JUDGMENT R.D. Shukla, J. -- 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 4-5-1984, passed in Civil Appeal No. 66-A of 1981 by the Court of First Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Chhindwara (arising out of Civil Suit No. 61-A of 1979, decided on 27-1-1981 by the Court of First Civil Judge (Class II), Chhindwara, whereby the judgment of dismissal of the suit has been reversed and the plaintiff's suit is decreed. 2. The undisputed facts of the case are that the defendant No.1 Deokoobai had executed the sale-deed (Ex.P-1), on 16-9-1969. The house in dispute is situated on Nazul Block No. 27, Plot Nos. 101/1 and 101/2, area 730 Sqr. ft., with an open land bearing Khasra No. 482, area 0.22 acre. The plaintiff had filed a suit against the defendant No.2 Anna rao for recovery of rent, which was dismissed and confirmed in appeal also. 3. The plaintiff's case, in brief, is that he purchased the suit property for a consideration of Rs. 3,000/- from defendant No.1 Deokoobai, vide sale deed dated 16-9-1969 (Ex. P-1). The same house was given on rent to the defendant No.2 Annarao, who was living with Deokoobai (defendant No.1). The defendants cooperated in the mutation proceedings. However, they failed to pay rent, in spite of service of notice on them, as also failed to deliver possession of the suit house to the plaintiff. 4. The defendants, however, pleaded that the plaintiff is carrying on business of money lending and, therefore, they obtained Rs. 3,000/- as a loan from him. The document was a nominal, sham and not to be acted upon. It was executed as a collateral security for loan. The trial Court dismissed the suit. However, the plaintiff's appeal was accepted by the first appellate Court. Hence, this second appeal. 5. This appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law – "(1) Whether the finding of the lower appellate Court with regard to the nature of the transaction dated 15-9-1969 being in disregard of material evidence and contrary to the dicta laid down in 1972 JLJ at page 632, is illegal and perverse'! Hence, this second appeal. 5. This appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law – "(1) Whether the finding of the lower appellate Court with regard to the nature of the transaction dated 15-9-1969 being in disregard of material evidence and contrary to the dicta laid down in 1972 JLJ at page 632, is illegal and perverse'! (2) Whether as a result of the mis-interpretation of the provisions of Sec. 58 (C) of the Transfer of Property Act, whereby the defendants were barred from proving the transaction to be one of loan, the judgment of the lower appellate-Court is vitiated'!" The third question of law has already been decided by the order of this Court dated 10-9-1990. 6. After hearing the counsel for parties at length, the case was remanded to the trial Court under Order 41, Rule 23 of the C.P.C., with the direction that the defendant be allowed to amend the pleading and, thereafter, parties be allowed to lead evidence on the points so raised. Now, the findings have been received hack by this Court. 7. Normally, the finding of fact of the first appellate Court is binding and is not to be disturbed at the second appellate stage- -unless it is shown that in reaching it, a mistake of law has been committed by the Additional District Judge. The Court is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence on record and if it refuses to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue and the error which arises is of a magnitude that it gives birth to a substantial question of law, the High Court is fully authorised to set aside the Now, therefore, it has to be seen as to whether the learned first appellate Court has misdirected itself as to application of law and as to whether it failed to consider material piece of evidence. 8. It is an undisputed fact that the suit house was purchased by the defendant-appellant on a price of Rs. 6,000/- vide registered sale-deed dated 6-2-1969. The same property, with an addition of plot, was sold to plaintiff-respondent on' a price of Rs. 3,000/-. It appears wholly unnatural as to why a person would sell the property for less than half of the price and, that too, after the period of seven months from the date of purchase. 6,000/- vide registered sale-deed dated 6-2-1969. The same property, with an addition of plot, was sold to plaintiff-respondent on' a price of Rs. 3,000/-. It appears wholly unnatural as to why a person would sell the property for less than half of the price and, that too, after the period of seven months from the date of purchase. Now, with the present trend of rising prices, the price of immovable property has also increased. It has never taken a downward trend. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the defendant No. 2 had participated in the mutation proceedings -- as is clear from paras 9, 10 and 13 of his (D. W. 5 Annarao) statement and, therefore, it will be presumed that he intended to transfer and, that is why, consent and connivance with respect to mutation. 10. The mutation of name is a fiscal proceeding. No title is conferred merely on the basis of mutation in the revenue records or in the records of municipality and, therefore, the connivance for the mutation, will not help the case of the plaintiff. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent, then, submitted that, once a document of sale has been executed, no oral evidence against such transaction, should be considered under Section 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. In this case, the defendants, by way of amendment, have pleaded that the sale, in question was a fictitious sale and it was executed to serve as a collateral security. It has further been pleaded that the plaintiff is a money-lender and, in order to avoid rigour of law with respect to money-lending, gets the sale- deeds executed and reconveys them after payment of loan so taken. The said plea clearly shows that the sale-deed was fictitious and no title in the property passed to the plaintiff in any manner under .the said sale-deed. In the opinion of this Court, in such a situation, the defendants are entitled to give evidence to show that the sale-deed was never agreed to be acted upon. If there was a stipulation between the parties that the contract would not be enforced or that it would not be acted upon ab initio, oral evidence in support of such a plea may be given. (Mandas v. Mallabai). 12. The defendants-appellants have filed a document (Ex. D-10-A), to show that the plaintiff-respondent purchased a house from one Mst. If there was a stipulation between the parties that the contract would not be enforced or that it would not be acted upon ab initio, oral evidence in support of such a plea may be given. (Mandas v. Mallabai). 12. The defendants-appellants have filed a document (Ex. D-10-A), to show that the plaintiff-respondent purchased a house from one Mst. Ginubai, on a price of Rs. 400/-, vide sale-deeddated•26-12-1967. The said property was reconveyed (vide Ex. D-11-A) to Mst. Ginubai on the same price, vide sale- deed dated 15-6-70. Similarly, the plaintiff Keshrichand purch3sed a house from one Narayan on a price of Rs. 500/- vide sale-deed dated 12-8-1969 (Ex. D-17-A). and reconveyed it to the same person on the same price-vide sale-deed dated 6-1-1971 (Ex. D-15-A). The plaintiff again purchased the property, i.e., the house, on a price of Rs. 500/- from one Marotirao, vide sale-deed dated 20.10.1970 (Ex. P-14-A) and reconveyed it to the same person on the same price, vide sale-deed dated 19.4.1971 (Ex. D-16-A). The plaintiff purchased in the name of his minor son Sharad Kumar, a house property from one Ganeshsingh, on a price of Rs. 2,000/-, vide sale-deed-dated 15-6-1970 (Ex-D-12-A), and reconveyed it as a guardian, to the same person, on the same price, vide sale-deed dated 19-6-1974 (Ex. D-9-A). The plaintiff purchased another house, from one Benisingh, on a price of Rs. 7,000/- vide sale-deed dated 10-6-1970 (Ex. D-13-A) and reconveyed the same property, to the same person, on the same price, vide sale-deed dated 26-7-1972 (Ex. D-7-A). The same property was sold by Benisingh to Seth Rameyandra Nema, on a price of Rs. 20,000/-, vide sale-deed dated 26-7-1972 (Ex. D-8-A). This shows that the plaintiff, in the normal course of his business, advances loans to various persons and gets the sale- deeds executed as a collateral security. It is surprising as to why a person should purchase the property in the regular course and sell it on the same price, to the same person; and, that too, after the lapse of sufficient period. With the present trend of rising prices, the price of immovable property has always been at an increase and, therefore, it can very well be assumed that these transactions are transactions of loan and the sale deeds were got executed by way of collateral security. 13. It is further evident from the documents, viz., Exs. With the present trend of rising prices, the price of immovable property has always been at an increase and, therefore, it can very well be assumed that these transactions are transactions of loan and the sale deeds were got executed by way of collateral security. 13. It is further evident from the documents, viz., Exs. D- 13-A, D-7-A and D-8-A, that Benisingh sold the same property to one Seth Rameyandra Nema (vide Ex. D-8-A), on a price of Rs. 20,000/-It was shown to have been sold to plaintiff Keshrichand, on a price of Rs. 7,000, vide sale-deed (Ex. D-13-A). This part of the evidence has not been taken into consideration by the learned first appellate Court. 14. Whenever a person is shown to be in regular course of dealing with the properties, purchases the properties and sells them almost on the same price, or adds to price earlier, by way of interest, or is shown to have purchased a property of higher value on a very low price, a presumption can be drawn that the transactions are loan transactions and the documents of sale are executed in his favour by way of collateral security for loan. No doubt, there may be cases where .A person may be a dealer of the property, but, in that case, the normal sale would be of denomination higher to the purchased price. He may be earning the profits out of it. 15. It, therefore, appears that the present plaintiff is a money- lender and he gets the documents of sale executed in his favour by way of collateral security for loan and the finding of the trial Judge in this respect appears to be proper. 16. Since the learned first appellate Court has failed to consider all the material evidence available in the case, this Court will be justified in reversing the finding of fact. It is, therefore, held that the finding of the first appellate Court with respect to transaction dated 16-9-1969 (wrongly mentioned as 15-9-1969 in the substantial question of law No. 1 is illegal and perverse. Learned first appellate Court was not justified in not accepting the oral evidence to show the nature of transaction. 17. As a result, the appeal is accepted. The judgment and decree of the first appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored. Learned first appellate Court was not justified in not accepting the oral evidence to show the nature of transaction. 17. As a result, the appeal is accepted. The judgment and decree of the first appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored. Consequently, the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs throughout. Counsel's fee Rs. 300/-, if certified.