Roshanlal’s case, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1030, was a case of reference arbitration in the course of a suit. 16. Firm Madanlal Roshanlal’s case, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1030, was a case of reference arbitration in the course of a suit. The parties to the lis entered into three contracts, the appellant before the Supreme Court agreed to sell some bales of cloth. The dispute between the parties in respect of the three contracts. Hukumchand Mills, the respondent before the Supreme Court instituted a Civil Suit No.l0A of 1950 in the Court of the Judge, Indore, against the appellant before the Supreme Court claiming a Rs.1,72,856, interest thereon from July 1,1948 upto January 30,1950, godown rent from the date of the institution of the suit and costs. The disputes in this suit were to the sole arbitration of Mr.S.N.Samvatsar, Advocate. After hearing the parties, arbitrator made his award on November 30,1961. The award recited the disputes the parties and their respective contentions and submissions and then directed defendant (appellantbefore- the Supreme Court should pay Rs.1,17,108-7-9 in all plaintiff (respondent in the Supreme Court) and to give up claim to 461/2 bales. appellant/ defendant should pay interest on the above sum to the plaintiff at the rate annas per cent per month. Such other directions were also given. The award was Court. The defendant/appellant before the Supreme Court filed an application to set aside award. The District Judge, Indore, dismissed the application and passed a decree award. An appeal from this order preferred by the appellant/defendant was dismissed High Court of Madhya Pradesh, the correctness of which was challenged in the appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted before the Supreme Court that the award should be set aside on various grounds. One of the objections to the award was that arbitrator had no power to award interest during the pendency of the suit. 18. The Supreme Court on a consideration of the objections raised by the appellant observed as under in Firm Madanlal Roshanlal’s case, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1030. "... In the present case, all the disputes in the suit were referred to the arbitrator for decision. One of the disputes in the suit was whether the respondent was entitled pendente lite interest. The arbitrator could decide the dispute and he could award lite interest just as a Court could do so under Sec.34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the present case, all the disputes in the suit were referred to the arbitrator for decision. One of the disputes in the suit was whether the respondent was entitled pendente lite interest. The arbitrator could decide the dispute and he could award lite interest just as a Court could do so under Sec.34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though, in terms, Sec.34 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to arbitrations, it was implied term of the reference in the suit that the arbitrator would decide the dispute according to law and would give such relief with regard to pendente lite interest as the Court could give if it decided the dispute. This power of the arbitrator was not fettered either by arbitration agreement or by the Arbitration Act, 1940. The contention that in an arbitration a suit the arbitrator had no power to award pendente lite interest must be rejected... 19. Union of India’s case, A.I.R. 1967S.C. 1032, was a case in which the question of grant pendente lite interest by the arbitrator was considered in a case where the reference arbitration was not made in course of a suit. Dealing with the argu-ment that the arbitrator had no authority to award interest, the Supreme Court held that it is an implied term of reference that the arbitrator will decide the dispute according to existing law and give such relief with regard to interest as a court could give if it decided the dispute. The principle underlying Sec.34, C.P.C., was held to be applicable to the arbitration proceedings awarding interest. After referring to the decisions in Edwards v. Great Western Railway, (1851)2 C.B. 588 and Chandris v. Isbrandtsen Mooller Company, (1951)1 KB. 240, Supreme Court held that the legal position in England that it was an implied term of contract that the arbitrator could award interest in a case where the Court could award equally applicable in India. In that case it was held that since all the disputes including question of interest were referred to the arbitrator for his decision, the arbitrator jurisdiction to grant interest from the date of the award to the date of the decree. It is useful to extract the relevant passage in the above judgment: "In the present case, all the disputes in the suit, including the question of interest, were referred to the arbitrator for his decision. It is useful to extract the relevant passage in the above judgment: "In the present case, all the disputes in the suit, including the question of interest, were referred to the arbitrator for his decision. In our opinion, the arbitrator had jurisdiction, the present case, to grant interest on the amount of the award from the date of the award the date of the decree granted by Mallick, J. The reason is that it is an implied term of reference that the arbitrator will decide the dispute according to existing law and give such relief with regard to interest as a Court could give if it decided the dispute. Though in terms Sec.34 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to arbitration proceedings, the principle of that section will be applied by the arbitrator for awarding interest in cases where a Court of law in a suit having jurisdiction of the subject matter covered by Sec.34 could grant decree for interest. In Edwards v. Great Western Rly., (1851)IIC.B. 558, one of the questions at issue was whether an arbitrator could or could not award interest in a case which within Sec.28 of the Civil Procedure Act, 1833. It was held by the Court of Common Pleas that the arbitrator, under a submission of all matters in difference’, might award the plaintiff interest, notwithstanding the notice of action did not contain a demand of interest; further, that, assuming a notice of action to have been necessary, the want or insufficiency of such notice could not be taken advantage of, since the 5 and 6 Vict. C.97, Sec.3, unless pleaded specially." 20. In State of M.P.’s case, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1507, it has been held that where disputes including claim for payment of the amount with interest referred to the arbitrator, the arbitrator can award interest during the pendency of the proceedings. While considering the contention that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award interest from period anterior to the reference, it was held that if all the disputes including the claim for payment of amount interest was referred to the arbitrator, the arbitrator had jurisdiction to award interest, during the pendency of the proceedings. While considering the contention that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award interest from period anterior to the reference, it was held that if all the disputes including the claim for payment of amount interest was referred to the arbitrator, the arbitrator had jurisdiction to award interest, during the pendency of the proceedings. On facts of the said case, it was also found contract did not provide that no interest was payable on the amount that may be found The judgments in Firm Madanlal Roshanlal’s case, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1030 and Union of case, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1032, were rendered by a Bench consisting of three Honourable Judges of the Supreme Court. The judgment in M/s.Hind Builders’case, A.I.R. 1990 1340, was rendered by a Bench consisting of two Honourable Judges of the Supreme The decision in Executive Engineer, Irrigation, Galimala’s case, A.I.R. 1988S.C. 1520, judgment rendered by a Bench consisting of three Honourable Judges of the Supreme. 21. The decisions in Firm Madanlal Roshanlal’s case,A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1030 and India’s case, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1032, were considered in the decision in State of M.P. A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1507, and it has been categorically laid down that where all the including a claim for the payment of the amount with interest is referred to the arbitrator, the arbitrator can award interest pendent elite. In fact, the decision in State of case,A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1507, did not arise out of a reference made to arbitration in a suit. 22. According to me, the ratio laid down in the three Judgments referred to above, still holding the field is that when all the disputes including a claim for payment of interest referred to the arbitrator, the arbitrator has power to award interest during the period proceedings are pending before him. Applying the said ratio to the facts of the present it has got to be held that the claim for payment of interest was specifically referred arbitratoras could be seen from the following paragraph: “Thus according to the claimant,a total sum of Rs.6,35,999.57 p. is due from the respondent together with interest at 18 per cent from the date of claim till payment and Arbitration. ” Further, the very question of ‘interest’ was the subject matter of arbitration as is evident from the following Issue No.7 in the award, which specifically deals with interest: “ 1.... 2.... 3. ... 4.... 5.... 6.... 7. ” Further, the very question of ‘interest’ was the subject matter of arbitration as is evident from the following Issue No.7 in the award, which specifically deals with interest: “ 1.... 2.... 3. ... 4.... 5.... 6.... 7. Whether the petitioner is entitled to claim interest on the amount due and if so at rate? ” 23. I am of the opinion that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of case, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1507, has not been departed from the subsequent judgments M/s.Hind Builders ’ case, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1340, which dealt with the general question relating to the ‘power of the arbitrator’ to award interest pendente lite. In the judgments Executive Engineer, Irrigation, Gali-mala’s case, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1520 and Builders ’ case, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1340, no argument appears to have been advanced power of the arbitrator to award interest pendente lite where, the dispute referred arbitration including the claim for interest. Therefore, in my opinion, learned counsel appearing for the Corporation/claimant, Mr.G.Rajagopalan was right in placing reliance in the judgments in Firm Madanlal Ros-hanlal’s case, and Union of India A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1030 and 1032 respectively, as understood and explained in the M.P.’s case, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1507. In view of the aforesaid conclusion, the award of interest from 26.9.1983 (date of entering upon the reference) to 15.4.1987 (date of the first by the same arbitrator) is legal, proper and valid. Hence, I confirm the finding arbitrator on this aspect. 24. Coming to the question of grant of interest for the period prior to the arbitration proceedings, viz., between 1.8.1970 (date of Ex.C-6) and 25.6.1983, the same is covered by the ratio laid down in the judgment in Executive Engineer, Irrigation, Galimala case, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1520, wherein it has been held that in cases to which the Interest 1978, applies the award of interest prior to the proceedings is not open to the question. 25. In the present case, the dispute between the parties was referred to arbitration pursuant to the that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award interest from period anterior to the order dated 21.7.1983 by Singaravelu, J. in C.S.No.144 of 1979. Admittedly, the case has arisen after the coming into force of the Interest Act, 1978 on 19.8.1981. Therefore, the arbitrator is fully justified in awarding interest on the amount awarded 1.8.1970 (date of Ex.C-6) to 25.9.1983. Admittedly, the case has arisen after the coming into force of the Interest Act, 1978 on 19.8.1981. Therefore, the arbitrator is fully justified in awarding interest on the amount awarded 1.8.1970 (date of Ex.C-6) to 25.9.1983. 26. The question of interest awarded by the arbitrator from 15.4.1987 (date of award by the same arbitrator) till the date of the decree viz., 11.6.1990 of this Court present case (post award period) is governed by the ratio laid down by the Supreme the decision in Union of India ’ s case, A.I.R 1967 S.C. 1032, wherein it has been held arbitrator has power to grant interest from the date of the award to the date of the This position of law has been reaffirmed by the decisions in Executive Engineer, Galimala’s case, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1520 and Gujarat W.S. & S.B. v. Unique Erectors (P.) Ltd., A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 973. Therefore, the award of the arbitrator granting interest the aforesaid period is also confirmed. 27. The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India’s case, A.I.R. 1967 1032, is understood and explained in the decision in State of M.P.’s case, A.I.R. 1972 1507, which has been subsequently applied and followed by the High Courts, of Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Calcutta and Kerala, and now by one in the case as could be seen from the following references: In State v. K.R.Narayan, A.I.R. 1971 Ker. 243, a Division Bench of the Kerala High after following the Supreme Court judgments held as follows: "... Though in A.I.R. 1967 S.C, 1030 and A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1032, interest was awarded the date of the award, the ratio of the decisions is that if the claim regarding interest implied term of the reference the arbitrator will have the power to decide the dispute according to existing law and give such relief with regard to interest as a Court could give the basis of the principle underlying Sec.34, C.P.C. We are satisfied from the award before us that the claim for interest was impliedly a subject matter of the reference. We therefore hold that the award of interest from the date reference is legal and cannot be interfered with." In Executive Engineer, R.E.O., Khurda v.D.N.Senapati, A.I.R. 1980 Ori. We therefore hold that the award of interest from the date reference is legal and cannot be interfered with." In Executive Engineer, R.E.O., Khurda v.D.N.Senapati, A.I.R. 1980 Ori. 74, Acharya, as under: "It is urged on behalf of the appellant that the arbitrator was not legally justified in awarding interest from 1.8.1973 to 31.7.1977 on the amount of the award. It is now well settled series of decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court that unless there is specific in the agreement prohibiting award of interest, the Arbitrator has jurisdiction to interest from the date of the award till the due date of payment." See A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1507; 1967 S.C.D. 937, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1032; (1974)2 Cut.W.R and (1978)45 Cut.L.T. 443". The same learned single Judge, while considering a similar question in Executive Engineer, Rural Engineering Division v. Surendranath, A.I.R 1980 Ori. 119, had as follows: "Unless there is specific clause in the agreement prohibiting award of interest the Arbitrator has jurisdiction to grant interest on the principal amount awarded by him on the different items of claim referred to him for arbitration. The natural conception of the word" interest the ordinary or normal profit which the person entitled to the principal money might made if he had the use of the said money, or his expected loss under usual or ordinary circumstances due to the non-payment of the same at the proper time. Apart from express provisions for payment of interest in different statutes or in the contracts between the parties, interest can be directed to be paid in an arbitration proceeding on ex-gratia by way of compensation for the deprivation of the use of the principal amount. If interest be awarded by the Arbitrator on that basis in order to compensate the loss suffered by man entitled to the principal amount due to deprivation of the use of the said amount, is no reason why the Arbitrator cannot on the same principle grant future interest from due date till its realisation. True it is that provision of Sec.34, C.P.C., is not applicable to the proceedings before the Arbitrator but there is nothing for the Arbitrator to call into aid the principles of that section for awarding interest, especially when one of the disputes referred to him for adjudication relates to payment of interest." In State v. B.N.Agarwala, A.I.R. 1981 Ori. True it is that provision of Sec.34, C.P.C., is not applicable to the proceedings before the Arbitrator but there is nothing for the Arbitrator to call into aid the principles of that section for awarding interest, especially when one of the disputes referred to him for adjudication relates to payment of interest." In State v. B.N.Agarwala, A.I.R. 1981 Ori. 124, Mohanti, J. observed as under: "The arbitrator has jurisdiction to award interest from the due date of payment but his to award interest comes to an end upon the passing of the decree. The period thereafter covered by Sec.29." A Division Bench of Orissa High Court consisting of Das, J. and Mohanty, J. in State of v. Gokulachandra, A.I.R. 1981 Ori. 160, held as follows: "It has been consistently held by this Court basing on the principle laid down in Construction case (supra) that interest can be awarded by the arbitrator if there prohibition for the same. The arbitrator has to find out as to what is the reasonable compensation. To justify the same, the contractor has to place materials before the arbitrator which he did in the instant case. The contractor claimed interest at the rate of 18% the arbitrator has awarded interest at the rate of 10%. Thus it appears that the arbitrator has taken into consideration the question of the rate of interest. The rate of interest challenged before us and no argument has been advanced on this point. In view dictum laid down in M/s.Ashok Construction case, it has been established by a series decisions of this Court and it is no longer open to the appellant to contend that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award interest when the reference was of general nature." In State v. Consolidated Construction Company, A.I.R. 1981 Ori. 166, Misra, C.J. (as was), held as under: "Unless there is a clear exclusion, the arbitrator would have jurisdiction to entertain for interest. The award of interest for the period from the date of detention of the upto the raising of the claim as also for the period the arbitrator was in seisin proceeding is tenable and the award would not be vitiated on that account. Case discussed." In M/s.Refugee Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Harbans Singh, A.I.R. 1982 Del. The award of interest for the period from the date of detention of the upto the raising of the claim as also for the period the arbitrator was in seisin proceeding is tenable and the award would not be vitiated on that account. Case discussed." In M/s.Refugee Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Harbans Singh, A.I.R. 1982 Del. Division Bench of Delhi High Court consisting of Avadh Behari Rohatgi and Mrs.Leila Seth, on the same question held as under: "To sum up, the arbitrator has power to award interest pendente lite, Bose, J. in v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1955 S.C.468 said that an arbitrator is not a court and therefore Sec.34, C.P.C. does not apply to him. Later judicial decisions to which we have referred that his view was not accepted. Though Sec.34 does not in terms apply, the arbitrator the same power as the Court has. The Court can award pendente lite interest at such the Court deems reasonable." So can the arbitrator. Though no statute gives him that the judicial decisions recognise as of necessity that power in him as an implied term reference. So far as post decretal interest is con-cerned,Sec.29 of the Act is a part statute law." In considering the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to award interest, unless prohibited agreement, Behera, J., of Orissa High Court in a decision in State v. M/s.Choudhury, 1982 Ori. 275, has observed as follows: "Unless there is a specific clause in the agreement prohibiting award of interest, Arbitrator has jurisdiction to award interest. The Arbitrator has power to award interest it is an implied term of reference and in the absence of prohibition in the agreement, interest may be awarded from the due date till the date of the award and the award allowing interest is not vitiated on that ground. ... Where the entire dispute has been referred to the arbitrator it is open to him to claims for additional works. Therefore, the award cannot be set aside on the ground some claims for additional work have been awarded." In State v. Purusottam Pradhan, A.I.R. 1983 Ori. 287, Behera, J. of Orissa High Court held under: "Unless the payment of interest has been prohibited by the agreement, it is open arbitrator to award interest. Therefore, the award cannot be set aside on the ground some claims for additional work have been awarded." In State v. Purusottam Pradhan, A.I.R. 1983 Ori. 287, Behera, J. of Orissa High Court held under: "Unless the payment of interest has been prohibited by the agreement, it is open arbitrator to award interest. This position has been well settled in a number of judicial pronouncements of this Court." A Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court, consisting of Punnayya, J. Kodandaramayya, J: in a decision reported in Government of A.P. v. The Gammon Limited, Bombay, A.I.R. 1984 A.P. 23, held that if there is a reference relating to the claim interest, the arbitrator can award interest from the date of reference till the date of award upto the date of the decree, if the reference is with the intervention of the Court. arbitrator has no power to award interest, after the date of decree and the Court alone competent to award interest after the date of decree under Sec.29 of the Arbitration Act. In the decision in Lala Gobind Ram v. Prem Parkash, A.I.R. 1984 J. and K. 48, Bench of Jammu and Kashmir High Court, consisting of Dr.A.S.Anand, J. (as he then and Kotwal, J. while considering an identical question held as follows: "Even though Sec.34, C.P.C., 1908, does not in terms apply to proceedings before arbitrator, nevertheless, the principles underlying the section do apply to such proceedings. To decide the dispute and give appropriate relief to the parties according to law, always an implied term of the reference, an Arbitrator shall have as much power to interest in arbitration proceedings as a Court trying a suit will have under Sec.34, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1030 and A.I.R. 1967S.C. 1032,relied on. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 468, referred. The provisions of Sec.34, C.P.C., are applicable in awarding interest in an account Therefore, an arbitrator can award interest in a suit for accounts that has been referred him. A suit for accounts is as good a suit for money, as any other suit for its recovery, the ‘principal sum adjudged within the meaning of Sec.34 in a suit for accounts would sum found due at the date of the suit. A.I.R. 1972 Mad. 463, relied on. Further the Court can award interest under Sec.34, C.P.C, even if it is not specifically claimed. A.I.R. 1972 Mad. 463, relied on. Further the Court can award interest under Sec.34, C.P.C, even if it is not specifically claimed. Therefore, an Arbitrator by applying Sec.34, C.P.C. can award interest in arbitration proceedings even if it has not been specifically claimed. State v. Ajit Singh, A.I.R. 1979 H. 179 (F.B.); A.I.R. 1921 Lah. 125 and A.I.R. 1931 Bom. 549, relied on. However, the Arbitrator can award interest in arbitration proceedings only from the date the award to the date of the decree and not beyond that date in view of Sec.29 Arbitration Act. While Sec.29 of the Arbitration Act in no way comes into conflict with ordinary powers of the Arbitrator to award interest pendente lite, or till the award is made rule of the Court, however, on the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant, the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to award interest beyond the date of the decree. Awarding interest till the amount decreed is realised, the entirely in discretion of the Court that the award a rule of the Court. No power can be, therefore, assumed in the Arbitrator to this discretionary power of the Court. Thus it cannot be said that an Arbitrator with the Sec.34, C.P.C. has power to award interest even from the date of the decree to the date amount decreed is realised, as such an interpretation is bound to create a conflict between the powers of the Court and those of the Arbitrator assuming that these powers are extensive." In Food Corporation of India v. Sarwan Kumar, A.I.R. 1985 Cal. 225, a Division Bench Calcutta High Court, consisting of Ray, J. and Mookerjee, J. has observed as follows: "Where the issue regarding the grant of interest on the claim made by the claimant had specifically referred to the Arbitrator, the award of pendente lite interest by the Arbitrator his award is wholly within his jurisdiction. It cannot be said that the Arbitrator has committed a legal misconduct within the meaning of Sec.30(a) in awarding interest or there illegality apparent on the face of the award within the meaning of Sec.l6(1)(c)." In Eastern and North East Frontier Railway Co-operative Bank Limited v. M/s.R.Guha Company, A.I.R. 1986 Cal. It cannot be said that the Arbitrator has committed a legal misconduct within the meaning of Sec.30(a) in awarding interest or there illegality apparent on the face of the award within the meaning of Sec.l6(1)(c)." In Eastern and North East Frontier Railway Co-operative Bank Limited v. M/s.R.Guha Company, A.I.R. 1986 Cal. 146, Majumdar, J. held that so long as there was a claim interest present before the arbitrator he could award it that he could also award its and he could also award interest from the date of award to the date of decree. In Union of India v. Unit Construction Company (P.) Ltd., A.I.R. 1987 Cal. 175, again another learned single Judge, Mrs.Partibha Bonnerjea, J. of the Calcutta High Court has also the similar view and observed that the arbitrator has jurisdiction to allow interest lite both from the date of reference and from the dale of entering upon the reference till dale of making of the award. 28. The further facts of the present case also compel me to make a sad commentary how a public body like the Board is attempting to disown its liability to pay the principal amount as well as the interest. It is seen from the records that the original claim was by the claimant as early as on 1.8.1970 under Ex.C-6 letter, followed by several other and reminders. There was absolutely no response. Later, the Corporation/claimant compelled to approach this Court by filing a suit under Sec.20 of the Act in the year The matter was pending in this Court till 21.7.1983, when this Court appointed Mr.N.Meenakshi-sundaram, Retired District Judge and Retired Additional Registrar of Court as arbitrator to resolve all the disputes including interest between the Corporation the Board. The arbitrator entered upon the reference on 26.9.1983 and passed an ward 15.4.1987. The award was filed in this Court as early as on 29.4.1987 in O.P.Nos.206 562 of 1987. The award of the arbitrator was confirmed by my learned brother, Janarthanam, J. on 11.6.1990 with subsequent interest from the date of his order. pertinent to note that no appeal was preferred against the order of the learned single by the Board. On the contrary, they paid a sum of Rs.5,70,747 being the principal and of Rs.77,336.20 p. towards interest, in all totalling to a sum of Rs.6,48,083.20 12.3.1991. pertinent to note that no appeal was preferred against the order of the learned single by the Board. On the contrary, they paid a sum of Rs.5,70,747 being the principal and of Rs.77,336.20 p. towards interest, in all totalling to a sum of Rs.6,48,083.20 12.3.1991. In view of the payment made by the Board on 12.3.1991, the order Janarthanam, J. has been fully accepted and acted upon by the Board, Thus, it is seen the sum of Rs.5,70,747 (principal sum), which is lawfully payable to the Corporation 1.8.1970 under Ex.C-6 has been wrongfully withheld by the Board for more than years. The S.I.Corporation was driven from pillar to post to receive their legitimate lawful dues. Hence, it is unfortunate to note that the Board instead of acting as a responsible public body has fought the litigation unnecessarily. 29. Mr.K.V.Venkatapathi, learned counsel appearing for the Board in support contention that the arbitrator appointed under Sec.20 of the Act is not a Court and cannot award interest as a Court has relied on Sheel Chandra v. Central Bank of India, 1982 Delhi 179, Usha Rani v. M/s.lndermal and Sons, A.I.R. 1988 Raj. 223 and Bimal v. Saikat Sarkar,A.I.R. 1987 Cal. 208. In view of the discussions made on this aspect earlier part of this order, it is unnecessary for me to deal with these judgments separately. 30. The next question to be decided is the rate of interest payable on the amount by the arbitrator. My learned brother, Janarthanam, J. has already awarded interest per cent per annum on Rs.5,70,747.10 p. from 11.6.1990 (date of his order) till payment. my opinion, the rate of interest at 18 per cent per annum is just and reasonable and accordance with the current lending rate by the Bank. It is also further to be seen said order of this Court was not appealed against by any party and the same was and acted upon by the Board by paying a sum of Rs.5,70,747 towards principal and Rs.77,336.20 p. towards interest at 18 per cent per annum, in all amounting Rs.6,48,083.20 p. on 12.3.1991.I do not find any reason to deviate cr take a different from the view taken by my learned brother, Janarthanam, J. with regard to the interest awarded by him in the very same case in the earlier round of litigation. the rate of interest awarded by the arbitrator at 18 per cent per annum in my view excessive. In my view, it is just and reasonable and in consonance with the trade and the normal banking rate. That apart, the Board had also the benefit of the use money all these years. 31. Yet another point to be noted is that when the matter was remitted back Arbitrator by this Court, it was only remitted for the purpose of determining the payable prior to 11.6.1990. The Board had not objected to the order of remittal. It from the order, dated 11.6.1990 of this Court, no argument appears to have been on the line that the matter should not be remitted back to the arbitrator for the purpose determining interest. Having accepted the order of reference, it does not lie in the mouth of the Board now to contend that the award interest is illegal and hence, I reject the same. 32. The recent pronouncement relied on by the learned counsel for the Board in A.I.R. S.C. 1340, was rendered by two Honourable Judges of the Supreme Court, whereas following Judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the Corporation were rendered three Honourable Judges of the Supreme Court: Firm Madanlal Roshanlal v. Hukumchand Mills Ltd., Indore, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1030, Union India v. Bungo Steel Furniture, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1032, State of M.P. v. Salt and Skelton Ltd., A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1507. The Honourable Supreme Court in the decision in Union of India v. K.S. Subramanian, 1976 S.C. 2433, held that the opinion expressed by the larger Bench of the Supreme to be preferred to Smaller Bench. In Union of India’s case, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2433, Supreme court held as under: “... The proper course for a High Court is to try to find out and follow the opinions expressed by larger benches of the Supreme Court in preference to those expressed by smaller benches of the Court. That is the practice followed by the Supreme Court itself. The practice has crystallized into a rule of law declared by the Supreme Court are not applicable to the facts the case it should say so giving reasons supporting its point of view.” In Parag Lal Behari v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Gorakhpur,A.I.R. 1985 All. 34, Bench of the Allahabad High Court observed as under: “ ... The practice has crystallized into a rule of law declared by the Supreme Court are not applicable to the facts the case it should say so giving reasons supporting its point of view.” In Parag Lal Behari v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Gorakhpur,A.I.R. 1985 All. 34, Bench of the Allahabad High Court observed as under: “ ... Secondly, even if some inconsistency may be there this Court is, on the facts instant case, bound to follow the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bengal v. Hemant Kumar, A.I.R 1966 S.C. 1061, the same having been rendered by a of four Honourable Judges in preference to the decision in the case of Mathura Prasad, same having been rendered by a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges. This is so in view decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra, A.I.R. 1976 2547, where it was held at 2556.” It is also to be borne in mind that even in cases where a High Court finds any between the views expressed by larger and smaller benches of this Court, it cannot disregard or skirt the views expressed by the larger benches. The proper course for a High Court such a case, as observed by this Court in Union of India v. K.S.Subramanian, (Civil No.212 of 1975 decided on July 30, 1976, reported in A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2433, to which us was a party, is to try to find out and follow the opinion expressed by larger benches court in preference to those expressed by smaller benches of the Court which practice, hardened as it has into a rule of law is followed by this Court itself.” In Govindanaik v. West Patent Press Company, A.I.R 1980 Karn. 92, a Full Bench Hon’ble Judges) of the Karnataka High Court observed as under: “In the light of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Mattulal’s case (supra) Subramanyam’s case (supra) we hold that the Full Bench of three Judges in Aramha (supra), did not lay down the law correctly and we overrule that decision. 92, a Full Bench Hon’ble Judges) of the Karnataka High Court observed as under: “In the light of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Mattulal’s case (supra) Subramanyam’s case (supra) we hold that the Full Bench of three Judges in Aramha (supra), did not lay down the law correctly and we overrule that decision. The answer to question referred to this bench, should in our opinion, be as follows: “If two decisions of the Supreme Court on a question of law cannot be reconciled and one them is by a larger Bench while the other is by a smaller Bench, the decision of the Bench, whether it is earlier or later in point of time, should be followed by High Courts other Courts. However, if both such Benches of the Supreme Court consist of equal number of Judges, the latter of the two decisions should be followed by High Courts and Courts.” It is to be noted that in view of the majority opinion, the answer to the question referred the Full Bench was answered as extracted above. 33. For all the foregoing reasons, I hold that the petitioner in Application No.2365 of 1991 O.P.No.179 of 1991 is entitled to interest on Rs.5,70,747.10 p. as ordered by the learned Arbitrator at 18 per cent per annum from 1.8.1970 to 11.6.1990. 34. In the result, O.P.No.179 of 1991 is ordered. Since the award has already been received, no further orders are necessary in O.P.No.179 of 1991, Application No.2365 of 1991 to pass a decree in terms of the award, dated 15.? 1991 ordered as prayed for and there will be a decree in terms of the award in favour of applicant viz., ‘South India Corporation Limited, Cochin’, in this application; In view of the orders passed in Application No.2365 of 1991, O.P.No.197 of 1991 filed Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Madras under Sec.30 of the Act is However, there will be no order as to costs in all these matters. Appln. No. 2365 of 91 is ordered accordingly. O.P.No.197 of 1991 dismissed.